Freedom's Philosopher

Stakeholder Theory of Corporate Management

2012-01-05T12:53:00.001-05:00

Stockholder and Stakeholder Theory are theoretical perspectives within the Nexus of Contracts framework. The Stockholder Theory of Corporate Management says that CEOs (leaders) “ought” to manage the nexus in the interest of stockholders. Stakeholder Theory argues that CEOS are agents for all of the stakeholders, and therefore, “ought to” manage the nexus in order to advance the interests of all stakeholders: stockholders, employees, consumers, suppliers, financiers, and the local community.

Stakeholder Theory provides a pretty big tent for a variety of different views. Many argue that corporations are not the private property of stockholders, but “public property” and that the goal role of the CEO is to increase cooperation and not competition. One implication of this emphasis on cooperation is the notion that the various stakeholders ought to be treated equally, and/or that it is wrong to deliberately allow the most advantaged stakeholders (especially stockholders) to exploit the least advantaged stakeholders. So the basic argument is that the various stakeholder groups come to the bargaining table with competitive disadvantages, and that Stockholder Theory often leads to the exploitation of employees, consumers, financiers, suppliers, and/or local communities. In other words Stakeholder Management implies a special moral obligation to advance the interests of the “least advantaged” (or the most vulnerable) stakeholders.

But the most important difference between the two theories is their respective views on the role that government ought to play in economic matters. If Stockholder Theory targets policy at increasing competition and personal liberty, Stakeholder Theory seeks to empower government to protect the least advantaged stakeholders; usually employees and consumers. Hence Stakeholder theorists tend to support policies such as a social safety net and/or a living wage. However, Stockholder Theorists prefer to address the needs of the "least advantaged" via individual philanthropy and/or voluntary associations rather than government programs.

Stockholder theorists tend to emphasize private property rights and personal liberty (Locke). On global issues, they embrace the mantra:”When in Rome do as the Romans do.” Stakeholder theorists focus more on public property, economic security of all stakeholders, and follow their manta: “When in Rome do what’s right.” As a general rule, European countries tend to embrace Stakeholder Theory, while the United States defends Stockholder Theory. But don’t jump to the conclusion that business ethics can be reduced to Stockholder Theory v. Stakeholder Theory. Both theories are more subtle than that; and of course, not all business ethicists buy into that whole "social contract" approach to doing ethics. I would argue that Nexus of Contracts Theory, Stockholder Theory and Stakeholder Theory all represent ideals. And that Realists observe that in the “Real World,” there are (in fact) neither “perfectly free markets” (perfect information, perfect freedom, and perfect competition) nor “perfectly functional governments." Ultimately, business ethics cannot avoid the basic issues in ethics: knowing v. doing, facts v. values, individual v. collective responsibility, legality v. morality, public v. private, and contextualism v. universalism. Don't let anyone tell you that ethics is easy. It's not!

Stockholder Theory of Corporate Management

2012-01-02T08:33:00.002-05:00

Recall from my previous blog that “Nexus of Contracts Theory” (NOC) says that a corporation is a nexus of contracts between various stakeholder groups: stockholders, employees, consumers, financiers, sub-contractors, and the local community. Business leadership ethics, therefore, is about how to manage that nexus. Within the contractual constraints of the NOC framework there are two competing theories that offer different strategies for dealing with the inevitable stakeholder conflicts that arise: stockholder theory and stakeholder theory.

Now an agent is a person possessing technical knowledge that is paid by someone else to serve their interests. Stockholder Theory states that the CEO is an agent hired by stockholders (or owners), and therefore he/she is legally and morally obligated to serve their interests. Corporations are money machines owned by the stockholders (not persons) and the CEO is hired to manage that nexus. In order for the CEO to make money for the stockholders, he/she must make decisions that affect all stakeholder groups. Stockholder theorists, therefore, argue that the “free market” is simply a system of distribution based the non-coercive, voluntary choices made by the various stakeholders. One of the criticisms of Stockholder Theory is that it seems to justify the unlimited exploitation of other stakeholders for the benefit of the stockholders. However, CEOs cannot simply ignore the interests of the other stakeholders. Otherwise, they’ll withdraw from the nexus: employees will quit, consumers will buy from a competitor, financiers will not lend them money etc. For example, if the CEO offers most workers $8.00 in hourly wages, and if prospective employees can freely accept or reject that offer, then it’s a moral transaction. However, a “good CEO” (that makes money for the stockholders) will, out of necessity, serve the interests of the other stakeholders, within the constraints of the free market. Hence, if a "good CEO" cannot hire enough workers at $8.00 an hour, then he/she will try $8.25. If there are many willing workers available, the CEO will offer $7.75. The same market-based bargaining will be applied in dealing with the other stakeholder groups.

What about business ethics? Or better yet…whose moral values is a "good CEO" morally obligated to uphold? Most stockholder theorists are moral relativists, and therefore, argue that the CEO must decide whose moral values ought to guide his/her decisions. Since the stockholders own the company they can collectively agree to operate based on a set of shared moral values. If the CEO disagrees with those values he/she can refuse to take the job or resign. And of course, any corporate morality must be clearly disclosed to the other stakeholders. If some stockholders disagree with those expressed values they can sell their stocks, employees can quit, financiers can refuse to loan money etc. But then again, very large corporations have thousands of stockholders whom may not share the same moral values. That’s why the stockholders appoint or elect their own agent(s), the Board of Trustees. However, if the CEO chooses to “manage” based on his/her personal morality, which is in conflict with the stockholders values, the Board can fire the CEO. Unfortunately, sometimes the CEO and/or the Board do not act as reliable agents. In those cases, if the stockholders find out, they can either hire new agents, or sell their stock. Although Stockholder Theorists tend toward moral relativism, they are legal objectivists, in the sense that they require corporate leaders to abide by the laws where they are doing business. So when competing in global markets where the laws vary between nations, Stockholder Theorists uphold the mantra: “When in Rome, do as the Romans do.”

Finally, any theory of the modern corporation must also address the political question: “What role should government play in managing the nexus?” Within the Stockholder Model, there’s a considerable disagreement over what role the government ought to play in managing the nexus. Anarcho-capitalists argue that all government violates the non-aggression axiom, and therefore all government intervention in the market is morally unjustified. Minarchists, however, argue that the primary purpose of government is to protect the personal and property rights of individuals. Thus, at a bare minimum government must monitor and enforce laws against theft, fraud, and breech of contract. However, all stakeholders possess “negative rights” and therefore, as bargainers they are guaranteed the equal right to bargain, but there can be no governmentally enforced guarantee that any one stakeholder group will emerge victorious as a result of the competitive process. According to ST, government ought to be “impartial” or “neutral” in the competitive bargaining process, but should not pick winners and losers. Again, the primary purpose of government is to enforce contracts between rationally self-interested bargainers and promote free market competition. Stockholder Theorists argue that over the long run, the free market approach to corporate management unintentionally leads to a moral nexus.

Libertarians generally defend various versions of the Stockholder Theory of corporate management. My next blog will cover Stakeholder Theory, the other approach to corporate management.

What is a Corporation?

2012-01-01T09:22:00.002-05:00

What is the most influential social institution in the Western world? Now by “influential” I don’t mean just “positive influence” but also “negative influence.” Well, let’s look at some of the candidates. Given the cultural forces that are currently at work here in the United States, most of you would say either religion or government. Both are pretty good candidates. But let’s look a bit closer. Who produced the food that you ate this morning? Who sold it to you? Who loaned you the money to go to college? Who built your computer? Who sold it to you? Who printed your books? Who sold them to you? Who brewed the beer that you drank last Saturday night, and who sold it to you? Who produced your cigarettes and who sold them to you? Who owns the Reds and the Bengals? Who built your home? Who financed it? Get the point? For better or worse, I would argue that corporations are the most influential social institutions in the Western world, especially in the United States. But what is a corporation? The answer to any question requires a theory. Therefore, we need a “theory of the modern corporation.”

Orthodoxy in business management and ethics often cites “Nexus-of-Contracts Theory.” Rooted in in social contract theory, it argues that the firm, or the modern corporation, is a complex adaptive system comprised of definable subsystems, called stakeholders. A stakeholder is any individual or group of individuals that either benefits of suffers as a result of the actions of that corporation. Therefore, the modern corporation is essentially a set of contracts or agreements between various stakeholder groups. The corporate stakeholder groups, engaged in this bargaining process typically include: stockholders, employees, consumers, suppliers, financiers, and local communities. The interests of these various groups are often represented by “agents.”

Now in order for the Nexus-of Contracts Theory to be useful it must be both descriptive and prescriptive; that is, it must describe how the classes of stakeholders (stockholders, consumers, managers, employees, consumers etc.) bargain in the real world, AND prescribe how those stakeholders ought to bargain. It must also describe and prescribe the role that leaders ought to play in this process. Hence, any theory of the modern corporation must answer three questions:

1. Whose ends (rights or interests) are in fact served by corporate leaders? (E.g.: stockholders, consumers, employees, financiers, suppliers, local communities, nations, humanity etc.) AND, whose ends (rights or interests) ought to be served by corporate leaders?

2. By what means can leaders in fact employ in order to efficiently realize these stated ends (rights or interests) AND, what means can managers morally realize these stated ends.

3. What role does government in fact play in the realization of these various ends? AND, what role ought government (local, state, federal, international) play in this process?

Despite the idealistic ruminations of various “win-win” strategists, in the real world, what’s “good” for one group of stakeholders (stockholders, employees, consumers, etc) is not necessarily “good” for the other stakeholders. If you raise the pay of employees, generally, either the consumers pay higher prices, and/or the stockholders earn less. And, what’s “good” for any given society may or may not be “good” for individual industries or corporations. And, what’s “good” for United States may or may not be “good” for the rest of the world. And what’s “good” for present stakeholders, may not be good for future stakeholders. Hence, corporations are both cooperative and competitive.

Within the NOC framework, a “good leader,” is a leader that can reconcile the often conflicting interests of the various stakeholder groups. NOC scholars have identified two alternative sub-theories of corporate leadership.

Stockholder Theory: Leaders are morally and legally obligated to serve as agents of the stockholders, and advance their interests regardless of how those decisions might affect the other stakeholders.

Stakeholder Theory: Leaders are morally and legally obligated to serve as agents of all stakeholder groups, and try to advance all of these interests collectively and impartially.

The next two blogs will discuss these two theories.

Responsibility

2011-12-26T09:16:00.000-05:00

The question of "responsibility" plays a central role in retribution and is central to our feelings and thought about justice. There are two different forms: legal responsibility and moral responsibility.

Legal responsibility is not necessarily identical to moral responsibility. Not everything that is “legal” is “moral,” and not everything that is moral is legal. The basic difference between legality and morality lies in the distinction between “laws” and “rules” and how each are monitored and enforced. Laws are monitored and enforced via the coercive power of the state. If you break a law and get caught, you can get punished by a government. In the Western world, governments “sanction” law breakers via fines, incarceration, and sometimes via death (United States). Some non-Western countries whip or beat law breakers. If you break a moral rule, members of the community will praise you or blame you. Most governments limit what groups can do to enforce morality. In some countries, like Saudi Arabia, almost everything that is immoral is also illegal.

Moral responsibility involves the basic question of what kinds of persons are “fair” targets for moral praise and moral blame. Simply put, we praise or reward persons that do good things, and we blame persons that do bad things. But what is it about the nature of persons that justifies holding them responsible for their behavior? And, why do we, in fact, hold each other morally responsible for our actions? Well, at least in the Western moral tradition we assess responsibility based on two main criteria: rationality and free will.

We praise and blame persons that are capable of understanding and applying moral rules and reasoning about consequences before they act. The assessment of degrees of rationality usually involves assessing mental processes such as logical reasoning, forethought, learning from experience, processing information etc. Thus, mind or mentality is a necessary condition for the assessment of moral responsibility, but not a sufficient condition. Not all persons that possess mentality are morally responsible. We do not hold young children responsible for their behavior. But as they get older we tend to hold them more responsible. Nor do we hold persons that have a "cognitive or defect" responsible for their actions. And, obviously we do not always hold other persons responsible for acts born out of ignorance of the rules or the consequences. We generally do not hold animals morally responsible for their good or bad behavior, although we may praise or blame them in order to encourage or discourage future behaviors.

We also praise and blame responsible persons for acts of free will; that is, acts that they are capable of controlling. Basically, this means that we do not praise or blame persons for acts that are coerced by other persons or forced by internal or external circumstances. Personal coercion generally involves the use of personal threats and enticements enforced by others. Both threats and enticements come in various degrees. Major threat: "Rob that bank or I'll kill your family!" Minor threat: "Rob that bank or I'll take your shoes!" Major enticement: "Rob that bank and I'll give you 10 million dollars!" Minor enticement: "Rob that bank and I'll give you one dollar." Generally speaking, we hold moral agents responsible for bad acts that were performed in exchange for enticements and we do not usually praise people that do good things in exchange for major enticements. In other words, responsible persons ought to be able to resist at least some low-level threats and/or enticements. Philosophers argue over whether and/or to what degree threats and enticements undermine free will, and whether the concept of free will even makes sense.

As a general rule, we do not praise or blame others for good or bad consequences that are brought on by chance, or moral luck. If I accidentally run into a fleeing bank robber, I probably will not be praised as a hero. Unless, I could convince the media that I knew he was a fleeing bank robber and that I deliberately tackled him. If I accidentally killed that robber, I might even be held legally responsible and blamed for his death. More on that later.

Not only do we hold persons morally responsible for their actions, we also hold groups of individuals legally and morally responsible for their actions. But collective responsibility is much more difficult to assess. Here’s why. First of all, our individual association with groups is not always framed by rationality or free will. Sometimes we are coerced into associating with others, and sometimes we associate ourselves with groups without really knowing everything that they do. Sometimes we associate ourselves with groups based on tradition alone. Most of us remain associated with the same religious group that we grew up with.

Voluntary associations are those groups that we rationally and freely choose to associate. These associations are often organized hierarchies that involve leaders and followers. Generally speaking, we hold both leaders and followers morally responsible for their actions. But the responsibility of followers is contingent upon what they knew beforehand and the presence of coercive influences. When we really know exactly what an organization does and when we freely choose to follow its leaders, we are held individually responsible for what that organization does. Hence, responsibility is diminished commensurate to both information and freedom. Unfortunately, in the real world followers do not always possess perfect knowledge or perfect freedom.

Moreover, hierarchies often delegate responsibility, which means that leaders at the top of an organization may not always know what lower level leaders are doing and sometimes upper level leaders employ coercive force on lower level leaders. For example, many of the Nazi doctors claimed that they tortured their patients because they would have been killed if they disobeyed orders.

Corporate responsibility is especially convoluted. Who is ultimately responsible for good and bad corporate behavior? Should we hold the CEO or the Board of Trustees of a multi-national corporation responsible for everything that takes place within that corporation? Should the leaders get paid for what followers produce? Should leaders be held responsible for immoral and/or illegal behavior of followers? In short, this notion of collective (or shared) responsibility turns out to be very complex.

Another source of complexity has to do with the dynamics of how human beings behave in groups. Historically, philosophers have identified two sources of determinism that limit moral responsibility” biology and social structure. Biological determinists argue that at least some human behavior is “natural,” or caused by our brains and genes. Therefore, biological determinists argue that at least some human behavior lies outside of the realm of rationality and free will and that praise and/or blame cannot alter those behaviors.

So, how does social structure affect human rationality and free will, and to what degree does "social causation" diminish individual and/or collective responsibility? This question raises a host of other questions concerning the nature and extent of circumstantial coercion, the malleability of human nature, and the "nature v. nurture controversy." To what degree are human beings conditioned by their social environment and their genetic makeup? There are two wrong answers:

1. Human behavior is infinitely malleable via manipulation of the social environment (social determinism). Therefore individual responsibility is impossible.

2. Human behavior is not malleable at all, but determined by our social environment and biology (genetic determinism). Therefore, the assessment of individual responsibility is impossible.

If the truth lies somewhere between these extremes, then how do we (in fact) go about assessing personal and collective moral responsibility in our everyday lives? How should we?

Now the relationship between legality and morality is itself subject to a long line of philosophical inquiry. Historically, many philosophers have argued that morality is timelessly universal and “objective” and that legality is relative to time and place. Other philosophers have argued that universal morality always trumps legality. Some say that both morality and legality are temporally and culturally relative. Therefore, “When in Rome do as the Romans do.”

Metaphysical Academic Freedom

2011-12-18T11:10:00.000-05:00

Okay...so I copped out on my last blog entry on academic freedom. If you all insist, I'll take a crack at the ever-elusive concept of "metaphysical academic freedom." To me, metaphysical academic freedom generally refers to either the descriptive (factual) capacity for human to "freely" produce a theory and the prescriptive (normative) conditions that might be involved. Descriptive academic freedom would entail addressing the larger problems of biological and cultural determinism. Prescriptive academic freedom might involve the rights and duties that would undergird that "freedom of inquiry." Answers to academic questions are called theories (or conjectures) that either explain, predict, or control phenomena. So it's fair to ask two questions: "To what extent do I have a right to propose theories?" And, "To what extent do I have a right to propose theories to an academic community?"

First of all, what do we mean by a right to propose a theory? There are two kinds of rights: positive rights and negative rights. If I claim a positive right to propose a theory, then someone else has a duty to assist me. If I have a negative right, that means that my right is implies the duty of non-interference by others and does not necessarily mean that others have a duty to assist me or enable me to publish my theory. That is: "Ron you have a right to publish that book, I won't interfere with that! But I don't have a duty to read it, and I don't have a duty to publish it in my journal. How about a case study?

Ron W. is going up for promotion next year and believes that he needs one more publication. So he surfs the Internet and finds a journal titled the Journal of Arcane and Useless Philosophy, which has an acceptance rate of 98.2% and a circulation of 73 subscribers. It is published by the Society for Arcane and Useless Philosophy, which has a membership of 73. Ron thinks to himself: "Ah...the perfect home for my most recent scholarly essay: "Does Academic Freedom Imply Positive or Negative Rights?" He sends the essay to the editor, who then sends it to two "referees," who read it six months later and submit their respective reviews. Reader A loves it, and offers three minor revisions. Reader B hates it and recommends that it be rejected. The editor, however, notes that only three essays were submitted to the journal in the last three months (all were accepted) and that Volume 11 Number 16 needs one more article. So he decides to publish Ron's essay. As a result, Ron was promoted to full professor. Since then, three scholars read that article (one of them finished it!), the Society for Arcane Philosophy has disbanded, and their journal discontinued. However, that article still appears prominently on Ron's curriculum vitae. Question: Does "academic freedom" include a scholar's right to publish research in journals that no one reads? Do academic institutions have a right or a duty to read what their faculty publish? And, if so who and how much should that reader get paid? So much for metaphysical academic freedom.

Academic Freedom

2011-12-17T11:10:00.001-05:00

A friend asked me to articulate my views on "Academic Freedom" from a libertarian perspective. As a philosopher, my usual strategy is to take a close look at the key concepts. In this case, let's look at the meaning(s) of "academic" and "freedom."

The term "academic" describes a human activity, a profession, and an industry. It also implies a unique set of instutional associations: colleges, universities, departments, publishing companies, professional organizations etc. However, the activity is nothing more than the process of human inquiry, or the distinctly human capacity to ask questions and propose answers between individuals, groups, and generations. I would also argue that academic inquiry (or inquiry conducted within an academic institutional structure) involves the epistemic pursuit of either Descriptive Truth (is) or Prescriptive Value (ought).

The concept of "freedom" within the context of academic inquiry turns out to be enormously complex and therefore wide-open to metaphysical interpretation. For us libertarians, freedom is a political concept that refers to the relationship between individuals and governments. Some of us take on the challenge of addressing "metaphysical freedom," or "freedom of the will," but most of us prefer to focus on freedom as the absence of coercion by government. Minarchist libertarians seek to limit the use of coercive power of governments to tax citizens and limit the use of tax money to the performance of specific functions, such as a: police force, judiciary, a military, and perhaps the provision of a very basic social safety net. Anarcho-capitalist libertarians seek to eliminate all involuntary forms of taxation and all coercive government.

So in light of the above, what can I say about "academic freedom?" For a minarchist like myself, I would say that we need to distinguish between public and private colleges and universities. Most of us argue the publically funded educational institutions violate the basic tenets of minarchy, and that all educational institutions ought to be private institutions. So I really can't say much about what academic freedom might mean in the context of a public college or university. But I can say something about what it might mean within a private institution.

Education is an industry. It involves the interaction of both buyers and sellers, and employers and employees. Academic freedom in private institutions is nothing more than what's mutually agreed upon within a contract. When you agree to accept employment in a private college the limits of your academic freedom are contained within that contract. If you do not accept those limits, then you have the freedom to decline the job offer. Of course, if you willingly sign that contract then your academic freedom does not include the freedom to violate the conditions of that contract. Unfortunately, as an employer the institution does have the "academic freedom" to unilaterally alter that contract without your consent, but you also have the academic freedom to either abide by that contract or resign (freedom to exit). Or, perhaps you might find solace in the "black market" and conceal or disguise your activities.

Over the years, academic institutions have adopted a variety of traditions intended to increase job security for faculty and expand the concept of academic freedom. The original idea behind tenure was to protect faculty from revolving administrations that constantly seek to revise the terms of employment of faculty, especially salary, working conditions, and academic freedom. Now we libertarians can argue over whether tenure ought to be included within any academic setting, especially over the cost/benefit ratios. But we are reluctant to argue about academic freedom outside of that contractual framework.

So what can I say about my own academic freedom within a Roman Catholic college? Well, obviously I cannot expect the college to grant me the freedom to publish articles with titles like: "The Virtues of Abortion" or "Why God does Not Exist." If I did, it would violate the terms of my contract and I'll get fired, or at least get reprimanded by my superiors. But since, I'm not interested in "inquiring" into the virtues of abortion or defending atheism, I don't regard it as a limit on my metaphysical academic freedom. However, I do disagree with the church's legal strategy for dealing with abortion and I am more of a pantheist than a theist. Now for the "million dollar question?" How did a libertarian philosopher that publishes regularly in journals like Independent Review survive for 25 years at a Roman Catholic college? The answer is simple. Roman Catholic colleges are, in fact, among the last bastions of metaphysical academic freedom in the United States. While it is true that some are more socially conservative than others, for the most part we enjoy much more freedom than other public or private institutions. I do have a few limits, but overall, my college values diverse points of view. In fact, we have not only a handful of outspoken libertarians like myself on the faculty and staff, but also a large number of non-Catholics and atheists. Let me add that all of the libertarians that I know on the MSJ faculty also have tenure. And at least one libertarian on the maintenance staff stops by office every morning to talk politics. But admittedly we're grossly outnumbered by welfare liberals.

The Super-Failure: Why the Super-Committee Failed

2011-11-23T10:35:00.000-05:00

I don't usually blog on national political news, but this one is hard to resist! As we all know, the so-called "Super- Committee" failed to reach a consensus on budget cuts and revenue. Although, the blogosphere is teeming with complex post-mortem explanations as to why it failed, I have a much simpler explanation. They were asked to "cut the budget" and/or "enhance revenue." What they really needed to do is reform wasteful programs and departments within that budget and reform the tax code.

Congress has a moral and political responsibility to make sure that tax dollars are spent as efficiently as possible. However, nearly every government program and department is riddled with well-documented wasteful spending. By far the worst budget-busters are the departments of Defense and Homeland Security. The "visible waste" in these bloated, unsupervised bureaucracies is legendary, while the "invisible waste" is hidden away in budgetary "black holes," where little is known and budgets are fictional. There's no telling how many investigations have been conducted by both governmental and non-governmental watchdog groups: costly research that invariably disappears into other well known "black hole:" the "congressional archives." Ironically, some of the best unread research is conducted by Congressional Budget Office. In short, everyone agrees that these programs and departments need reform, and there's plenty of information out there prescribing what needs to be done. The same can be said for Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security. But simply cutting the budgets of inefficient, bureacracies will only make those programs less efficient and more wasteful.

What about revenue enhancement? Again, everyone in Congress knows that our tax system has become a bastion of unfairness and incomprehensibility. It's so arcane and complex that most Americans employ third parties to file their taxes. It's even incomprehensible to the IRS! The astronomical error rate for the chronically understaffed, under-brained IRS has been documented many times over, in 6,000 page reports. Unfortunately, those reports are ultimately filed away in the Congressional Archives, or well hidden from Internet search engines, never to be seen again. Moreover, everyone knows that the tax code needs to be reformed from top to bottom, but that's not even on the political horizon. Herman Cain's feeble-minded 9-9-9 tax proposal clearly illustrates this tendency to ignore well-known facts.

So, if Congress already has access to the information necessary to reform and/or eliminate wasteful spending, why don't they do it? That's a good question. Here's my theory. First of all, individual congressmen rarely if ever read anything substantive. Why not? First of all, there's so much information, misinformation, and disinformation manufactured by government agencies that it's impossible for any one human to read even a small portion of it. That's why individual lawmakers hire an army of congressional staffers to read it and summarize it. Now, there's no guarantee that staff members are themselves competent and/or actually read and comprehend those 6,000 page reports. Nevertheless, staffers pass on those summaries to illiterate congressmen, who may (or may not) read them.

So why is it that politicians don't read and act on this vast body of well-documented information? Well, it's because they are politicians and therefore spend most of their time, energy, and resources running for re-election. Watch C-Span and marvel at the quasi-articulate speeches delivered before an empty rooms! But then again, when they do show up for work, they rarely vote on anything. Check out what congress has actually accomplished this year! Your jaw will drop!

So why did the super-committee fail? Well, for starters they were pursuing the wrong goal. Why pay a group of lawyers to argue endlessly over whether to cut budget items and/or increase revenue under the guise of half-baked political and economic theories? They should have been actually fixing and/or cutting inefficient programs and departments and the reforming the tax code. My modest solution? I think we need a whole new batch of politicians with a strong work ethic; statesmen that read more, attend more, and simply act more. I would also argue that we have WAY too many lawyers in Congress that stay in office WAY too long. Let's insist that the forthcoming 2012 Congress actually read, attend, and act upon what's already known. In sum, we Americans have been WAY too tolerant of incompetent lawmakers. Next November, I propose that we vote out every single incumbant in the House and Senate, and whenever possible vote for third party candidates. In short, let's fix the system ourselves.

Why Read Machiavelli's THE PRINCE?

2011-11-09T06:06:00.000-05:00

Over the years non-philosophers done a pretty effective job of disparaging the philosophical writings of Nicolo Machiavelli's writings. Leadership scholars simply dismiss his works under the rubric of "bad leadership." Among psychologists the term "Machiavellian intelligence" refers to the human (and Chimpanzee) propensity for deception. In fact, the adjective itself, "Machiavellian," has become synonymous with deception and immorality. Philosophers, political scientists, and scholars that have actually read (and understand) his seminal works: The Prince, Discourses on Livy, and The Art of War have a much more nuanced assessment.

As you read The Prince it's important to understand Machiavelli's philosophical moorings. First and foremost, Machiavelli is a descriptive empiricist. Therefore, in contrast to the a priori, deductive, rational epistemology employed by Plato in The Republic, Machiavelli believes that human knowledge can only be ascertained via inductive observation of the world, or as Plato would say "in the cave." In other words, if you want to know how to organize a group of human beings, Machiavelli suggests that the best way to begin that process is to uncover the descriptive facts: How are sucessful organizations organized?

Second, Machiavelli is a prescriptive utilitarian; that is, he (like Plato) believes that a good organization produces more happiness than unhappiness. Like Plato, Machiavelli believed that political leadership is especially important and that "bad leaders" destroy themselves and their organizations and "good leaders" preserve themselves and their organization. Based on historical evidence, Machiavelli described how thoroughout the course of human history, leaders and followers tend to behave within certain kinds of organizational contexts. At the beginning of The Prince he identifies two different organizational contexts: republics (shared governance) and principalities (monarchy). The Prince explores the "nature" of principalities. So as you read The Prince keep in mind that he is not "prescribing" monarchy as the best way to organizise human beings, he's only "describing" the kind of behavior that you'll observe in principalities. Of course, some principalities survive for a long time, while others have suffer extinction.

Now it's important to emphasize that both Plato and Machiavelli are both utilitarians of sorts, and therefore agree that the primary value of collective life is that it brings about more happiness than unhappiness. Philosophers call this flourishment. Therefore, Plato and Machiavelli that are trying identify the underlying political arrangements that increase happiness and decrease unhappiness. Recall that in The Republic Plato attempted to prove that tyrants are unhappy and the organizations that they head are also unhappy. Well, what Machiavelli is going to argue in The Prince is exactly what Thrasymachus would have argued in The Republic if he had chosen to remain engaged in the dialectic with Socrates. In other words, Machiavelli is going to do philosophy within "the cave," in a world where humans actually possess the equivalent of "Gyges Ring."

One of Machiavelli's of The Prince is the idea that sometimes leaders have to make decisions where none of anticipated outcomes are ideal. In short sometimes leaders must get their hands dirty; that is "choose between lesser evils." Philosophers call this the "ethics of dirty hands." Political leadership often takes place within this context, however you might argue that other leadership contexts also entail getting your hands dirty. Machiavelli argued that virtue-based ethics in the Greek and Judeo-Christian traditions cannot provide moral guidance in these contexts and that "virtuous leaders" (in the Platonic sense) are deposed by followers and/or conquered by other nations. The question for you is as follows: "Are there times when leaders MUST "enter into evil" in order to avoid catastrophic consequences? If so, does this apply to other leadership contexts?"

African Development

2011-11-06T08:33:00.000-05:00

A Facebook friend of mine from Ghana asked me what I thought about "African Development." That's a tough question...given the fact that I don't know very much about Africa or the various nation states that currently dominate political discussions. But like most philosophers, I won't let my ignorance of the facts stand in the way of participating in that discussion. That's because there are philosophical issues that I can help sort out. The following is my edited and expanded response.

First, what do you mean by "African development?" It could mean many things. Philosophically, the concept of development signifies progress toward a desirable goal via some means. So to talk "development" we need to identify both a GOAL and the MEANS of achieving that goal. Also, we need to clarify what you mean by "Africa." Are you referring to the entire continent of Africa as a whole or the nation-state of Ghana? There are also "long-term goals" and "short-term goals" and various means of achieving both. Some "goals" are realistic (means are known and can be implimented) and others are idealistic (imaginable but impossible to realize). Of course, we don't always KNOW with certainty which goals are "realistic" and what's "idealistic." Right now, it's hard to set long-term or short-term development goals for Africa as a whole because there's very little social, cultural, or political unity. Even national identity in many African countries are currently in a flux. Do you envision African unity, where all the various tribes, religions, and nation states "cooperate" toward a specific ENDS? If so, by what means MEANS to you plan to to impliment in bringing about that end?

Having said all that, let's return to the original question: "What do you mean by African development?" I assume that you are referring to "economic development." Does your vision for African economic development refer to the ability of Africa to operate (survive or thrive?) independent of the rest of the world (autonomy and self-sufficiency); or, do you want Africa to develop the capacity to participate in the global economy? Both goals have implications for one's vision of the future of African identity. If economic autonomy and self-sufficiency are your long term goals, then what social, cultural, and political traditions do you embrace, and how do you instill those values? How do you reject the old values? In short, how does economic development relate to sociopolitical development?

Now if your ultimate goal is for Africa to participate in a global economy, you'll have to promote social, cultural, and political traditions that are not hostile to participation in global trade. First of all, Africa would have to embrace rule of law; that is Africans will have to obey rules (that apply to everyone) not what leaders say. Africans would have reject violence, theft, fraud and breach of contract. If Africa is unable or unwilling to monitor and enforce these basic moral rules, then other nations will not willingly trade with Africa. If you want Africa to be "autonomous and self-sustaining" those same moral and legal rules would have to be enforced. In fact, I would argue that any nation on earth (at any time or any place) that wants to "develop" will have to follow these rules.

I wish I could say that the United States provides a useful role model, but our society has fallen far short of the "ideal." In fact, much of the economic recession can be attributed to our own failure to uphold these values. So...back again to your original question. What is your vision for Africa 20 years from now? Do you seek a unified Africa (one single sociopolitical entity), or many different competing and cooperating states (like the US and European Union)? Do you want the everyday lives of future Africans to revolve around work, religion, family? Do you want Africans to own a lot of stuff (homes, automobiles, airports, trains, Chinese food, McDonalds food, Western clothes, Western music, Western art etc.)? Or, would you rather revive lost traditions, such as tribal association or subsistence agriculture? What do you think? What is your long-term vision for Africa and how might that vision be realized? What must you do in the sort-term to realize this goal?

Plato's, REPUBLIC: In defense of the "A Priori Method"

2011-10-28T08:20:00.001-04:00

Recall that Peirce identified four methods for the fixation of belief: tenacity, authority, a priori, and science. Plato is the undisputed king of the a priori method, therefore it's worth looking into the epistemological assumptions that underlie Plato's ideal state. As you dive into "Book 1" of the Republic, it becomes immediately evident that Socrates is playing an active role in guiding the conversation toward a conclusion. Plato called this process of "questioning and answering" the dialectic, which is known today as the basis of all human inquiry. In the early going, the main question to be addressed is clearly identified: "What is justice?" Of course, the underlying assumption is that it is possible to "know" what justice "really is" and whether this knowledge has some kind of a foundation, and whether this knowledge is accessible to everyone. Throughout history, philosophers have defended one of two alternative "foundations" for human knowledge: the empirical foundation and the rational foundation. Empiricist philosophers anchor human knowledge in the observation of either: an exterior material world that resides "outside" of the human mind; or, an interior world of ideas that lies "inside" the human mind. Today, most philosophers and scientists are empiricists in the materialist tradition. Since Plato, rationalism has been associated with with the reality of this internal world of a priori ideas.

Plato grounded his rational foundation in a priori knowledge; that is, knowledge that exists "before human experience." In other words, Plato believed that the human mind comes front-loaded with a body of knowledge. Plato and subsequent rationalists tend to identify "real knowledge" with timeless universality. However, according to Plato, if you want to gain access to this vast body of timelessly, universal Truth you must possess both innate intelligence (nature) and many years of training and education (nurture). Plato argued that stable political regimes must have leaders that possess timelessly universal knowledge. Thus political science is mostly about identifying naturally intelligent leaders and educating them. One of the necessary conditions for entering the a priori world is the natural ability to learn mathematics and geometry. Therefore, before any student could enroll in Plato's school, "The Academy," they had to know mathematics and geometry.

What's so special about mathematics and geometry? Well, they both provide access to timelessly, universal truth; that is, 7+5=12 always was and always will be true...everywhere in the universe! Therefore, knowledge of mathematics and geometry provides students with an initial glimpse into this internal world of a priori truth. Now...back to justice! If you want to answer the question "What is justice and how do you come to know it?" There are two possibilities. You can "look out" at instances of justice in the material world, or you can "look in" at the idea of justice. Obviously, if you look at material world, you'll probably find more "injustice" than "justice," therefore that's not a very promising strategy. Therefore, Socrates chooses to explore the ideas of "justice" and "injustice." Socrates argues that the concepts of "justice" and "injustice" possess a timelessly, universal form that transcends all human languages. Unfortunately, not all of us are capable of knowing the difference between justice and injustice, therefore we must acknowledge (and trust) the authority of those naturally gifted, well-trained experts. So in an ideal political regime, authority must be based on the possession of privileged, timelessly universal knowledge that only a few can possess. Followers must be taught to submit to the authority of this naturally gifted, carefully groomed "class" of "philosopher kings."

Now in Book 1, Thrasymachus argues that "justice is in the interest of the stronger." Most of his arguments, and Glaucon's and Adeimantus' subsequent arguments are based mostly on empirical observation of how powerful humans, in fact, behave in the "material world." But does the apparent fact that the unjust tend to fare better than the unjust, necessarily imply that injustice is preferable to injustice? Interestingly, over the next nine books, Plato attempts to prove that the unjust do not, in fact, fare better than the rest of us. So...by now you're you're probably wondering, "What is justice?" Well, you'll have to read the rest of the book. As you read, pay close attention to "Gyges Ring" and the "Allegory of the Metals" (gold, silver, and bronze).

Plato's, REPUBLIC: Introductory Remarks

2011-10-26T09:30:00.000-04:00

For the next few weeks I'll be using the Freedom's Philosopher blog to post supplemental reading for my philosophy courses. The first few entries will be on Plato's Republic.

Although there is very little agreement among contemporary philosophers...about anything! I suspect that most of us agree the Plato's Republic is the greatest and most important work in all of Western Philosophy. It has, without a doubt, exerted a profound influence on the subsequent development of both Western philosophy and political science. It's certainly one of those timelessly universal classics. At times, you'll get the sense that Plato is writing directly to those of us living in the twenty-first century. Although it was written in 375 B.C., I want you to read the Republic as if it were written in 2011. What kinds of questions does Plato ask? What are his answers? Are these questions and answers relevant today? Can we learn anything from this ancient Greek philosopher?

Well...who was Plato? Actually, we know a lot about him. There are many references to Plato made by ancient philosophers, historians, and other writers. Plato also left behind and astonishing body of philosophical work, about 35 dialogues that address a wide variety philosophical questions. In these dialogues, Socrates is the main character. We also know that Socrates was, in fact, the "teacher" of Plato and his brothers Adeimantus and Glaucon and that Socrates, apparently, never wrote anything. Therefore, most of what we know about him and his philosophy is from other sources. One might question whether Plato's dialogues accurately document Socrates' thought, or wheter Plato merely used Socrates as the main character in his own dialogues to articulate his own views. I'm not particularly interested in that question.

I assume that Plato was profoundly influenced by not only Socrates, but also by other historical forces. For example, we know that the dialogue depicts a fictional conversation that took place between 431 and 411. We know that Plato was deeply influenced by the Pelopponesian War (431-404) between the city-states (and empires) of Athens and Sparta. Therefore, we know that most of Plato's political thought responds to the political arrangements of those warring city states: Athens was a Democracy, Sparta was an Oligarchy. We know that Socrates served honorably in that war, and that although he was a stone mason by trade, he spent most of his time teaching philosophy to the "youth of Athens" (young men). Finally, we also know that Socrates was put to death in 399 by the Athenian government, for "corrupting the youth of Athens" and "worshipping false Gods" and that Plato wrote a series of dialogues that depict the trial and death of his teacher. (Apology, Crito, and Phaedo)

The over-riding theme of the Republic is established in the Book 1, where Socrates is invited to a party, where the conversation eventually converges on the question: "What is justice?" After Socrates effectively dismisses several incomplete theories, Thrasymachus (a local sophist) argued that justice is "nothing more than the interest of the stronger." Although, Socrates initially presented Thrasymachus with several semi-plausible counter-arguments, Thrasymachus left the discussion rather abruptly, and Plato's brothers took over the argument. Throughout the next nine books, Socrates attempts to convince Glaucon and Adeimantus that Thrasymachus' views is wrong. As you read the Republic be aware of the following elements: "Justice is in the interest of the stronger," Gyges Ring, The Divided Line and the Allegory of the Sun (Plato's theory of knowledge), the Noble Lie (gold, silver, bronze), three part division of the soul and the state, tyranny, democracy, oligarchy, timocracy, and aristocracy, and the Myth of Er. Our class discussions will focus on these elements. My next blog will outline Plato's theory of knowledge and how it relates to the refutation of Thrasymachus.

"Is Bigger Really Better?" Part 2

2011-10-23T12:40:00.000-04:00

As I pointed out in my last blog entry, we now live in a world dominated by large, complex, impersonal, and ineffective social institutions: corporations, schools, hospitals, and a variety of governmental entities. At the moment we're just now beginning to realize that governmental entities such as Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid are in dire need of reform. The U.S. military has been on a functional losing streak here recently, despite the fact that we spend more on defense than the rest of the world combined. Interestingly, we rarely conclude that these entities are just too large and complex to be functional. Instead, we vacuously argue that all they really need is a little reform; that is, we believe that we need new and more effective rules and/or more intelligent, dedicated, monitors and enforcers. However, when we look large-scale exemplars of functionality that might serve as a models for other large institutions, we find ourselves at a loss. My point here is that we've all been blinded to large scale dysfunctionality by an ideology that tells us, repeatedly, that "bigger is better," despite an enormous body of evidence to the contrary.
So how has most of Western civilization been infected by an ideological disease that has led to our prevailing epidemic of institutional dysfunctionality? Much of it can be explained by human nature. The fact is that human beings have an uncanny ability to "identify" with groups. Throughout most of human history we identified with small groups: families, clans, and tribes. The agricultural revolution led to the formation of much larger groups (cities, empires, and nations) that were held together not by face-to-face personal relationships but by the imposition of abstract rules and laws. The belief in the sanctity of laws led to a corresponding belief in the sanctity of lawmakers. In fact, many large-scale rulers still rule by "Divine Right." Today, we still teach our children to "respect" leaders, especially their parents, teachers, religious leaders, and government officials. This demand for respect for formal authority was "backed up" by systems of monitoring and enforcement. As the number of formal rules increased, so did the number of monitors and enforcers. And of course, those "bureaucrats" really do not produce anything of value, but nevertheless draw paychecks. In fact, not only do they draw paychecks, they now draw heftier paychecks than those who actually produce something of value. Thus, today we have a growing number of highly-paid bureaucrats and a dwindling number of lowly-paid producers. Ironically, under this cultural anamoly, when we get "promoted" it usually means that we take on more "responsibility" in terms of monitoring and enforcement, but produce less value.

Now let's be honest! This is not a mere cultural anamoly, it's a full blown epidemic. Today we're faced with the realization that our lives are shaped by more rules and laws than we can possibly know, and more monitors and enforcers than we can afford to pay. And of course, as the number monitors and enforcers increase, the number of innovators declines proportionately. Unquestioned rule compliance, therefore, invariably leads to a stagnant society of obedient followers led by non-substantive, ineffective, inefficient leaders. Although, I blame the "bigger is better" ideology for our current epidemic of dysfunctionality, we must ultimately blame ourselves for believing it.

Is "Bigger" Really "Better?" Libertarian Ruminations on the Economy of Scale

2011-09-22T12:04:00.002-04:00

Unless you've been living under a rock, it should be obvious that human social organization in the Western world is increasingly being dominated by large-scale organizational structures. Examples are obvious and bountiful. Why is the financial world today controlled by a handful and large Wall Street banks that have grown to the point where they are "too big to fail," and why are small local banks struggling to stay in business? Why are a few large scale retailers like Amazon, Walmart, Home Depot, and Target, thriving while small local "mom and pop" stores are out of business? Why are individual schools getting larger and often bundled and "administrated" into large school districts or corporate entities? Why are small family-owned farms being usurped by large "factory farms" owned by huge corporations? And finally, why are Federal and State governments growing by leaps and bounds, while small local governments are struggling to remain solvent?

Orthodox economic theory says that the natural evolution of markets inevitably leads to dominance by a few large scale competitors and that the rise of oligopolies is a sign of economic maturity or progress. In other words, "Big is Good!" But what if orthodoxy is wrong? What if our current state of social organization is actually a malaise? What if the "bigger is better" thesis is actually a well-disguised ideology that has created large scale social structures that are really "too big to survive?" In short: What if "smaller is better?"

For the sake of argument, let's assume that most of what Adam Smith identified as the basics of free market competition is more-or-less accurate. Namely, that economic activity involves competition between buyers, between sellers, and between buyers and sellers. And that all competition takes place on two axis: quality and price. The quality of a good or service is determined by the free choices made by the buyers and sellers in the form of a contract. The price refers to what the buyer is willing to pay for it, and what the seller is willing to accept. The "Holy Grail" of economic competition is to provide high quality goods or services at the lowest price. The defenders of the "bigger is better" thesis say that larger organizations naturally benefit from "economy of scale" because larger organizations are more innovative and efficient than small organizations, and therefore can produce higher quality products and services at a lower price. Thus, it seems as though the "free market" leads inevitably to dominance by a few large scale organizations, or oligarchy. The problem with all this is that "bigger is better" contradicts almost everyone's "real world" experience with large-scale, centralized, bureaucratic social structures.

I currently teach at a small liberal arts college, but I have also taught at a major state university. Most small private liberal arts colleges are now "out of business" while the larger ones are thriving. Orthodoxy says that large universities benefit from "economy of scale" and therefore are more innovative, efficient, and therefore less costly. Of course anyone that ever attended or taught at a major university will readily question all three of those statements. How can a major university provide a superior education if most of the courses are taught by graduate students and adjuncts? If large universities are indeed "better" then why are the retention rates of large universities so dismal in comparison to small colleges? Admittedly, the issue is much more complex than this, but the question remains: "Is bigger really better?"

Libertarians like myself argue that the rise of large scale corporations are often the product of "crony capitalism" and not "free market capitalism." Thus, governments drive small organizations into extinction by: subsidizing the costs of large organizations, issuing expensive regulations that small organizations cannot afford, and via tax policy. In my next blog, I'll explore the coevolution of "big government" and "big corporations" and the difference between "crony capitalism" and "free market capitalism." I will argue that, contrary to what orthodoxy says, with few exceptions, in the absence of large scale government intervention, "smaller is almost always better."

The Fixation of Belief: The Method of Science

2011-09-15T09:38:00.000-04:00

So far, Peirce has identified three inferior methods that we all use to fixate our beliefs: authority, tenacity, a priori. He then argues that there is one method that is more likely to settle our opinions: the method of science.

First of all, Peirce is an epistemological realist, which means that he believes that there is something out there called reality whose nature remains constant relative to our beliefs, and that truth and falsity relate to that external reality. In other words, at least some of our individual and/or collective beliefs are true and others are false, whether we like it or not. Now, Peirce realizes that many philosophers in his time rejected realism and that it's impossible to "prove" that the real world exists. His argument is that the process of inquiry, however, can provide us with some guidance. The fact of the matter is that the overwheming majority of individuals and collectives believe that there is a real world (of some kind), and therefore, we do not doubt that it exists. A few philosophers doubt it, but so what? The pragmatic (common-sense) truth of the matter is that we all act based on our beliefs, unless that belief is in fact doubted. Doubt cannot be turned on and off. It's something that naturally arises, whether we like it or not! Therefore, Peirce argues that we are entitled to believe in a real world, at least until we actually doubt it.

So what is the "Method of Science?" Well, it's nothing more than the "process of elimination," or "trial and error." If something "works" we keep it! If it "doesn't work" we don't keep it. In short, Peirce is proposing an evolutionary epistemology, whereby Truth and Falsity are sorted out by the process of inquiry over time. Methodologically, Peirce argues that human knowledge advances based on evolution, especially variation and selection. Over time, our individual and collective bodies of belief evolve by weeding out the unfit. Later philosophers called this process "creative destruction." Hence, nature "creatively destroyed" dinosaurs, buggy whips, the geocentric map of the universe. Within the realm of belief, the process of inquiry requires that we willingly expose our beliefs to the falsification process, which implies avoiding the methods of tenacity, authority, and a priori. We can't know for certain what's true, but we can know what's false.

What's important here is that Peirce observes that we do (in fact) employ those inferior methods, however, we must deliberately fight that natural impulse. As Thomas Kuhn later observed, scientific theories (beliefs) are often willfully protected from the forces of creative destruction by self-interested scientists, scientific organizations, and governments that have invested their time, effort, and resources in maintaining the status quo. In short, there is a sociology of knowledge that often works against scientific human inquiry. Peirce also argued that scientific knowledge is highly fallible (his epistemological doctrine of fallibilism) and that we ought to guard against the rising tide of scientific positivism.

How many of our cultural beliefs are overdue for creative destruction but remain intact because they have been propped up by sociopolitical power structures? Libertarians argue that socialism is long overdue for creative destruction. I would add, that I seriously doubt that the Cincinnati Bengals will make it to the playoffs this year.

The Fixation of Belief: The A Priori Method

2011-09-12T08:35:00.002-04:00

The "A Priori Method" of belief fixation is based on the idea that the human mind (or brain) has direct access the a body of knowledge prior to experience. Thus, if you want to know the Truth all you have to do is think real hard about it and you instantly ascertain "know" the Truth. As Peirce suggests, there are two problems here: 1.) There is very little agreement among philosophers in terms of a list of universally accepted a priori empirical truths. 2.) When we introspect our consciousness, we are actually looking in at relative culturally-based truths that are usually based on authority.

However, Peirce is not as hostile to the A Priori Method as one might think. In his other writings, he acknowledges that when faced with an enormously complex question (like the structure of DNA) humans have an uncanny ability to guess the right answer and that hypotheses often originate as feelings. In fact, Crick and Watson literally guessed the double-helical structure of DNA out of thin air! In fact many scientific theories "emerge" out of dream states. What's important here is that Peirce differentiates between the process of generating theories (intuition or feeling) and the process of determining whether those intuitions are, in fact, True or False. Peirce insists that although we often guess right, we still cannot rely solely on authority or a priori intuition. Truth, Peirce argues, has experimental consequences. That is, if a theory is True it should enable you to either predict or control that phenomena. Although many a priori theories generate highly plausible, psychologically pleasing explanations, Truth is ultimately "Pragmatic." As William James later observed Truth must ultimately exhibit "cash value." Just because the double helical structure of DNA originated a priori, it was not "True" until it's "cash value" was established in the laboratory. And of course, today the "cash value" of their discovery continue to roll in, as illustrated by genetic testing and genetic therapy.

Another point worth mentioning here is that Peirce did not believe that scientific theories could ever be finally verified in the laboratory. Why? Because of David Hume's "problem of induction," which observes that, eventually, future experiments (observations) almost always falsify previous previous observations. Therefore Peirce argued that all theories are, therefore, fallible and subject to future revision. So when we say that "DNA has a double helical structure," we're really saying that Crick and Watson's theory has not been falsified. In my next blog, I'll sketch in Peirce's Scientific Theory of the Fixation of Belief.

The Fixation of Belief: The Method of Tenacity

2011-08-31T08:41:00.000-04:00

Peirce argued that the laws of nature are habitual behavior and that our beliefs shape our  behavior.  Beliefs are individual, collective, generational, and inter-generational. Peirce distinguished between scientific beliefs (scientific theories) and non-scientific beliefs (or non-scientific theories). Some of our beliefs are True and other are False, thus Peirce's theory of belief implies a theory of knowledge or epistemology. At a pragmatic level, sometimes our beliefs contribute to our long-term (and/or short-term) survival as individuals or collectives, sometimes our beliefs are neutral, and sometimes our beliefs work against us. When our individual or collective beliefs about the laws of nature enable us to predict, explain and control nature, we say that our beliefs are True. Ultimately, our survival is often contingent upon whether our beliefs are true or not: "Will that tiger eat me?" If you falsely believe that tigers are vegetarians you are not likely to survive that first encounter. In my last blog I argued that the Fixation of Belief based on the Method of Authority, is natural, but highly fallible.

The Method of Tenacity is also a "natural," but unreliable method of belief fixation. This method involves the willful avoidance of circumstances that might stimulate doubt within your current repertoir of beliefs. Recall that human inquiry is an involuntary process triggered by feelings of doubt, and that our old beliefs, naturally, compete with aspiring new beliefs. But Mother Nature stacks the deck in favor of our old habits, as our oldest habits are often the hardest to break. There's a lot of truth in the old saying: "You can't teach an old dog new tricks!" (I have been teaching my Ethics course at 9:00 AM for the past 25 years. This semester it was changed to 10:00 AM. Guess what time I showed up for class!) So, we humans are naturally conservative and therefore tend to act based on our old habits, and protect those old beliefs from the onslaught of doubt. Now remember, the Method of Tenacity (like the Method of Authority) is perfectly natural. We all do it individually and collectively! It's just not very likely to lead to True beliefs.

Let's look at how the Method of Tenacity operates at the collective and individual levels. All organized social groups tenaciously protect their core ideological beliefs. That's why the core beliefs espoused by the oldest world religions have changed very little over thousands of years. For example, the Roman Catholic Church still tenaciously protects its belief that only men can become priests and therefore it actively discourages nuns from discussing or teaching the ordination of women. Indeed, censorship is the primary instrument for exercising collective tenacity. Although, we usually associate ideological censorship with religious organizations, all organizations do it. Scientists tend to tenaciously protect their most important theories, and resist the onset of doubt by marginalizing scientists that seek to undermine scientific orthodoxy.

Political regimes are especially adept at protecting their ideological moorings. The well-known positive techniques for implimenting collective tenacity include: the institutionalization of regime reinforcing symbols, oaths (..."I pledge allegiance to the flag of the...), patriotic songs and stories. Negative techiques include  censorship of the media and criminalization of dissent. Now obviously, our own individual beliefs are often shaped by collective ideological tenacity. But as Peirce recognized the "social impulse" tends to undermine the method of tenacity. Today, communication technologies such as the television, Internet, and cell phones have made it especially difficult for all of us to protect our core beliefs from the irritation of doubt. It has become increasingly difficult for religious political regimes to deprive women of the right to vote, drive automobiles, receive health care, receive an education, get a job, and/or control their own reproductive lives. In short, the Method of Tenacity just won't work as well as it used to!

Today the irritation of doubt is difficult, if not impossible, to control. For Peirce, that's a good thing. We'll never know if our old beliefs are True or False unless we allow them to compete with new ideas. The methods of Authority and Tenacity both undermine human inquiry and impede our quest for true belief. Now, what about the A Priori Method?

The Fixation of Belief: The Method of Authority

2011-08-28T08:16:00.000-04:00

So far I've suggested that we act based on our beliefs and that those beliefs that address either matters of Fact (Truth or Falsity) and matters of Value (Good and Bad). Peirce argues that we "fixate" our beliefs in four different ways. All of these methods have advantages and disadvantages. Among humans, the most common method for fixating our beliefs is based on authority. Let's take a close look at it.

Given our natural propensity to live in groups and organize those groups, hierarchically, based on leadership and followership, we all fixate at least some of our beliefs based on the "authority" of others. The hallmark of any authority is that we trust them! Given our longstanding attraction to religious authority, many neuroscientists argue that our brains have been programmed by biological evolution to believe in a God, trust God, and obey God. Hence, the question of whether the pronouncements of religious authorities are True or Good is settled based on whether we trust that the authority is truthfully interpreting the pronouncements of God. If we trust an authority we tend to believe them and willingly give them power over us. Worldwide, most human beliefs are fixated based on the religious authority. God is the supreme religious authority. Sometimes religious authority is based on what leaders of the past have written in the form of "sacred texts." But usually, religious authority is based on how contemporary religious leaders interpret those sacred writings. Thus inquiry into the Truth or Goodness of the pronouncements of religious leaders is about "who they are" not "what they say." Today we know a lot more about the psychological basis for trust in authorities than Peirce knew. For example, we know that most of us will do things that we ordinarily wouldn't do when we are told to so by trusted authorities. The Holocaust and the Jonestown Masssacre are prime examples.

Today we all trust many different authorities: physicians, scientists, journalists, and celebrities. Although Peirce doesn't say much about it, there are more and less trustworthy authorities. I trust my family physician because I've known him for 20 years and because he has taken good care of me and my family. For libertarians the most pernicious form of authority is government. One of the most serious problems we have here in the United States is that the vast majority of Americans do not trust our government? Why because it hasn't taken very good care of us for a long time. Libertarians argue that government tends to take care of itself and its cronies, often at the expense of the rest of us. If we don't believe what the government says, it forces us to submit to it's edicts, whether we believe those edicts or not.

Today, many political scientists question whether its possible for us humans to escape from the influence of various authorities. Peirce was a realist, which means that he believes it is at least possible to base our beliefs on something other than authority. But he might be wrong. It may be the case that Truth is nothing more than what the prevailing authorities say is True and that Truth is "socially constructed" based on the self-interest of leaders. Maybe Truth is "manufactured" by those who hold power over us and not really discovered?

The Fixation of Belief

2011-08-27T08:10:00.000-04:00

In 1877, Charles Sanders Peirce published a series of articles in Popular Science Monthly. The first essay, entitled: "The Fixation of Belief," has had a profound influence on my philosophical approach. So I thought it would be interesting to share some of those basic ideas and outline how I have expanded upon Peirce's original architecture.

First of all, Peirce was one of the first philosophers to acknowledge that the question of the nature of human belief is an important area of philosophical inquiry. Beliefs, according to Peirce, underlie many (if not most) of our actions. He argued the the formation, or "fixation" of a belief is the product of a natural process, which he called human inquiry. This process is initiated by an identifiable "feeling of doubt" that is generated by our brain and central nervous system. It is this "feeling" that initiates and sustains the involuntary process of inquiry until a new belief is established. Peirce suggested that the feeling that accompanies belief is more pleasurable than the state of doubt. So the psychological states of doubt and belief are marked by distinctive "feelings," and all humans naturally know the difference between the two. We, therefore, naturally, seek the pleasure of belief and avoid the pain associated with the state of doubt. Over the course of our lifetimes many our "old beliefs" are cast into doubt by inquiry and are replaced by "new beliefs." Just because we happen believe or doubt something, either individually or collectively, does not mean that it is True or False. Hence, Peirce is an epistemological realist in the sense that he believes that Truth is a correspondence between what be believe and something external to that belief.

Now let's stop and think about all this so far. First, note that Peirce's theory of inquiry is rooted in biology, which implies an ultimate evolutionary explanation; and that this biological process generates mental states that we interpret as doubt or belief. Second, Peirce argues that since we "act" on the basis of our beliefs, there are social implications. Third, Peirce argues that there are better and worse ways for us to forge our beliefs. He therefore identifies four methods for the fixation of belief that all human beings have adopted over the long course of human history: method of authority, method of tenacity, the a priori method, and the scientific method. Although all four methods are "natural," but only one is likely to generate beliefs that are relatively stable over the long run and likely to be True. I'll explore these four methods in subsequent blogs.

Stewardship Part 2

2011-08-20T08:21:00.000-04:00

So the concept stewardship is usually invoked in a context where something valuable is being shared over time. In ethical terms that suggests that sharing over time is good; that is to say, it's a virtue, a duty, or a preferable consequence.

If stewardship is a virtue it signifies excellence in character. For Aristotle, it would relate to distributive justice. Hence, a "good person" takes no more nor less than he/she deserves. Now Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics really doesn't get into intergenerational justice, but we know from his other writings that potential beings would have moral standing. We also know that if stewardship is a virtue, it would involve teaching, learning, and the establishment of a habit. But beyond that I'm not sure Aristotle takes us very far. The Judeo-Christian concept of the virtue of stewardship is based on the idea that God gave the universe to humans to share. There is a built in sense of value associated with any "gift" that comes from an omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, and "Good" being. God, by definition, does not give lousy gifts! No ugly ties or exploding cigars! Moreover, since God created Homo sapiens as an intergenerational community, he certainly would not favor early generations over subsequent ones. Nature is not a Ponzi scheme! Hence, previous generations took their fair share, we take, our fair share, and future generations take their fair share. The problem here is how do we know how much each generation can consume without shortchanging the next generation? The history of humans on earth suggests that virtue-based concepts of stewardship have led to intergenerational exploitation rather than intergenerational justice.

If stewardship is a duty, then we must think about it in a different way. First of all, we'd have to establish that all generations have an equal right to that good thing that is being shared between generations. So if we establish that each generation has an equal right to the fish in ocean then, each generation has a duty to determine it's fair share of fish and preserve the rest for the next generation. But there's a lot more here than meets the eye. Suppose subsequent generations will have more living persons than our generation? Do we have a duty to take into account the fact that the next generation will "need" more than we do? And, of course how far into the future does this obligation extend? Moreover, the human ability to exploit the earth's bounty changes relative to technology. We can catch more fish, cut down more trees, extract more oil and coal than previous generations. Hence, the potential for intergenerational injustice is magnified over time. All I want to say here is that even if we all agree that we have a duty to hold back a few fish for future generations we really don't know what this duty entails. In short, it's a lot easier to assign rights and duties across generations than it is to fulfill them.

Finally, if stewardship is conceived as the means to a preferable set of consequences or outcomes across generations, we must be able to assess cost/benefit ratios across generations. Thus stewardship might imply aiming at the "greatest happiness for the greatest numbers" across generations. If this is our goal, then it's not at all clear how much we ought to hold back, given that we really don't know how many generations will follow us. I would argue that if stewardship requires utilitarian calculus exercised across generations, each generation's rate of consumption would be minicule if not zero. Of course, that would solve the obesity problem, but that's another topic worth exploring.

So what does all of this say about stewardship as a moral concept? First of all, there's a lot of muddled thinking about "sustainability." If we have a moral obligation to consume at a "sustainable" rate we have to decide how far into the future that obligation extends. If we limit our obligation to the next generation we might be able to calculate a sustainable rate of consumption. On the other hand, if todays politicians seek to be responsible stewards of the earth's bounty and neglect the needs (and wants) of our present generation in order to save a few fish for future generations, those politicians won't be in office very long. Future generations aren't old enough to vote!

Stewardship Part I.

2011-08-14T08:36:00.000-04:00

The moral concept of "stewardship" is deeply rooted in the Judeo-Christian tradition. Today, it is used primarily as a set of moral obligations that are associated with the responsible use of something that belongs to someone else. Or as Merriam Webster puts it: "...the careful and responsible management of something entrusted to one's care." In light of my recent rants on intergenerational justice, I thought I'd deconstruct that slippery concept a bit.

First of all, today "stewardship" is most often encountered in the context of the sustainable management of resources. A "steward" is someone that takes care of someone else's property, hence the notion of ownership plays a key role. A "responsible steward," therefore, preserves or "sustains" the value of that property while an "irresponsible steward" does not. Stewards are not entrusted to sustain something of no value. And there's also a temporal component to stewardship; that is to say, the steward's "sustenance" of something valuable extends over a period of time.Therefore, stewardship has two moral components: the goal (or motive) of sustaining valuable something and knowledge of the means of sustaining that value. Thus, a responsible steward must be motivated to sustain something and know how to do it. An irresponsible steward (or a non-steward) either lacks the motivation to sustain something, or doesn't know how to do it. Thus, stewardship involves both knowing the Good and being able to do the Good.

Suppose, I agree to loan you one of my guitars for a week. Naturally, I expect you to be a responsible steward of it. At a bare minimum, I would expect it to be as returned without loss of value. A responsible steward might return it to me in better condition: maybe polish the finish and change the strings. You might replace the pickups or refinish it, which might or might not meet my approval. WARNING: Do not repaint my orange guitar with black spray paint. So responsible stewardship implies knowledge of the interests of the owner.

Stewardship also shares common ground with the concept of "agency," where one person serves as an "agent" for another person (or "principal"). A responsible agent, who possesses specific knowledge or skills is expected to serve the interests of the principal. Thus, the common ground is the expectation that another person will serve the interests of someone else. But there is also an underlying expectation that the steward or agent will benefit from serving as a steward or an agent. Today, we generally pay agents (insurance agents, financial advisors, and physicians) to serve our interests while stewards benefit by using what they are entrusted to sustain.

So far, the idea of stewardship between individuals seems fairly clear cut, and hardly worthy of a philosophical diatribe. But when stewardship is applied in the context of collective ownership, and/or collective stewardship the waters get muddy fast! I'll dive into that morass next.

Our Intergenerational Credit Card

2011-07-23T10:35:00.001-04:00

The current debate in Congress over raising the debt ceiling plays into one of thorniest issues in all of moral philosophy: the problem of future generations. Although it lurks most often in the context of environmental issues (usually pollution and resource depletion) it is readily applicable to the debt crisis.

Imagine the following scenario: Congress is issued an intergenerational credit card, and thereby can access a never-endling line of credit. Now, if you are a Congressman who would like to get re-elected, how would you use that credit card? There are multiple possibilities. First of all, whose interest would you serve? A.) Present generation that can either benefit or be harmed by your spending habits, or B.) Future generations. Would you pay off the balance on that credit card every month, or would you just pay the minimum balance and accumulate debt and pass the deby onto those vulnerable future generations? Of course, the The beauty of the intergenerational credit card is that future generations do not yet exist, and therefore it's relatively easy to pass the credit card balance onto them. And of course, since future generations cannot vote, there is no reason to fear them as a voting block. There is no lobbying group to represent them. Thus, all of the political rhetoric tends to focus on what would happen to the present generation if Congress decides to either default on that credit card or begin to pay down the debt without buying more stuff to benefit the present generation. Of course, Congress might decide to "invest in the future" by asking the present generation to pay for projects that might benefit future generations at the expense of the present generation. For example, we could embark on a long-term railroad building project that would take 20 years to complete. Unfortunately, our efforts to benefit the future might be thwarted by some new transportation technology (personal aircraft?) that would decrease the value of that investment. Now as long the present generation pays the cost of providing this benefit to future generations, we're at least acting responsibly. However, if we decide to benefit the future generations and pass on the cost of providing that benefit to future generations we're on shaky moral ground. Why? Who is really benefitting from these intergenerational projects? The workers in the present generation that land those jobs. If those costs can be paid for with that intergenerational credit card, then Congress can get re-elected by the present generation and future generations can pay their salaries. If that's not a Ponzi Scheme, I don't what what to call it. But clearly, the idea of an intergenerational credit card is a prescription for taking unfair advantage of future generations.

Two Challenges of Minarchy

2011-07-16T10:03:00.000-04:00

In my last blog I suggested that minarchy lies midway between the ideals of anarchy and unbridled progressivism. This raises two obvious questions: "How small is small?" and "How do we prevent small from becoming large?" How any government (national, state, or local)  answers to these questions determines the degree of personal liberty within that jurisdiction. I'll try to focus on the United States, but I think these issues apply equally to all governments.

Almost all minarchists argue that there are three main functions that require a publically-funded governmental monopoly: a defensive military, a domestic police force, and a criminal justice system. (Some of us are also willing to provide a basic safety net.) All three represent a realistic collective response to the darker side of human nature. Some individuals and groups of humans are willing to violate the non-aggression axiom and/or the anti-theft axiom, in order to advance their interests. Anarchists argue that even these functions ought to be be privatized, which would subject those functions to competition, increase quality, and reduce cost. The question here is whether minarchies can maintain competition without caving into cronyism.

Obviously, all nations need a military force. The the size of that military is contingent upon how governments use those militaries. Minarchists argue that the the military must be defensive in nature. Thus, we must be able to thwart an invasion. If, governments expand that mandate to include "potential invasions," then the size of the military is likely to expand. According to Ron Paul and Dennis Kucinich, the United States' military has expanded way out of control, and as a result we have troops stationed all over the world and several wars underway. Cronyism is a primary source of spiraling military budgets. The corporations that supply the "War Machine" with supplies are especially powerful, mostly because military contracts are notoriously opaque and non-competitive. Hence, the proverbial $400 toilet seats! One might argue that we've already "privatized" the U.S. military, however, what we've really done is disabled competition via cronyism. In short, privatization does not necessarily imply free markets.

Minarchists also support a publically-funded police force. Now, first of all, the size of a police force is contingent upon the number of laws that it is required to montor and enforce. The more more laws there are "on the books" the larger the police force you'll need. Minarchists argue that lawmaking powers of congress must be limited the laws that address the harm principle; that is "harm to other persons" (assault, murder etc.) and "harm to the property of others" (theft, fraud, breach of contract etc.). The problem with the harm principle is that it tends to become irrationally pre-occupied with preventing low-magnitude harms and low-probability harms. Paternalistic laws that protect us from "self-inflicted harms" have led to an extraordinary expansion of police forces, especially drug laws, laws against gambling, alcohol abuse. The United States leads the world in incarceration, most of those prisoners committed are non-violent drug crimes. The actual cost of providing a police force is also contingent upon how those policemen are paid. Libertarians argue that policement ought to be paid based on free market forces, where the best policement get paid the most (within the bounds of the free market) and the worst policemen get fired. Of course, crony relationships between politicians and law enforcement are way too common and lead to bloated, over-paid and under-paid policemen.

Minarchists also accept a publically-funded criminal justice system. Like the police force, the size of the judiciary is contingent upon the number of laws it is expected to enforce. The more laws and the more policemen, the more lawyers and judges that are needed. The exponential growth of the judiciary (at all levels) is also related to the fact that our law schools crank out a lot of lawyers, those lawyers often become politicians, and they have a powerful lobby. Thus, cronyism also contributes to bloated judiciaries. The cost of maintaining a judiciary is also contingent upon how much lawyers and judges are paid, and whether they are appointed or elected. Another important cause of "judiciary creep" is the longstanding legal tradition of writing laws in a private language known only to lawyers, and judges who are empowered to "interpret" those laws. This also artificially enforces their monopoly.

In sum, I have argued that minarchists seek to limit the size and scope of government to military, police, and judicial functions. However, even if our government limited itself to those three functions, there is no guarantee that small government would not morph into large government. Therefore, the most efficient way to limit the size of government is to limit the ability of politicians to endlessly expand the criminal code beyond crimes against persons and properties. I think both libertarians and progressives agree that the U.S. government has expanded way beyond minarchy.

Two Ideological Perspectives on the Use of Coercive Political Power

2011-07-13T12:26:00.001-04:00

The current political malaise in the United States can be best understood in terms of two conflicting ideological perspectives on the the nature and use of political power. On the far left we have the progressives, on the far right we have the libertarians. There is a lot of variation within both ideologies. However, in the United States progressives usually lean toward the far left of the Democratic Party, the libertarians usually lean toward the far right of the Republican Party. However, neither progressives nor libertarians dominate their respective parties. The progressive-libertarian debate is a very old and important debate, therefore it's still worth reviewing those two ideologies.

Progressives are idealists that believe that political entities (cities, states, and nations) must deploy the coercive of power of government in order to serve the public good. Progressive government requires that altruistic, impartial, objective leaders that will exercise political power in pursuit of the "public good." Good government, therefore, requires that political entities seek out these "good leaders." When government fails to serve the public good it is because the political system has become infested with self-serving leaders that use their political power to enrich themselves, their families, and friends at the expense of the public good: call it cronyism. Therefore, the key to progressive government is to devise a political system that selects these "good leaders." Plato believed that in order to maintain a sufficient supply of "good leaders," the state must develop selective breeding programs and specialtized education programs. Contemporary American progressives reject selective breeding, but place invest heavily in law degrees earned at elite private schools, most notably Yale and Harvard. Coercive force is exercised in the form of a "progressive" tax code, which provides the funds to serve the public good. In the United States, progressives tend to equate serving the public good to implimenting government programs that serve the unmet needs of the "least advantaged," the poor, workers, consumers, elderly, sick, racial minorities, and women. This agenda requires large numbers of workers employed by tax-funded government agencies. For most progressives, knowledge of the "public good" and knowledge of how to achieve it usually relegated to empowered social scientists. On foreign policy, many progressives support the use of U.S. military power to advance the "public good."

Libertarians are idealists that believe that coercive power is always wrong, either because it violates the property rights of others or because it leads to bad comsequences. Taxation is regarded as problematic because it resembles theft; that is the involutary appropriation of another person's property. Libertarians also argue that knowledge of the public good and how to achieve it is elusive, if not impossible. Social scientists routinely identify the "public good" with the good of the social scientists themselves, or their cronies in government that empowered them. Libertarians are especially wary of the rise of cronyism, where government serves the good of specific interest groups, especially: corportations, labor unions, churches, and the military. All libertarians are against the use of military power unless we're actually invaded by a foreign nation. Therefore, according to libertarians, the secret to good government is to either eliminate the coercive power of government (anarchism) or limit the coercive power of government (minarchy).

Anarchists reject government outright, and idealistically believe that if individuals (and groups of cooperating individuals) are left to make their own decisions and live with the consequences of those decisions, human society would thrive. Anarchists argue that because progressive governments "spend other people's money," they tend to be overly-generous to the least advantaged and public employees, and less concerned with "bang for the buck" efficiency. Moreover, anarchists observe that over time, collectivized power tends to corrupt even the most altruistic, and impartial leaders. Social science is similarly corrupted. Therefore, progressive governments tend to collapse under the weight of military adventurism coupled with the high levels of taxation needed to serve the bureaucracies that serve the "military-industrial complex" and the ever-growing ranks of "least advantaged." Anarchists argue that eventually everyone becomes either a soldier or "least advantaged." Thus, under anarchy all collective functions are met by non-governmental entities, including the: military, police force, criminal justice system, and social welfare.

Minarchists embrace limited government; that is government that is limited to using tax money to provide a defensive military, police force, and judiciary. Some minarchists, like myself, are also willing to include a "basic safety net" to protect the "least advantaged." Anarchists, however, insist that minarchy is unsustainable and that, over time, minarchism becomes progressivism. Altruistic politicians and social scientists are eventually corrupted by power. Progressives argue that the limited power of minarchism, inevitably leads to under-funded military, police, judiciary, and safety nets.

Today, the idealists on the far left (progressives) and the far right (anarchists) are unwilling to compromise and therefore the U.S. government now mired in gridlock. Since minarchists draw criticism from both the far left and the far right, they now occupy the centrist position in U.S. Politics. I would argue that the future of the United States lies in the formation of a coalition of progressives and libertarians that are willing to limit the exercise of concentrated political power, but not necessarily eliminate it. Politically, this might result in the formation of a political alliance between Ron Paul and Dennis Kucinich.

Nuanced Cooperation

2011-05-25T08:24:00.000-04:00

In my previous blog entry I suggested that social scientists often overlook some of the finer points in human cooperation. Let's continue that diatribe! Obviously, the word "cooperation" is notoriously vague. It is a relational term that can mean just about anything. So let's call my new approach: "nuanced cooperation." Obviously, cooperation requires at least two persons, unless you suffer from multiple-personality disorder. Under normal, healthy psychological circumstances, you cannot cooperate with yourself or with a thing. Individuals can cooperate with other individuals and/or groups, and groups can cooperate with other groups and/or individuals. One of the nuances that is almost entirely overlooked in discussions of cooperation is the obvious fact that there are varying degrees of cooperation. So why do we cooperate in varying degrees? Well...because we live in a finite world and therefore individuals and groups cannot afford to contribute time, energy, and resources to all cooperative enterprise. Hence, finite humans ration their cooperative time, energy, and resources. Many if not most individual enterprises involve both cooperation and competition from other enterprises. Even Bill Gates rations his finite resources! Given the vast number of cooperative opportunities in our social environment, we are all probably more non-cooperative than cooperative. Therefore, it's probably more accurate to portray modern humans as a non-cooperative.

All cooperative enterprises involve planning in pursuit of ends or goals. Collective enterprises orchestrated by groups (or organizations) require collective planning, which in turn requires leader-follower relationships. A good leader attracts followers, a bad leader repels followers. Individual enterprises require individual planning. And, of course, there are better and worse forms of individual and collective planning. Ineffective planning usually leads to failure to achieve one's goals. We are non-cooperative when we prefer not to contribute our time, energy or resources to any given enterprise. Even when we choose to cooperate, we limit the amount of time, energy, and resources that we commit to various cooperative enterprises. Consequently, most enterprises eventually suffer from extinction due to competition from other enterprises. The number of cooperators associated with the horse and buggy industry and the Flat Earth Society has been greatly diminished.

Of course, there's a lot moral discourse associated with how individuals and groups ration time, energy, and resources, especially when it comes to beneficent enterprises. There are many enterprises conducted by charitable organizations that are worthy of our cooperation. But it's impossible to contribute time, effort, and resources to all of them! Our personal friends and relatives often request our beneficent cooperation in pursuit of their personal ends (or goals). If you have a lot of "needy" friends, these requests can really drain your time, energy, and resources. Parents with young children and adult children with old parents experience the finitude of time, energy, and resources. Everyone believes that their own particular enterprise is worthy of the time, effort, and resources of others, and therefore, we are often offended when others choose to be non-cooperative, or contribute less to our enterprise than we'd like.

Some cooperative enterprises are immoral and therefore, not only do we refuse to cooperate, we actively seek to undermine those enterprises. Some immoral enterprises pursue immoral goals, some employ immoral means, and some pursue both immoral ends via immoral means. Unfortunately, we ration our cooperation based on imperfect information, and unwittingly contribute time, effort, or resources to illegal and/or immoral enterprises. One way to dress up a repulsive enterprise is to lie about it's means and/or ends. How many bogus charitable organizations have you contributed to?
Moreover, human cooperation has always been conditioned by both enticements (rewards) and coercive threats (punishments). Many cooperative enterprises involve reciprocity; that is cooperation is based on "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours." However, we all willingly contribute variable quantities of our time, energy, and resources to various enterprises in the absence of either enticements or threats. And, depending on your supply of time, energy, and resources, if you commit yourself to to many cooperative enterprises, your contribution to any one enterprise might be negligible, or even border on non-cooperative.

Finally, given the inevitable competition between cooperative enterprises, all enterprises eventually suffer extinction. Where's that Roman Empire now? One way to avoid extinction is to force individuals and groups to contribute time, effort, and resources to your particular enterprise. However, forced cooperation is no panacea. Those who control enterprises that provide the coercive force that sustains involuntary cooperation, also ration their own time, energy, and resources, and therefore, usually demand more and more of your time, effort, and resources to monitor and control those who prefer non-cooperation. How many DEA agents, fences, courts, and prisons will it take to monitor and enforce the ongoing Drug War enterprise? There is a general understanding that Libertarians are committed to voluntary cooperation and therefore they reject forceful seizure of the time, energy, and resources of others; and the expansion of coercive force necessary to insure all forms of involuntary cooperation.

Cooperation

2011-05-18T08:01:00.001-04:00

Over the years there's been a lot scientific research and discussion of cooperation, especially in the area of "leadership studies." Personally, I think a lot of it is based on conceptual ambiguity. Let's see what we can do to clean up some of the mess.

Since Plato, philosophers have found it useful to distinguish between two species of the Good. Some human actions are regarded as "intrinsically good," or "good for their own sake." Happiness, pleasure, and friendship are usually offered as examples. Other human actions are "extrinsically good," or "good for their favorable consequences." Getting a flu shot in the fall is a good example. And of course, since Plato, philosophers have argued endlessly over whether ANY human actions are really "good for their own sake," AND whether it is possible to know (with certainty) whether human actions have positive or negative utility ratios over the long-term or the short-term. And of course, there's the old standby: "Good for whom?" So let's ask the simple question: "Is cooperation Good? If so, is it an intrinsic good or an extrinsic good?"

Before we answer that, we have to decide what we mean when we use the term cooperation. First of all, we cooperate (or do not cooperate) in the context of the pursuit of goals, therefore cooperation is a teleological term subject to analysis via "means" and "ends." In ethics, we can judge the morality of both means and ends. Some ends are morally praiseworthy (ending world hunger) others are morally blameworthy (genocide). Some means of ending world hunger are morally praiseworthy (teaching starving nations how to grow food), other means are immoral (killing off children to feed adults). So what does this say about cooperation? Human cooperation in inexorably amoral; that is to say, we human beings can cooperate in pursuit of either praiseworthy or blameworthy goals, and can cooperate via both both moral and immoral means. So what does this say about the morality of the human species? Well, we certainly cannot deduce morality from the mere fact that we cooperate with one another. Moreover, there are also more and less effective means of cooperating. Some "means" are more likely to produce "ends" than others. I don't think anyone thinks that, over the long run, shipping vast quantities of food to starving countries is a very efficient way to solve the problem of world hunger. In other words, we have a moral obligation to not only cooperate in the pursuit of worthwhile goals, we also have an obligation to do it as efficiently as possible. Call it non-productive cooperation. There's a ton of it out there! Conversely, we humans often cooperate very efficiently in pursuit of immoral goals, genocide, holocaust, organized crime etc. So I would argue that morality cannot be deduced from the fact we are a cooperative species. The ethics of cooperation is enormously complex and vastly under-developed by contemporary moral psychology. My next blog entry will explore the ethics of individual cooperation in collective projects.

Science and Morality

2011-03-15T10:01:00.000-04:00

In my previous blog I argued that morality requires more than praiseworthy moral intent. You must also must exert a reasonable effort to figure out how to effectively and efficiently fulfill that goal: call it a plan. One of the hallmarks of recent human history is that fact that we now know more and can do more, and therefore our individual and collective plans are more likely to be fulfilled more effectively and efficiently. But not all of our plans are morally good.

So why can we do so much more than our Pleistocene forbears? In a word: Science. Although there are many different ways to define “Science,” I prefer to boil it down to its essence. To me (and F.A. Hayek) Science is nothing more than extended, systematized “trial and error.” By this definition, hunter and gatherer societies certainly had Science. These small groups no doubt employed trial and error, but it was much less effective and efficient because the number of “trials” employed in solving any given problem was severely limited; and so was their ability to ability to detect variable degrees of "error." So the hallmark of Modern Science is the sheer number scientists, the ability of those scientists to keep track of what works and what doesn’t work, and the ability to communicate these results to large numbers of other scientists. So Science is about creating large networks of cooperative and competitive inquirers. NOTE: cooperation and competition are not polar opposites, but complementary, necessary conditions for Science. The vast networks of scientists today, are, in fact, markets comprised of "buyers" and "sellers" of information (or what works and what doesn't work). These markets exchange not only time, energy, and resources between buyers and sellers, but they also exchange theories, which are the basic units of information. Competing Scientific theories reside in the networked minds (brains) of communities of scientists. The more scientists the merrier! Thus, the sociopolitical rise of modern scientific inquiry corresponds to the expansion of idea markets beyond small groups of hunters and gatherers. Today we can cooperate and compete in the production of ideas based on trust, not only with our close relatives (kin altruism) and friends (reciprocal altruism), but also with strangers. The initial challenge for the rise of Modern Science was extend the benefits of reciprocal altruism to include strangers. So is it that can we trust strangers? For the rise of Modern Science this entailed creation scientific institutions such laboratories, libraries, and colleges and universities. But it also required the discovery of large-group morality via trial and error. "Hey, wouldn't we all be better off by cooperating and competing with strangers, based on mutually agreed upon rules, than simply going to war with them again?" This moral revolution entailed the cultural acceptance of three abstract rules that constitute large-group morality: don't kill, don't steal, and don't lie. Adherence to those three rules led to the rise of markets, including idea markets.

The rise of these institutions and rules that comprise Modern Science was made possible by the Agricultural Revolution, which marked the decline of small group morality (based on genetic relatedness and friendship) and the rise of large group (modern) morality. Pleistocene scientists expended so much time, effort, and resources hunting and gathering that they were unable to do much science, which explains why human societies remained relatively unchanged for millions of years. In fact, it's hard to deny that conditions of human life has changed more in the last 300 years than the previous 3 million.

Now what about ethics? Ethics is about how benefits and harms are distributed within and between human communities. Obviously, there are more known benefits to be distributed today and more known harms to be avoided. (When I was a kid we used to break thermometers and play with the little balls of mercury!) Unfortunately, Science is amoral in the sense that it is equally proficient in generating harms as it is benefits. Thanks to the rise of Modern Science we can now cure many diseases, build safer buildings, grow more food, travel faster and farther, and communicate more efficiently. But we can also more effectively and efficiently: kill each other (advanced weaponry), steal from one another (identity theft), and disseminate misinformation and disinformation (lie). Scientific lies are especially pernicious. Scientific Fraud is based on lying; that is where scientists falsely report the results of trial and error in order to reap the social and economic benefits that we bestow upon scientists. So Modern Science, or systematized trial and error, has provided modern humans with the opportunity to execute both morally praiseworthy and morally blameworthy plans. The challenge for us today is how to increase the use of Science in the pursuit of praiseworthy goals and minimize its use in pursuit of blameworthy goals.Thus, Modern Science is not exempt from the dictates of large-group morality: don't kill, don't steal, and don't lie. This raises an extremely thorny political problem. What kind of political strategy should political regimes employ in order to maximize the positive impact of science? A Progressive Strategy: increase the power and influence of "good" leaders and followers and the pursuit of good ends by moral, effective, and efficient means. Or, a Libertarian Strategy; decrease the power and influence of bad leaders and followers and the pursuit of bad ends, by immoral, effective, efficient means? I'll try to tackle this problem in my next blog.

Fairness: The Puzzle of "Knowing" and "Doing."

2011-02-11T08:46:00.000-05:00

Why is "Fairness" (and ethics in general) such a complex line of human inquiry? There are many different possible answers to that question. In this blog I will argue that one important, but often neglected, source of moral complexity is the Aristotelian distinction between "knowing what's good" and "doing what's good." Let me start off with a few basics.

First of all ethics is inexorably teleological; that is to say it is about "goal-directed" behavior. It's about how we go about pursuing ends by various means in a social context. Hence, we argue over whether our individual and/or collective goals are "good or bad;" and we argue over whether the means that we employ in pursuit of those goals is "good or bad." Thus fairness, and ethics in general is about knowing what's good and then doing it. For Aristotle, both are necessary conditions for moral action. Sometimes we "know" what's good, can easily do it, but just choose not to do it (which is usually immoral); and sometimes we "do" what's good without "knowing" it (which is amoral). I would argue that at the level of theory, this is all pretty much self-evident and consistent with how we humans go about making moral judgments and assessing moral responsibility, especially fairness.

Second, fairness is ultimately about what we "know and don't know"; and what we "do and don't do." Are you still with me? Let me see if I can clarify this. How often do you find yourself in a situation where you know what's a good goal, such as feeding homeless people, but don't know exactly how to do it. Should I give the old guy panhandling in the Kroger parking lot $5, or should I donate that money a local charitable organization? If I give him $5 I don't "know" if he'll buy food, booze, or drugs. If I give it to a charity, I don't "know" if that charity is legitimate. If the old guy buys a six pack or if the charity pocket's my donation I really didn't do any good. Right? On the other hand, if I want to "know" these things I'll have to expend my own time, energy, and research finding out. My only point here is that moral action requires knowledge and acquistion of knowledge requires time, effort, and resources.

For now, let's assume that we all agree on a universal set of moral ends. For example, my friend Peter Corning identifies 14 basic human needs that any "Fair Society" must address in order to insure human survival: theromregulation, waste elimination, nutrition, water, mobility, sleep, respiration, physical safety, physical health, mental health, communications, social relationships, reproduction, and nurturance of offspring. I happen to agree with this basic list, although I would probably add a few other human "needs" such as: creative and artistic expression and recreation. Now if we all agree that fairness demands that we identify (know) and bring about (bring to fruition) these 14 or so goals, the logical question is how do we go about acquiring the knowledge necessary to achieve them? After all, we could all agree that we "ought" to pursue these goals, and nevertheless fail miserably to achieve them for lack of knowledge. A Fair Society, therefore, must not only "know" what's "Good" but it must also expend time, energy, and resources developing the knowledge necessary to bring about what's good.

Take for example, one of my scholarly interests, "physical health." If we expect to maintain a reasonably healthy population, we obviously must "know" something about how the human body works and how it interacts with our social and physical environment. What kinds of food should we eat and how much? How much and what kinds of exercise do we need to maintain health? How do we avoid and/or cure diseases? This is all "knowledge." Right? But the acquisition of knowledge requires more than a Philosopher King contemplating "Truth." It's much more complex than Plato or Aristotle ever envisioned. It takes many scientists working in expensive laboratories communicating, cooperating, and competing with one another.

So if I'm right (which I am) the production of scientific knowledge is a necessary condition for human need fulfillment. This raises a whole new level of moral analysis. Here are few questions that must be addressed by any Fair Society. Where do we find the time, energy, and resources necessary to conduct scientific research? Where do we find the time, energy and resources necessary to teach scientific research? How do we go about providing incentives that might influence young people to study the natural and social sciences? How do we develop and maintain a sufficient number educational institutions that can effectively teach science to this next generation of scientists? And, finally how do we go about distributing the products and services developed by Science? Should all Americans have equal access to state-of-the-art cancer treatments? Motorized wheel-chairs? Heart transplants? If so, exactly how should that distribution be managed? My conclusion is that we are not going to meet our basic survival needs without investing in scientific knowledge. For health care, we need not only biological knowledge, but also social, political, and economic knowledge. And none of these knowledge bases can be acquired for free. "There is no free lunch!"

Now during the Pleistocene era, out hunter-gatherer ancestors "survived" for centuries without the benefits of modern science. I'm glad they did! In fact, I'm glad that over the past fifty years scientists expended time, energy, and resources studying primitive societies and other primates. Although, primitive societies were probably egalitarian (and therefore met the basic the basic needs of all members of the group, more or less "equally") they really didn't "know" very much. In fact, thanks to modern science, we know they didn't live very long. They certainly didn't know anything about how their bodies worked, or how to identify and cure diseases. They didn't know how to distinguish pure from impure water sources. The fact that they didn't "know" very much suggests that they really couldn't "do" very much, and therefore, they didn't "have very much." Hence, there really wasn't much for them to distribute fairly to begin with, maybe: food, clothing, shelter, a few tools, sex partners. In short, it's easy to be "Fair" in a society that doesn't have much to distribute. If everyone lives to be about 40 years old, and if 25% of women died during childbirth, that's certainly a "Fair Society," but not necessarily "Good." One of the fruits of the Scientific Revolution has been that we "know" a lot more, we can "do" a lot more, and as a result we "have" a lot more to distribute (especially in the area of health). The hidden puzzle for us today is how to keep the "Ball of Science" rolling in a world of "free riders;" that is a world where the cost of the acquistion of scientific knowledge is unequally distributed. We need to "know" much more today; and unfortunately, there is no guaratee that we'll continue to acquire the knowledge we need to survive as modern society. We have to know how to nurture Science.

In my next blog I'll try to make the argument that scientific knowledge requires global cooperation, global scientific institutions and free markets.

The Problem of Future Generations: Part 2

2011-01-23T08:27:00.001-05:00

You probably recall that my previous blog entry ended with the seemingly bizzare suggestion that future generations are the "ultimate strangers." The common thread is that altruism between strangers is difficult to establish and that large-group cooperation based on a social contract must figure out how to convince strangers to cooperate. That claim is based on the two basic forms of altruism: kin altruism and reciprocal altruism. In order to make my "ultimate stranger" argument, I'll employ a simple case study. Suppose you are a morally competent person living in 2011 and you learn that scientists have proven beyond a shadow of a doubt the earth will be uninhabitable in the year 3000 if our generation and all subsequent generations do not cut back on carbon pollution by 50%. Does that fact (is) imply an individual and collective moral obligation (ought) on our part to cut back our carbon-based energy pollution by 50%? Can future generations be included within a social contract framework? Does that future generation have a right to an inhabitable environment? Do we have a duty to sacrifice our individual interest and our generation's interest on their behalf? Do those intermediary future generations between us and 3000 also have that same duty?

Well, back to my initial claim. In what sense is that distant future generation populated by strangers? From the standpoint of kin-altruism, I may have absolutely no genetic stake in that 3000 generation. Why? Well, first of all my two sons are not even married yet, may never get married, and may never have children. None of my nieces have children yet either. So if my specific genetic lineage will end after their generation, why should I turn down my thermostat, buy a high mileage vehicle, and take other actions that benefit that 3000 generation? There goes my personal self-interested incentive. So much for kin-altruism. The only alternative would be to postulate a "general will" that includes future generations. But that would not be kin altruism.

What about reciprocal altruism? That 3000 generation can clearly benefit from John Rawls called our "just savings," but how can they reciprocate? We can scratch the back of future generations but they can't scratch ours. Barring the invention of a time machine (which would facilitate retribution between generations), about the only thing that the 3000 generation can do in retribution is praise or blame us. "Boy, that generation that lived in 2011 neglected to save us 50% of their pollution. What a self-centered, discriminatory generation! They preferred to serve the interest of their own generation at the expense of our generation. That's UNFAIR!" They violated the intergenerational social contract." If we had that time machine, we might leap forward and respond to that indictment as follows: "Heck, we didn't even know that your generation would ever exist? The human species might have been wiped out by a lethal epidemic of swine flu in the year 2999. Moreover, if we had chosen to "save" some clean air for your generation, how could we know if my sons' generation or their kids generation (and all subsequent generations) wouldn't default on that obligation and undo any good that our "savings" might have accomplished? In other words, what happens if those intermediary generations act as free riders and merely spend the "just savings" that my generation withheld on behalf of your 3000 generation?"

First of all, lets admit that there's no easy solution to the problem of future generations. Throughout human history present generations have routinely over-consumed and over-polluted at the expense of future generations. Rawls argued that distant future generations are indeed vulnerable and that we ought to save something for them. However, he also recognized that, in the real world, our incentive to feel a sense of moral obligation toward distant future generations is weak. Therefore, he suggested that we think of intergeneration justice within the bounds of kin altruism. If every generation "saves" enough back for their children and grandchildren, the interests of the 3000 generation would be taken care of over the long run. Unfortunately, that wouldn't work for the case study I proposed, unless near generations also require that 50% just savings.

Now admittedly distant future generations are not the only candidates for the title of "ultimate strangers." Historically, many groups of humans have also been excluded (racial and ethnic minorities, women, children, fetuses, serial killers, lepers, and AIDS patients). So any large-group social contract theory will have to contend with the question of whose interests (small groups or individuals) shall be included or excluded from the contract. We might argue that ugly and/or scary animals (snakes, spiders, bees, and snails) and plants are "strangers" in so far as we are not likely to include them within our anthropocentric social contract framework. Based on evolutionary theory, it is clear that the contract cannot grant priviliged status to humans over plants and animals. Thus, if evolution enlightens social contract theory at all, it is clear that the interests of distant future generations of humans are no more salient than the interests of future generations of plants and animals. In sum, the challenge for any social contract theory is how to overcome not only the "problem of future generations" but also its anthropocentric moorings, which have been empirically discredited by evolution.

The Problem of Future Generations: Part I

2011-01-22T09:06:00.000-05:00

Any attempt to establish a cooperative, inter-generational morality will have to contend with the vexing puzzle known as the "Problem of Future Generations." Although this is vexing for all moral perspectives, it is especially vexing for social contract theories. Let's take a quick look at social contract theory. There are several competing formulations of social contract theory; all of which are all descended from the original eighteenth-century contractarian philosophers: Jean-Jacques Rousseau, John Locke, and Immanuel Kant. The eighteenth century social contract theorists were mostly concerned with the formation of national governments, however, social contract theory, if valid, ought to be equally applicable to the formation of non-governmental groups, especially businesses, military organizations, gangs, families, and sports teams. The two basic questions that face all social contract theories are: "Why join a community?" and "Why stay?" The answers to these questions are usually based on two competing theories (narratives) of human nature: communitarianism and individualism.

Communitarians since Aristotle have argued that human beings live in cooperative groups by nature. The underlying idea behind all social contract theories is that "society" is the product of deliberate cooperation. The rub here is what do we mean my "deliberate?" Back in the eighteenth century Rousseau, a communitarian, argued that human beings living "naturally" in groups develop a "general will" or, what we'd call a "mental mechanism" that predisposes us to act based on the interests of the group, even in opposition to their own self-interest. For now, let's call it altruism.  In other words, human beings living in a "state of nature" deliberately sacrifice their own self-interest for the group. Implicit in this approach is that individual contractors actually "know" specifically what those group interests entail. Here it is important to note that the social contract theorists are are profound philosophers and that their theories are enormously complex. One such complication is how to integrate social organization based on leadership and followership into their theory. In a short blog, I can't get into that right now. But I'll try to cover it later. Sorry. My friend Peter Corning, an excellent contemporary social contract theorist has written a book called The Fair Society that addresses many of the puzzles that confront communitarian social contract theory. I'll examine some of his arguments in a forthcoming entry for the APLS Blog.

Locke, an individualist, argued that the "state of nature" for humans is individual, and that human beings forge groups based on self-interest. Thus, communities that violate the interests of individual members tend to lose members. Why? Because there is no "general will" apart from the wills of the individuals that comprise those groups. Hence, all "wills" are individual and all rights are individual rights. In other words, human beings "cooperate" with others and form "groups" because they deliberately and rationally conclude that at least sometimes, we are "better off" cooperating with some groups rather than others. Therefore, in the absence of a "general will" many communities simply employ coercive force to hold their community together.

Evolutionary ethicists observe that we are most likely to form groups based on "kin-altruism;" that is to say, we are genetically predisposed to cooperate with other human beings that are genetically related to us. Knowledge of genetic relatedness is less certain for males than females, therefore, males must often rely on other sensory cues, most obviously: "Does this other person(s) look enough like me to be my son, daughter, brother, sister, aunt, uncle etc? During the Pleistocene era hunters and gathers lived in small, genetically related kin groups that formed cooperative in-groups. The "general will" for kin-altruism is genetic. So how can the social contract extend beyond kin groups? Cooperative groups comprised of strangers require trust. When Pleistocene in-groups encountered neighboring out-groups that looked very different (call them strangers) they were more inclined to compete (kill them) than cooperate. Thus evolutionarily, one of the main problems for social contract theory is how to explain how strangers can ever become included within any contracting group. There are many possible explanations. One way is to follow Rousseau and postulate a complex "mental mechanism" or brain function that corresponds to a "general will."

Individualists argue that if there is a such thing as a "general will,' it would be revealed in democratic political processes. However, consensus in large groups of strangers is rarely achieved. If there is such a thing as a general will, it is more likely to emerge out of small homogenous groups than heterogenous groups comprised of multiple racial, religious, ethnic groups, or even age groups. Thus modern democratic nation states like the United States have a problem reconciling conflicting "general wills." Therefore, any large-group communitarian social contract theory will have to explain how to develop a national (or global) "general will" that trumps conflicting wills of constitutive small groups, or individuals. Peter covers this as well as any social contract theorist.

Now, back to the problem of future generations...Here's the basic problem. If there is a such thing as a "general will," how can it extend beyond the present generation? After all, future generations are, what I'd call, the ultimate strangers. They don't even exist yet! Does the present generation of contractors have duties toward future generations of humans? Or, in other words, do future generations have rights? If so, what are those rights? We'll cover that in Part II.

Democrats, Republicans and their Narratives: The Tucson Shootings

2011-01-20T08:27:00.000-05:00

The political landscape in the United States is dominated by two political parties, Republicans and Democrats, that embrace competing macro-narratives. Sometimes individuals and coalitions group members within the parties do not always embrace the "official" group narrative, sometimes party leaders change the macro-narrative in order to placate more powerful internal groups avoid extinction via the ballot. Both Republican and Democratic narratives have evolved over time based on internal and external pressures. Those narratives follow four dimensions: liberal-conservative, social-economic. Since the late 20th century, Democrats have been social liberals and economic liberals. Hence, Democrats generally did not try to employ the coercive power of government to regulate social morality on issues such as abortion, gay marriage, drugs etc, but did seek to regulate corporations. Republicans have been social conservatives and economic conservatives. Hence, they try to legislate morality on core issues like abortion, marriage, and drugs; but otherwise did not seek to regulate corporations.

Today the core beliefs of the Democratic Party reflect the interests of a coalition of interest groups that shape their narrative(s). Those groups include: the least advantaged and their advocates, African Americans, public and private labor unions, most college and university professors, and trial lawyers. Traditionally, many of us libertarians vote Democratic because the party has not sought to overtly control our personal lives. However, in recent years the social side of the Democratic narrative has become less liberal.

In the case of the Tucson shooter, the prevailing Democratic narrative might include include some of the following arguments. Since most Democrats today are large group communitarians, that narrative would blame our national social and political environment for the shooting. According to this narrative, Jared Lee Loughner was programmed by a national culture of violence, especially in states like Arizona where political discourse is volatile, guns are easily accessible and can be legally carried and concealed. Some Democrats might also attribute the mass shootings to the the lack of access to mental health services, Arizona's tightening of Medicaid eligibility, or poor mental health coverage offered by private health insurance companies. They may also blame individual Republican political leaders (Sarah Palin), the media (Glen Beck), and lobbying groups (National Rifle Association) for the Arizona shootings. At least some Democrats would hold Walmart International or at least the local Walmart franchise responsible for selling Loughner the ammunition. Most Democrats probably agree that, if we want to prevent terrible future shootings like this, the federal government must control inept, irresponsible state and local governments, gun manufacturers, retail stores, and the right wing media moguls, "for the good of the nation." In short, the social side of their narrative is becoming more conservative.

The Republican narrative is also evolving under both internal and external pressures. The social side of their narrative remains conservative on most core issues however, on other social issues they tend to be more liberal, especially on gun rights and free speech. For Republicans, their most salient internal pressure is how to maintain a political coalition comprised of major corporate interests, evangelical religious groups, and an amorphous (and logically incoherent) body of Tea Partiers. External pressure comes from a growing number of Latin American immigrant voters, and public dissatisfaction with both parties, corporate welfare, and government in general. Republicans have recently adopted select portions of the libertarian individualist narrative, which which attracts corporate cronies, and some (but not all) Tea Partiers, but alienates evangelical protestants. Republicans claim that they are individualists or small group communitarians committed to a small (limited) federal government, and therefore prefer to let individual states, localities, and individuals take responsibility for their own problems. But they only do so as long as it doesn't interfere with their courtship of the lobbying groups that give them the most money: conservative evangelical Protestant groups, NRA, oil companies, and banks. Hence, the Republicans tend to be the main drug warriors. In other words, the Republican narrative is currently incoherent, waffling between social liberalism and social conservatism, and therefore will not have much of an interpretation of the shooting, other than defending gun rights and Walmart. Republicans might argue that the community college officials that expelled him should have notified the police of the shooter's bizarre behavior. His parents, and the school officials might deflect responsibility by saying that the mental health laws in Arizona (and federal guidelines), which were designed by socially liberal Democrats from the 1970s, make involuntary committment almost impossible.
Traditionally, the individualist libertarian narrative is based on social liberalism (toleration) and economic conservatism (free market). The libertarian narrative would avoid all forms of "collective responsibility" and hold Loughner responsible for the Arizona shooting, unless it can be shown that a "brain lesion" caused his aberrant behavior. If there is "shared responsibility" it would be among individuals (leaders and followers), but not abstract groups.

The genious of the U.S. constitution is that it provides a roadmap for principled interaction between competing narratives. In the upcoming months we can expect a barrage of competing narratives on the Arizona shootings. Small groups, large groups, and individuals will rally behind their respective narratives. These narratives will be replicated on media outlets, including radio, television, printed media, and the Internet. The problem for the United States is that we have a cacophony of small group narratives, but only two political parties. Neither of those official narratives resonate with most us. Both parties are currently more interested in defending the rights of internal lobbying groups (cronies) than the rights of individuals. Libertarians continue to embrace social liberalism and economic conservatism, but neither party really tells our story. Many, if not most, libertarians will not vote in the next election.

Narratives: The Story-Telling Instinct

2011-01-17T09:17:00.000-05:00

Not only do human beings live in groups, but they tell stories, or "narratives" within and between those groups. World views, or what I call macro-narratives are grounded in a few "core beliefs," which undergo alternate periods of relative stability followed by gradual and/or revolutionary change. In short, macro narratives evolve over time based on variation and selection. Macro-narratives generate explanations for perplexing past events and serve as the basis for strategies to predict and control future events. Macro-narratives compete with other macro-narratives and micro-narratives. Some competing narratives come from individuals and coalitions of individuals within the group, some come from outside individuals and groups. We all believe that our own individual and group narrative is True and everyone else's is False. In the history of social and political philosophy there are three competing macro-narratives: large group communitarianism (LGC), small group communitarianism (SGC) and individualism. Let's explore these three narratives.

The central core of both LGC and SMC narratives is that individual human actions are described as the product of "social causation." Communitarians embrace the core belief that "groups of individuals" are the basic unit of social analysis and that individuals are, at best, passive participants in group behavior. There is little (or no) accommodation for individual responsibility, only collective responsibility. The puzzle for LGC is that "large-groups" (with many members) are often comprised of "small groups" (with fewer members) that often tell micro-narratives that compete with the official macro-narratives embraced by large groups. The LGC narrative argues that the interests of large groups trump the interests of smaller sub-groups and individuals. How large is large? Some LGC are globalists and argue that morality is universal and therefore the narratives told by nation states, religions, and multi-national corporations are (or ought to be) trumped by narratives of the "global community" as represented by global groups.

Within the political sphere, some LGC are nationalists and argue that the national interests trump the global interests, and therefore they seek to "liberate" their nation from encroachment by the global community. In the United States, many small group communitarians seek to "liberate" individual states from encroachment by the federal government; and many local governments seek to be "liberated" from ever-expanding state and federal governments. Similarly, some private-groups such as corporations, religious groups, even families seek to limit encroachment by local, state, and federal government, and from other competing larger groups. Hence, even for communitarians the concept of "liberty" is central.

So far we've covered some of the various aspects of the communitarian macro-narratives. What about individualism? Individualism macro-narratives argue that individuals are real. Groups, they argue, have no objective "collective identity" apart from the "individual identities" of their particular leaders and followers. Hence, groups are manufactured by individuals. Thus individualism explains collective group behavior in terms of the actions of individual leaders and followers within groups.Individuals, they argue "ought" to be free from coercive power exercised by both large and small groups, unless those individuals harm others (or threaten to harm others). This narrative places the onus of moral responsibility on particular individuals and not on an amorphous concatenation of interacting groups.

In the United States today, our national macro-narrative is in a state of flux. For better or worse, it is dominated by two competing political narratives (as opposed to scientific or religious narratives) in a media driven environment. In my next blog I will argue that our national narrative has been hyjacked by overly simplistic Republican and Democratic narratives.

Trial and Error: the Quest for Cosmic Rationality

2011-01-03T10:11:00.000-05:00

One of the wonders of life on planet Earth is the fact that it continues to thrive. Survival takes place at many different levels: genes, organisms, species, local ecosystems, and our global ecosystem. As scientists continue their quest for that elusive "Theory of Everything," (or TOE) let me offer my own TOE. I'll call it by its most familiar name: "Trial and Error," or TAE. There are two natural correlaries that follow from TAE: P1. "If it's broke, fix it." and P2."If it's not broke don't fix it." In a nutshell, this is how Mother Nature keeps the "ball of life rolling." Biologists call it "natural selection." It's also the basis for what I call cosmic rationality. Unfortunately, humans, both individually and collectively, routinely violate P1 and P2 and therefore undermine cosmic rationality. Here are a few examples.

We violate P1 when we know that "x is broken," we know how to fix it, it's not prohibitively expensive, and we just don't fix it. For example, I "know" that if I eat a lot of sweets, I gain weight fast, especially ice cream. I gained 3 pounds over the Christmas holiday, so how do I fix it? Well, if I'm rational I'll avoid eating sweets. That's the fix! But there are many hidden variables at work here. Suppose I keep eating a lot of sweets every day and don't look in the mirror, or step on the scales, and gain weight without realizing it? Then, another micro-fix is in order. Step on the scales once a week. But as Aristotle observed, we humans often "know the fix" but we unwilling or unable to actually "do the fix." Just because we know that "x is broken," and we know how to fix it, doesn't mean "we'll fix it." Nowadays, almost everything is broken and nothing is being fixed.

Now I know what you're thinking: "Well, Ron...what happens if we don't know how to fix it? My answer is simple: innovate. Try F1. If x "works perfectly" after trying F1, you've fixed it. Do not try F2, F3, F4, or F5 unless you have extra time, energy, and resources. If F1 works, but not very efficiently try F2, F3, F4, or F5. How many cookies a day can I eat before I start to gain weight? Or, how long will I have to walk to burn off those calories? If I discover, via trial and error, that I can eat 312 chocolate chip cookies every day, if and only if, I walk for 12 hours every day on a treadmill, then I'll have to decide whether those cookies are worth it? Or I may decide that I could eat 312 cookies one day a month if I exercise every day for 2 hours. Fortunately, I don't like to eat that many cookies in one sitting so that's not a problem.

So much for cosmic rationality at the individual level. How might it work at the collective, or communal level? We know, for example, that the city of Cincinnati is way over budget on it's public employee pension system. We also know why. Too many city employees (mostly policemen and firemen) pay too little into the system for too long and retired too early, pension administrators have done a poor job of investing funds, and politicians have been reluctant to raise taxes to pay for those cushy, early retirements. We also know the "micro-fixes." Make city employees pay more into their pensions, make them wait until they are 65 before they retire, hire competent pension administrators, and/or elect politicians that are willing to raise taxes on the rest of us, and/or execute a combination of these other micro-fixes. That a classic violation of P1 cosmic rationality.

The Cincinnati Bengals, obviously, need to be fixed again. Why because the "fix" that we tried a few years ago (building them a new stadium) didn't work. We'll be paying for that "non-fix" for a long time. In fact, the Bengals may be "unfixable." In a world ruled by cosmic rationality they would have been weeded out a long time ago by "creative destruction": the natural consequence of not fixing things! Five turnovers in yesterday's game! Of course you may ask, why did I watch to the game? I never said that I'm ALWAYS rational.

Now, back to the beginning. What about P2? "If it ain't broke, don't fix it." I like my teaching job. I get paid well enough, I like to teach, I like what I teach, I like my colleagues, I'm pretty good at it, I hate faculty meetings (but I don't go). Being an astute observor of cosmic rationality, I am not looking for another job. I don't even read the job listings in the Chronicle. Now that I'm back on my normal diet, my weight is going back down. It should level off at 173 by the end of next week. Henceforth, I won't eat a lot of sweets. Two cookies a day in the morning with two cups of coffee. That's about it. No ice cream. "If it ain't broke, I won't fix it." What about those city pensions? City counsel did not "fix" the system, therefore they continue to violate P1.

As for P2. I tried to find one thing that the city of Cincinnati does well enough that it ought not try to fix it. (I need help on that one!) Cincinnati does have several "fixes" in the works that address non-problems. Do we really need another transportation system downtown besides buses, taxis, automobiles, and foot. Do we really "need" an electric trolly car? Transportation is not broke, so don't fix it.

If the city of Cincinnati is a prolific source of P1 violations, the federal government is off the charts. Where do we begin: TSA, FDA, EPA, SEC, Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, the criminal justice system, infrastructure, schools? When everything is broke, and nothing is getting fixed, cosmic rationality goes on vacation, along with our diets.

Is Morality "Natural," or was it "Invented?"

2010-12-29T07:54:00.000-05:00

Here's another question for you: Why do most humans avoid killing, stealing, telling lies, and breaking promises? In other words: why are most of us moral agents? There are basically three competing hypotheses. All three assume that morality is ultimately a brain activity.

The "Good-Natured Hypothesis" (GNH) argues that beginning in the Pleistocene era, (3 million years ago) biological evolution (natural selection and sexual selection) endowed us with a "natural" set of mental mechanisms that facilitate living in small, cooperative groups. Some of these mechanisms are "rational" (located in the outer layers of the brain) some are "emotional" (located in the outer layers of the brain). Despite these mechanisms, it's also obviously true that, today, some of us modern humans still act like Chimpanzees, that is: kill, steal, lie, and break promises? (The question of whether Chimpanzees are good-natured or bad-natured is open to debate.) In fact, some human groups are literally "infected" with immoral behavior: organized crime syndicates, some inner-city neighborhoods, and the Afghan military and police forces. How do these infestations of immorality take root and how can we "cure" them? Based on the GNH, there is a "mismatch" between slow-paced biological evolution (genes) and fast-paced cultural evolution (ideas). If we want to "restore" natural communal cooperation, we need to cure those cultural viruses (bad ideas) so our good nature can shine through again.

On the other hand, the "Bad-Natured Hypothesis," argues that biological evolution has endowed us with a set of mental mechanisms that promote self-interest, predation, and "dog-eat-dog" competition. Cooperation, they argue requires a degree of altruism, which is naturally limited to within families and kin groups. These "selfish genes" tend to impede the formation of cooperative groups, so if we want to improve communal cooperation, we must overcome our bad nature via cultural evolution (good ideas). Our "bad nature" is most clearly evident in the universal persistence of human warfare, murder, theft, lying etc. Despite our best cultural efforts, major parts of the world remain locked in intractable warfare (think: Israelis v. Palestinians, drug lords v. drug lords, democrats v. republicans). Based on the BNH, morality is unnatural, in the sense that it is the product of cultural evolution, or ideas. In other words, at some point in human history, human beings "discovered" that we can overcome these selfish genes via teaching and learning. Imagine the revelation: "Hey you all, listen up...if we really work at it, we can resist our natural impulse to kill, steal, lie, and break promises. Then we can reap the benefits of living in large cooperative communities. Just think: We can free ourselves from incessant hunting and gathering and buy our food at Kroger. No more warfare either! In short, despite our bad nature, we really can 'get along!' "According to the BNH, when we revert back to our "bad nature" all we have to do is develop cultural institutions that can keep them in check, things like: educational institutions, criminal justice systems, political parties etc.

So the "Good-Natured Hypothesis" says that morality is primarily the product of biological evolution, and the "Bad-Natured Hypothesis says that morality is fundamentally the product of cultural evolution. The third hypothesis, which I call the "Good and Bad Natured Hypothesis," GBNH is a hybrid of both, with many variations. Here are two variations.

GBNH Variation #1 argues that human beings have two sets of genetically programmed brain mechanisms. One set constitutes our good nature (genes for: intelligence, reciprocity, feelings of sympathy, etc.); the other our bad nature (genes for: stupidity, predation, lying, cheating, stealing, etc.). Although the good nature mechanisms for cooperation within families tend to be more powerful than the mechanisms cooperation between strangers, both are at least possible. But there's really not much we can do about it, other than discover how those brain mechanisms work and perhaps re-program them via genetic therapy, drug therapy, or maybe brain surgery. Hence, "You scratch my back and I'll scratch yours" can only be enhanced by increasing serotonin and reducing testosterone levels within specific populations either via eugenic programs, drug therapy, or by brain surgery (most likely targeting the limbic system).

GBNH Variation#2 argues that although we have both "good" and "bad" brain mechanisms, we can increase the manifestation of good mechanisms by deliberately altering the environment in which we live. For example, we could move out of those large cities into smaller kin groups of about 150, make sure there enough healthy food to go around (but not too much!), and keep cooperative human males engaged in good groups (such as: schools, churches, sports teams, police and fire departments) and away from bad groups (such as: gangs, organized crime, the military, and the banking industry).

Now here's that initial question again! Are human beings "good natured" or "bad-natured?" Are those "natures" the product of biological evolution, cultural evolution, or both? What, if anything, can we do individually or collectively to maximize our "good nature" (if there is one) and minimize our "bad nature" (if there is one)? As soon as I figure it all out, I'll post in on this blog. It could take a while...

Merit v. Need: The Libertarian Response

2010-12-22T06:38:00.001-05:00

Well what do libertarians say about distributive justice and the conflict between the material principles of fairness, especially merit and need. First, let me reinterate my usual disclaimer. There are many different forms of libertarianism that range from the far-right to the middle-left on the political spectrum. I can't cover that whole spectrum in a blog. But I can sketch in one basic line of argument.

In general most libertarians view "Fairness" in the context of the rules that govern competition; call it procedural justice. Competition is fair if and only if everyone plays by the same rules. For example, the game of baseball is "fair" to the extent that the rules apply equally to everyone that plays the game: "Three strikes, you're out!." Now, suppose the number of strikes afforded each player varied based on need. "Ron White is coming up to bat for the Cincinnati Reds. He's 60 years old, near-sighted, cross-eyed, has a stigmatism, and poor hand-eye coordination. So out of fairness, the umpire decided that Ron "needs" 11 strikes." Now would that be fair? Well, Joey Votto might argue that it's unfair to him because he was only afforded 3 strikes. On the other hand, Ron might argue that Joey comes to bat armed with a set of "natural advantages" that he doesn't deserve; natural attributes like: youth, uncanny vision, extraordinary hand-eye coordination, and the ability to concentrate on hitting the ball with runners on base. He also comes to the plate with years of practice and experience. Call it merit. While Joey was practicing hitting, Ron was reading and teaching philosophy. So if Ron and Joey were afforded three strikes each, regardless of their natural and acquired abilities, Joey would win the batting title and Ron would win the strikeout title. However, if Ron were given 11 strikes and Joey 3, Ron would argue that it's only fair based on need.

Now here's the problem. Why would Ron choose to compete in a game where the existing rules are stacked against him? If he chose to give up his teaching job to tryout for the Cincinnati Reds, and didn't make the team whose fault is it? Ron might argue that the rules of baseball discriminate against the elderly and/or the visually impaired. Joey might argue that giving Ron 11 strikes discriminates against Joey. After all, it's not Joey's fault that he's younger than Ron, has better eyesight, and better hand-eye coordination. So how do we go about resolving this apparent conflict over fairness between merit (allowing Joey to benefit from unearned attributes) and need (allowing Ron to benefit from the lack of those attributes)?

There are many different ways to look at this. I would argue that the Cincinnati Reds are the property of the owners of the team. If they want to bench Joey and let Ron play first base and hit third, it's their team. But who would choose to watch a baseball game where incompetent hitters are given 11 strikes? (The game is already slow enough!) Even though Ron agreed to a salary of a mere $100,000 a year, the nature of the game would shift from exhibiting merit to exhibiting need. No one would come to the games and MLB would go bankrupt. So barring any court ordered affirmative action, Ron's dream of becoming a Cincinnati Red has been thwarted by the rules of the game, and Joey Votto is likely to earn millions of dollars. But now we have Ron, who gave up his teaching job to pursue a career in Major League Baseball, and is now unemployed. Should he be able to draw unemployment? He bought new glasses and still spends all day in the batting cages practicing his swing and contacting other teams for an opportunity to tryout. But they refuse to even let him tryout! Should Ron get himself a lawyer and sue MLB for discrimination based on merit? What do you think? Is baseball a micrcosm of life or is it something else? Are natural attributes distributed more or less equally, even though they are highly variable? Is it up to us to choose occuptions that match our natural attributes? If Ron gets his teaching job back, would it be fair to pay Ron less than Joey? After all, the only basis for his merit is his ability to hit a ball, but he can only do it 33% of the time?

The Struggle for Fairness: Merit v. Need

2010-12-19T07:17:00.000-05:00

The question of how to effectively employ the powers of the state to bring about a Fair Society is the "bread and butter" issue of all social and political philosophers. There are two underlying distinctions that cloud our understanding of the distribution of benefits and costs among humans: natural distribution and social distribution.

First of all, Nature provides all of us with a set of natural advantages and natural disadvantages that affect how we we fare in a Darwinian world. As John Rawls noted, these advantages and disadvantages are distributed based on a "natural lottery," which is partly genetic (lucky draw of genes) and partly social (lucky draw of parents and society). Given that nature "distributes" these advantages and disadvantages randomly, it's hard to argue that any of us "deserve" our current economic status. In other words, Mother Nature is not fair, because she blindly stacks the cards either in our favor, against us, or both. Therefore, social and political philosophers on the left, like Karl Marx and John Rawls, argue that the purpose of government is to use the coercive power of government to redistribute benefits and costs. Since merit (adaptive attributes such as high IQ and good looks) and need (maladaptive attributes such as low IQ and ugliness) are distributed unfairly, leftists argue that the purpose of government is to redistribute the fruits of the natural lottery. Call it: economic security.

So how do we go about this social redistribution process? Well, Aristotle identified four material principles of fairness: merit (the best get the most), need (the neediest get the most), equality (everyone gets the same), and utility (the distribution that affords the "greatest happiness for the greatest number"). Aristotle, a natural law theorist defended meritocracy, where all social structures are designed to make sure that the advantaged get the most and the least advantaged get the least: "the best get the most and the worst get the least." Any society that varies from this standard is unfair. He argued that the needs of the least advantaged are to be met by the virtuous acts (beneficence) of the meritocrats. But if neither merit nor need is deserved, neither is virtue." Not only did my parents pass on bad genes, they also failed to teach me virtue!" Therefore, how can I be held morally responsible for robbing that Quicky Mart last week? After all, I needed the money and the owner of the that store that I robbed inherited that successful business, along with a high IQ and good looks. So he didn't "deserve" that money, either.

Rawlians and Marxists solve this merit v. need struggle by using the coercive power of government to take a certain percentage of the store owners income and giving it to me, so I won't have to steal it in order to meet my needs. Marx (and B.F. Skinner) dismissed private property all together and argued that all goods are social goods, and therefore ought to be redistributed equally by a panel of government experts. Rawls argued that the most advantaged ought to be forced to contribute to a "basic safety net" or provide a social minimum to protect the least advantaged. Rawls, therefore, allows the most advantaged to prosper, but only as long as the social distance between the rich and the poor either diminishes or does not increase. The rich cannot get richer, if the poor get poorer as a result of a natural distribution.

So the common strategy employed by left-wing Marxists and Rawlsians is to use the power of government to eliminate or lessen the consequences of natural inequality. Now what do right-wing libertarians say about all this? Well, they present a long list of counter-arguments. Next time, I'll sketch in a few of them. Stay tuned.

Complexity and Central Planning

2010-12-04T05:47:00.000-05:00

Another bone of contention between socialists and libertarians centers of the political implications of natural complexity. Here's heart of the issue: If Nature is a vast network of complex adaptive systems conditioned by unpredictable emergent properties, then what are the implications for public policy? In general, there are two political options: the political right embraces "central planning" and the right defends "de-centralized planning."

Beginning in the twentieth century, a variety of philosophers and scientists began to develop a systems ontology, which identified "systems" as the basic units of ontic reality. Typically, systems theorists differentiate between macrosystems (the Amazon Rain Forrest) and microsystems (species and organisms that live in the Amazon Rain Forrest), non-living systems and living systems, relatively simple, closed systems, and more complex open systems. Complexity spawns emergent properties that are explicable (in terms of systems theory), but are inherently unpredictable and uncontrollable. To make a long discussion short, most biologists agree that even the simplest living organisms exhibit enormously complexity and that ecological systems like the Amazon Rain Forest are exhibit infinite complexity via interacting open living and non-living sub-systems. Enter the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers... To what degree should we "trust" the ACE to redesign our natural ecosystems, especially wetlands?

If human communities are comprised of a number of at least two infinately complex human brains networked together in an infinate number of interacting networks (communities); and, if the behavior of those macrosystems (neighborhoods, cities, states, nations etc.) is influenced by what happens in the microsystems (neurons, brains, human organisms, and families), and if what happens in the microsystems is shaped by what happens in the macrosystems, and what happens in BOTH are influenced by what happens in other systems in the environment, then what are the political ramifications?

Central planning implies a Newtonian interpretation of Nature that assumes that Nature is ultimately a complex"clocklike" mechanism that can be fixed and/or redesigned by "engineers." They argue that since the world is a mechanism (closed system) that can be fully described in terms of deterministic laws of nature, once we discover these laws we'll be able explain, predict, and control all aspects of human nature.

Most behaviorists are Newtonians, but argue that we really don't have to know exactly what goes on within the human brain to predict and control human behavior. All they need to know are systemic inputs and outputs. But the underlying premiss is the same for all Newtonians: human behavior is ultimately explicable, predictable, and controllable, once we discover the deterministic laws that govern human behavior.

De-Centralized planning is based on a Darwinian interpretation of Nature, where unpredicatable emergent properties at the micro-cosmic levels (genes, organisms, species) condition organization at the macrocosmic levels (ecosystems). Beginning in the late 19th century, philosophers like Charles Sanders Peirce, began to seriously question whether complexity is merely a reflection of our ignorance of the true laws of nature, or whether there's an irreducible element of chance in the universe. Today we know that the human brain is an enormously complex system comprised of many identifiable, interacting subsystems. We also know that when these brains get together and form complex networks we create communities and cultures that exhibit mind-bogglingly complexity. If brains and networks of brains generate mind-boggling complexity, what can we say about economics?

Classical, Neo-Classical, and Keynsian economists are Newtonians. Darwinians (that accept the metaphysical assumption that Nature is conditioned by a degree of chance) reject the Newtonian assumption that Nature is ultimately a deterministic closed machine describable in precise mathematical calculus, and by implication they also question the human capacity to re-engineer or re-design Nature from the "Top Down." This is the underlying theme of Austrian macro-economic theory as described by Mises and Hayek.

So here are the basic ontological issues. Are the laws of nature that describe human genetics and economics ultimately like the laws that govern the movement of the planets in our solar system, or are those laws qualitatively different? If we knew the precise laws of Nature that underlie human brain activity, would we be able explain, predict, and control individual human behavior, community behavior, and cultural behavior with the same same degree of accuracy as we can explain, predict, and control the boiling of water? And, if we "could" someday redesign Nature, does that mean that we can do it now, and does that imply that we "ought" to do it? If so, what "ends" ought those re-design efforts pursue? Now there's a homework assignment for you! Have fun.

A Living Wage

2010-12-02T07:44:00.000-05:00

Another bone of contention between libertarians and welfare liberals is the idea that all workers "ought to" be paid a "living wage." What might that entail?

Beginning with Plato but mostly with Aristotle, philosophers have acknowledged two different kinds of principles: formal principles and material principles. Untangling confusion between these two different kinds of principles accounts for about 2500 years of the history of philosophy. Aristotle distinguished between the formal principle of justice ("Treat equals equally and unequals unequally") and the various material principles of justice (merit, need, equality, social utility). Everyone agrees that the formal principle captures the essence of what we mean when we say "X is fair" or "X is unfair." The formal principle captures the "idea" of justice. The material principles of justice are basically the principles that human beings living in the "material world" employ to decide how the formal principle applies to the distribution of social goods. Thus, when we say "X is fair" we "really" mean that it's fair based on one (or more) of the material principles. So, if you own a corporation and want to pay your workers "fairly," you will have to specify a material principle.

Suppose you decide that you decide that you want to pay your workers a "fair wage," how would you proceed? Well, the formal principle says that morality requires adhering to the formal principle and at least one specific material principle. Aristotle thought social goods "ought to be" distributed based on "merit." In a fair society, "the best get the most," regardless of need, equality, or utility. Egalitarians would pay everyone the same salary, regardless of merit, need, or utility. Welfare liberals would base salaries on need, and would ignore merit, equality, and utility. So suppose we decided that every corporation in the United States must pay their employees based on "need," or what welfare liberals might call a "living wage," what might that entail?

Well generally, a living wage entails paying your workers enough to meet their basic needs, which requires a material distinction between needs and wants. Needs are often associated with "a positive right to life," which implies a duty to provide a wages sufficient to cover things like: food, clothing, and shelter. In the United States today we'd probably include a right to health care, retirement, disability insurance, and unemployment insurance. But let's forget all that for now, and just focus on food, clothing, shelter, and maybe transportation. Let's tackle a hypothetical case study.

White Widget Inc. employs 10 workers. Ron want's to provide all of them at least a "living wage." He just now hired George, who has sole custody of five children. How would Ron set that initial pay scale. Well, he'd be morally required to provide enough wages to feed his family. How would Ron calculate how much George needs to feed his family? Should he go to Kroger and figure out how much it would cost to provide meals a week? Let's assume, that Ron wants George's family to be healthy so he decides to pay him enough for him to buy a daily portion of chicken or fish, fruits, vegetables, and whole grains. Let's say it costs $3 per meal x 3, or $9 per day per family member, or $54 a week per family member, x 6 family members or $324 a week.
For the sake of argument, let's assume that George's family already has enough clothes. What about shelter? If Ron want's to pay enough for shelter, how much would that entail? Should Ron pay enough to rent a house or buy a house? Should every member have their own room? Let's say Ron is generous and pays enough for George to rent a six bedroom house for $250 a week. Now, unfortunately that house is 10 miles from the widget factory, so George will need transportation. Let's say that the house is on the bus route and the ride costs $2 a day x 5 or $10 a week. So right now that living wage stands at $584 a week or about $14 an hour. But wait...three of George's kids are under 5 years old and need day-care. But George lucked out and found a neighbor that would watch his this kids for $40 a week, a real bargain. So Ron decides to pay George $13 an hour to sweep the floors at White Widget Inc.

Now George goes to Kroger and spends $500 on frozen pizza, ice cream, Coca Cola, chips, Hostess Twinkies. Then he goes out and buys a new Toyota Camry for $25,000 so he doesn't have to ride the bus, and decides to send his two older children to a private school for $10, 000 a year each. And of course, George also starts buying $100 worth of lottery tickets a week. Now George can't pay his rent.

So if Ron wants to pay George a "living wage," how much a week should Ron pay George? Mary, a much more productive worker, also gets paid a "living wage" but lives within her means. Should Ron pay George more, less, or the same wages as Mary?

Markets

2010-12-01T07:58:00.000-05:00

One of the fundamental points of contention between libertarian and socialist philosophers is their views on "The Market." As a philosopher, let me try to clear away some of the noise that impedes rational discussion.

First of all, the term "market" is ubiquitous. Everyone likes to talk about it but they are rarely talking about the same thing. I'm one of the few philosophers that "hangs out" with economists, so I've obviously been influenced by them. However, even economists often fall prey to ubiquity. So here's my philosophical analysis based on what I've stolen from philosophers and economists.

More than anything else "markets" are the natural consequence of scarcity. Our lives are finite. Although there are 24 hours in a day, I usually sleep 8 hours out of that which means I have 16 hours a day to "do things." The average lifespan of the average American is about 78 years old. My genes suggest a shorter lifespan for me. Thus, every day I have to deal with this "time market," which means I have to decide how to spend the rest of my life. Right now I'm writing a blog entry. There are costs associated with that decision. I could spend this time preparing for a meeting one hour from now, grading exams, or playing guitar. In other words there are "opportunity costs" associated with me writing this blog. You are reading this blog. There are other things you could be doing with your time. That's why I appreciate the fact that you're reading it! After all, there are thousands of other bloggers on the Internet. You could have spent this time reading their blogs, watching television, or taking a walk. Taken together, there is a "blog market" where us bloggers compete for readers with finite time, energy, and resources. I sell Freedom's Philosopher on that market, you bought it. No money was exchanged, but you bought it with "time and effort." No one forced you to read it, and no one forced me to write it so here we are participating on that free market. I also read several blogs on a regular basis and spend time and energy commenting on those blogs. Writing and reading blogs is a form of cooperation.

My blog also participates in another market. The market of "ideas." Since the nineteenth century, philosophers have been participating in an "extended" market across several generations comprised of competing "ideas." My blog ideas usually relate to the nature of government and it's role in human affairs, however, I also expend time and energy thinking about and writing about health care policy. In fact, my mind is a marketplace of competing ideas. Right now I'm thinking about markets. My blog competes with, not only with other libertarian blogs, but also with Marxist and anarchist blogs. The beauty of the Internet (as it currently exists in the United States) is that the "idea market" can thrive. No one forces us bloggers to blog and no one forces you to read them. Consequently, there is a lot of variety on the Internet, which is a huge marketplace of ideas. (It's also a great place to buy books and guitars!) Unfortunately, you can't read every blog on the Internet market because of the natural scarcity of time, energy, and resources. If I spend too much time writing and reading blogs, my wife will get mad at me and my students will complain that I'm unprepared for class. In fact I have to end this blog right now and go to that meeting. I wonder if anyone will notice that I didn't prepare for it?

Evolutionary Epistemology

2010-11-26T07:00:00.000-05:00

Let's talk metaphysics. There are two longstanding strands of metaphysical inquiry: ontology (inquiry into the basic elements and forces that constitute the universe); and epistemology (inquiry into what we can know about the universe and how we can know it.) Materialism attempts to reduce epistemology to "material things" such as brains, neurons, molecules, or atoms. Idealism atempts to reduce epistemology to "mental things" such as feelings, thoughts, memes, beliefs, theories or in more recent parlance "information." Hence, contemporary ontologists that embrace complex adaptive systems theory as a monistic theory, and thereby avoid Cartesian dualism (and the mind body problem) reduce reality to either matter (and/or energy) or information. Now the most fundamental question of metaphysical inquiry is whether scientists can develop a freestanding ontology that explains the nature of information; or whether ontology presupposes epistemology. Evolutionary epistemologists like Peirce and Popper argue that knowledge of Truth and Value (the primary targets of epistemology inquiry) evolve based on variation and selection. What is the evidence? The history of individual and collective belief systems.

Individual minds and collective minds accumulate beliefs over time whereby old beliefs compete with new beliefs. Hence, the metaphysical beliefs that currently occupy my individual mind have survived 60 years of variation and selection. Many of those beliefs are collective beliefs that I've replicated from previous cultures, I've also replicated other cultural beliefs that have emerged more recently, such as systems theory. I hope that some of my individual metaphysical beliefs get replicated by the larger community of scholars that study evolution. Of course, Darwins' beliefs have been replicated across many different scholarly disciplines: evolutionary biology, evolutionary psychology, evolutionary ethics, and evolutionary politics. Before Darwin, Aristotle ruled the roost! All of those scholarly disciplines are comprised of individual minds that share new beliefs and old beliefs (information) within networked groups. Beliefs that survive competition between old and new beliefs are deemed True.

Peirce argued that the basic elements of "The Fixation of Belief" are the feelings of belief and doubt. Of course, today social psychologists and neuropsychologists generate theories that identify the various mechanisms that underlie those processes. They write scholarly papers and books hoping to "sell" those beliefs (literally and figuratively) to scholarly communities and/or the community at large. But all human communities are generally hostile to new ideas, just like Nature is hostile to most genetic mutations. Peirce argued that humans (individually and collectively) literally "love" their beliefs and want to share them with others. But fast-paced, full-blown, sustained intellectual revolutions within large communities of networked minds are pretty rare. Most intellectual revolutions (individual and collective) are slow, incremental, and temporary. After all, we all prefer to bask in the truth of our beliefs and seek to avoid the unpleasant feelings of doubt. In fact, most full-blown scientific (intellectual) revolutions take place only after the minds (and bodies) of the defenders of the previous theories die off. Inexplicably, there are still a few members of the Flat Earth Society, Klu Klux Klan, and Nazi Party. As long as they don't force the rest of us to join their groups, or harbor their beliefs they will eventually suffer extinction.

I "love" the theory of libertarianism. I belong to to several groups that share those beliefs, including: the Independent Institute, Institute for Humane Studies, and the Reason Foundation. We don't all agree on everything. Some libertarians are anarcho-capitalists (reject all government) and some are minarchists (reject big governmment). Because we all tend to hang out together, especially on the Internet, we do not always subject ourselves to other new beliefs that might raise doubts about our old beliefs. A real libertarian deliberately embraces variation of belief and is even willing to defend the rights of welfare liberals and Marxists in an "Open Society." Evolutionary epistemology requires a free market of beliefs, and therefore defends free inquiry more than any one set of beliefs. The ultimate Truth emerges out of what Peirce called the evolutionary process of "Human Inquiry," what Popper called "Conjecture and Refutation," and what Hayek called the "Extended Order."

Scientific and Moralistic Positivism

2010-11-20T07:16:00.001-05:00

How can we know what's True and/or what's Good? Philosophers call this area of inquiry epistemology. There are two untenable theories: positivism and constructivism. Positivists argue that human beings can know timelessly universal scientific and/or moral facts, which correspond to reality. A statement is true if it corresponds to the facts. Correspondence is detemined based on a verification process. Hence, positivists argue that "if X is true, than it's true in all times and all places." And/or, "If X is good, it's good in all times and all places." And of course, we all seek these timelessly universal "True Beliefs," and when we think we've got one, we arduously embrace those "facts." A world of timelessly universal facts is highly coveted, but profoundly naive. The other untenable epistemological theory is called constructivism, which argues that Truth and/or Goodness are manufactured by sociopolitical forces. Hence, our beliefs are are relative to time (historical relativism), or place (cultural relativism). Most constructivists are either historians or sociologists. So are there epistemological theories that avoid both positivism and constructivism?

Most libertarians embrace evolutionary epistemology as proposed by Charles Sanders Peirce and Karl Popper. The basic idea is that our individual and collective beliefs evolve over time based on variation and selection. Hence, they reject the verification process in favor of a falsification process, or "creative destruction." Why? Because we can never know when the verification process is over (the problem of induction). How many experiments must we conduct before our theory is finally verified. Peirce and Popper, therefore argued that, although we cannot know the Truth, we can know what's False. Therefore, when we say "X is true," what we're really saying is that "X hasn't yet been falsified." The goal of human inquiry is to dethrone false theories. Over time, our individual and collective beliefs get closer to the Truth, but never achieve finality. So what are the social implications of evolutionary epistemology?

Scientific and moralistic positivists typically claim unqualified authoritative dominion over others based on what they "know," that is "The Truth" and/or "The Good." Finality: it's over! "I know the Truth or the Good, and you don't. I'm the ultimate authority, therefore, you must submit to that authority and bestow up me, the social privilages that I deserve." Libertarians, resist the temptation to coronate timelessly universal "experts." Expertise is inexorably fallible, but not necessarily socially constructed. Libertarians, therefore, question both scientific and moral authorities. Why? Because they forge monopolies.

Theories and experts become authoritative when they dominate any given market. The sellers of theories profit most when their theories gain monopolistic status, which can be achieved via either persuasion or coercion. Theories become natural monopolies when they explain, predict, or control phenomena better than other competing theory and therefore attract a critical mass of buyers based on emotive and/or rational persuasion. Artificial monopolies attract and maintain buyers not by persuasion (emotion or reason) but by coercion, which usually prevents exposure to falsification. Thus there is a difference between "selling" theories of Truth and Goodness within a competitive market of ideas and "forcing" others to buy those theories. The most efficient way to establish an artificial knowledge monopoly is to deploy the coercive power of government via the criminal justice system, which often protects artificial monopolies. That's how theories become ideologies and scientists and moralists become ideologues: by using their enhanced sociopolitical status as justification for exercising coercive force over non-believers. Both Science and Religion can easily fall into the hands of ideologues.

The "Is" and the "Ought"

2010-11-16T07:01:00.000-05:00

As I wind up my research on Leadership Ethics I have become more convinced of the centrality of the distinction between facts (is) and values (ought), and how they are related. As social psychologists continue to uncover the mental mechanisms that comprise our "moral psychology," it becomes increasingly evident that we still do not really know what to make of these scientific truths. Here are the basic questions: How does empirical knowledge about mental mechanisms elucidate everyday moral problems? If we knew all of the "facts" that underlie our moral feelings, thoughts, and behaviors, would we also know all of the "values" that ought to guide us? Before we get started, let's clear the air of two fallacies. The naturalistic fallacy says that "facts" determine "values" and that empirical knowledge alone elucidates knowledge of moral goodness. The moralistic fallacy says that knowledge of "values" (moral facts) trumps knowledge of "facts" and/or that "facts" are merely values in "disguise. Most moral psychologists deny that either the naturalist fallacy or the moralistic fallacy is a fallacy. So how does libertarianism approach the is/ought distinction?

First of all, thoughtful libertarians like Karl Popper, F.A. Hayek and myself (;D) deny that there are (in fact) either scientific facts or moral facts. The word "fact" carries with it an aura of finality: "We know the Truth, therefore, we must act on it. If it's True, it's True forever." Libertarians argue that knowledge of facts and values is highly fallible and therefore must be subjected to constant revision. Why? Well, because scientists, like everyone else, are prone to make mistakes and/or succumb to the influence of power structures. Science and ethics, therefore, are about establishing a self-correcting system that uncovers both factual errors and value-errors wrought by ideological corruption. The early libertarians were the first to attack the scientific positivists and the moral positivists by insisting on continued inquiry, even when scientists and moralists insist that they've got it right. That means that thoughtful libertarians are reluctant to bestow unquestioned authority on either scientists or moralists. We are not skeptics or cynics. Our allegiance is not to particular scientific or moral truths but to self-correcting epistemic processes that weed out error and ideological contamination of what's presented as unassailable scientific and moral facts. How does all of this work? I'll have to cover that later. I have a class in 10 minutes and a stack of essays to grade before I can do much else.

Nationalism v. Globalism

2010-11-14T08:18:00.000-05:00

Check out my friend Peter Corning's most recent blog entry on "Fair Trade" on his FAIR SOCIETY blog and my comment. http://www.thefairsociety.net/

Who says: "Money can't buy Happiness?"

2010-09-23T05:05:00.001-04:00

I saw this in Science News. http://www.world-science.net/othernews/100908_happiness

What is Happiness?

2010-09-08T07:25:00.000-04:00

Aristotle's philosophy is based on two naturalistic principles: centrality and hierarchy. Both play a key role in his theory of happiness. Both are empirically dubious and tend to undermine personal liberty.

For Aristotle, everything in nature has a goal or purpose. Excellence of anything, therefore, refers to the fulfillment of function or purpose. What end or purpose do all humans pursue? Aristotle argues that happiness is the supreme "end" of all human action. Humans have three kinds of souls: vegetative (appetitive), animal (spirited), and human (rational). We are qualitatively superior to other species because of the presence of that "higher" rational soul. Thus we have the basis for over two thousand years of anthropocentrism. And unfortunately, Aristotle never empirically verified the existence of these three souls. They are really explanatory constructs. Today we know that these functions (along with many other functions) are performed by our brains and spinal cords. But anyway... Aristotle attributed our human nature to this "higher" rational soul. Like Plato, Aristotle argued that in the sphere of human action, the function of that "higher soul" is to control the other two "lower souls."

Aristotle was also intellectually infatuated with the "middle" or "centrality." Everything good, naturally, resides in the middle. Hence, the earth must be the center of the universe. Moral virtue, therefore lies midway between the vices of excess and deficiency. Thus the "Good Life" is one of moderation in all spheres of deliberate human action. When faced with fear, the virtue of courage is bordered by both foolhardiness and cowardice. Then, Aristotle goes on to identify many other spheres where virtue might be exercised. Virtue is also contextual. Again, doing the right thing requires you to "do it" at the right time (not too early, not too late), at the right place, and right degree (not too much, not too little.

So everything that we deliberately pursue aims at the goal of happiness. Unfortunately, not everything we pursue actually leads to happiness. We all make mistakes by going after the wrong things, at the wrong place, and/or wrong degree. (But that doesn't necessarily disprove his general hypothesis.) He argues that there are three main ways that humans pursue happiness, or the "Good Life:" a life in pursuit of pleasure (experience), a life in pursuit of honor (military), a life in pursuit of wisdom (contemplation). For now, let's focus on the pursuit of pleasure. Aristotle, distinguishes between the experience of higher and lower pleasures. Unfortunately, he wrongly believed that only humans are capable of experiencing the higher intellectual pleasures. Higher intellectual pleasures are qualitatively and quantitatively superior to lower pleasures, which are the products of our "lower" nature. Thus, if we never experience higher pleasures we are not fulfilling our higher purpose, and therefore are not really happy. Even if we believe we're happy! I suspect that Aristotle would say that the vast majority of humans do not live happy lives, even though they believe they are happy. After all, most humas are not capable of living happy lives because they lack either the natural intelligence or the moral training to be virtuous. Three final caveats: First, it is natural (and good) for "virtuous people" to rule. Second, you cannot be the judge of your own happiness. It requires third-party verification. And Third, happiness can only be predicated over a lifetime, therefore, a happy life can only be identified by third parties after you're dead. Thus young people have only the potential to be happy. But if you are 21 years old and still lack moral virtue, that potential is rather low. And, of course, it's natural (and good) for old people to rule over young people. (Right now I won't go into his idea than men ought to rule over women and animals.)

Aristotle is challenging for any libertarian. Why? There's a lot of good, old-fashioned common sense! He's obviously right in affirming that we're rational animals that live in cities. It's also probably true that a life of moderation is more likely to contribute to at least a long life. But then, most of us acknowledge that many "good lives" are posthumously valued because they have been cut short. However, libertarians are obviously concerned with his propensity to defend natural social hierarchies, which tend to concentrate power in the "upper classes." Overall, there is no necessary reason for a libertarian to reject virtue-based ethics. After all, it's your life. However, we are concerned with your political views, especially if seek to set yourself up (and/or your cronies) in that "higher" social status, and rule over the rest of us.

My next blog entry will delve deeper into the question of whether happiness requires third-party attribution by outside experts, and whether that determination must be post-mortem.

Happiness: Introductory Remarks

2010-09-07T07:38:00.000-04:00

I use the Freedom's Philosopher blog to develop libertarian theories that address important issues in social and political philosophy. I recently tried my hand at leadership. I thought it would be worthwhile to explore the question of "happiness." I'm in the process of re-reading Aristotle's NICOMACHEAN ETHICS for my course on Human Nature, and I'm reading Sissela Bok's new book, EXPLORING HAPPINESS. In a few days I should be ready to embark on that endeavor. I'll probably address three main issues raised by Aristotle, which are also covered by Bok. What are the basic theories of happiness that have been offered by philosophers? Can we know whether we are happy or not without input from others? And, what is the relationship between morality and happiness? The next three blog entries will tackle these basic questions.

Legality and Morality

2010-08-21T07:15:00.000-04:00

Prescriptive human inquiry explores the basis for normative human behavior guided by "norms." Philosophers often distinguish between two spheres of normative activity: "legalty" and "morality." Political philosophy focuses on how organized societies employ these two alternative means of social control. Liberal societies tend to rely more on on morality, communitarian societies tend to rely more on legality. Let's sort out these two basic concepts a little bit.

Individual human beings are planners by nature; that is, we are goal-directed animals that have the ability to deliberately alter our present behavior in order to bring about a preferable future state of affairs. Social psychologists argue that although we are capable of altering our own goal-directed behavior for the sake of the future, we're not very good at it, and therefore we tend to live more in the present or near future. (There are evolutionary reasons for this that we explore later.) Living in social groups requires placing limits on at least some forms of individual behavior. All groups employ the use of painful disincentives (or sticks) and pleasurable incentives (or carrots). Legality and morality represent two different ways that societies and social groups to use those sticks.

Legality enforces rules, primarily, by punishing rule violations with painful dinincentives. Historically, societies have used physical pain (whipping), killing (hanging), deprivation of resources (fines), and incarceration (jail time). The degree of punishment has always been set in proportion to seriousness of the rule violation (or crime): "An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth." The rules that are monitored and enforced by any given group, reflect the values of the central planners. The Taliban's recent execution (by stoning) of a young couple for elopement, reflects the "value" that it places on the rules that govern marriage. The United States government still imposes longer sentences for drug offenders that use "crack cocaine" than for "powdered cocaine." (Don't ask me why!) Legality is obviously enormously complicated. Justice requires that rule violations must be deliberate, and therefore enforcers must decide the degree of voluntariness involved in the rule violation. Individuals that are declared "incompetent" are given lighter sentences, or placed under the control of psychiatrists rather than prison guards or executioners. The laws themselves are written by "lawmakers," in an obscure language that only lawyers can understand (sometimes they can't even understant it!), which means that questions of guilt or innocence are shaped by credentialized lawyers and judges, who control the processes of criminal justice. Some laws are so vaguely written that it's difficult if not impossible to decipher the lawmakers' original intent. Old laws are especially problematic. The courts generally rely on tradition to resolve these vague cases by referring to previous "legal precedents." In the end, judges and juries decide matters of guilt or innocence and the degree of punishment. Of course, the more laws that are being enforced, the more difficult it is for individuals to know what's illegal. And finally, most societies have processes by which convicted rule-breakers can appeal to another judge or jury. We can go on-and-on...but the point here is that legality is one way that human beings enforce rules that shape social behavior.

Morality is different. First of all, morality (by definition) is not enforced by any one single centralized entity: otherwise it becomes legality. Morality naturally arises from personal and group relationships. In it's purest form the rules of morality spontaneously emerge out of specific social contexts. We praise good behavior and blame bad moral behavior. Blameworthy behavior is discouraged by public sentiment, and not by physical threats to person or property. Public sentiment can be applied in various ways such as "labeling" the person that violate the rules, labels with negative connotations such as: whore, cad, tight-wad, drunk, or addict. Sentiment also includes punishing violations by individually and collectively treating that person as less valuable than others, including the practice of "shunning." The specific rules of morality tend to be rather stable because they get locked into bodies of tradition via teaching and learning. In fact, many individuals justify moral rules based on tradition alone: "We've always done it that way." But over the long run, moral rules evolve based on variation and selection. In the United States we do not regard having children out of wedlock as immoral or ilegal, although we do not think its very prudent. We certainly don't stone them. The advantage of relying on morality to insure social cohesion is that it does not require the formentioned expensive legal institutions: policemen, lawyers, judges, prison guards, and executioners. A moral society is "self-organized."

The nature of any society is based how much morality is monitored and enforced via legality. Minarchist libertarians, like myself, seek to limit the sphere of legality to harm to persons or property. Hence, limit legality to controlling murder, theft, and fraud. Communitarian societies tend to monitor and enforce much of their moral codes via the coercive power of legality, including . In countries like this, the legal codes become enormous, and the costs of monitoring and enforcement rise proportionately. One sign of a society that relies primarily on legality is the size of their police force,judiciary, and the number of lawyers. We can also look at the number or prisons and/or executions (for non-violent crimes). Now when groups are organized based on legality, members obey the law based on "fear of getting caught." Therefore, in groups that have many laws, but don't have enough policemen, those laws are routinely violated. My personal view is that a "Good Society" or "Good Social Group" is one that limits legality to monitoring and enforcing laws against harm to others. Why? Because legality interferes with the natural evolution of morality. I'm glad we don't stone young couples that want elope any more, but I am concerned that the Drug War marches on, even though most of us are concerned with the exponential growth of police forces and the inordinate amount of time spent on drug crimes. One consequence of using the police to enforce legal moralism is that the police rarely catch murderers, rapists, thieves, and frauds; and jails and prisons are all full of junkies. No room left for real criminals. Go figure.

Experts and Imperfect Information

2010-08-03T07:02:00.000-04:00

In my previous blog, I suggested that the Gulf Oil Spill is has been polluted by a surge of experts. Since I already discussed a libertarian stance on leadership, I thought it might be worthwhile to take a closer look at those "experts."

First of all, leaders and experts have a lot in common. Both enjoy the social privileges associated with authority and both gain those privileges via a maze of socio-political construction. So what is an "expert?" Well, today the process of gaining expertise is a lot different than it was in the past. On the other hand, let me suggest that all societies in all times and all places produce experts and that the processes employed are very similar. At the cultural level, the first experts were probably religious experts that claimed to possess knowledge of the will of God. More recent experts claim to know the will of Nature. While we'd all like to say that there's a major difference between experts on religion and experts on nature, I'd argue that there's more commonality than difference. The most obvious commonality is that expertise has always been conferred by a public institution of some kind. Religious experts are coronated by religious institutions and scientific experts are coronated by scientific institutions. Today, scientific expertise is contingent upon the completion of a series of tasks and the acquistion of a technical language that signify membership in the community of scientific experts. FThis entails attending a college or university that confers documents that confer expertise. Once you complete this series of tasks (usually four years) you must undergo a ceremony of initiation. These ceremonies exhibit highly ritualized speech and behavior that involve costumes, music, documents and a gallery of witnesses comprised of family and friends of the conferees. These pompous ceremonies are conducted by old experts that have already completed these rituals. Near the end of the ceremonies, conferees are awarded their official documents, which signal the acquistion of expertise. These documents are usually prominently displayed on a wall where the expert sells his/her expertise. Once this document is secured, the new expert joins an association, which has its own rituals and mode of communication.

It is important to note that throughout human history the vast majority of conferers and conferees of expertise have been men. Although, in recent years, many females have entered the brotherhood of experts, they tend to be experts in areas involving the "care" of other humans; especially in primary education, health care, and social science. But there are still very few female experts in physics, mathematics, engineering, or religion. In recent years there has been an overall surge in the number of female experts, as the number of males that complete the ritual declines. How that plays out over the long run remains to be seen.

Now there are two different kinds of experts. First, there are experts that acquire "perfect information" over the course of their ritual. The hallmark of the acquisition of perfect information is that it leads to the ability to effectively predict or control something of value. An expert in mathematics can accurately add, subtract, and multipy numbers; and expert in engineering can build a bridge. This kind of expertise is easily demonstrated so if your mathematical calculations are wrong or if your bridge falls into the river, your expertise may be questioned, despite the possession of the document displayed on a wall. Occasionally, the conferers of expertise withdraw their expert designation and remove the document from the wall of the conferee. But not very often. In fact, the higher the level of expertise attained, the less likely it is that you'll lose that document.

The second kind of expert, claims possession of "imperfect information." These experts are usually held to a much lower standard, given that the phenomena that they predict and control are more complex and therefore there is less consensus among the conferers of expertise as to what the expert will be able to predict or control after the document is conferred. The most noteworthy experts on imperfect information are in religion, philosophy, social science, medicine, theoretical physics, macro-economics, and ecological science. The hallmark of experts on imperfect information is that it is more difficult for them to publically demonstrate their expertise and even more difficult to disprove their expertise. Therefore, experts in imperfect information primarily demonstrate their expertise by producing documents that other experts in their association occasionally read and criticise. Fortunately, publication of these documents is sufficient to maintain expert designation, even if no one understands or even reads those documents.

Finally, it is important to note that experts on imperfect information, rarely if ever, admit that their information is imperfect. But instead, they claim to possess perfect information. Since their bridges never fall in the river, and their oil wells rarely pollute the waterways, these kinds of experts tend to enjoy a high degree of job security. Therefore, in the near future we can expect an increase in the number of experts on imperfect information. We can also expect more falling bridges and oil spills.

Speculation and the B.P. Oil Spill

2010-07-31T07:33:00.000-04:00

I've been thinking about the B.P. "Oil Spill" lately. As is the case with most complex human events, we can anticipate a rash of speculation on its short-term and long-term consequences. Of course, the global media has been rife with speculation, as experts line up to give their official assessments. What will happen to the ecology of the gulf? What will happen to the fishing industry? What will happen to the tourist industry? What will happen to BP? In light of this speculative frenzy, I thought it would be worthwhile to add a few speculations on the nature of "speculation."

First, a few observations. The art of speculation is a direct consequence of the evolutionarily-based human need for us humans to predict and control our natural and social environment. In fact, we only use the word "speculate" when we are dealing with the uncertainty wrought by complex events. Generally, long-term speculations are more prone to error than short-term speculations. We speculate as individuals and in groups. Speculation within groups is often, but not always, marked by the absence of consensus. And finally, in our culture we tend to "believe" and "trust" the speculations of experts; that is we are more likely to "act upon" the speculations of credentialed authorities. That's why news media outlets seek out speculators that hold advanced degrees in biology, engineering, economics, and law. The hallmark of group-based speculation in the twenty-first century is the ability of experts to market their speculations via the mass media and attract large numbers of believers and non-believers. In modern times, the most authoritative speculators are scientists.

Our desire to predict the unpredictable has spawned a vast speculative industry, where individuals and corporations earn hefty paychecks by marketing their speculations. Now rational humans want to act on the basis of reliable information, therefore, we must try to distinguish between variable degrees of reliability of expert speculators and the information they convey. Individual and corporate experts have track records; that is, the accuracy of previous speculations can be an important in deciding who to trust. Unfortunately, experts usually do not often disclose their track records, and therefore, you may not be able to determine their reliability. Some experts are more prone to speculate than others. Because speculation only takes place under conditions of complexity, some sciences generate more speculators. Economists are probably the most speculative.

Now back to BP. Many rational persons living on the Gulf coast have to act based on imperfect information offered by speculative experts. Will the oil slick affect their livlihood? Should fishermen move operations to another area? Should they stay put and draw unemployment and/or draw from the BP relief fund until future becomes less clouded? Should fishermen change occupations, go to college and become credentialed speculators and earn a living predicting unpredictable events and/or teaching the science of speculation? As a credentialed speculator (with a rather dismal track record), I would offer the following speculation. Given our innate human desire to know the unknowable and the ability of credentialed speculators to market their speculations via and ever-evolving media technology, I would speculate the speculating industry and the industries that support that industry (colleges, universities, media, etc)have a very rosy future.

Leadership Theory and Biology

2010-07-16T08:24:00.000-04:00

I posted a blog entry on the APLS Blog on "Leadership Theory and Biology," where I argue that Leadership Studies has a long history of ignoring biological research. Check it out. click here

Leadership and Self-Organization

2010-06-27T07:06:00.000-04:00

In my previous blogs, I've been arguing that our society relies too much on social organization based on leadership and followership. I also suggested that: we have too many leaders, we unjustly praise and blame them for the successes and failures of others, we over-pay them, and bestow way too much media exposure upon them. So what's the alternative? My answer "self-organized social systems."I'll be the first to admit that this sounds fishy. Let me try to clean out the fish tank a bit.

First of all, I am not advocating anarchy. We humans are social animals, and therefore, we will always "organize" ourselves in order to achieve various ends by via various means. Hence, human organizations are irrevocably teleological (goal-directed). Libertarians argue that long-term survival of any organization is contingent upon functionality: the ability to achieve its goal. Moreover, I also fully acknowledge that our natural instincts propel us to play "following the leader." My argument is simply that this leader-follower organizational structure doesn't work anymore. What's the alternative? Self-organization. So what would this alternative system look like?

Let's start off with a few empirical observations concerning the nature of ALL human organizations. 1.) All organizations emerge out of complex human social interactions. 2.) Historically, they are organized on the basis of leadership and followership. 3.) All organizations emerge and adapt to changing environments, and eventually suffer extinction. 4.)Over the course of an organization's finite lifetime, leaders influence followers and followers influence leaders. 5.) Over an organization's lifetime, sub-organizations emerge that seek change either organizational ends, means, or both. 6.) Organizations are also influenced by other external organizations within their environment. Some are cooperative some are competitive in the quest for members and/or resources. In other words, ALL ORGANIZATIONS ARE COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS. Human organizations differ from other natural systems insofar as they can be either self-organized (from the bottom up) or leader-organized (from the top down).

Now what are self-organized systems? Self-organized organizations lack a master-control mechanism. The best example of a self-organized system is an ecological system. Because no one controls what's going on at the lower levels, ecosystems can easily adapt to environmental change via variation and selection. For human organizations, adaptation is contingent upon the ability of members to freely enter or exit that organization; that is join, maintain membership, or quit. All organizations cooperate with and/or compete with one other for members and resources based on information provided to members and non-members relating to ends and means. Rational human beings do not join an organization, if they don't know (Trust) what it does or how it does it.

Organizations that cannot maintain membership and/or resources must either revise their organizational ends or means in order to survive. Mother Nature "creatively destroys" organizational dysfunctionality, if-and-only-if, members are rational and are free to enter or exit. So why are there so many dysfunctional organizations? Dysfunctional organizations can extend their lives by short-circuiting the process of "creative destruction." There are three manifulative strategies: threats, enticements, and disinformation.

Many, if not most human organizations are leader-organized from the top down where followers are simply manipulated by leaders. How? Human beings are naturally attracted to pleasure and repulsed by pain. We prefer pleasure and fear pain. Thus, the most common strategy for propping up dysfunctional organizations is to either threaten (pain) members with coercive force or offer an enticement (pleasure). Organizational survival based on threats is obviously contingent upon the ability of organizational leaders to carry out those threats. Another, related strategy is to use physical barriers such as walls or fences that control entry or exit, which must deal with tunnels, aircraft, and ships.

Dysfunctional organizations can also survive by offering enticements, which attract and retain membership transactionally; that is, by giving (or taking away) something members value. The Robin Hood Strategy involves taking away the property of some members and giving it to other members. The problem here is how to take from the "haves" without them exiting the organization, and how to decide how much to give to the "have nots." One effective strategy is to disquise both the identity of the beneficiaries and the contributers.

But the most common strategy for maintaining dysfunctional organizations is to control the flow of "information" within the system and outside the system. Informational control involves manipulation of the beliefs of members (and or non-members) by deliberately obscuring or disguising organizational means or ends: propaganda or ideology. Organizations also tend to disguise information relating to actual benefactors and beneficiaries; usually by disguising costs and/or benefits of being a member. For example, you might be a member of group that you believe is committed to achieving praiseworthy goals (save the whales) via praiseworthy means (exposing the impending extinction of the species), but later discover that this organization uses its resources to support terrorist activity in Afghanistan. Of course, (in the absence of coercive force) if and when this information is exposed, most whale lovers head for the exits and other potential whale lovers look for alternatives. Unfortunately, whale lovers that support terrorism might choose to remain and new terrorists might also join.

Now, here is the crux of my argument. There are two different kinds of organizations: private organizations and public organizations. Public organizations survive or suffer extinction via the use of legalized threats, enticements, and disinformation. Private organizations survive or suffer extinction without the benefit use of LEGALITY. This is not to say that dysfunctional private organizations are by definition non-transactional or less ideological than public organizations. Many are coercive (think gangs). But their use of coercion and manipulation is limited by competition with other organizations. In other words, it is much more difficult for private, voluntary organizations to survive because we naturally prefer voluntary over-non-voluntary organizations. Two caveats: 1.) We don't always exit organizations that threaten or seize the property of others, therefore, organizations are often threatened by external organizations. 2.)Sometimes more powerful organizations intervene on behalf of members of other organizations.

Nevertheless, over the long run, private, non-coercive, voluntary organizations tend to be more adaptive. Mother Nature punishes organizations that employ coercive force or tell lies. So again, why hasn't this behavior been weeded out by creative destruction? Non-voluntary organizations survive by controlling the flow of energy and information within and between organizations. The cultural evolution of weaponry and information technology tend to undermine creative destruction of dysfunctionality. Survival, therefore, becomes contingent upon weaponry and media access. Thus competition is shifted from the ability to attract and keep voluntary members to the ability to effectively employ coercive force and tell lies. This accounts for the rise and durability of nation states as the dominating political entity in the world today. Generally speaking, there are very few "failed nation states." All nation states are more or less coercive, anthough their methods vary significantly. All employ propaganda. Coercive organizations that can raise and maintain an army and/or control information can survive.

So what does all this say about leadership and followership? Modern organizations that rely primarily on the ability of leaders to attract and maintain followers via threats, lies,or transactions, are doomed to fail; especially in environments where members can avoid threats, detect lies, or resist payoffs. Libertarians argue that we must guard ourselves against coercive and deceptive organizations. Anarcho-capitalist libertarians argue that this requires the dismantling of the nation state. Once this is done, they argue, creative destruction will purge the world of aggression and theft. I'm not quite that idealistic. Minarchists, like myself, argue that we need a degree of monopolized coercive force (government) to protect voluntary organizations from coercive force and deception. Although anarcho-capitalists and minarchists disagree over the MEANS of protecting self-organization, we at least agree that the process must be protected. We also agree that "good organizations" embrace moral rules against aggression, theft, and lies; and that, over the long-run, modern organizations that are not open to the forces of "creative destruction" find themselves on "The Road to Serfdom."

Throughout most of human history, human organizations have been held together by fear and lies. Although that worked well enough for most of human history, it will not work any more, unless we want to revert back to Pleistocene life styles.

Libertarian Leadership Theory and the Flow of Information, Misinformation, and Disinformation

2010-06-20T08:36:00.000-04:00

So far, I've been arguing that we have a biological and cultural bias that over-values "leaders," and therefore, we tend to grant them too much authority over our lives and over-pay them relative to what they actually contribute to human organizations. If I'm right, the obvious question is: "How did this tradition become entrenched in Western culture?" My answer is that it has a lot to do with the nature of information and how it flows (or does not flow) within and between organizations.

All evolutionary systems exchange energy and/or information. The precise nature of the relationship between energy (or matter) and information is puzzling. DNA is matter that conveys information. And all information is processed by our brains. Does that mean that all information is "really" matter? Does materialism win out. Let's not talk about that right now. Let's just assume that it makes sense to talk about information apart from its material substrate. One thing we do know is that the concept of information is front-loaded; that is, we use the word "information" only in contexts where we believe that a statement is true. Hence, we have other words that we employ in different contexts. For example, misinformation is information we once believed to be true, but subsequently turned out to be false under evolutionary pressure. Call it the process of "creative destruction." Evolutionary epistemologists argue that this process of falsification is endless and that we get closer to the "Truth" over the long run, but never really arrive at absolute truth. Species never reach their final evolutionary state either. Why? Because physical and cultural systems constantly change under pressure from internal sub-systems and external systems. So far, we've looked at the concepts of information and misinformation. Although there are a few epistemic puzzles, they seem pretty straightforward. The real problem for cultural evolution is "disinformation" (sometimes called propaganda or ideology). Disinformation emerges out of the exercise of power within hierarchical social structures. Plato called it the "Noble Lie," where the Philosopher King deliberately tell lies to followers (populace) in order to provide a "greater good." Plato was no dummy, he also recognized that leaders often lie out of self interest.

So here's the rub. When followers allow leaders to control the the flow of information, what is to prevent those leaders from telling "ignoble lies, to benefit themselves at the expense of everyone else? Plato argued that leaders must be virtuous (good, wise, temperate, and courageous etc.) and that the capacity for virtue is mostly inherited, and can be undermined by dysfunctional social structure. Hence, for Plato "good leaders" are more likely to arise in "republics," and less likely to emerge in military governments, oligarchies, democracies, or under tyranny. Today, we believe that we can teach our future leaders these virtues (at least to a greater extent). My thesis is that when leaders have the power to control the flow of information in order to advance the public good, three problems arise: they wrongfully mistake information for misinformation. No problem there, we all make mistakes. Even President Obama! A second problem is that they make a mistake in identifying the public good, or mistake private good for public good. That's more serious. The most serious problem arises when leaders take either information or misinformation and transform it into disinformation in pursuit of either self-interest or the interests of their friends and relatives. In the private sector we call it "crony capitalism." It's a serious disease that infects all complex modern societies.

My hypothesis is that most human organizations are knee deep in disinformation promulgated by self-interested leaders. Let's call it the "Enron Effect," where leaders skillfully manipulate the flow of information within their organizations and between organizations. As a result, leaders can attract and maintain a critical mass of followers by skillfully controlling the flow of information. The more complex an organizations internal institutions and the more complex the legal structure, the easier it is for leaders to manufacture Truth. Even when we catch them in the act of lying, we rarely hold them responsible. Why? Because of our biologically and culturally based reverence for leaders. In the modern world we really have to be more critical followers and abandon bad leaders; or better yet, let's just refuse to engage in most followership.

My libertarian theory of leadership suggests that leaders that operate within hierarchical social structures take advantage of the increasing complexity of human organizational life by generating disinformation that protects themselves from competition, increases their power, and ultimately the size of their wallets. In other words, the complexity of modern life has undermined the liklihood of virtuous leadership and that before we can advance as a modern society, we have to abandon our unbridled faith in heroic leaders and move more toward self-organized social structures that allow for the free flow of information within and between organizations. Of course, that means I'll have to explain what I mean by a leaderless, self-organized social system. I'll try to do that in my next blog.

A Libertarian Theory of Followership

2010-06-18T07:23:00.000-04:00

Because of our biological and cultural programming, researchers continue to focus on male-dominated "heroic leadership" with little regard for the facts and values associated with followership. So first of all, let's clear the air. There are no leaders without followers and there are no followers with out leaders. Therefore, our obsession with freestanding leaders and our relative disregard for followership is itself is worthy of explanation and commentary! Second, let's also admit that if there are better and worse leaders (in terms of both effectiveness and morality), there are also better and worse followers. And third, let's admit that (for better or worse), over time, leaders influence followers and followers influence leaders; that is, leaders and followers adapt to their organizational environments. Fourth, organizations, leaders, and followers are all influenced (for better or worse) by other organizations in their environment. And fifth, sometimes organizations, leaders, and followers cooperate in pursuit of their respective goals and sometimes they compete. If this sounds complicated, you're right!

Now a libertarian theory of followership is a prescriptive or moral theory based on aforementioned facts. So what are the necessary conditions for ethical followership? Obviously, libertarianism requires that followership be voluntary. I like John Rawls' term "voluntary association." Hence all organizations must include freedom of exit. Why? Because sometimes powerful leaders threaten to use lethal force to prevent followers from exiting non-voluntary organizations. And of course, sometimes followers employ lethal force to remove leaders. (Assassination of leaders by followers is embarassingly common and probably unique to humans and chimpanzees.) This also suggests that sometimes followers care more about organizations than they care about their leaders, and sometimes (perhaps more often) they care more about their leaders than their organizations. In so far as libertarians take the non-aggression axiom seriously, the use of lethal aggression to remove leaders can be employed only in self-defense. Otherwise, we are morally required to exit dysfunctional and/or immoral organizations. Although the "heroic theory" of leadership and followership would label this strategy as cowardly, or effeminate, it works; economists call it "creative destruction." Remember, there are no leaders without followers. There are, however, self-organized, leaderless organizations. More on that in a subsequent blog.

Sometimes followers follow leaders based on false or misleading information. My next blog entry will attempt to sketch in how the flow of information within and between organzations influences the survival and extinction of organizations and why libertarian followers must be wary of misinformation and/or disinformation diseminated by leaders.

Leadership, Culture, and the Market

2010-06-10T06:07:00.000-04:00

A few of my libertarian friends have been "beating me up" on Facebook for some of what I said about leadership in my last blog entry. I'm just beginng to formulate what I'd call a "Libertarian Theory of Leadership." Let me see what I can salvage. First of all, I've been teaching a graduate course on Ethical Issues in Organizations for many years and I'm working on a bibliographical essay on Ethical Leadership this summer. It's interesting stuff! Most of the recent research penned by social scientists either seeks to identify the individual traits that constitute leaders; or understand the social dynamics between leaders, followers, and other stakeholders. Philosophers, tend to look at the conceptual dynamic: What exactly do we mean when we label someone as "leader," "follower," a "good leader" or "good follower?" For most of us leadership resembles pornography: "We know it when we see it." For philosophers that not enough.

We do know that we humans have a universal propensity to socially organize ourselves based on leadership and followership. We first experience it on the playground in grade school, where certain kids "take the lead." As I stated in my last essay, that's natural. We still exhibit that behavior because it facilitated the passage of human genes across generations. My take on it? Social organization based on hierarchical structures with powerful leaders perched at the top, "worked" during the Pleistocene era, but not in complex modern society. It "worked" in in small hunter-gather societies because one "leader" could know enough to facilitate group survival. Hence, the genes for leadership and deferential followership facilitated human survival. Unfortunately, we still have those genes. The genes for hierarchical leadership tend to follow the Y chromosome, that is some males have the natural impulse to "take charge" and most everyone else has the natural impulse to follow that leader. Followers also tend to willingly bestow authority upon leaders; that is we allow them to make individual and collective decisions for us. Followers also tend to "value" leaders more than followers, and therefore we willingly shower them with social privileges that most followers do not enjoy: more sex, more food, more resources etc. Again, I think this is all natural. But it's no longer good. My basic argument is that libertarians must be wary of our natural inclination to coronate leaders and shower them with special privileges. That's how we succumb to totalitarian leadership.

Now back to my contention that today we have too many leaders and that our culture tends to over-pay leaders. Let's see if I can salvage this idea. Let's say that like everything else, leaders are subject to market forces and therefore they are subject to market fluctuations. Call it the leadership market. Philosophers are experiencing the lower end of that business cycle right now! I think that leaders are now about to face that same downturn. Because of the widespead availability of information, we now are coming to the realization that our leaders are not Godlike (omniscient and omnipotent), that they are fallible, and that we pay them more than they are worth. In short, a market correction is now underway. (Ask President Obama!) As a libertarian, I think this is a good thing. Throughout most of human history leaders have been generally given a free pass. They've been able to control information, competition, and even control entry and exit from leadership positions. They've often used government to protect their lofty positions. Interestingly, when we discover leadership chicanery, we say: "Oh, he's not a real leader!" What's going on there?

A Libertarian Theory of Organizational Leadership

2010-06-08T07:25:00.001-04:00

I've been thinking about what a libertarian theory of organizational leadership might look like. Libertarians often rant and rave about leadership, but rarely present anything that resembles a general theory rooted in libertarian principles. Here's my modest start.

First of all, humans, like many of species of living things, live in organized groups. Human beings and chimpanzees seem to be especially prone to the formation of "organizations" controlled by dominance hierarchies with coalitions of males perched at the top, with one "alpha male" serving as leader. Organizations, therefore are comprised of complex relationships between "leaders" and "followers." Hence there are no leaders without followers, and no followers without leaders. All human organizations are created to serve some purpose. Thus all leaders lead toward the realization of some future end or goal. Although human beings create and dissolve organizations all the time, most scholars seem to focus on certain kinds of organizations: political organizations, military organizations, and business organizations. The central question of leadership studies is whether there are general laws of nature that apply to all organizations, regardless of their purpose; or whether the laws of nature are relative to specific kinds of organizations that pursue specific goals. In short, are there laws of leadership and followership that apply equally to all organizations? Are the leaders of corporations, terrorist networks, baseball teams, and rock bands (in fact) all subject to the same a set of universal laws? My current view is that there are very general laws of nature that explain, predict and control the behavior of all human organizations. But that will require an argument.

My observation is that all organizations involve relationships between leaders and followers. Over time, as human relationships became more complex under pressure from rapid cultural evolution, most notably in Western nations. Again my understanding of social anthropological findings is that early human social organizations were dominance hierarchies led by an alpha males. But leadership was based on demonstrated competence. No one Alpha made all the decisions. As long as humans lived in small groups this "worked" very well. However, as the sizes of human organizations increased, the efficacy of these dominance hierarchies diminished. Although many large human organizations are still organized based on rigid dominance hierarchies, these organizations often survive but rarely flourish. There are still many nations led by military dictatorships headed by leaders that are viewed in otherworldly terms; that is, omnipotent and omniscient. Many corporations are also still led by iron-fisted CEOs. However, my theory of organizational leadership is that large scale organizations require a different kind of leadership. Actually, Machiavelli noted the difference between a principality (single leader) and a republic (multiple leaders). Large scale republics are more likely to floursh than large scale principalities. Admittedly, many large scale principalities do "survive" for a long time, but they cannot flourish. Why because large scale social organization require the free flow of information and resources. Now, several hundred thousand years ago, leaders could know everything the group needed to survive.Today, it is impossible for the President of the U.S. to know everything about health care, banking, or oil drilling. The President of Toyota can't know how to engineer an automoble from scratch, and college presidents can know how to teach every course on the curriculum. Successful modern leaders cannot be omnipotent and omniscient, therefore, its naive to expect them to be. Obama can't know how to fix the oil leak in the Gulf of Mexico. I's nonsense to expect him to "take responsibility for it." All that does is support our misguided that our leaders must be God-like, which explain why we no longer "trust" our leaders. Effective leaders of modern large scale organizations facilitate the flow of information and resources within their organizations; and forge useful coalitions with other external organizations. That does not require omnipotence or omniscience and it certainly does not warrant multi-million dollar executive pay. Any libertarian theory of leadership will argue that we need less powerful leaders and a lot fewer of them. Finally, if leaders are responsible for maintaining the flow of information and resources, then they are responsible removing forces that interrupt that flow. Therefore, although I do not hold Obama responsible for the oil leak, I will hold him responsible for maintaining inflexible governmental bureaucracies that do not fulfill their official purpose. Good leaders fire irresponsible subordinates and dissolve dysfunctional governmental agencies. Let's start with FEMA,EPA,and he U.S. Coast Guard.

Public and Private Unions

2010-05-15T08:05:00.000-04:00

My friend David inspired me to write about public unions. My views are rooted in my longstanding adherence to voluntary association moderated by competition.

Human beings are social animals that have the natural capacity to organize themselves into groups of other like-minded, self-interested humans. We certainly associate ourselves with a wide variety of groups. Like all groups labor unions are the manefestation of this natural capacity to form cooperative groups to advance individual self interest. The libertarian stance on labor unions requires adherence to the principles of voluntariness, non-aggression, and competition. Therefore, unions, like any other voluntary associations must be subject to "creative destruction," which is nature's way of weeding out group dysfunctionality and inefficiency. When a union ceases to advance the self-interest of it's members, or if another union does a better job of advancing those interests at a lower cost, that dysfunctional and/or inefficient union loses members to its competitors and becomes extinct. If a union does an extraordinary job of serving the interests of its members, it may temporarily achieve monopolistic status; at least until its competitors figure out how to compete for members more effectively by offering superior functionality more efficiently. However, unions, like other voluntary associations, often develop survival strategies that have nothing to do with serving members more efficiently. The most common strategy is to employ coercion or the threat of coercion to force new members to join the union and/or prevent old members from abandoning the union; thus undermining voluntariness, non-aggression, and competition. And of course, the most sure-fire way to maintain dysfunctional unions is to employ the coercive power of government to control entry and exit.

Originally, unionization arose as a natural counter-balance to the growth of private corporations, which at least in theory, are also subject to creative destruction. However, since the 1960s, there has been a growing movement toward public unions; that is unions that are formed in order to meet the wants and needs of those who are employed by government. As agencies of government gradually displaced private corporations, unionization was gradually introduced into the public sector; most notably, in the areas of public education and postal service. So what's the libertarian stance on public sector unionization? Well, most of us libertarians oppose governmental encroachment into the private sector, therefore public sector unions border on absurdity. Other than relying on that reductio ad absurdum argument, what else can be said about public unions?

First of all, public sector monopolies are by their very nature immune from competition, which explains why public education and postal service have remained low quality and inefficient for so long. Public unions contribute to low quality and inefficiency by protecting workers from competitors via controlling union entry and exit, and by preventing the formation of competing public unions. Note that the salaries of public workers are paid for via coercive taxation, and that public officials are less than frugal when they spend tax other people's money. Therefore, we end up with a growing public sector workforce, protected by non-competitive unions that reward incompetency with non-competitive salaries and benefits. And of course, this devolutionary process ultimately leads to public spending deficits, increased taxation, and inferior public services.

Some misguided libertarians argue that public unions ought to be illegal. But I would argue that what we really need to do is to get back to limited government, or at least regulate both the public and private realms by enhancing competition rather than stifling it. My prediction would be that if left to the impersonal working of creative destruction, both public and private unions would eventually become extinct. And, where unionization is justified, competing private unions would drive public unions out of business. In short, libertarians must eschew all artificial monopolies, including both corporations (corporate welfare) and unions (union welfare). But we can't simply deploy the coercive power of government to prevent the formation of unions or any other voluntary associations. That's just another indirect expedition on that road to serfdom.

The Road to Serfdom: Part 4

2010-04-28T08:09:00.001-04:00

Hayek's wide-ranging critique of collectivism is difficult to summarize. Much of his argument is based on his observations on human nature, especially our individual and collective capacity to both compete and cooperate. The basic problem with collectivism is our infinite capacity to identify ourselves (as individuals) with groups. As Hayek and most social psychologists note, group indentification leads to "in-group out-group bias," or the tendency to cooperate with other members of our group, and compete with outsiders. When we compete with outsiders we tend to dehumanize them and therefore justify coercive force based on their non-human status. Of course, not all forms of out-group behavior ends up violent. As a rule, the losers of Kentucky v. Tennessee basketball games rarely dehumanize the victors and violence is rare. However, other forms of competition are typically less civil. Worldwide, intra-group competition often leads to coercive violence. Think competition between competing: nations, religious groups, ethnic groups, tribal groups, racial groups, and gender groups. Hence, the rise of group-based partiality: nationalism, religious fanaticism, ethno-centrism, tribalism, racism, and sexism. The difference between being a Kentucky Basketball fan and a white male, is that I cannot exit from the brotherhood of white males, unless I change my genetic code. Thus, barring skin grafts and a sex change operation, whether I like it or not, I'm a white male. Although, I'm an American, I am not a "flag waving" patriot! At the moment, those "flag wavers" tolerate me, but I can imagine a time when that toleration may wear thin. The most likely scenario would be during wartime. Fortunately, recent wars in Irag and Afghanistan have not produced a plurality of flag wavers so I'm still safe. However, another catastrophic 911 event might change all that.

Hayek observes that fear tends to increase the number of flag wavers, and that Philosopher Kings (controllers) have a vested interest in perpetuating that fear via the use of propaganda. As nation states cultivate nationalism via public education, or at least undermine the development of the critical skills of students, we invariably find ourselves in a perpetual state of emergency. Unfortunately, its not just Americans that are bombarded with emergency propaganda (war on terror, war on drugs, war on disease etc.). Every other in-group on earth (nations, religions, ethnic groups, etc.) are all equally suject to in-group/out-group bias.

So what are the prospects for world peace? There are two possibilities: we can all rally behind one Philosopher King and form one single group, called humanity. But what are the prospects for uniting the world without an out-group to rally against? Or we can return to the Enlightenment vision of individualism that makes group identity voluntary. It will be tough! We'll have to overcome our natural inclination to identify with non-voluntary groups and we'll have to be intelligent enough to stop demonizing everyone that looks, thinks, or acts in ways that contradict what our own Philosopher Kings tell us. Hayek defends that second option. World peace is unlikely no matter what, but individualism and commercial society offers a more likely strategy than in-group/out-group bias. What do you think?

The Road to Serfdom: Part 3

2010-04-26T07:27:00.000-04:00

Socialism relies heavily on central planners; that is "Philosopher-Kings" that allegedly know what's "Good" for the whole community. The longstanding assumption that underlies all communitarian philosophy is that empowered "experts" are better suited to decide what's good for us as individuals. In short, socialism is inexorably paternalistic. One of Hayek's main arguments against socialism is that, in the real world, Philosopher-Kings are not impartial, but tend to distribute social goods based are group favoritism and cronyism. Let's sort this out.

Socialism is based on the notion that political organization must be based on groups: Plato (leaders, military, populace), Marx (Bourgeosie, Proletariats) etc. Philosopher-Kings are empowered to eliminate competition by serving as the master-distributer. Why does this lead us down "the Road to Serfdom?" Well, the basic problem is that human beings have an infinite capacity for group membership. I am a member of many different groups: white males, college professors, faculty member at MSJ, band member, AARP member, etc. Now what happens when there is a central planner? Well, suppose that central planner decides to build a new football stadium for UC. How would other colleges in the region respond? Hayek says "envy!" We'd probably want a new dorm. So how does this allegedly "unbiased" central planner proceed? Well, he'd (it would be a guy, right?) probably aim at equality. Thus if UC get's $12 million, so does every other college. Suppose the zoo asks for more money, what does the Freedom Center ask for? Union Terminal? Get the idea...?

Now let's get down to it. What kind of person would want to be a Philosopher-King? Well, Plato got it right! Anyone with a high-degree of intelligence would NOT want to be a Philosopher-King. If you're not willing to force intelligent persons to serve as Philosopher-Kings, what kinds of persons will volunteer for the job? Will they be intelligent? Would they be unbiased? Let's look at what's going on today. Congress has already "bailed out" several large Wall Street banks, an enormous insurance company, and two "American" automobile companies. How about "cash for clunkers?" Tax breaks for "Green Corporations." Tax breaks for first-time home owners? Note the cascading effect that Hayek predicted. And of course, when Philosopher-Kings pay for these favors, where does the money come from? You would think that it comes from taxpayers, but taxpayers also are a group that lobby the Philosopher-Kings. One recent group that lobby against increased taxation are called "Tea-Partiers." So right now, the money for these schemes comes from loans from China, which someone must pay back someday? Who will that be? The rich? The poor? The middle-class? The elderly? Corporations? Small businesses? White people? Black people? Native Americans? How about future generations? That's my guess! Why because future generations do not yet exist and therefore do not have well-funded lobbyists.

What does all of this say about the prospects for group-based equality? My fourth and final blog on Hayek will explore Hayek's defense of individualism as an alternative to collectivism and speculate on the prospects for world peace.

The Road to Serfdom: Part 2

2010-04-25T07:42:00.000-04:00

Social and political philosophy is often couched in the language of "isms;" that is, highly idealised conceptual frameworks. These polarized idealizations never exist in the "real world," but they usually represent broad sociopolitical tendencies. In short, societies tend to "lean" one way or another. F.A. Hayek's, The Road to Serfdom identifies two of these "isms:" individualism and collectivism. His basic argument is that eighteenth-century individualism (John Locke, Adam Smith) led to dramatic increases in the quality of life in the Western world; and that nineteenth-century collectivism has led to equally dramatic decreases in that quality of life. Hence, the book's title: The Road to Serfdom. Hayek argues that social and political philosophy is a matter of choice, we are not predestined toward one or the other: philosophical ideas matter! In the United States today, the Democratic Party leans toward collectivism and the Republican Party leans toward individualism, however neither party seem to be very cognizant of the philosophical bases that Hayek identifies. So let's sketch in the broad drift of these two polar "isms."

Individualism argues that personal liberty, individual planning, free market competition, and democratic political institutions are essential for the realization of the "Good Life." Moreover, individualism argues that the relatively unfettered pursuit of self interest by individuals contributes leads to the social good. In other words, society as a whole benefits when individuals are allowed to plan their own lives (pursue their own self-interest) by forging voluntary contracts with others. We all pursue what we believe is "good" for us as individuals. We can best realize these personal individual ends (get a good job) by means of voluntary cooperation with others (paying tuition at the College of Mount St. Joseph). No one forced you come to MSJ. If the college fails to meet your expectations you can choose to take your tuition money and go to another college. If over time, enough students decide to go to another college, MSJ will go bankrupt. However, if we meet student expectations, we'll not only survive but also drive our competitors out of business. (Look out UC, Xavier, Miami, Thomas More, and NKU!) When we earn that monopoly, we cannot sit back and enjoy that enviable position, because our current or future competitors will copy what we did to earn that monopoly. Thus, over the long run competition leads to higher quality education at a lower cost. Not that government had little to do with it. The only thing the free market really needs is to enforce contracts, and monitor and enforce laws against theft and fraud.

Collectivism argues that the free market generates inequalities that cannot be overcome. That's because all markets are subject to business cycles that, by their very nature, wax and wane. Of course, those who own the means of production survive by cutting back on labor costs: buying machines to replace works, making workers work longer hours for less money etc. At the bottom of the business cycle, competition does not work because there are more workers than jobs and therefore dissatified workers are easily replaced. Thus, when workers find themselves at the bottom of one of these cycles, they become alienated from themselves, their family, and their work. They lack economic security. Collectivism, therefore seeks to spread out this risk by using the coercive power of government to plan national and global economies. Collective planners are experts that replace the free market mechanism with a collective system that insures the well being of everyone. Typical collectivist mechanisms include social welfare, unemployment insurance, socialized medicine, centalized banking, and public education. When government control is complete we call it totalitarianism. Under totalitarian collectivist regimes private property, private institutions, and individual planning are replaced by public property, public institutions, and collective planning. Therefore, under a totalitarian regime the College of Mount St. Joseph would be taken over by government's central planners. At that point, all colleges would be controlled by government and you would have no choice of which college you want to attend. My guess is that if MSJ were to continue as a public institution, planners would keep its health care programs and scrap all the other programs. There would be no competition between programs because they'll all be the same. Central planners would decide what is taught, who teaches, how much they get paid, and which students get admitted. Of course, UC would be converted to a football college that trains men to play football. But it would be very boring to watch because the teams wouldn't be allowed to keep score.

My next blog will discuss what Hayek says about the nature of leadership and followership under individualism and collectivism.

The Road to Serfdom: Part 1

2010-04-23T06:13:00.000-04:00

My philosophy class has been finishing up the semester by reading F.A. Hayek's classic work, The Road to Serfdom. Admittedly, its not often assigned in introduction to philosophy courses. Philosophers will forgive me, given that we also read: Plato's Republic; Machiavelli's, The Prince; Marx's Communist Manefesto; and Skinner's, Beyond Freedom and Dignity. Throughout the course I emphasized three major relational themes: the nature of human knowledge and it's relationship to politics, the relationship between leaders and followers, and relationship between social groupings and individuals. I thought I'd devote the next two blog entries to Hayek as a social and political philosopher.

Before we get started, it is important to note that Hayek acknowledges that human beings are individuals that live in communities organized via leadership and followership. We usually organize communities via dominance hierarchies, ruled by Alpha Males. He also acknowledges that we are emotional beings driven by fear, and that much of our communal life is aimed at securing our individual lives from the forces that provoke those fears. The central question for social and political philosophy is to what degree we ought to empower government to provide that security? There are two closely related forms of security: physical security (fear of physical pain, suffering, and death: think terrorism) and economic security (fear from deprivation of material sustenance: think food, clothing, shelter). Hayek also distinguishes between two public policy options the pursuit of limited security and the pursuit of absolute security. The Road to Serfdom is a long argument against the socialist (Marxist) idea that the public policy goal must be the pursuit of absolute economic security, but his arguments apply equally to physical security. His arguments ultimately hinge on his views on the nature of cooperation.

We humans cooperate with one another either by choice or by coercion. Socialists argue that absolute economic security can be provided via large scale cooperation masterminded by a governmentally empowered "central planner." Central planning is by it's very nature coercive, in so far as it requires taking from some individuals and giving to other individual (usually via taxation). Therefore the basic question for social and political philosophy is what can we reasonably expect out of central planning in terms of providing economic and physical security? What kinds human activities, if any, ought to be centrally controlled by government, and what kinds of activities ought to be left to individual planning via non-coercive cooperation and competition?

Recall from my earlier blogs that some libertarians are anarchists. Hayek is not an anarchist, but a minarchist that recognizes that government must play role in human affairs. In fact, anarcho-libertarians often criticise Hayek for suggesting that government ought to provide a basic security "safety net" for citizens. Exactly what this net includes is left unclear. (Think hurricane relief, basic retirement, and basic health care.) What is clear, is that the goal of providing this safety net must be limited security and NOT absolute security. Why? Because when central governments pursue absolute security, the cost is an inevitable loss of individual planning. Why is this the case?

Well it has to do with the fact that human beings, by nature, plan for the future as both individuals and as communities. Now, what exactly is individual planning? In the economic realm its about buying and selling products and services; that is, engaging in cooperative, self-interested, voluntary exchanges with other humans in a free market. In the end, voluntary exchange is inexorably both competitive and cooperative: buyers compete with sellers, sellers compete with other sellers, buyers compete with other buyers etc. Thus individual planning in a capitalist society is moderated by supply and demand. But it's not necessarily "dog eat dog" competition. Buyers and sellers can also cooperate with each other via the formation of corporations, unions, and other non-governmental organizations. (Hint: Walmart, American Medical Association, and the Red Cross)

What is collective planning? Collective planning is when a central authority (a leader) plans for the well being of the whole community. "One size fits all!" In the political realm, this can only be accomplished by employing the coercive power of government to take money from one constituency and give it to another. (Remember Robin Hood?) Hence, the central planner(s) decide "who gets what and when." Collective planning entails replacing (or at least modifying) the act of "buying and selling." So what kinds of goods and services ought to be provided via by free market voluntary exchange and what ought to be provided by government? Military, Police and Fire Departments, Health Care, Retirement? If you believe that government ought to provide most of our economic security, you are a collectivist and a socialist. If you believe all of our needs and wants ought to be centrally distributed by government you are a totalitarian. If you believe most of our material sustence ought to be left to individual voluntary exchange within a free market, you are a individualist and a capitalist. If you believe that government ought to leave everything to the free market with no input from government, you are an anarchist.

In my next blog, I'll explore some of Hayek's specific arguments against collectivism, socialism, and central planning.

Paternalism and the Rise of Risk-Averse Culture

2010-04-08T07:21:00.000-04:00

So far I've suggested that paternalistic intervention is an other-regarding act performed on behalf of a beneficiary (or beneficiaries) by a benefactor. By definition it requires the violation of the liberty of that beneficiary in order to provide that benefit. Therefore, paternalism requires the application varying degrees of coercive force; usually in the form the imposition of a physical or economic threat. If the beneficiary voluntarily agrees to submit to the intervention without threat, it is NOT paternalistic, and interventions that merely entice beneficiaries (via rewards) without threatening a harms are NOT paternalistic. The case for paternalism is strongest when the benefactor seeks the removal of a harm. Harm is relative to individual and collective risk hierarchies. Irrationality, therefore, is relative to individual and collective risk hierarchies. And finally, paternalistic interventions either advance the interests of the beneficiary or they do not. Many interventions are either unsafe or ineffective, therefore, paternalism has an empirical component. An intervention that does not, in fact, provide a benefit (a positive cost-benefit ratio)is, strictly speaking, not paternalistic.

Authoritarian regimes are more prone to violate the liberty of citizens under the guise of paternalistic intervention. Indeed, citizens often become so acclimated to governmental authority that they willingly submit to governmental management of their personal risk-taking. Now, what happens when government uses its coercive power to define acceptable and unacceptable risk-taking? What are the social implications? Well, the first thing that happens is that minor risks are transformed into major risks and the range of acceptable risk-taking behavior narrows. Second, citizens begin to expect government to protect them from more and more low level risks, and over the long run, society become increasingly risk-averse. Admittedly, that is an empirical observation. Does it hold water? As a 58 year old libertarian, my observation is that the United States has become increasingly risk-averse. The most obvious examples are: increasingly strict drug laws, laws against smoking, laws against the use of transfats in restaurants, seat belts, child seats, helmet laws (I never wore a helmet when I rode my bike as a child). How about laws require that the organizers of large public gatherings take out liability insurance? Increasingly intrusive airport surveilance under the guise of protecting us from terrorists? Of course, in each of these cases we must ask the hard empirical question: "Do these interventions REALLY make us safer" Is government "better" at managing risk than I am? I don't know about you, but I'm willing to match my risk-taking acumen against government's any time. Then, pour me another beer, pass me the butter, and light me up a joint.

PATERNALISTIC INTERVENTIONS

2010-03-27T08:48:00.000-04:00

As I suggested earlier, paternalistic intervention involves a conflict between the risk hierarchies of a benefactor and an intended beneficiary. So paternalistic intervention is is based on the supposition that a benefactor's cost/benefit analysis (at least sometimes) trumps the assessment of a targeted beneficiary AND that the intervention will, in fact, leave the beneficiary "better off." Being made "better off" could mean either an unwanted benefit or an unwanted lessening or removal of a harm. The lessening or removal of a harm could mean either reducing the probability of its occurance or reducing its magnitude. Moreover, justified paternalistic intervention implies empirical evidence that the intended intervention, will in fact, leave the beneficiary "better off" in either the long-run or short run. So the question is whether a beneficiary will (in fact) be better off or not as the result of a given paternalistic intervention.

In assessing whether a beneficiary will be better off or not must take into account the full range of known costs and benefits. Paternalistic intervention invariably requires the use of coercive force, which is often an under-valued cost. The degree of coercive force is, obviously, contingent upon the degree of resistence offered by the intended beneficiary. Sometimes beneficiaries are relatively submissive and make a calculated decision to submit to the benefactor: "It's not worth fighting over!" When the beneficiary offers resistance intervention requires more coercive force. So some interventions require high degrees of physical coercion and inflict greater or lesser injuries on the beneficiary: black eyes, bruises, broken bones etc. Sometimes injuries result, not only from the interdiction process, but also from subduing the resistant beneficiary long enough to provide the benefit. Sometimes the interventions themselves inflict costs, which are euphemistically described as "side-effects. Most anti-psychotic drugs turn out to have serious long-term and short-term side effects, including suicidal thoughts, sexual dysfunction, and loss of energy etc. Thus the overall "redounding good" of any intervention must take into account the amount of coercive force required to get the job done and the side-effects of the intervention itself.

With the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, let's take a look at a few of classic large group paternalistic interventions. In the nineteenth century psychiatrists believed that the mentally ill were "better off" locked up in a mental hospital where they could be bled and force-fed emetics and purgatives. In hindsight, we know that those were unjustified interventions. In the mid-twentieth century, psychiatrists believed that electro-shock therapy and lobotomies left patients better off than bloodletting, emetics, and purgatives. Today we have a long list of modern drugs that have been proven to be either unsafe, ineffective, or both: DES, Fen Fen etc.

So despite the dismal record of well-meaning paternalistic interventions, and despite the fact that most interventions benefit the benefactors (and third parties), why do we accept paternalism as a social practice. I believe we all have a biological predisposition to submit to group-based authority, even when there is little evidence to suggest that authoritative interventions are any more reliable than anyone else. In other words, we blindly submit to group-based authority and rarely question it. This is probably a remnant of our Pleistocene hunter-gatherer brain. Therefore, it is very difficult for us to question socially-designated authorities. The social processes that we employ to manufacture experts is intriguing. Just think about how we ceremoniously bestow these "experts" with credentials: advanced degrees, licenses, etc.

PATERNALISM: HARM AND RATIONALITY

2010-03-22T07:45:00.000-04:00

So under what conditions, if any, is paternalism morally justifiable? In the Western philosophical tradition justified paternalistic intervention, has focused on detailed philosophical analysis of the interwoven concepts of harm and rationality. First of all, since John Stuart Mill, the Western liberal tradition has distinguished between “harm to self” and “harm to others” and that paternalism, by definition, must target “harm to self.” Justified governmental intervention in regard to “harm to others” involves different principles and arguments. As stated in my previous essay, most human actions and paternalistic interventions affect others. So, with all this in mind, for now let’s focus on “harm to self.”

Paternalistic intervention is, by definition, an act of beneficence, where an individual (or group) coercively violates the liberty of another individual (or group) in order to prevent and/or remove “harm.” Well, what is harm? I don’t think I can improve much on Joel Feinberg’s definition, as the “invasion of an interest.” What is an interest? Well, it’s “anything you have a stake in.” If you have a “stake” in something, it means that, ultimately, your pleasure or pain is at stake. We all have an interest in a lot of different things, but obviously, we value some interests more than others. Let’s call these individual and collective rankings “interest hierarchies.”

Are these interest hierarchies “objective” or are they “relative” to individuals, small groups, or large groups? One might argue that interest invading harms are objective to the extent that harm can be measured in terms of magnitude and probability. Magnitude is the sheer degree of harm: "Death has greater magnitude than embarassment." Probability is the sheer likelihood of that harm. Thus, some harms are of great magnitude (death), but improbable (while flying); others are lesser in magnitude (embarrassment) but highly probable (farting in public). Moreover, the magnitude and probability of harm can be assessed over both the short-run and the long-run. Hence, most of us agree that Russian roulette is a high-magnitude, high-probability harm over the short run; smoking is a high-magnitude, high probability harm over the long run. (For the sake of argument, let’s assume that our beliefs about the causal relationship between smoking and cancer are true. My only point here is that smoking and Russian roulette are different.)

But in the real world, magnitude cannot be measured in a vacuum. It is always relative to other harms and benefits, and therefore subject to trade-offs. Therefore, rationality and irrationality are about those "interest hierarchies," risk-taking and trade-offs. We take risks when we either “do things” and when we “don’t do things,” therefore paternalistic interventions can either force us to “do things,” or prevent us from “doing things.” J.S. Mill suggested that irrational persons take irrational risks; that is they do things (or don’t do things) where the potential (or actual) costs of those actions exceed the potential (or actual) benefits. In short, irrational risks are not worth taking relative to an interest hierarchy. Unfortunately, he didn’t provide much insight into what this might mean in the real world. So what kinds of risks are rational?

Bernard Gert argues there harm is more or less objective. He observes that, unless a person has a good reason to do otherwise, rational individuals tend to avoid: death, pain, disability, and loss of opportunity. So what’s a “good reason” to choose death? Well, most Americans living in the twenty-first century agree that it is not, necessarily, irrational to choose death over suffering high levels of intractable pain or disability. But what happens if suicide is sometimes a rational act, relative to a large group, but irrational relative to a small group or an individual? If a teenager wants to jump off the bridge because of social embarrassment (farting in math class), then that it seems objectively irrational. After all, over the long run, embarrassment is, at most, a low magnitude short-term harm. But note that our large group, small group, and individual judgments are based the assumption that it is irrational to kill one's self out of embarrassment. Objectively speaking, embarassment is a mow magnitude harm, therefore suicide, a major harm, can never be justified. But in many parts of the world, embarrassed fathers routinely kill their daughters in the name of “honor” (embarrassment) and many daughters commit suicide after dishonoring (embarrassing) their fathers. Although most American believe that honor-based suicides are irrational (and immoral), how does one go about establishing an objective, universal standard?

So here lies the basic paternalistic dilemma. If our individual interest hierarchies are at least influenced by small groups and large groups, what does personal liberty mean in this context? (I'll address this in the next essay.) And, when there’s a conflict between individual and collective interest hierarchies, which interest hierarchy prevails over the others? Whose risk-assessment trumps whose? Large-group communitarians tend to empower large group hierarchies (American's), and small-group communitarians tend to empower small group hierarchies (Roman Catholic's), and libertarians empower individual hierarchies (Ron White's). But the question for libertarians is whether paternalistic intervention can ever be morally justified? As stated at the outset, traditionally that question has involved the analysis of rationality and harm. But another approach to this question is to take a closer look at how human knowledge underlies specific paternalistic interventions.

Pure and Impure Paternalism

2010-03-14T10:40:00.000-04:00

Let’s begin with a fundamental distinction between pure and impure forms of paternalism. Paternalistic intervention is an intentional act of beneficence where a benefactor violates the liberty of a beneficiary in order to provide an unwanted benefit. Beneficiaries and benefactors can be either individuals or groups. Within group-based paternalism, we can also differentiate between governmental paternalism (state paternalism) and non-governmental paternalism. Under state paternalism government acts as the benefactor by exercising the coercive power of government via regulations and taxation. For now let’s focus on group-based state paternalism.

Pure state paternalism is where the group whose liberty is being violated is identical to the group that may benefit (seat belt laws). Impure paternalism is when the group whose liberty is violated is larger than the group that is targeted for benefit. (laws that restrict access to sudafed)

Another feature of state paternalism is that it often benefits the benefactor and/or third parties, and therefore, masks conflict of interest and corporate welfare. Most paternalistic laws are initiated by providers. In modern societies, acts of pure paternalism are extremely rare. After all, in the “real world” of state paternalism, politically well-connected third parties almost always benefit such as: daycare centers, beauty salons, tatoo parlors, mental institutions, drug companies, psychologists, and psychiatrists. Seat belt laws benefit the engineers and manufacturers that produce seat belts. Drug laws benefit the alcohol industry and criminal organizations. (Admittedly, this is an empirical observation. If I'm wrong, please correct me!)

Now what can we say about those intended paternalistic benefits? Well, the fact of the matter is that many (if not most) paternalistic interventions enforced by the state, benefit the providers much more than the targeted beneficiaries. Do you really believe that laws that restrict access to marijuana protect anyone other than pharmaceutical companies, local police departments, and the employees of the Drug Enforcement Agency? (Another empirical observation!) As a modest proposal, let me suggest that justified paternalism requires that beneficiaries actually benefit from their loss of liberty. Libertarians tend to be highly critical of state paternalism because it rarely benefits intended beneficiaries and almost always masks corporate welfare. I’ll try to develop this theme in subsequent blog entries.

Paternalistic Intervention: Part 1

2010-02-27T09:25:00.000-05:00

My friend Bill inspired me to clarify my thoughts on the libertarian stance toward paternalism. The word “paternalism” is rooted in the Latin noun “pater,” or father. Today, the word paternalism signifies an act of intervention whereby one party, a well-meaning “benefactor,” violates the liberty of another person(s), a “beneficiary,” in order to provide an unwanted benefit. Benefits can be classified either something generally considered to be good, or the removal of something bad, a harm. The overwhelming majority of paternalistic interventions involve the removal of harms. Therefore, many (if not most) acts of paternalism seek to limit risk-taking by intended beneficiaries.

First of all, two parties are involved in paternalistic interventions: a beneficiary and a benefactor. So let’s break down this dyadic relationship a bit more. Beneficiaries and benefactors can be either individuals (individual paternalism) or groups of individuals (group paternalism). One important for of group paternalism is “state paternalism.” Examples of state paternalism include seat belt laws, drug laws, etc.

Paternalism involves the imposition of an unwanted benefit by a benefactor. On the face of it, this sounds absurd. After all, human beings tend to want benefits and not want harms. So the idea of an unwanted benefit seems irrational. That’s why RATIONALITY plays a key role in justifying paternalistic intervention. But in the real world, benefits and harms are subject to a certain degree of social construction. Thus rationality and social control tend to often overlap. We believe that there are some risks that are irrational. Why would any rational person choose to: kill one’ self, take mind altering recreational drugs, live homelessly out on the streets, refuse chemotherapy, not wear seat belts when driving etc. So the concepts of both rationality and HARM are central to paternalism.

But paternalism is only morally problematic in a social structure that places value on both PERSONAL LIBERTY and BENEFICENCE. Conversely, in cultures that place little or no value on personal liberty, or routinely value beneficence over liberty, paternalism is not regarded as problematic. Indeed, many cultures defer decision-making to husbands, parents, religious leaders, and/or government. However, in most of the Western world, especially, the United States and Europe, personal liberty has at least some value, and therefore, the violation of one’s liberty requires moral justification.

Insofar as paternalistic intervention violates the will of an intended beneficiary, it requires the benefactor to employ a certain degree of COERCIVE FORCE. Here the presumption is that if you do not want the benefit that is being offered, but you do not pose any resistant force to its imposition, it is not paternalistic because no coercive force was required.

And finally, we can explore the nature of interventions. Since all interventions involve costs and benefits, the underlying feature of paternalism is that the benefits offered by intervening outweigh the costs for not intervening. Call it REDOUNDING GOOD. Thus, there seems to be an empirical component involved in paternalistic intervention: either the intended beneficiary will, in fact, benefit from the intervention or they will not.

So we’ve established that there are five dimensions to paternalistic intervention:

1.) The presence or risk of an identifiable HARM.

2.) The value of PERSONAL LIBERTY and BENEFICENCE and the underlying assumption that individuals ought to be able to take at least some risks without being subjected to well-meaning benefactors.

3.) The RATIONALITY of the intended beneficiary and benefactor and/or the risks involved.

4.) The use of COERCIVE FORCE by benefactors

5.) The assessment of costs and benefits, or REDOUNDING GOOD of the intervention.

I’ll explore each of these dimensions in detail in subsequent blog entries.

Haiti: A Libertarian View of World Hunger

2010-02-07T08:48:00.000-05:00

With some justification, rights-based libertarians have been accused on being chronically insensitive to world hunger. Actually, the issue is much more complex. Take, for example, the ongoing food distribution debacle in Haiti. It seems that much (if not most) of the food aid being funneled into earthquake ravaged Haiti has been plagued by bribery, corruption, and theft perpetrated by gangs of predatory males. (This was true even before the eathquake!) To combat male-dominated food piracy, and maldistributed food aid, relief agencies have been issuing food coupons to women, who in are expected to exchange them for food and distribute it equitably among men, women, and children. Unfortunately, to the surprise of profoundly naive distributers, women are now being robbed by men of their coupons and food rations before they even get home with the goods. As reported by USA Today, these same women are being raped and victimized by these predatory males in the re-settlement camps.

Back in the 1970s, Neo-Malthusians like Garrett Hardin pointed to the intergenerational "ratchet effect" that invariably plagues food distribution. You feed one generation, they have more babies, population increases, and your moral obligation to feed them increases geometrically. But there is also an intrageneration "ratchet effect." In order to feed the hungry, distributers must first clear the rubble out of the streets, then police the roads for gangs that demand bribes for safe passage, set up distribution centers, make certain that the food gets to vulnerable women and children,and then police the camps where the Haitians are living to make sure that women and children are not victimized by men on the way home or at the lawless camps. In other words, at least in Haiti you cannot realistically expect to "feed" anyone without monitoring and enforcing a semblance of "rule of law" and, ultimately, without rebuilding their nation from the bottom up.

If you are a utility-minded libertarian and you want to spend your hard earned money to feed starving fellow humans, is Haiti a good place to send your money, or are there other countries where you'd get more "bang for a buck?" Of course, once the intragenerational ratchet effect subsides (if it ever does), then what? When is the job finished? How long will it take to teach Haitian males not to advance their individual and collective well-being through violence, threats, thievery, and corruption? If you expect the Haitian government to soon rise to the occasion, forget it. It is too busy prosecuting misguided missionaries caught trying to smuggle a few children out of a Malthusian quagmire.

A Libertarian View of Airline Security

2010-01-08T09:05:00.000-05:00

In light of the recent avalanche of media coverage targeting airline security, I thought it would be worthwhile to briefly outline a libertarian approach. Here is what we know:

1. Terrorism is not the product of one single group under the direction of one single leader, but a conglomeration of loosely organized, decentralized organizations from the Middle East. They overwhelmingly profess allegiance to Islamic religious beliefs. However, Islam is not only factionalized (Shiite Sunni etc.) but also highly decentralized, and therefore there is no one-single Islamic leader that has control over other groups. The vast majority of these “Islamic Extremists” live in poor Middle Eastern and African countries: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia etc. The vast majority of them are poor, male, illiterate, and unemployed. The majority of these potential terrorists have never flown in a plane.

2. All governments thrive on fear, and gain power over citizens by promising protection from threats. Invariably, the illusion of security is achieved at the expense of personal liberty and efficiency. The modern world is rife with both real and imagined threats. Americans have become increasingly risk-averse and therefore expect our government to protect us from an ever-expanding list of potential threats: influenza, balloon mortgages, unemployment, hunger, stupidity, rising gasoline prices, urban violence, sexual predators, contaminated food, and suicide bombers.

3. In the modern world perfect security is impossible because there is an infinite number of potential threats and an infinite number of ways to incite fear through the media. Threat-mongering enjoys a bull market. Therefore, if you watch CNN, or follow Internet news sources, you would think that we live our lives on the brink of disaster, when in fact most of us lead extraordinarily safe lives.

So what would a libertarian conclude about all of this? First of all, most of us would argue that we cannot afford to protect ourselves from an infinite number of potential threats, therefore security-rationing is inevitable. Most of us libertarians believe that the terrorist airline threat is greatly overblown. Moreover, our ongoing wars against local, regional, national, and international "Radical Islamic Groups" tend to manufacture more terrorists. Every time a drone missile kills an innocent (or guilty) woman or child, friends and family members seek revenge. However, they are not likely to buy an airline ticket to the United States. Given what we know about the efficiency of airline security, if terrorists were really interested in (or capable of) blowing up airplanes at will, there would have been many more air disasters. The fact of the matter is that you are safer on an airplane than in a car or a hospital. And finally, I think all libertarians agree that the airline industry is much more likely to be able to make rational assessments of the terrorism threat, and develop reasonable airline security policies than a governmental agency.

So what do we do? End the various instantiations of the “War on Terror” (along with the “Drug War”), let the free market sort out the degree of threat, develop useful technologies such as scanners, and biotechnical identification cards. Then, turn those “no-fly lists” over to the real experts: Federal Express, Wal-Mart, and Disney Corporation. Check out my recent APLS Blog Entry.

Employer Mandates, Individual Mandates and the Return of the Edsel.

2009-12-26T07:28:00.000-05:00

The debate over health care reform is almost over. Other than a few minor modifications that will be needed to reconcile the House and Senate bills, the long battle is over. Although I’m reluctant to predict what the final product will look like, there are two reforms that will most likely survive the sausage-making process: employer mandates and individual mandates. As Charles and I suggested in our paper The Modern Health Care Maze, given the perverse systemic incentives present in our health care system, individual and employer mandates are unavoidable. Here’s what we can expect from these mandates.

EMPLOYER MANDATES: It’s not clear is how the government will be able to force small businesses to offer “quality health insurance” at a "reasonable cost," without incentivizing those employers to either: drastically reduce the wages of their employees, cut back the number of full-time employees, or filing for bankruptcy. The only way to prevent any of these adverse responses is for government to either subsidize health insurance for small businesses, redefine “quality insurance,” or both. Both strategies will be in the final bill. No one knows how much future small businesses will be willing or able to spend on employee health insurance. My best guess is that most small-business owners will need nearly a 100% subsidy in order to stay in business. And, let's not forget that the vast majority of small businesses will go bankrupt, regardless of health care reform. Government will try to control health insurance costs by redefining “quality insurance.” A 40% tax on “Cadillac Health Insurance Plans” offered by large employers will almost certainly be in the final bill. But I have very little faith in our legislators’ ability to distinguish between Cadillacs and Edsels. I do predict that Congress will end up with Cadillacs and most of the rest of us will have Edsels.

INDIVIDUAL MANDATES: No one knows how much young, healthy individuals will be willing or able to pay for mandatory health insurance, without defaulting on their student loans, defaulting on their car loans, or defaulting on their home mortgages. Without a 100% subsidy, my best guess is that we’ll see either a massive default rate on loans or a radical decline in college enrollment, new car or home purchases by young, healthy people. Therefore, if I’m right, government will be paying for most of the insurance that it mandates for young, healthy individuals.

So between employer and individual mandates government will be paying for a lot more or Edsel quality health care. And given that there is nothing in the health care reform bills that will force providers to compete based on quality and price, those subsidies will merely add to the inflationary spiral.

Why the American Hospital Association and the American Medical Association Oppose Lowering the Age Requirement for Medicare

2009-12-12T10:07:00.000-05:00

As health care reform continues it's steady decent into oblivion under the watchful eye of a swarm of lobbyists, let me offer a few comments on a recent news article announcing that the American Medical Association and the American Hospital Association will oppose the expansion of Medicare as an alternative to the proposed “public option.” As reported by David Espo on December 11: "The American Hospital Association and American Medical Association have both criticized the proposed Medicare expansion since it was announced Tuesday night, saying the program pays health care providers less than private insurance companies, and warning against increasing the number of patients."

Although I personally stand to benefit from the proposed lowering of the program's age requirement from 65 to 55, I really can’t defend an expensive government program infested with fraud and grossly over-budget: even if it is popular among those who benefit from it. But I would like to point out that the opposition voiced by the AHA and AMA is exactly what you’d expect from any artificial monopoly.

Artificial monopolies thrive, not because they provide higher quality products and/or services at a lower price than their competitors, but because they convince government to disable competition. It’s a lot easier and less expensive to dispatch an army of well-paid lobbyists to Washington than it is to compete head-to-head. That’s also why the quality of health care in the United States has been in decline while the price continues to rise.

In the case of hospitals and physicians, competition has been long disabled by an extraordinarily convoluted and opaque pricing system. The cornerstone of this system is called price-discrimination, whereby sellers conveniently set their prices based on the buyers’ ability to pay. In the health care industry it’s based the size of the risk-pool. (Keep in mind that price-discrimination only works under conditions where buyers cannot simply refuse to buy these products and services: think cancer treatment!) Hence, under a price-discriminatory system, providers charge different prices to different buyers and buyer groups. If your private health insurance policy has a large enough risk pool, it can force the sellers to charge less. Of course, providers always prefer to negotiate with small risk-groups, and their lobbying efforts invariably reflect that preference. If you are not part of a group you’ll pay to the teeth!

Private insurance companies are currently regulated by state governments; which obviously limits the size of buyer groups. But under this bizarre pricing structure, no one really knows what that final price will be until long after the product or service has been provided. (Go ahead, call around town and ask how it costs to get an MRI!) Imagine going to your auto repair shop and asking how much a new muffler will cost, and the mechanic responds by saying: “Well the price depends on the size of the risk pool that backs up your auto insurance. We currently charge 37 different prices. We’ll replace your muffler and then figure out that price and send it to your insurance company, then they’ll decide how much they’ll pay, then you’ll get a bill for the difference.” After you get through laughing your ass off, you’d probably decide to fix that muffler yourself, or simply drive a noisy vehicle.

So what’s the story with Medicare? Well, it’s a single-payer system (and a so-called "public option") which means that it draws on a national market and has enough bargaining power to negotiate a lower price from providers. It also forces providers to charge a set fee that clearly reflects what Medicare will pay for that product of service. It’s a lot like going to your auto repair shop where the prices are posted on the wall and on their website, and everyone pays the same price. This kind of a pricing structure actually forces providers to compete based on quality and price. Of course, if you are a provider you’d prefer to be paid more per-buyer than less-per buyer, which is why many successful providers simply refuse to take on any Medicare patients. As the number of providers that refuse to participate in Medicare increases, it gets more difficult for elderly patients to find willing providers. When they do find one, they'll probably spend several hours in the waiting room! However, there is one class of providers that thrive on Medicare; that is, dishonest providers that charge the program for unnecessary products and services or for products and services that they never provided. And the government's inability to monitor the system, attracts dishonest providers.

So what’s the solution here? Well, I would argue that the health care industry ought to operate under the same legal pricing constraints as other industries. Most other countries have outlawed price-discrimination and therefore force providers to post their prices. Of course, that won’t happen in the United States because The American Hospital Association and the American Medical Association would descend on Washington like a swarm of locusts.

The Illusion of Costless Benefits: Mammograms, Pap Tests, and the Inspection of Goat Entrails

2009-11-27T09:12:00.000-05:00

Last week the results of two major research studies challenged the utility of two cancer screening tests: mammograms and Pap tests. As a libertarian philosopher, I thought I’d add a few caveats.

Scientific predictions of impending downward spirals are subject to two kinds of costly errors that waste time, effort, and resources: false positives and false negatives. Mammograms and Pap tests are subject to a high incidence of both, which raises two questions. 1.) Under what conditions does it make sense for an individual to undergo these imperfect screening tests? 2.) Under what conditions does it make sense for government to encourage or discourage the use of these imperfect screening tests? The cost/benefit ratios for these tests are enormously complex and include both biological and economic determinents. Recent scientific evidence indicates that for individuals, the utility ratios for both mammograms and Pap tests vary based on one's medical history, family history, and age. If you have had cancer before, or if you have a strong family history of cancer, evidence suggests that you probably ought to be tested.

Once it is determined that you ought get routine mammograms and/or Pap tests, then scientists must then determine at what age routine testing ought to begin and end, and how often you ought to be tested? Surprise! The corporations that manufacture these tests and the specialists that interpret the results prefer that more women get tested more often. Third-part payers prefer fewer women being tested less often. As scientists gather empirical evidence over time, the cost/benefit ratios for various groups change and the status quo becomes subject to revision, and some women who were previously recommended for routine may no longer be routinely tested, and/or some who were not recommended for routine tested may be routinely tested.

Although about 3-4 million Pap tests are performed annually, only about 13, 000 cases of cervical cancer are diagnosed, and 4,000 women die from it every year. In the case of mammograms, 1,900 women must be screened for a decade in order to save a single life. In light of this body of statistical evidence, under what circumstances might government encourage women to undergo these tests, or mandate insurance companies to pay for these tests? Here lies the political problem.

For better or worse, we have all been culturally programmed to ignore the economic dimension of health care: an ideology that is reflected in the often cited moral pronouncement: “Regardless of how much it costs, if we can save one life… it’s worth it.” This high-minded ideology has had, not only a devastating effect cost of health care, it has also undermined scientific medicine. Based on the “save one life principle,” if we screen 100 million persons and save one life, it’s worth it! Or, if we spend $50,000 keeping 95 year old Uncle Joe alive in an intensive care unit for three more months, it’s worth it. And, of course the “save one life principle” becomes even more pernicious when someone else pays for the tests and/or hospital bills.

We Americans are more likely to want and/or undergo any screening test if a third party (private health insurance, Medicare, Medicaid etc.) pays for it. Economists call it “moral hazard.” So how do third-party payers decide which tests to pay for? Well, state and federal governments usually decide for them by force third-party payers to pay for certain tests. How do legislators decide which tests to mandate? We would all like to believe that scientific evidence plays a prominent role, but that’s not how our political system works. What usually happens is that the manufacturers of the tests and the would-be beneficiaries of low-probability, costless benefits get together and form coalitions that vigorously lobby state legislators. How hard is it for male legislators to refuse to cover Pap tests and/or mammograms when confronted by an army of female lobbyists?

Libertarians are critical of any system where government presides over the distribution of "costless benefits." If the goat industry and a group of patients that believe in the prognostic value of the inspection of goat entrails could form an effective lobby, third-party payers could be forced to pay for those tests. The fundamental problem in the United States is that health care policy is often forged on the basis lobbying acumen, often at the expense of science. As the goat industry plans its lobbying campaign to force third-party payers to cover the inspection of goat entrails as an alternative to mammograms and pap tests, we can begin to understand why the quality and cost of health care in the United States will remail suboptimal.

Group Bias in the Distribution of Health Care in the United States

2009-11-07T09:21:00.000-05:00

As I suggested in an earlier blog entry governmentally subsidized health care in the United States is already being rationed. I think it is distributed based on an indefensible group bias; that is, politicians control access to subsidized health insurance based on arbitrary group association. Let's take a closer look at that.

Since the twentieth century, politicians have granted subsidized access to specific groups. In the 1940s, the first “group” to gain that access was comprised of individual white, male workers that worked for large unionized corporations. Later, politicians expanded access by including other groups including: the elderly, the poor, veterans, Native Americans, employees of government, and children. As a result of this irrational group-based allocation system, we now have a “maze” of health care tax-supported programs that provide various levels of health care coverage to most Americans. The current problem is that we now have a growing number of individuals that need access to health care but do not fall into any of these arbitrary groupings. Therefore, in order to gain access these “outsiders” have had to manufacture their own “group,” and lobby government for equal recognition. This new group is comprised of everyone that is not employed by a corporation that offers private health insurance, not elderly, not poor, not a veteran, not Native American, not employed by government, and/or not children.

Now any rational person that is against health care reform within its current framework must argue that these outsiders are not entitled to health coverage, even though these other groups already enjoy subsidized health insurance. Of course, no politician is going to take subsidized health care away from workers, the poor, elderly, soldiers, or children. But many politicians are opposed to adding “outsiders.” Interestingly the rest of us rarely demand that those politicians justify the inclusion of one group and the exclusion of another. Why?

Academic Dishonesty in Higher Education

2009-10-18T16:13:00.000-04:00

Walter Williams is my favorite syndicated columnist. I look forward to reading his column every Sunday in the Cincinnati Enquirer. One of his favorite targets is the sorry state of higher education in the United States. His most recent rant, titled, Academic Dishonesty, shines a bright light on grade inflation at elite colleges and universities and how those very expensive institutions manipulate statistics to maintain their high rankings. Rather than rehash my hero’s arguments I thought I’d add a few caveats. As a professor at a small private liberal arts college, I can offer a slightly different perspective.

Like it or not, students at small private colleges compete with the graduates of these “highly ranked” programs; for jobs and for admission into graduate programs. But how can we compete with those institutions when they give all of their students A’s and B’s? Realistically, can we give our students a lot of B’s and C’s? Moreover, if you are a junior faculty member that hopes to earn tenure at a small college that emphasizes “good teaching,” how can you earn stellar student evaluations if you give out mostly B’s and C’s? Or better yet, if you are a Program Chair or an Academic Dean responsible for granting promotion and tenure, would you promote “easy-grading” professors with high student evaluations or “hard-grading” professors with lower evaluations; especially, knowing that low GPAs will not get your best students into high-paying jobs or graduate school?

So although it is tempting to attribute to the decline of higher education in the United States to simple dishonesty, it is actually much more complicated. At least part of the problem can be attributed to publically funded universities that spend millions of dollars in tax money on attractive new buildings and expensive athletic programs. And of course, those institutions must then take in more students to help pay the bills. Without expensive remedial programs, many of these new students flunk out the first year. One inexpensive way to make up for feeble remedial programs (and poor secondary education) is to lower academic standards. In other words, grade inflation is an effective solution to sagging retention numbers.

In my view, the only way to fix this mess is to accept the fact that higher education is an industry. This requires a major shift in governmental policy away from subsiding inefficient state institutions (and driving small public institutions out of business) and toward a less intrusive role consisting in promoting fair competition between private institutions. Realistically, will that ever happen? Well Walter, what am I going to do? Am I going to start giving out a lot of C’s and D’s in order to rescue academic honesty in higher education. If you said no, go to the head of the class.

The Non-Debate over Health Care Reform: Or, Why the Status Quo Will Prevail

2009-09-30T07:47:00.000-04:00

Historically, health care in the United states has always been highly decentralized and forged on the basis of political action committees and paid lobbyists that represent specific groups: Medicare (the elderly), Medicaid (the poor, ) Children's Health Insurance Program (children), Veterans Health Administration (veterans), the Indian Health Service (native Americans), and Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (federal employees). Others are covered by employment-based private health insurance. All of these programs are tax-supported to various degrees. And all of them are either running deficits, infested with fraud, inefficiency, or a combination of all three. Despite shortcomings, these programs are also highly coveted by their respective constituencies, and therefore no one in Congress can reasonably propose replacing this patchwork with a single system. In other words, the health care reform movement in the United States is not about creating one single system, but rather adding other programs to that patchwork. The powerless constituencies that are currently left out this patchwork include: employees whose employers do not offer health insurance, patients with pre-existing medical conditions, employees that are under-insured (but don’t know it yet), and an undetermined number of young, healthy employees that choose to forego purchasing health insurance. Whatever happens under the guise of health care reform, I can promise you that none of the current programs will be eliminated. In other words, whatever it is that’s taking place in Washington under the guise of “Health Care Reform,” it is really about maintaining the status quo. At this point, there is no reason to debate the question of whether a centralized system is preferable to a decentralized one. That’s because no one in congress is really pushing for a centralized system. What's the problem? It's the way we go about forging public policy in the United States. Can we really afford to continue to allow Congress unlimited access to tax dollars and dole out political favors to powerful groups represented by well-paid lobbyists?

NON-COMPLIANCE WITH TITLE IX

2009-08-16T10:06:00.000-04:00

This morning, an article in the Cincinnati Enquirer caught my eye: “Playing Field Still Not Level.” Basically, it exposes the fact that the state of Ohio does not enforce Title IX (1973), the legislation which mandates that public high schools offer male and female students an “equal opportunity” to participate in sports. Although I am both an avid “sports nut” and a supporter of gender equity, I am nevertheless puzzled by our disproportionate emphasis on sports in public high schools and the costs that are passed on to taxpayers; especially when most public schools are struggling to offer decent academic programs. Obviously, some sports are more expensive than others. Although I am a football fan, there is no good reason to offer this expensive sport in cash-strapped public schools (or any public school!). Without boring you with numbers I’ll merely point out that it’s very expensive to: build and maintain a football stadium, transport 75-100+ students to and from practice and games, buy equipment, pay coaches, and pay liability insurance premiums. It is the king of deficit sports. Unfortunately, football is also a “Y Chromosome sport,” and therefore any school that has a football team of, say, 150 male students, equality of opportunity would require 150 opportunities for females. This usually means that any school that takes Title IX seriously will not be able to offer other male sports such as wrestling, track and field, or lacrosse. If Ohio’s level of seriousness in respect to title IX is indicative of what’s going on elsewhere, public high school athletics is still overwhelming male dominated.

My basic argument is more subtle. I would argue that it makes more sense to offer athletic opportunities through private, non-profit voluntary associations than tax-supported schools. In fact, most communities already offer sports for pre-high school children outside of school, especially Pee-Wee Football, Little League Baseball, and AAU soccer, basketball, and track. In order to pay for these opportunities, parents pay a fee and/or raise money via bake sales, candy sales etc. Most coaches are parents that volunteer. The beauty of this arrangement is that the costs are incurred by those who receive the benefits. But today, these private endeavors are crowded out by public, tax supported high school teams. (Talk to any “select soccer coach!”) Now I can’t guarantee that football would survive privatization. It’s probably too expensive for most parents. In other words, football would not survive exposure to the free market, which is precisely why it is socialized. Think Amtrack…

One reason why I am a critic of public schools is that an inordinate amount of coercively obtained tax money is expended on sports and other extra-curricular activities. In fact, many schools that lack science laboratories, and/or air conditioning have a full array of expensive athletic teams. But then again, labs and air conditioners do not provide subsidized after-school adult supervision for mischief-prone teenagers!

Now back to title IX… If Cincinnati decided to eliminate all high school sports, parents that want their children to participate in sports would have to pay directly for these activities. Interested parents and students would have to set up these voluntary associations and volunteer to help coach, sell concessions, wash uniforms, mow lawns, etc. If the parents of female students are less-willing to get involved, that is not “discrimination.” It’s called “parenting.”

Unfortunately, the cultural drift of American society makes it difficult for high schools to cut back on extra-curricular activities, because colleges and universities now base admission and scholarships on participation in these kinds of activities. High schools that merely offer top-notch academic programs do not compete very well based on this mindset. How many student play high schools sports, cheerlead, or march in the marching band hoping to earn a college scholarship? When the stakes are that high, those voluntary coaches and band leaders are quickly replaced by paid “professionals.” And finally, many public schools are so bad that students won’t show up for school unless they can play sports, cheerlead, or play in the marching band. Well, Professor Serafini, what do you have to say about all of this? And “HAPPY BIRTHDAY!”

Tragedy of the Commons, Part 3: Over-Pollution

2009-07-13T07:14:00.000-04:00

The second manifestation of the “tragedy of the commons” is the problem of over-pollution. When human beings either extract resources from the environment or transform resources into artifacts a certain amount residual material is left behind. That residual material deposited in the earth, air, or water can be useless, useful, harmful, or harmless. We usually call the useless, harmful, residual “pollution.” Knowledge of whether that residual material is (in fact) useful or useless, and/or harmless or harmful is contingent upon conducting costly scientific research and acting based on that research. Moreover, in many cases the natural environment is capable of reducing or eliminating the harmfulness of pollution. Knowledge of Mother Nature’s timeline for the transformation of waste can often be discovered via research, but sometimes not. The holy grail of human extraction and production is to develop techniques that minimize; or, at least expel waste at a degree and rate within Mother Nature’s ability to transform it into more useful and/or less-harmful byproducts. Call it "sustainability."

The basic problem for the social and political management of pollution is how to provide incentives and disincentives that lead extractors and producers to conduct the research necessary to limit and or reduce pollution, and act based on this research. The “tragedy of the commons” predicts that political stewardship over the “commons,” is invariably inefficient and/or ineffective. Hence, when extractors and producers expel useless and/or harmful waste into “commons” there is little, if any incentive to conduct the research necessary to transform it, eliminate it, or act on that research. Here’s why. If it costs less to pollute than not pollute, extractors and producers will usually choose to pollute. They will invest in research to minimize pollution and/or convert it, if and only if, the cost of conducting that research, and the prospects of that research “paying off” is less than the cost of continuing to pollute with impunity. For example, it is difficult to extract minerals from the earth without polluting the adjacent air and water. If there is little cost associated with polluting the commons, mining companies will continue to pollute, and/or transfer the cost of cleaning up the mess to others (usually government). Therefore, pollution control policy is all about providing extractors and producers with incentives and disincentives that lead to acceptable levels of pollution.

There are two ways for societies to provide these incentives: one entails “more government” the other “less government.” Unfortunately, neither strategy is likely to succeed at a global level. There are two “more government” strategies that are often employed to raise the cost of polluting the commons. One way is to simply tax or fine polluters. This strategy entails that government "cap" pollution levels, monitor and enforce compliance with these caps, and either tax or fine extractors or producers that exceed those limits. This raises serious practical problems. At what level will government set those pollution limits? (Set caps too high and there will be no extraction or production.) How much will it cost for government to effectively monitor and enforce compliance with pollution limits? (It could cost more to monitor and enforce pollution laws than it would cost to clean up the mess.) At what level will the government tax or fine violators? (Set taxes or fines too low and there is no incentive to not-pollute, set it too high and black market polluters will appear.) Who pays the cost of monitoring and enforcement of pollution standards? (Taxpayers, polluters, stockholders, retailers etc.)

The second “more government” strategy is the policy now being pursued by the Obama administration, called “cap-and-trade.” The general idea is to “cap” pollution at a certain level, but then allow extractors and producers that generate pollution levels lower than the cap to “trade” or sell “pollution credits” to those extractors and producers that are unwilling or unable to meet those standards. This creates an artificial market, that in theory, provides an incentive to become a seller of pollution credits, and a disincentive to become a buyer of credits. Although, this resembles a free-market approach, it is really a contingent upon where government sets the pollution limits, how government manages the pollution credit market, and how much government spends doing all of this. Since the sellers of the credits are the primary beneficiaries of cap-and-trade, the question remains of how to pay for the army government watchdogs responsible for implementing this convoluted cap-and-trade system.

Critics of taxation, fines, and “cap and trade” argue that most serious problem with any strategy that involves setting, monitoring, and enforcing “caps” is that these standards are usually set by industry lobbyists rather than scientists, and therefore reflect political expediency and not science. Other critics argue that the cost of monitoring and enforcing the caps would require hiring an army of monitors and enforcers, which would require a massive tax increase, user fees of some kind, and/or increased borrowing from China! And, of course, all libertarians will point out that in recent years the United States government has proven to be less than reliable steward of the "public good" and an ineffective and inefficient monitor and enforcer of laws governing other undesirable forms of corporate behavior.

Libertarians therefore argue that the best “less government” strategy for the reduction of pollution would be to simply transform public property in private property, and thus eliminate "the commons." But private ownership of earth, air and water will not necessarily reduce pollution in the United States. If the short-term (or long-term) benefits of extraction outweigh the perceived costs of continuing to pollute, extractors and producers will continue to pollute. Moreover, if extractors and producers were required to pay the owners of the earth, air, and water, to clean up the mess, or purchase earth, air, or water from the owners, it would almost certainly reduce pollution levels, but where? If United States adopted this strategy, the most likely consequence would be that extractors and producers would simply move extraction and production to other countries that maintain “public property,” where government officials earn a handsome profit from graft and corruption. So when pollution is exported to nations that allow their governments to exercise stewardship over publically-owned earth, air, and water, “tragedy of the commons” predicts that pollution levels will rise in those countries. So although private ownership in the United States may reduce pollution levels in the United States, global pollution would continue to increase. In other words, global pollution will require global cooperation between nations and/or universal abandonment of "the commons,"which are both highly unlikely. Am I a libertarian or a cynic? What do you think?

Tragedy of the Commons, Part 2: Over-Extraction of Resources

2009-07-09T11:25:00.000-04:00

One manifestation of the “tragedy of the commons” is that human beings tend to over extract resources. Resource depletion can often be blamed on the fact that we often have imperfect information, as to the exact quantities of available resources at our disposal and the natural capacity for replenishment. How many salmon can be extracted before the species is no longer able to sustain itself? I wish imperfect information was the only source of unsustainable resource depletion. Unfortunately, we all over-extract in order to reap known short-term benefits at the expense of the unknown long-term costs. As evidenced by the universality of this kind of behavior, I’m afraid that human beings (individually and collectively) are naturally predisposed to unsustainable over-extraction.

In a free market, one would expect that the extraction of increasingly scarce resources would become prohibitively expensive and, therefore, extractors would be incentivized to pursue less-expensive substitutes. However, technology extends the ability of extractors to find increasingly scarce resources, while other technologies make it possible to efficiently over-extract those remaining resources. Hence, technology also plays a role in over-extraction. Governments encourage investment in these technologies by offering tax write-offs and other less visible incentives.

But then again, we might question whether the long-term extinction of any one resource is necessarily tragic. Although the over-extraction of oil would be tragic to the oil industry and its stockholders, over the long-run, it would be a godsend to the coal industry and other alternative energy industries. If those alternatives turn out to be onerously expensive, we can always alter out consumption patterns. Unfortunately, this natural process is often short-circuited by governmental tax policies, subsidies, and licensing that provide perverse incentives that lower the cost of continuing to extract increasingly scarce resources at the expense of other potentially viable substitutes. Libertarians argue that viable substitutes must be discovered via free market competition. But welfare liberals cling to the false belief that government experts possess perfect information, and therefore can choose the best substitutes. When governments choose the wrong substitutes, we invariably end up with resource shortages, higher prices, and/ or higher taxes. F.A. Hayek called this governmental tendency to over-estimate its ability to manage markets, “The Fatal Conceit.”

In the United States, the over-extraction of natural resources is also fueled by public ownership of resources, coupled with the government charging favored extractors ridiculously low license fees to extract publically-owned oil, coal, and timber. Sometimes these “sweetheart deals” can be attributed to outright corruption of public officials, but most often it’s a matter of legislators trying to protect extraction jobs in their districts by artificially lowering the cost of extraction and thereby fighting off viable competing substitutes offered by other districts. Hence, onerously expensive off-shore drilling for increasingly scarce oil is incentivized by government by lowering extraction fees, water pollution standards, and taxes etc. Despite years of tragic over-extraction, environmentalists continue to express unbridled faith in governmental stewardship over resource extraction, while in reality they are more likely to end up with “corporate welfare,” which is how governments make the “tragedy of the commons” even more tragic.

Environmental Policy and the "Tragedy of the Commons" Part I

2009-07-06T07:46:00.000-04:00

Any libertarian-based environmental policy begins with a foundational principle called the “Tragedy of the Commons.” Let’s break it down into its basic components: “commons” and “tragedy.” In the Western world, the cultural origin of the concept of collective environmental ownership can be traced to the Biblically-based tenet that God gave the earth to mankind. Over the centuries this has been interpreted to mean that caring for the earth is our collective responsibility: call it “stewardship.” Unfortunately, the problem with collective responsibility is that we have repeatedly proven to be irresponsible stewards. That’s why when human beings assert collective dominion over the environment the consequences are inevitably tragic. Hence, the familiar libertarian mantra, “When everyone owns it, nobody owns it.”

Human beings utilize our common earthly environment in two different ways. We extract resources and expel waste. Throughout human history, environmental tragedy has resulted from our over-extraction and over-expulsion. In recent years, the over-extraction and over-pollution have become more problematic than in the past because we’ve become much more efficient extractors and polluters. The root of the problem is that, when given the option, we humans would rather reap benefits than pay costs. In the case of over-extraction and over-pollution the costs are usually transferred (shifted) to other humans, and most often to future generations. Most libertarians argue that the only way to avoid “tragedy of the commons” is to abandon collective ownership and stewardship in favor of private ownership. I’m not sure about that. Private ownership alone will not necessarily lead to non-tragic environmental policy. After all, individual owners are also prone to over-extraction and over-pollution of their own property, as they willingly risk less-certain long-term tragedy in pursuit of certain short-term benefits.

So the real problem arises when opportunistic owners over-extract and over-expel at the expense of other adjacent property owners. Therefore, other libertarians argue that private ownership must be accompanied by the empowerment of adjacent property owners to exact retribution. When my neighbor builds a dam upstream to divert water for his private fishing pond, why can’t I sue him for over-extraction? When the coal-fired utility plants along the Ohio River pollute the air over my property why can’t I sue Duke Energy Corporation for polluting my air? But it's not that simple. The two manifestations of the “tragedy of the commons” are so different that they require more detailed, separate analyses. Therefore, my next two blog entries will cover over-extraction and over-pollution, respectively.