I'm not much of a proponent of virtue-based ethics, but lately I've been warming up to it it...One virtue I've been thinking about is "Trust."
First, let's agree that we use the word in a bewildering variety of contexts. We say that we "trust" or "distrust" both living and non-living entities. I "trust" my wife, my dogs, and the brakes on my Toyota. I would "distrust" my wife to perform brain surgery. I certainly wouldn't "trust" my dogs to drive my Toyota. We also "trust" or "distrust" organizations, leaders, and or followers. For now, let's focus on individual and organizational trust.
In virtue ethics, I'm a big fan of Aristotle's emphasis on context. He certainly would NOT argue that it is virtuous to completely trust all persons, leaders, followers, or organizations, at all times, in all places. To be trusted one must be ... or trustworthy. Let's break this down a bit. Aristotle thought that trust (and distrust) are virtues, and that virtuous behavior is habitual. Therefore, the decision of whether to trust a person or organization is contingent upon access to information about habitual behavior. If John Doe has a history of drinking all of your most expensive beer when you're not home, then you probably wouldn't want to leave an unguarded case of Heineken in your refrigerator. You might, however, trust that John will not steal your wife, Toyota, or your dogs. Hence, trust really is contextual. Moreover, if you habitually trust persons or organizations that, obviously, are untrustworthy, you are not virtuous. You're a "sucker." If you habitually "distrust" persons or organizations that are demonstrably trustworthy you are not virtuous either. You are a "cynic." In short, Aristotelian virtue requires that we trust the right person, at the right time, in the right place, to the right degree. We must be discerning.
As a general rule we trust family and friends, at least in part, because we know their "track record." On the other hand, we generally, distrust "strangers;" that is persons and organizations whose track record is unknown. However, if we're virtuous we naturally seek out "information" that might indicate trustworthiness or untrustworthiness. Of course, that leaves us open to the criticism that we're biased or discriminatory; especially when we distrust classes of strangers based on limited information. So here is the basic question! When we are deciding whether to trust or distrust strangers, what should be the default position? Should we trust strangers until we possess reliable information that warrants distrust; or should we distrust strangers until we possess reliable information that warrants trust? Unfortunately, some individuals and organizations are opportunistic, and are highly skilled at disguising their untrustworthiness. Hence, many positions of trust are invaded by untrustworthy opportunists. At least in recent years, politicians have probably been the most opportunistic. Here, the basic problem is that politicians have almost unlimited ability to disguise their opportunism by manipulating the machinery of government to their advantage. Transparency, therefore, is a necessary condition for guarding against opportunism. But transparency undermines opportunism, and therefore persons and organizations often manipulate language to make it difficult for the rest of us to decode their track record. Hence, the rise of "private languages," that serve to undermine our ability to know who to trust. Most professions that serve as "agents" for the rest of us, employ private languages: lawyers, priests, ministers, physicians, politicians, used car salesmen, insurance brokers etc. I call it "private language fraud."
I've been rightfully identified as a cynic; that is, I am not readily predisposed to blindly trust strangers, especially those that expect me to trust them to decode a private language. In fact, I always deploy my philosophical skills to "deconstruct" those private languages on my own, or at least find someone that I trust to do it for me. The most conspicuous example of private language fraud on earth is the U.S. tax code. Until that mess is translated into "public language" that the rest of us can understand, I'll continue to distrust politicians.
Tuesday, April 16, 2013
Saturday, March 2, 2013
Self Sacrifice for the Common Good
"Common good arguments" inevitably call for "self-sacrifice" by individuals, small groups, and large groups. Self-sacrifice entails the allocation of time, energy, and our resources in the interest of other individuals and/or groups. Hence, I might be urged to tune my guitar for the "common good" of my band. My band might be urged to rehearse at a lower volume for "common good" of my neighborhood. My neighborhood might be urged to clean up trash on the streets for the "common good" of the city of Cincinnati...etc. Democrats and Republicans are being urged to "sacrifice" their "partisan" interests for the good of the whole country. The U.S. is asked to sacrifice its "partisan" interest in cheap energy for the "common good" of cleaner air for the rest of the world. In each instance, self sacrifice calls for individuals or groups to either "do something" unpleasant, or "not do" something pleasant for the "common good." Moreover, there is always an added correlary: non-cooperative "bad persons" can be justifiably coerced to "do" or "not do" these goods. While I would never argue that self-sacrifice is "bad," I do think that whether it is justified or not in any context requires a complex moral argument. Merely declaring that X serves the "common good" is not enough...at least for a philosopher.
"Self-sacrifice arguments" are part of a larger complex of moral beliefs bound together by the central notion that "good persons" and "good groups" willingly sacrifice their interests (time, energy, or resources) for the common good; and that "bad persons" do not. The more you are willing to sacrifice, the "better." As I pointed out in my previous blog, the most idealistic "common good arguments" urge us to sacrifice our own short-term, individual (or small group) interests in order to advance long-term, larger group interests, or global interests. Hence, the moral ideal consists in self-impovershment for the sake of the universal, long-term common good.
Because "self-sacrifice arguments" are usually rhetorically persuasive, more and more "interest groups" invoke them, and demand increasing levels of "self-sacrifice" out of all us. Government is the most zealous proponent of "self-sacrifice." The TSA now expects all of us to "sacrifice" increasing levels of privacy in order advance the "common good" of airline security. If I object to aggressive testicular groping I am not a "good citizen" or a "good person." Here in Cincinnati we are being asked to pay higher taxes to pay for two sports stadiums, a zoo, several museums, an orchestra, a new bridge across the Ohio River, and new a street car...all in order to advance that proverbial "common good"over the "long-run." If I object to sacrificing my own financial interests in order to advance any of these "common goods," I'm immediately labelled as selfish, uncooperative, and a bad citizen or person. My question is this. If "self-sacrifice" for the "common good" is our primary social value and the basis for "social justice," and if, over the long-run, there is an infinite number of possible "common goods," then how can we avoid self-sacrificing ourselves into abject poverty?
Right right now I bet you're thinking something like this..."Obviously we can't advance all "common goods," therefore we are only "obligated" to advance the most salient "common goods" that fill the "needs" of other individuals and/or groups? In other words, it is morally acceptable to ration our self-sacrifice and thereby avoid self-inflicted poverty. That works fine in the private sphere where we have control over our own rationing process. It doesn't work very well in the public sphere where others coercively ration our time, energy, and resources. In either case, here's the basic question: "How do we know that any self-sacrificial act will, in fact, advance the "common good" and not merely advance the short-term"partisan good" of those who stand to benefit from our sacrifices?" Obviously, its harder to know universal, long-term consequences.
In sum, I am not opposed to the "common good" or "self-sacrifice," however I am wary of the dangers of unquestioned devotion these abstract principles. Both terms are what I call "conveniently vague" which means they tend to evoke consensus, even when there really isn't. Moreover, failure to deconstruct these arguments leaves us vulnerable to opportunists who will "cash in" on our unbridled generocity; especially corporations. Hence, the spread of corporatism in the Western world, as corporations skillfully deploy "common good" and "self-sacrifice" arguments to advance their own partisan interests. In recent years, the most prolific beneficiaries of blind self-sacrifice have been associated with the health care industry, especially: health insurance companies, pharmaceutical companies, hospitals, and physicians. But that's another topic.
"Self-sacrifice arguments" are part of a larger complex of moral beliefs bound together by the central notion that "good persons" and "good groups" willingly sacrifice their interests (time, energy, or resources) for the common good; and that "bad persons" do not. The more you are willing to sacrifice, the "better." As I pointed out in my previous blog, the most idealistic "common good arguments" urge us to sacrifice our own short-term, individual (or small group) interests in order to advance long-term, larger group interests, or global interests. Hence, the moral ideal consists in self-impovershment for the sake of the universal, long-term common good.
Because "self-sacrifice arguments" are usually rhetorically persuasive, more and more "interest groups" invoke them, and demand increasing levels of "self-sacrifice" out of all us. Government is the most zealous proponent of "self-sacrifice." The TSA now expects all of us to "sacrifice" increasing levels of privacy in order advance the "common good" of airline security. If I object to aggressive testicular groping I am not a "good citizen" or a "good person." Here in Cincinnati we are being asked to pay higher taxes to pay for two sports stadiums, a zoo, several museums, an orchestra, a new bridge across the Ohio River, and new a street car...all in order to advance that proverbial "common good"over the "long-run." If I object to sacrificing my own financial interests in order to advance any of these "common goods," I'm immediately labelled as selfish, uncooperative, and a bad citizen or person. My question is this. If "self-sacrifice" for the "common good" is our primary social value and the basis for "social justice," and if, over the long-run, there is an infinite number of possible "common goods," then how can we avoid self-sacrificing ourselves into abject poverty?
Right right now I bet you're thinking something like this..."Obviously we can't advance all "common goods," therefore we are only "obligated" to advance the most salient "common goods" that fill the "needs" of other individuals and/or groups? In other words, it is morally acceptable to ration our self-sacrifice and thereby avoid self-inflicted poverty. That works fine in the private sphere where we have control over our own rationing process. It doesn't work very well in the public sphere where others coercively ration our time, energy, and resources. In either case, here's the basic question: "How do we know that any self-sacrificial act will, in fact, advance the "common good" and not merely advance the short-term"partisan good" of those who stand to benefit from our sacrifices?" Obviously, its harder to know universal, long-term consequences.
In sum, I am not opposed to the "common good" or "self-sacrifice," however I am wary of the dangers of unquestioned devotion these abstract principles. Both terms are what I call "conveniently vague" which means they tend to evoke consensus, even when there really isn't. Moreover, failure to deconstruct these arguments leaves us vulnerable to opportunists who will "cash in" on our unbridled generocity; especially corporations. Hence, the spread of corporatism in the Western world, as corporations skillfully deploy "common good" and "self-sacrifice" arguments to advance their own partisan interests. In recent years, the most prolific beneficiaries of blind self-sacrifice have been associated with the health care industry, especially: health insurance companies, pharmaceutical companies, hospitals, and physicians. But that's another topic.
Thursday, February 28, 2013
The "Common Good"
Tomorrow my college is conducting a faculty retreat to teach us what it means to advance the "common good," how we can know specifically what it requires out of us morally, how to do what's right in advancing the "common good," and how to teach students to advance the "common good." I've been working on this for more than 30 years and haven't been able to do much with it. After 2500 years of Western philosophical debate on that issue, I'm glad a committee at my college, finally, figured it all out. Here's what I expect to learn.
First, of all when we hear the admonition, "Do X in order to advance the 'common good" it's intended to serve as the atomic bomb of philosophical discourse. When non-philosophers hear it, they inevitably submit to it's authority. After all, how can one reasonably present a counter argument? "Do X in order to not serve the 'common good.'" Or, "Do X in order to advance the "common bad." Secondly, when it is invoked within any given context it excites an emotional response within us; namely, a feeling of "solidarity" with other humans and that "we're all in this together." Therefore, "common good arguments" tend to resonate with most of us both rationally and emotionally. Hence, over thousands of years of intellectual history it shouldn't be surprising to find that the "common good argument" has been invoked (and continues to be invoked) in a wide variety of contexts. Most wars (including the Crusades) have been deemed both "justified" and "unjustified" based on the "common good" along with the torture of prisoners of war, internment of foreign nationals during wartime (Japanese), and recent drone strikes against "terrorist leaders" in populated areas. Other "common good arguments" have been offered both for and against: slavery, capital punishment, gun ownership, and the confiscation of private property by government. Over the past 300 (or so) years, the most persuasive "common good argument" offered by political regimes has been that, inevitably, we must sacrifice our personal liberty in order for government to provide us with "security." The most obvious application here has been our willingness to submit to increasingly invasive "searches" under the guise of "airport security." Over the years, the concept of "security" has expanded exponentially to include not only: physical security (from criminals and invaders), but also economic security, safety, health, even offence or embarassment.
OK, I know what you're thinking! "Ron, just because someone invokes the "common good argument" (or it's variants: greater good, public good, social good etc.) doesn't mean that the argument is sound. If X does not, in fact, serve the "common good' then we ought to reject that argument." Fair enough! So what we really need to know is: the meaning of the "common good," know whether X in fact advances it, and if X advances the "common good" we need to know exactly how to do it.
What is the meaning of the "common good?" Better yet...what is the meaning of "the Good?" If we don't know exactly what "the Good" means, we cannot know the "common good." So what are we really saying when declare that "X is good?" Well, we use the word "good" in many contexts. My new suit looks good. Red wine tastes good. Garlic smells good. The Maladroits sound good. etc. We also use the words "good" and "functional" interchangeably. A BIC razor is good for shaving my head. Plato identified at least three different species of "the Good:" extrinsic goods (good for what they bring about, e.g. money) intrinsic goods (good for their own sake e.g. happiness) and the best things in life are both. Is "the Good" an idea? If so, where did that idea originate? Is it in all of our minds, or only a few of our minds? If so, if only a few of us know "the Good," who knows it, and how do we know that they "know it?" Is it because knowledge of "the Good" runs in families and that it is passed on via genetics? Is knowledge of "the Good" acquired via teaching and learning? Is "the Good" a feeling? When I say that Bota Box Wine is good, am I reporting how I feel when I drink it? If you drink it and report that it's bad, who is "right" and who is "wrong?" What if I'm the only one in the world that reports that Bota is good? Am I wrong? If I say that F.A. Hayek is a "good philosopher" is it just another report, or am I doing something other than stating my approval? Or, is "the Good" a property of things that we can see, feel, touch, or smell...once we learn how to do it? Again, after 2500 years of philosophical debate, I'm glad that someone finally figured all this stuff out.
Tomorrow, just after I learn the meaning of "the Good," I'll finally learn the the meaning of the "common good," how to know it when I see it, and how to advance it. I suppose the key to "knowing" the "common good" is identifying the "interests" that I have "in common" with others. Of course, that assumes that I "know" my interests and "others"know" their interests. But more than that, what does "others" mean? Everyone employed at my college has an "interest" in increasing student enrollment and retention. However, I don't think other competing colleges share those interests. In fact, they have an interest in my college having lower enrollment and lower retention. So what is "good" can be specific to different "commons:" what's good for Cincinnati, Ohio, the United States, or the whole world. Now the atomic bomb of all "common good arguments" is to argue that "X is good for everyone on earth." Universality trumps particularity. Therefore, if "X is "less good" (or even bad) for me or Cincinnati, then we ought to "cooperate" anyway in order to advance the more "common good." Those arguments are usually complicated even more by the passage of time. Hence, "common good arguments" often differentiate between what serves the common good over the long-run or the short run.'" Here we have yet another atomic bomb; "whatever serves the "common good" over the "long-run," necessarily, trumps what merely serves the common good over the short run. Thus, "common good arguments" aim toward the ideal of advancing "what's good for everyone over the long run." As a philosopher that only occasionally "knows" what's good for himself over the short run, I'm really looking forward to tomorrow.
Finally, after tomorrow I'll not only know what's good for everyone over the long-run, I'll also know how to bring it about. As a lifelong pacifist, I have no doubt that "world peace" is in everyone's interest over-the-long run. However, I also recall from history that war mongers have always argued that we need to fight just one more war "to end all wars." We hear that same argument in defense of the drug war. "All we need to do is incarcerate a few more drug lords and drug users, and, over the long-run, there eventually will be no more drugs or drug violence. As you might imagine, I'm really looking forward to learning more about how I can advance the "common good" over the long-run. I'll definately, pass it onto my students. My next blog will explore "self-sacrifice" in pursuit of that elisive "common good."
First, of all when we hear the admonition, "Do X in order to advance the 'common good" it's intended to serve as the atomic bomb of philosophical discourse. When non-philosophers hear it, they inevitably submit to it's authority. After all, how can one reasonably present a counter argument? "Do X in order to not serve the 'common good.'" Or, "Do X in order to advance the "common bad." Secondly, when it is invoked within any given context it excites an emotional response within us; namely, a feeling of "solidarity" with other humans and that "we're all in this together." Therefore, "common good arguments" tend to resonate with most of us both rationally and emotionally. Hence, over thousands of years of intellectual history it shouldn't be surprising to find that the "common good argument" has been invoked (and continues to be invoked) in a wide variety of contexts. Most wars (including the Crusades) have been deemed both "justified" and "unjustified" based on the "common good" along with the torture of prisoners of war, internment of foreign nationals during wartime (Japanese), and recent drone strikes against "terrorist leaders" in populated areas. Other "common good arguments" have been offered both for and against: slavery, capital punishment, gun ownership, and the confiscation of private property by government. Over the past 300 (or so) years, the most persuasive "common good argument" offered by political regimes has been that, inevitably, we must sacrifice our personal liberty in order for government to provide us with "security." The most obvious application here has been our willingness to submit to increasingly invasive "searches" under the guise of "airport security." Over the years, the concept of "security" has expanded exponentially to include not only: physical security (from criminals and invaders), but also economic security, safety, health, even offence or embarassment.
OK, I know what you're thinking! "Ron, just because someone invokes the "common good argument" (or it's variants: greater good, public good, social good etc.) doesn't mean that the argument is sound. If X does not, in fact, serve the "common good' then we ought to reject that argument." Fair enough! So what we really need to know is: the meaning of the "common good," know whether X in fact advances it, and if X advances the "common good" we need to know exactly how to do it.
What is the meaning of the "common good?" Better yet...what is the meaning of "the Good?" If we don't know exactly what "the Good" means, we cannot know the "common good." So what are we really saying when declare that "X is good?" Well, we use the word "good" in many contexts. My new suit looks good. Red wine tastes good. Garlic smells good. The Maladroits sound good. etc. We also use the words "good" and "functional" interchangeably. A BIC razor is good for shaving my head. Plato identified at least three different species of "the Good:" extrinsic goods (good for what they bring about, e.g. money) intrinsic goods (good for their own sake e.g. happiness) and the best things in life are both. Is "the Good" an idea? If so, where did that idea originate? Is it in all of our minds, or only a few of our minds? If so, if only a few of us know "the Good," who knows it, and how do we know that they "know it?" Is it because knowledge of "the Good" runs in families and that it is passed on via genetics? Is knowledge of "the Good" acquired via teaching and learning? Is "the Good" a feeling? When I say that Bota Box Wine is good, am I reporting how I feel when I drink it? If you drink it and report that it's bad, who is "right" and who is "wrong?" What if I'm the only one in the world that reports that Bota is good? Am I wrong? If I say that F.A. Hayek is a "good philosopher" is it just another report, or am I doing something other than stating my approval? Or, is "the Good" a property of things that we can see, feel, touch, or smell...once we learn how to do it? Again, after 2500 years of philosophical debate, I'm glad that someone finally figured all this stuff out.
Tomorrow, just after I learn the meaning of "the Good," I'll finally learn the the meaning of the "common good," how to know it when I see it, and how to advance it. I suppose the key to "knowing" the "common good" is identifying the "interests" that I have "in common" with others. Of course, that assumes that I "know" my interests and "others"know" their interests. But more than that, what does "others" mean? Everyone employed at my college has an "interest" in increasing student enrollment and retention. However, I don't think other competing colleges share those interests. In fact, they have an interest in my college having lower enrollment and lower retention. So what is "good" can be specific to different "commons:" what's good for Cincinnati, Ohio, the United States, or the whole world. Now the atomic bomb of all "common good arguments" is to argue that "X is good for everyone on earth." Universality trumps particularity. Therefore, if "X is "less good" (or even bad) for me or Cincinnati, then we ought to "cooperate" anyway in order to advance the more "common good." Those arguments are usually complicated even more by the passage of time. Hence, "common good arguments" often differentiate between what serves the common good over the long-run or the short run.'" Here we have yet another atomic bomb; "whatever serves the "common good" over the "long-run," necessarily, trumps what merely serves the common good over the short run. Thus, "common good arguments" aim toward the ideal of advancing "what's good for everyone over the long run." As a philosopher that only occasionally "knows" what's good for himself over the short run, I'm really looking forward to tomorrow.
Finally, after tomorrow I'll not only know what's good for everyone over the long-run, I'll also know how to bring it about. As a lifelong pacifist, I have no doubt that "world peace" is in everyone's interest over-the-long run. However, I also recall from history that war mongers have always argued that we need to fight just one more war "to end all wars." We hear that same argument in defense of the drug war. "All we need to do is incarcerate a few more drug lords and drug users, and, over the long-run, there eventually will be no more drugs or drug violence. As you might imagine, I'm really looking forward to learning more about how I can advance the "common good" over the long-run. I'll definately, pass it onto my students. My next blog will explore "self-sacrifice" in pursuit of that elisive "common good."
Wednesday, December 5, 2012
Collective Interests
Last blog I suggested that human being pursue both individual and collective interests and that consensus is required of the latter, but not the former. This blog will address some of the puzzles associated with the identification of collective interests and why consensus is a necessary component of collectivism.
First, let's recall that interests are "ends" or "goals" and that our knowledge of interests is imperfect, therefore we all make mistakes. Because we change and the world changes over time, our knowledge of long-term interests (individual and collective) is highly fallible. Here's why collective interests are so puzzling.
One problem is that we often simplify the nature of "collective interests" by focusing on universal collective interests that correspond to basic biological needs: food, clothing, shelter etc. Then, these basic needs are interpreted as universal legal rights which imply corresponding legal duties to provide food, clothing shelter etc. But what's missing here is HOW to best meet human needs. The knee-jerk answer is usually that government ought to provide a social safety net for those whose basic needs are not met needs via taxation and redistribution. However, is that necessarily the only way to meet basic human needs, and is it the most efficient way? Libertarians generally avoid the imposition of collective legal duties in favor of individual moral duties. Collective rights (legal and moral) and collective duties (legal and moral) are essentially abstract, faceless, rhetorical devices, which must eventually connect to individual responsibility. In other words, only individuals have rights and duties, therefore beneficence (or benevolence) is best exercised as a moral duty. Then, it's up to individuals to figure out "if" and "how" to fulfill that responsibility. Sometimes it might involve feeding a particular homeless family. Sometimes it might involve contributing to a private charitable organization. Sometimes it might doing nothing at all.
Another problem with collective interests is that humans are social beings and therefore identify themselves with a variety of groups or collectives. These groups are created around common-interests, which are the products of our individual and collective imaginations. (For example, I am a Cincinnati Reds fan, which means that I "identify" with other fans that go to games, watch games on T.V.., or listen to them on the radio. We all prefer that they win games.) However, interest groups can be organized to greater or lesser degrees. The most common form of organizational structure is the "dominance hierarchy," where leaders (at the top) identify the ends pursued and the means by which these interests are pursued. Leaders can either use logic and/or rhetoric to attract and maintain followers, or deploy coercive force. For now, let's focus on the former, but there are many puzzles.
The first, and most serious puzzle, is that collective interests do not, necessarily, correpond to individual interests, therefore leaders attempt to convince individual followers that they must sacrifice a few of their lesser-interests for greater-interests; short-term interests for long-term interests; and/or sacrifice their own interests for the interests of other group members. Second, although many leaders believe they know collective interests and how to attain them, they really don't have access to that knowledge, but, nevertheless, have the ability to convince followers that they really do. Years ago, city council voted to use tax money to build new, state-of-the-art stadiums for the Reds and the Bengals. The argument was that those stadiums would advance the collective interests of Cincinnati. Many individuals benefitted from that stadium deal (ballplayers, team owners, hotel owners, restaurant owners) but not everyone. I've never been to the football stadium and I attend only 1-2 baseball games a year, but I pay taxes. Third, many leaders surreptitiously manipulate the concept of "collective interest" to advance their own individual interests. That's exactly the purpose of lobbying government...to advance the interests of one group at the expense of the interests of other individuals and groups.
So how can we make sense of "collective interest" within dominance hierarchies? Well, there's a longstanding tradition in philosophy (J.S. Mill) that says that "collective interest" is really nothing more than aggregated individual interests based on reciprocity. Individuals voluntarily identify with groups, and therefore, forge voluntary contracts with one another in order to advance what they believe to be their individual interests: hence, the dictum "You scratch my back and I'll scratch yours." Now the internal dynamics of this process is important. Contracts require the exchange of information between the individual and the group. Individuals must know the ends that are being pursued the means by which those ends are to be pursued. Then the contract must be based on freedom of entry (voluntary and non-coercive association) and freedom of exit.
Now obviously, social contracts can only function in a group that has a moral foundation. There are really only a few moral rules that are absolutely necessary for voluntary association. 1. You can't steal from others or harm others in pursuit of your individual interests. 2.) Everyone must tell the Truth or at least pursue the Truth (information)before the contract is agreed upon. 3. Once you forge a contract with a collective you must keep that contract (promise), unless it was based on deception or fraud. 4. You can't have leaders and/or majorities over-rule or nullify contracts between individuals unless either rule 1, 2, or 3 are violated. (Obviously, individuals need to be wary of long-term contracts with groups! NEVER purchase a Timeshare!)
Now if all human organizations were voluntary and non-coercive, over time those groups would naturally evolve: that is, over the long-run they would either survive, thrive, or become extinct. Economists call this process "creative destruction." When this principle is disabled by misinformation, coercive entry, and coercive exit we end up with dysfunctional organizations that pursue immoral ends through immoral means. NOTE: this is not majority rule. I didn't vote to pay for those two stadiums, so why should I be forced to pay the costs? Projects like this ought to be funded by voluntary association, or consensus. Let the individual sports teams, hotels, restaurants, and the fans voluntarily pay for those stadiums. I'd rather listen to Marty on the radio. .
First, let's recall that interests are "ends" or "goals" and that our knowledge of interests is imperfect, therefore we all make mistakes. Because we change and the world changes over time, our knowledge of long-term interests (individual and collective) is highly fallible. Here's why collective interests are so puzzling.
One problem is that we often simplify the nature of "collective interests" by focusing on universal collective interests that correspond to basic biological needs: food, clothing, shelter etc. Then, these basic needs are interpreted as universal legal rights which imply corresponding legal duties to provide food, clothing shelter etc. But what's missing here is HOW to best meet human needs. The knee-jerk answer is usually that government ought to provide a social safety net for those whose basic needs are not met needs via taxation and redistribution. However, is that necessarily the only way to meet basic human needs, and is it the most efficient way? Libertarians generally avoid the imposition of collective legal duties in favor of individual moral duties. Collective rights (legal and moral) and collective duties (legal and moral) are essentially abstract, faceless, rhetorical devices, which must eventually connect to individual responsibility. In other words, only individuals have rights and duties, therefore beneficence (or benevolence) is best exercised as a moral duty. Then, it's up to individuals to figure out "if" and "how" to fulfill that responsibility. Sometimes it might involve feeding a particular homeless family. Sometimes it might involve contributing to a private charitable organization. Sometimes it might doing nothing at all.
Another problem with collective interests is that humans are social beings and therefore identify themselves with a variety of groups or collectives. These groups are created around common-interests, which are the products of our individual and collective imaginations. (For example, I am a Cincinnati Reds fan, which means that I "identify" with other fans that go to games, watch games on T.V.., or listen to them on the radio. We all prefer that they win games.) However, interest groups can be organized to greater or lesser degrees. The most common form of organizational structure is the "dominance hierarchy," where leaders (at the top) identify the ends pursued and the means by which these interests are pursued. Leaders can either use logic and/or rhetoric to attract and maintain followers, or deploy coercive force. For now, let's focus on the former, but there are many puzzles.
The first, and most serious puzzle, is that collective interests do not, necessarily, correpond to individual interests, therefore leaders attempt to convince individual followers that they must sacrifice a few of their lesser-interests for greater-interests; short-term interests for long-term interests; and/or sacrifice their own interests for the interests of other group members. Second, although many leaders believe they know collective interests and how to attain them, they really don't have access to that knowledge, but, nevertheless, have the ability to convince followers that they really do. Years ago, city council voted to use tax money to build new, state-of-the-art stadiums for the Reds and the Bengals. The argument was that those stadiums would advance the collective interests of Cincinnati. Many individuals benefitted from that stadium deal (ballplayers, team owners, hotel owners, restaurant owners) but not everyone. I've never been to the football stadium and I attend only 1-2 baseball games a year, but I pay taxes. Third, many leaders surreptitiously manipulate the concept of "collective interest" to advance their own individual interests. That's exactly the purpose of lobbying government...to advance the interests of one group at the expense of the interests of other individuals and groups.
So how can we make sense of "collective interest" within dominance hierarchies? Well, there's a longstanding tradition in philosophy (J.S. Mill) that says that "collective interest" is really nothing more than aggregated individual interests based on reciprocity. Individuals voluntarily identify with groups, and therefore, forge voluntary contracts with one another in order to advance what they believe to be their individual interests: hence, the dictum "You scratch my back and I'll scratch yours." Now the internal dynamics of this process is important. Contracts require the exchange of information between the individual and the group. Individuals must know the ends that are being pursued the means by which those ends are to be pursued. Then the contract must be based on freedom of entry (voluntary and non-coercive association) and freedom of exit.
Now obviously, social contracts can only function in a group that has a moral foundation. There are really only a few moral rules that are absolutely necessary for voluntary association. 1. You can't steal from others or harm others in pursuit of your individual interests. 2.) Everyone must tell the Truth or at least pursue the Truth (information)before the contract is agreed upon. 3. Once you forge a contract with a collective you must keep that contract (promise), unless it was based on deception or fraud. 4. You can't have leaders and/or majorities over-rule or nullify contracts between individuals unless either rule 1, 2, or 3 are violated. (Obviously, individuals need to be wary of long-term contracts with groups! NEVER purchase a Timeshare!)
Now if all human organizations were voluntary and non-coercive, over time those groups would naturally evolve: that is, over the long-run they would either survive, thrive, or become extinct. Economists call this process "creative destruction." When this principle is disabled by misinformation, coercive entry, and coercive exit we end up with dysfunctional organizations that pursue immoral ends through immoral means. NOTE: this is not majority rule. I didn't vote to pay for those two stadiums, so why should I be forced to pay the costs? Projects like this ought to be funded by voluntary association, or consensus. Let the individual sports teams, hotels, restaurants, and the fans voluntarily pay for those stadiums. I'd rather listen to Marty on the radio. .
Friday, November 30, 2012
The Philosophical Foundations of Consensus
My next few blog entries will address the philosophical foundations of the concept of consensus. Given that libertarians reject the use of coercive force in cooperative endeavours, the concept of consensus is important, but often ignored by libertarian scholars. So I'll try to clear up a few conceptual puzzles.
First of all, for libertarians consensus is only relevant to a limited sphere of human action; namely, what J.S. Mill described as other-regarding actions. When I sat down to write this blog I did not ask anyone else if it's OK. Why? Because it's purely a self-regarding action! It's my time, effort, and resources. The act of me writing this blog will not invade the interests of anyone else. Hence, the first concept we need to explore is the idea of an "interest."
As a libertarian in the utilitarian tradition, I associate interests with pleasure and/or happiness. Thus, as individuals we all have greater and lesser interests which correspond to degrees of pleasure and pain. I obviously have an interest in writing this blog, even though it prevents me from pursuing other interests, such as grading 38 essay exams. Interests are basically ends (or ) goals, which implies that they are realized via means. Thus we pursue knowledge of not only our interests, but also the means of achieving those interests. Rational agents often willingly sacrifice lesser interests in order to realize greater interests, and sacrifice short-term interests for long-term interests. Fortunately, grading those exams advances long-term interests, and therefore I can put it off until this weekend. It looks like a painful weekend for me! Knowledge of the magnitude (greater/lesser) and temporal scale (long-term/short/term) of our individual interests is imperfect. I hope I'll be able to finish this blog in the next 30 minutes, but I might not. I also hope I'll experience a degree of pleasure when I finish it. If it turns out lousy, I won't publish it. Then I'll regret that I spent time writing instead of grading. For individuals, knowledge of very long-term interests and knowledge of how to realize those long-term interests is highly fallible. I'm hoping to retire in 9 years, but a lot can happen before then. I might die, I might win the lottery (probably not...I never buy lottery tickets), I might decide that teaching is more fun than retirement. Short-term interests are much easier. I'll be in class today at 11:00 AM, barring some unforseen invasion of my interests. I know (with relative certainty) what room to go to and what we're going to do (discuss Walmart bribery in Mexico).
The inverse of an interest is a harm, or more precisely a harm is an invasion of an interest.Thus, there are greater and lesser harms depending on the magnitude of the invaded interest. Thanks to the structure of the human brain and spinalcord, we pursue what we believe to be our interests and avoid what we perceive to be harms. Hence, I'd prefer retirement over pre-mature death. Of course, death might be really great...even better than retirement. I might get to play guitar with Les Paul! But given what I know right now, I prefer retirement. On the other hand, retirement will invade my interest in teaching, but advance my interests in playing guitar and traveling. So self-regarding actions involve trading off interests and harms and adopting various means (or plans) for realizing conflicting interests.
However, my retirement is not a purely self-regarding action. There are other stakeholders involved, namely my college and my wife. That's where consensus becomes relevant. I know with a fairly high degree of certainty, that the my college has an interest in me retiring. I can easily be replaced by a young, good-looking, intelligent recent graduate that would work for much less than I'm getting. In fact, my college might prefer that I retire sooner rather than later. In that case, hopefully we'd reach a consensus...unless the college unilaterally decides to coerce me into retirement. In that case, subsequent deliberations will be based less on my interests and the interests of the college than determining who holds legal coercive power over the other. For libertarians the forging of consensus based on the interests of stakeholders is always preferable to legal coercion. As for my wife...we've already reached a consensus. The best time for me to retire will be in 9 years, unless our interests change between now and then. Then again, by then my college's interests might also change.
In sum,knowledge of one's own interests and knowledge of how to realize those interests is difficult to ascertain, and therefore highly fallible...but ultimately doable. I've done OK so far. However, knowledge of the interests of other individuals interests and the collective interests of communities is much more problematic. My next blog will explore knowledge of collective interests and knowledge of how to achieve those interests....and of course, how that knowledge relates to forging consensus among stakeholders.
First of all, for libertarians consensus is only relevant to a limited sphere of human action; namely, what J.S. Mill described as other-regarding actions. When I sat down to write this blog I did not ask anyone else if it's OK. Why? Because it's purely a self-regarding action! It's my time, effort, and resources. The act of me writing this blog will not invade the interests of anyone else. Hence, the first concept we need to explore is the idea of an "interest."
As a libertarian in the utilitarian tradition, I associate interests with pleasure and/or happiness. Thus, as individuals we all have greater and lesser interests which correspond to degrees of pleasure and pain. I obviously have an interest in writing this blog, even though it prevents me from pursuing other interests, such as grading 38 essay exams. Interests are basically ends (or ) goals, which implies that they are realized via means. Thus we pursue knowledge of not only our interests, but also the means of achieving those interests. Rational agents often willingly sacrifice lesser interests in order to realize greater interests, and sacrifice short-term interests for long-term interests. Fortunately, grading those exams advances long-term interests, and therefore I can put it off until this weekend. It looks like a painful weekend for me! Knowledge of the magnitude (greater/lesser) and temporal scale (long-term/short/term) of our individual interests is imperfect. I hope I'll be able to finish this blog in the next 30 minutes, but I might not. I also hope I'll experience a degree of pleasure when I finish it. If it turns out lousy, I won't publish it. Then I'll regret that I spent time writing instead of grading. For individuals, knowledge of very long-term interests and knowledge of how to realize those long-term interests is highly fallible. I'm hoping to retire in 9 years, but a lot can happen before then. I might die, I might win the lottery (probably not...I never buy lottery tickets), I might decide that teaching is more fun than retirement. Short-term interests are much easier. I'll be in class today at 11:00 AM, barring some unforseen invasion of my interests. I know (with relative certainty) what room to go to and what we're going to do (discuss Walmart bribery in Mexico).
The inverse of an interest is a harm, or more precisely a harm is an invasion of an interest.Thus, there are greater and lesser harms depending on the magnitude of the invaded interest. Thanks to the structure of the human brain and spinalcord, we pursue what we believe to be our interests and avoid what we perceive to be harms. Hence, I'd prefer retirement over pre-mature death. Of course, death might be really great...even better than retirement. I might get to play guitar with Les Paul! But given what I know right now, I prefer retirement. On the other hand, retirement will invade my interest in teaching, but advance my interests in playing guitar and traveling. So self-regarding actions involve trading off interests and harms and adopting various means (or plans) for realizing conflicting interests.
However, my retirement is not a purely self-regarding action. There are other stakeholders involved, namely my college and my wife. That's where consensus becomes relevant. I know with a fairly high degree of certainty, that the my college has an interest in me retiring. I can easily be replaced by a young, good-looking, intelligent recent graduate that would work for much less than I'm getting. In fact, my college might prefer that I retire sooner rather than later. In that case, hopefully we'd reach a consensus...unless the college unilaterally decides to coerce me into retirement. In that case, subsequent deliberations will be based less on my interests and the interests of the college than determining who holds legal coercive power over the other. For libertarians the forging of consensus based on the interests of stakeholders is always preferable to legal coercion. As for my wife...we've already reached a consensus. The best time for me to retire will be in 9 years, unless our interests change between now and then. Then again, by then my college's interests might also change.
In sum,knowledge of one's own interests and knowledge of how to realize those interests is difficult to ascertain, and therefore highly fallible...but ultimately doable. I've done OK so far. However, knowledge of the interests of other individuals interests and the collective interests of communities is much more problematic. My next blog will explore knowledge of collective interests and knowledge of how to achieve those interests....and of course, how that knowledge relates to forging consensus among stakeholders.
Monday, November 26, 2012
The Economics of Friendship
Ok...I'm not an economist...but I play one on the Internet. I've been trying to sort out some of the philosophical puzzles that contribute to economic disagreements. Here's one puzzle that often eludes both economists and philosophers. I call it the "Economics of Friendship." First some basics...
Classical economic theory is about the distribution of resources. Most often it focuses on buying and selling of products and services between strangers. Today, most economic activity is, indeed, between strangers. I don't know who manufactured the various components of this computer, who assembled it, who delivered it to the retailer. etc. I don't know the salesman that sold it. Classical economics says that when buyers and sellers reason about transactions with strangers, they at least try to maximize their own self-interest. Buyers prefer transactions (products and services) that maximize quality and minimize costs. When multiple sellers compete buyers tend to get a better deal and when multiple buyers compete, sellers tend to get a better deal. That's the beauty of a "free market." It allows strangers to benefit from exchange. But what can we say about transactions between friends and families?
When I buy musical equipment I always check, first, with my friend Gordon at Western Hills Music. I buy all my strings from him, even though I pay about a buck more per pack...which would be irrational if I didn't know him. Of course, if I didn't know Gordon, I might decide to get those strings from him, anyway, because I'd spend more than $1 in gas to drive all the way to Guitar Center. Why waste the time, energy, and resources driving all that way to save $1? But that's not how I reason about it economically. On the other hand, if I were buying an expensive guitar, say a Gretch, I'd talk to Gordon first and see if he could get one for me and how much he'd have to charge me. He would figure it out and if I could get the same guitar at Guitar Center for $200 less, he'd say: "Ron, get it at Guitar Center (Or better Yet, get it online at Musician's Friend, and save taxes!) That would be irrational econiomic behavior on his part, at least from the standpoint of traditional economics. Although I'd probably buy that guitar online, I'd bring it to Gordon to set it up for me. I'd never ask him, beforehand, how much it will cost, and I'd never, get a second price from Guitar Center. If it doesn't need a setup, Gordon would say: "Ron, the setup is perfect! I just removed the original .010 roundwound strings for you, and put a new set of #.011 Flatwound strings for you." Guitar Center, however, would probably do some minor adjustment, charge me for a full setup, and (might) call me and ask what kind of strings I'd like.
What does all this mean? Well, Peter Singer and many other philosophers have argued that "ethics" consists in treating strangers as if they were friends. Therefore, a good person is "impartial." On the other hand, I'd argue that it makes much more sense to treat strangers impartially and friends partially. No one in their right mind would criticize me for giving one of my sons a guitar (as a gift) and NOT doing the same for a stranger. I would probably sell one of my guitars to a friend, for a lot less than I would a stranger. There's nothing wrong with that either. In fact, there's nothing wrong at all with either nepostism or cronyism in the world of one-on-one transactions. Problems arise when government and large corporations conspire to undermine those personal economic relationships by passing laws (taxes, regulations etc.) that make it more difficult for small businesses to enjoy the competitive advantages (and disadvantages) associated friendship. I don't know about you, but I prefer an economy where I can deal with both strangers and friends. So let's NOT let the big corporations and government surreptitiously destroy small businesses.
Classical economic theory is about the distribution of resources. Most often it focuses on buying and selling of products and services between strangers. Today, most economic activity is, indeed, between strangers. I don't know who manufactured the various components of this computer, who assembled it, who delivered it to the retailer. etc. I don't know the salesman that sold it. Classical economics says that when buyers and sellers reason about transactions with strangers, they at least try to maximize their own self-interest. Buyers prefer transactions (products and services) that maximize quality and minimize costs. When multiple sellers compete buyers tend to get a better deal and when multiple buyers compete, sellers tend to get a better deal. That's the beauty of a "free market." It allows strangers to benefit from exchange. But what can we say about transactions between friends and families?
When I buy musical equipment I always check, first, with my friend Gordon at Western Hills Music. I buy all my strings from him, even though I pay about a buck more per pack...which would be irrational if I didn't know him. Of course, if I didn't know Gordon, I might decide to get those strings from him, anyway, because I'd spend more than $1 in gas to drive all the way to Guitar Center. Why waste the time, energy, and resources driving all that way to save $1? But that's not how I reason about it economically. On the other hand, if I were buying an expensive guitar, say a Gretch, I'd talk to Gordon first and see if he could get one for me and how much he'd have to charge me. He would figure it out and if I could get the same guitar at Guitar Center for $200 less, he'd say: "Ron, get it at Guitar Center (Or better Yet, get it online at Musician's Friend, and save taxes!) That would be irrational econiomic behavior on his part, at least from the standpoint of traditional economics. Although I'd probably buy that guitar online, I'd bring it to Gordon to set it up for me. I'd never ask him, beforehand, how much it will cost, and I'd never, get a second price from Guitar Center. If it doesn't need a setup, Gordon would say: "Ron, the setup is perfect! I just removed the original .010 roundwound strings for you, and put a new set of #.011 Flatwound strings for you." Guitar Center, however, would probably do some minor adjustment, charge me for a full setup, and (might) call me and ask what kind of strings I'd like.
What does all this mean? Well, Peter Singer and many other philosophers have argued that "ethics" consists in treating strangers as if they were friends. Therefore, a good person is "impartial." On the other hand, I'd argue that it makes much more sense to treat strangers impartially and friends partially. No one in their right mind would criticize me for giving one of my sons a guitar (as a gift) and NOT doing the same for a stranger. I would probably sell one of my guitars to a friend, for a lot less than I would a stranger. There's nothing wrong with that either. In fact, there's nothing wrong at all with either nepostism or cronyism in the world of one-on-one transactions. Problems arise when government and large corporations conspire to undermine those personal economic relationships by passing laws (taxes, regulations etc.) that make it more difficult for small businesses to enjoy the competitive advantages (and disadvantages) associated friendship. I don't know about you, but I prefer an economy where I can deal with both strangers and friends. So let's NOT let the big corporations and government surreptitiously destroy small businesses.
Monday, August 13, 2012
On Health Savings Accounts
Libertarian views on health care reform in the United States still focus on combining Catastrophic Health Insurance with Health Savings Accounts or HSAs. The idea of HSAs can be traced to John Goodman's, Patient Power (1992) and was later popularized by Michael F. Cannon and Michael D. Tanner's Healthy Competition (2007). Goodman's more recent book Priceless (2012) continues that argument. Although I agree in principle with moving public policy away from Comprehensive Health Insurance, I'm less enthusiastic with HSAs here's why.
Here is how HSAs are supposed to work. Basically they are a form of "self insurance" where U.S. citizens are expected to pay for more of their non-catastrophic health care needs via a tax exempt savings account. That tax exemption, in effect, reduces the cost of paying for health care out of pocket by about 1/3. Why pay for some health care out of pocket? Well, both Goodman and Cannon persuasively argue that the ever-spiraling cost of health care is fueled by third party payment. Health insurance insulates consumers from both price and quality, and therefore they over-consume. Comprehensive health insurance, they argue, incentivizes providers to provide more health care than those price and quality insensitive patients need, and incentivizes patients to demand more health care. Thus, over time, health insurance has gotten more "comprehensive" over time, and ultimately more incomprehensible and more costly. As long as employers could absorb the ever-spiraling costs, everyone was satisfied with comprehensive health insurance. However, as state governments required insurance companies to cover more-and more more products and services, the cost began to far outstrip the federal tax advantage offered employers.
Goodman's HSA idea was to limit insurance coverage to catastrophic insurance that covers only expensive, unanticipated, catastrophic illness and force patients to pay for most other everyday expenses (preventative care, doctor visits, pharmaceuticals etc.) out-of- pocket. The argument here is that if patients were forced to pay for these non-catastrophic products and services out-of-pocket, they would be more sensitive to cost and quality, and force providers to compete in a free market. I think that's all right-headed. Here are my concerns.
How do we get to a system based on catastrophic health insurance and HSAs from where we are today politically and culturally? Let's look at political reality first. How do we get politicians to NOT tinker with the basic legal requirements of HSAs? Right now government limits the amount of money that can be sheltered in HSAs, it also limits how long the money can be left in the account before it is confiscated by the bank that provides it. They even limit what counts as "health care." You can't use HSAs to pay for over-the-counter-drugs any more! But that's not the most serious problem.
The fact is that HSAs are incompatible American culture. We live in a society that "borrows" much more money than it "saves." Thus, most Amercans are already in debt via credit cards, home mortgages, automobile loans, and educational loans. How can we reasonably expect Americans to suddenly start saving for future health care needs? Most of us are already trying to pay off our existing debt and make ends meet day-by-day. Many American are unemployed. So where will all the HSA money come from? The basic problem with trying to incentivize Americans to save for future health care needs is that healthy Americans will choose NOT to purchase health insurance and will choose not to put money in that HSA. After all, why would young healthy adults save for future health care needs over other more immediate needs? Recent college grads inevitably find themselves saddled with onerous college loans, yet they're culturally expected to own their own home, drive a new car, and a save money for retirement, and even save for their children's college education! Now that just ain't going to work!
But most importantly, HSAs are based on a tradition that most of us libertarians really abhor. That is, the tradition of government using the tax code as an instrument for social engineering. Our tax code is already enormously complex, convoluted, and steeped in cronyism? How many tax advantages can be doled out before there's no one left paying taxes? The Feds have already doled out tax advantages to homeowners, college students, investors, the rich, the poor, churches, farmers and a slew of corporations. Meanwhile, local governments continue to generously dole out tax advantages to their cronies while finaning a growing number of "public goods," such as: sports stadiums, hospitals, orchestras, zoos, and airports. They also lavish public union members with Cadillac health insurance and generous pensions. So on the one hand we have a growing list of beneficiaries of tax money, and an ever-diminishing number of tax payers. Now that's the ultimate source of our current economic malaise. The only way to fix these deficits is to end tax-based cronyism once and for all and not allow Congress to reward its political friends and punish it's enemies. So that's why I'm not much of a supporter of HSAs. To me they are really just another highly-disguised form of cronyism.
Here is how HSAs are supposed to work. Basically they are a form of "self insurance" where U.S. citizens are expected to pay for more of their non-catastrophic health care needs via a tax exempt savings account. That tax exemption, in effect, reduces the cost of paying for health care out of pocket by about 1/3. Why pay for some health care out of pocket? Well, both Goodman and Cannon persuasively argue that the ever-spiraling cost of health care is fueled by third party payment. Health insurance insulates consumers from both price and quality, and therefore they over-consume. Comprehensive health insurance, they argue, incentivizes providers to provide more health care than those price and quality insensitive patients need, and incentivizes patients to demand more health care. Thus, over time, health insurance has gotten more "comprehensive" over time, and ultimately more incomprehensible and more costly. As long as employers could absorb the ever-spiraling costs, everyone was satisfied with comprehensive health insurance. However, as state governments required insurance companies to cover more-and more more products and services, the cost began to far outstrip the federal tax advantage offered employers.
Goodman's HSA idea was to limit insurance coverage to catastrophic insurance that covers only expensive, unanticipated, catastrophic illness and force patients to pay for most other everyday expenses (preventative care, doctor visits, pharmaceuticals etc.) out-of- pocket. The argument here is that if patients were forced to pay for these non-catastrophic products and services out-of-pocket, they would be more sensitive to cost and quality, and force providers to compete in a free market. I think that's all right-headed. Here are my concerns.
How do we get to a system based on catastrophic health insurance and HSAs from where we are today politically and culturally? Let's look at political reality first. How do we get politicians to NOT tinker with the basic legal requirements of HSAs? Right now government limits the amount of money that can be sheltered in HSAs, it also limits how long the money can be left in the account before it is confiscated by the bank that provides it. They even limit what counts as "health care." You can't use HSAs to pay for over-the-counter-drugs any more! But that's not the most serious problem.
The fact is that HSAs are incompatible American culture. We live in a society that "borrows" much more money than it "saves." Thus, most Amercans are already in debt via credit cards, home mortgages, automobile loans, and educational loans. How can we reasonably expect Americans to suddenly start saving for future health care needs? Most of us are already trying to pay off our existing debt and make ends meet day-by-day. Many American are unemployed. So where will all the HSA money come from? The basic problem with trying to incentivize Americans to save for future health care needs is that healthy Americans will choose NOT to purchase health insurance and will choose not to put money in that HSA. After all, why would young healthy adults save for future health care needs over other more immediate needs? Recent college grads inevitably find themselves saddled with onerous college loans, yet they're culturally expected to own their own home, drive a new car, and a save money for retirement, and even save for their children's college education! Now that just ain't going to work!
But most importantly, HSAs are based on a tradition that most of us libertarians really abhor. That is, the tradition of government using the tax code as an instrument for social engineering. Our tax code is already enormously complex, convoluted, and steeped in cronyism? How many tax advantages can be doled out before there's no one left paying taxes? The Feds have already doled out tax advantages to homeowners, college students, investors, the rich, the poor, churches, farmers and a slew of corporations. Meanwhile, local governments continue to generously dole out tax advantages to their cronies while finaning a growing number of "public goods," such as: sports stadiums, hospitals, orchestras, zoos, and airports. They also lavish public union members with Cadillac health insurance and generous pensions. So on the one hand we have a growing list of beneficiaries of tax money, and an ever-diminishing number of tax payers. Now that's the ultimate source of our current economic malaise. The only way to fix these deficits is to end tax-based cronyism once and for all and not allow Congress to reward its political friends and punish it's enemies. So that's why I'm not much of a supporter of HSAs. To me they are really just another highly-disguised form of cronyism.
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