Recall from my last blog, that human beings ask questions about nature of morality. In the process of prescriptive inquiry, we employ a technical vocabulary. We also invoke theories to explain the nature of morality. All moral theories address the questions of what is Good, why it's Good, and where the Good is located? If there is anything "easy" about moral inquiry it's the fact that there are only three basic kinds of prescriptive moral theories: teleological theories, deontological theories, and virtue-based theories. Unfortunately, they often (but not always) provide different and mostly conflicting answers to these basic questions. In this blog I'll focus on Teleological Moral Theories.
Teleological moral theories locate moral goodness in the consequences of our actions and not the action itself. According to teleological (or consequentialist) moral theory, all rational human actions are teleological in the sense that we reason about the means of achieving certain ends. Moral behavior, therefore, is goal-directed. I have ice in my gutters right now. I am deliberating about when and how to get that ice out in order to prevent water damage inside the house. There are many strategies (means) that I might employ to remove that ice (end). Should I send my oldest son, Eli, up on the icy roof today? After careful deliberation I finally decided not send him on the roof because it is slippery and he might fall. How did I decide? Well, I took into account the possible consequences. There is nothing inherently wrong with climbing on the roof. What made roof climbing the morally wrong thing to do at this particular time and place were the possible consequences. The issue has moral significance in so far as it affects persons. So from the teleological point of view, human behavior is neither right nor wrong in and of itself. What matters is what might happen as a consequence of those actions in any given context. Thus, it is the contextualized consequences that make our behavior, good or bad, right or wrong. In the case of roof climbing in the winter, I decided to climb up on the roof myself, because it's dangerous. Eli might fall off and get hurt. If that happened, my wife would blame me and so would the community. But if I fell off the roof, I would be judged to be imprudent, but not necessarily immoral.
From a teleological standpoint, stealing, for example, could not be judged to be inherently right or wrong independent of the context and the foreseeable consequences. Suppose I am contemplating stealing a loaf of bread from the neighborhood grocery store. Many moral theorists would argue that morality requires an analysis of my motives (or intent) that brought about that behavior. However, from a teleological perspective, motives really have nothing to do with the rightness or wrongness of the act. What really matters lies in the potential pains and pleasures associated with the short-term and long-term consequences. If my children were starving, and if stealing a loaf of bread would immediately prevent them from starving, then I might seriously consider stealing.
But I'd have to know if the consequences would significantly harm the grocery store? What would be the odds of getting caught? If I got caught, what would happen to me? Would I go to jail? Get fined? If I went to jail, who would take care of my children? Therefore, even if my motive (preventing my children from starving) was praiseworthy, the act of stealing might still be wrong because other actions might be more cost-effective in bringing about the desired consequences. Perhaps I'd be better off signing up for food stamps or asking the storeowner to give me day-old bread. On the other hand, suppose that there were no other options and that I invented a foolproof system for stealing bread. Would I be wrong for doing it? If you think about the consequences of your actions when you make moral decisions, you are applying teleological moral theory.
Teleological moral theories must somehow connect the consequences of human behavior to the foundational moral concepts of good and bad, right and wrong, and moral and immoral. The hallmark of most teleological moral theories is that they identify these moral concepts with pleasure and pain, or happiness and unhappiness. Hence, moral acts are considered good, right, and/or moral in so far as they lead to pleasurable consequences; and bad, wrong, or immoral if they lead to painful consequences. This longstanding moral doctrine is called hedonism. Now once we accept the hedonist doctrine that the good=pleasure and bad=pain, we find ourselves faced with a number of interesting philosophical dilemmas.
If there is a compelling reason to accept hedonism, it is the fact that all human beings have the ability to differentiate between pain and pleasure. When we experience pleasure or pain, we are immediately aware of that fact. We are also immediately aware of the fact that pain and pleasure are subject to greater or lesser degrees. In general, we universally seek pleasure, and avoid pain. According to many hedonists pleasure and pain can be quantified and therefore, they argue, that it open to objective, descriptive scientific inquiry.
Many hedonists observe that pleasures and pains can be measured in quantitative terms such as: intensity, duration, fecundity, and likelihood. Today, the intensity of pleasure and pain can be indirectly measured with the use of state-of-the-art brain imaging technology. We now know that certain kinds of pleasures light up specific parts of the brain and that intensity correlates with the degree to which the brain lights up. The human orgasm is generally acknowledged to be one of the more intense pleasures that human beings can experience. Scientists have observed the brain activities that accompany orgasms under scientific conditions, and know what specific parts of the brain light up. Interestingly, it is the same part of the brain that lights up when human beings have another intense experience; that is religious experiences. Most adults have had orgasms, few have had religious experiences. As a general rule, the intensity of the pleasure associated with eating pizza is much less intense than orgasm. However, if you get a bad pizza, or if you eat too much of it, and subsequently, throw up, that can be a pretty intense pain. And, some human beings are physically incapable of having an orgasm. Naturally, they tend to rank pizza higher on the pleasure scale.
The duration of pains and pleasures can be accurately measured with the assistance of a much older technological device; a simple clock. The duration of the pleasure associated with pizza eating is contingent upon how much pizza is available, and how tasty your pizza is, and how fast you eat it. In general it's probably true that if your brain generates pleasurable experience while you are eating pizza, that pleasure usually lasts about thirty minutes, at best. If you stretch that experience much more than that the pleasure diminishes proportionately. If you eat it one molecule at a time you will not experience intensity at all, but it would take a long time to eat the pizza. If you eat it too fast, you might also miss out on a lot of the intensity.
At best the human orgasm lasts only a few seconds, although the sensual experiences that lead up to orgasm are also pleasurable. Depending upon your sexual prowess these lower-level sensual activities can last quite a while, but that orgasm will still only last a few seconds. Although I haven't checked out the research, I'd estimate the average duration of pleasurable sexual activity and pizza eating to be about thirty minutes. A skilled hedonist learns how to maintain maximum intensity and duration of the experience of pleasure.
The experience of pleasure and pain is very complex. Sometimes pleasurable experiences lead to painful consequences and sometimes painful experiences lead to pleasurable consequences. Some pleasures are more likely to lead to other pleasures. The fecundity of a pleasure, therefore, refers to the probability that it will lead to future pleasures. Admittedly, the pleasures associated with reading Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics registers low on the intensity scale (it may occasionally even fall into painful zone) and it takes about a week to read it, and therefore it has more duration than sex or pizza eating.
However, the intensity, duration, and fecundity of pleasure are often subject to the laws of probability; that is to say; there is often a quantifiable likelihood that some human acts that one would anticipate to be pleasurable turn out to be painful, and some normally painful acts turn out to be pleasurable. Generally speaking, if you like eating pizza, it is usually a reliably pleasurable experience. But sometimes you do overeat and/or get a lousy pizza. Female orgasms are dependent up acquired skills, and therefore are less likely than male orgasms. But females also have the capacity to experience multiple orgasms, whereas males a refractory period between orgasms. The likelihood, of having a child after having unprotected sex is fairly low, depending on whether there is a fertilizable ova present. And, pregnancy can be interpreted as being either good (pleasurable) or bad (painful), depending upon the context. If you do have children, both the pains and pleasures can have a long of duration: your entire lifetime.
Some hedonists distinguish between higher intellectual pleasures and lower physical pleasures. The physical pleasures that typically light up our spinal cord and the inner regions of our brains tend to score high in intensity and likelihood, but rather low in duration and fecundity. Intellectual pleasures involve the pleasures associated with higher-level thinking that result from exercising the cerebral cortex. These pleasures typically lack in intensity, but often register high in duration and fecundity. I've read Aristotle's Ethics many times and have experienced new (low intensity) pleasures every time. But if you happen to read at a third grade level, the likelihood of you ever "cashing in" on the experience of reading Aristotle is remote. Nevertheless, most (but not all) hedonists argue that "higher" intellectual pleasures are somehow quantitatively superior to "lower" physical pleasures.
Other philosophers, argue that even if it turns out that the higher pleasures are quantitatively inferior to lower pleasures, they are nevertheless, qualitatively superior. What exactly this means is beyond my philosophical acumen. Is classical music really qualitatively superior to bluegrass music or rock and roll? Nevertheless, the vast majority of practicing hedonists acknowledge that the "Good Life" ultimately consists in a good mix of both higher intellectual and lower physical pleasures. After all, even philosophers occasionally eat, drink, and have sex. On the other hand, if you live life wallowing like a pig in the lower pleasures, and never experience the higher pleasures, your life will probably be shorter and the variety of pleasures experienced will be very limited. If you neglect the lower pleasures you probably won't have many friends and you'll probably not live very long either.
Finally, the intensity, duration, fecundity, and likelihood of experiencing pleasure can be predicated over the long-term and short-term. There are many pleasures such as smoking tobacco that are highly pleasurable over the short-term, but highly painful over the long term. Other pleasures, such as vigorous physical exercise and practicing violin scales can be painful over the short-term, but tend to pay off over the long run. The basic problem with managing our personal pains and pleasures over the course of our lifetimes is that it is usually much easier to predict the intensity, duration, fecundity, and likelihood of short-term pains and pleasures. Unfortunately, that's why most of us tend to overly indulge ourselves in short-term pleasures like smoking, having unprotected sex, and running up credit card debt, often at the expense of our long-term pleasure.
So, hedonists argue that morality consists in choosing pleasurable consequences over painful consequences. If this is true, the next question we have to deal with is "Whose pleasure counts?" There are two moral traditions egoism and altruism. Both theories are subject to descriptive and prescriptive philosophical analysis.
Egoism is the hedonistic doctrine that holds that the "Good Life" consists in the optimal experience of personal pleasure. Altruism is the hedonistic doctrine that states that the "Good Life" consists in cultivating the experience of pleasure in others. Of course, both doctrines are subject to philosophical debate. Descriptively, we might ask, "Are human beings, in fact, selfish or altruistic by nature?" Prescriptively we might ask, "Is human selfishness and/or altruism good?"
First of all, let's be honest and admit that the descriptive question of whether human beings are selfish or altruistic can be resolved fairly easily based on empirical observation. When we objectively observe human behavior over the long course of history it's hard to ignore the fact that we humans do, more often than not, pursue personal pleasure, and often do so at the expense of others. So let's provisionally designate egoism as the default position. But let's also admit that human beings also often sacrifice personal pleasure, and even endure pain, for the sake of others. But we're much more likely to exhibit altruistic behavior toward our close relatives and friends than toward strangers. Therefore, in human nature we find a lot of egoism and kin altruism. Finally, let's also observe that most religions and moral codes encourage their believers to increase altruistic behavior and decrease egoistic behavior. In short, human nature propels us toward egoism and kin altruism while human culture propels us toward altruism.
Descriptive egoism states that human beings are, as a matter of fact, selfish and that we are more often prone to serve our own interests than the interests of others. Prescriptive egoism takes the view that selfishness morally good. The most cogent defense of prescriptive egoism can be found in Western economics, which is based on the premise that when human beings act out of self-interest, it's good for everyone. Free market capitalism, which is based on reciprocity, provides the most efficient and humane way to distribute resources. When two rationally self-interested human beings cooperate with one another based on mutual self-interest, we call it reciprocal altruism. Is that really altruism, or is it just egoism? We'll talk more about that later.
Descriptive altruism says that human beings are programmed by nature, to sacrifice their own self-interest in order to advance the interests of others. Prescriptive altruism says that, even if it is true that human beings are naturally selfish, it is not good. Good human behavior, they argue, must intentionally address the pleasure and pains of others. Prescriptive altruism is contingent upon knowledge of what others regard as painful and pleasurable and the capacity to avoid pain and promote pleasure for others. We can't assume that everyone likes pizza.
In sum, teleological theories generally require that we anticipate how pleasure and pain (or, happiness or unhappiness) will be distributed as a consequence of our actions. Therefore, teleological moral theorists, are usually hedonists who believe that all morally good acts promote pleasure and that all morally bad acts promote pain. In the social context, the obvious question is whose happiness counts in this cost-benefit analysis? Again, an egoist believes that moral decisions ought to be based on how one's personal happiness or pleasure is affected by that decision. An altruist thinks that moral decisions ought to take into account how other people are affected.
TERMS TO REMEMBER: Teleological, Consequences, Short-Term Consequence, Long-Term Consequences, Cost-Benefit Analysis, Egoism, Altruism, Descriptive Egoism, Prescriptive Egoism, Descriptive Altruism, Prescriptive Altruism.
TERMS TO
Tuesday, April 11, 2017
What is Ethics: An Introduction to Moral Inquiry?
To begin with, let's agree that our knowledge of Truth and Value is contingent upon a process called "human inquiry." This process results in the forging of beliefs that are embraced by both individuals and communities of individuals. Here I'll defend a foundational philosophical distinction between two broad areas: descriptive inquiry, that is, the process of forging beliefs that approximate the Truth; and prescriptive inquiry, the process of forging beliefs that pertain to Value. I shall argue that these modes of inquiry are NOT incommensurable, but rather, relate to one another in enormously complex ways. Although, the boundaries between Truth and Value are far from clear, if there is such a thing as "The Good," our knowledge of it is contingent upon our knowledge of "Truth." However, I will also argue that both the descriptive and prescriptive modes of inquiry are, not only unclear, they are also inherently fallible, and open-ended, which explains why human beings often disagree what's true and good, and frequently change their individual and collective minds.
So all human beings believe that some human behavior is good and praiseworthy, and that other behavior is bad and blameworthy. It is true that human beings (as a matter of fact) murder each other, steal from each other, drive too fast, and fart in elevators. Under most circumstances, none of these behaviors are considered to be good or praiseworthy, although there may be particular circumstances when they might be. Farting is a perfectly natural phenomenon open to descriptive inquiry. It can be explained in terms of the laws of human physiology, (the production of nitrogenous waste) and the laws of physics: our knowledge of both sets of laws change over time. Killing and stealing can also be explained in biological terms. But many philosophers argue that there is a difference between inquiring into whether something is true and/or whether it is good.
If Truth involves a correspondence between our beliefs and reality, we might argue that Value involves a correspondence between our prescriptive beliefs and what is in fact, good. Unfortunately, moral philosophy is not that simple. It's not even clear that Truth involves correspondence, let alone value.
My view is that the line of demarcation between the descriptive "is" and prescriptive "ought" is extremely ambiguous. Descriptive theories aim to explain, predict, and control our behavior. These theories are either true or false. Prescriptive moral theories explain whether or not those beliefs correspond to what's good or bad. For example, if you want to know whether or not I believe that capital punishment is morally good, or not...you could begin by asking me. That's fine, assuming that I know what I believe and that I don't lie to you. Fortunately, beliefs are not only mental entities, but they also influence our behavior. So if you want to know what I believe to be true or good, observe my behavior over a period of time. You could listen to my lectures, or see if I've ever signed petitions for or against capital punishment, etc.
In my case, I'm not exactly sure what I think about capital punishment. Over the years I've changed my mind. I do know that if a member of my family or a close friend was murdered, my behavior would be profoundly influenced by emotion. I'd insist on retribution. In a moment of moral weakness, I might even attempt to exact retribution on my own. I think it is "true" that in all times and in all places, human beings seek retribution for harms inflicted by others. It is also "true" that human beings often kill one another. Now whether these behaviors are good or not is another question.
Scientists today have begun to cultivate a line of scientific inquiry that I call "descriptive psychology." Some of these inquirers explain our moral behavior by examining the structure of our brains. Then they suggest that that the brain module responsible for morality was shaped by millions of years of evolution. Based on this line of inquiry, many philosophers argue that, over time, as this line of descriptive inquiry unfolds, it will gradually replace prescriptive inquiry. That is to say, prescriptive inquiry will someday be absorbed by descriptive inquiry in the form of brain science. I don't believe it. Prescriptive moral inquiry is here to stay. Nevertheless, I think that descriptive inquiry certainly elucidates prescriptive inquiry.
To me, the only way to make sense of prescriptive inquiry is via descriptive inquiry: that is to say, we must establish how we, in fact, go about making value judgments. This is an empirically based activity in which we can all participate. All we have to do is observe how we employ moral language in our everyday lives, and how we arrive at moral judgments. Descriptive ethics, therefore, involves the collection of data that relates to moral behavior and the forging of our moral beliefs. It can involve biological inquiry, psychological inquiry, economics, sociological inquiry, and/or political inquiry. But in the final analysis, it turns out that there is something left over that resembles universal morality.
You may also notice that I am disinclined to spin a fine distinction between "ethics" and "morality." In fact, I shall use those terms as synonymous. The language that we employ within the moral domain is an essential ingredient for productive. Unfortunately, moral inquiry has always been complex, convoluted, and ambiguous. Thank God for philosophers! I'll at least try to identify some of those messy borders.
Another empirically-based observation evident to prescriptive inquiry is that it produces judgments containing an "ought." Positive moral behavior is judged to be "good" and therefore we "ought to do" those kinds of things. Negative behaviors that are "bad" and therefore we "ought to not do" those things. In a nutshell, morality consists in urging ourselves and others to do some things and not to do other things; and, therefore, we may have either positive duties, negative duties, or both. Moreover, we praise or blame each other, both, for doing good things and for not doing good things.
There is also widespread agreement that throughout human history, morality involves rules of conduct. In general, we praise persons that obey the rules and blame those that do not. But there is a lot of disagreement over specific moral rules and how we go discovering which rules to follow under various circumstances. Many philosophers argue that moral rules are simply statements of personal preference, while other philosophers say that moral beliefs are merely expressions of tradition and convention. Let's just say that traditionally, prescriptive moral inquiry usually addresses the question of rules.
Let's also agree that human beings make moral judgments, not only about specific acts of human behavior, we also make judgments about the character of the persons that perform these acts. This usually involves the analysis of internal mental things like intent, reasons, motivation, and conscience. Let's examine both good behavior and good persons.
When we say that a specific behavior is good, we are "prescribing" that behavior. Of course, we prescribe a lot of different kinds of behavior under a wide variety of circumstances. In fact, I think there are basically four kinds of behavior in which we use the adjective "good:" moral behavior (right or wrong), conventional behavior (good or bad manners), prudential behavior (practical/impractical), and legal behavior (lawful or unlawful)? Usually we invoke rules of conduct to frame these behaviors. But there are notoriously fuzzy boundaries here.
Moral behavior is usually classified as a subcategory of normative human behavior, which is to say that not all human normative behavior involves morality. In our society unconventional behavior, such as belching and/or farting at the dinner table is widely regarded as bad behavior. So is eating with your mouth open, picking your nose, and scratching private parts in public, especially on television. Conventional behavior is often dictated by a specific line of habitual behavior expressed as rules, which constitute a body of collective beliefs called tradition. Most traditional behavior varies between cultures and within cultures. They also vary relative to time and place. Bad manners can evoke feelings of distaste or revulsion in others within those cultural settings, but are not necessarily viewed as immoral. However, philosophers argue over whether there is something more to morality than rules enforced by tradition and convention.
The category of legality refers to behaviors that are prescribed or proscribed by power-laden institutions through the enforcement of laws. If a behavior is illegal, it carries with it a sanction that is imposed by that institution. Legal sanctions can be imposed by a variety of institutions, including: political institutions (government), religious institutions (churches), and economic institutions (corporations). Lawmakers often pass laws that are unenforceable, or laws that lack sanctions.
Prudence is an old, and probably arcane, concept. As I use the term, it signifies behavior that either advances individual or collective interests; or, at least it does not undermine interests. Imprudent behavior may or may not violate good manners, conventionality, or the law. Generally speaking, overeating is neither illegal nor immoral, but if you do it often enough it is certainly imprudent. And, unfortunately, in the United States overeating has become conventional behavior. In other contexts, overeating might be regarded as bad manners. Some argue that it is immoral to overeat if other human beings are hungry or starving. In most places it is not illegal to deliberately fart in a public elevator, but it will almost certainly be regarded as bad manners. It might also be imprudent, if your boss is in the elevator with you at the time.
Obviously, there is a lot of legal behavior that is immoral, nonconventional, and/or imprudent; and there is a lot of illegal behavior that is neither: immoral, non-conventional, nor imprudent. And of course, it is usually imprudent to violate standards of legality. But it is only imprudent if you get caught breaking the law. Sometimes the government is incapable of detecting your bad behavior, (weak monitoring) sometimes the sanction that it imposes does not threatening enough to deter your behavior (weak sanction), and sometimes government simply lacks the power to effectively enforce the sanction.
Within our own cultural setting, it seems fairly easy to differentiate between the domains of morality, conventionality, legality, and prudence, but it is much more difficult to do it between cultures. All human cultures use legality to enforce morality, conventionality, and prudence to varying degrees. Libertarians prefer to limit use of the legal code to enforce these alternative forms of the good. We'll get back to that shortly.
Although it is very difficult to distinguish between these normative contexts, there are several common denominators. All of these domains tend to involve persons, behaviors, rules, and the assessment of praiseworthiness, and blameworthiness. Once we get beyond these rather obvious generalities, things get more complicated. If it is philosophically possible to draw a clear line between these categories, morality is usually distinguished on the basis of its alleged universality. But prudential behavior can also approach universality. That is because prudence is often enforced by the laws of nature. (It's almost never a good idea to step in front of a vehicle traveling 75 miles an hour!). And murder is universally regarded as illegal, even though all cultures admit various exceptions. In some cultures, it is conventional to kill women that have been raped.
So the precise borders between morality, convention, legality, and prudence are far from clear. This ambiguity contributes to interminable debate over normative issues that transgress these vaguely defined borders.
In sum, so far I have suggested that human beings, by nature, ask questions and propose answers to those questions. Philosophy is simply the study of this questioning and answering process, which I call human inquiry. Whether we like it or not, we are all philosophers in so far as we engage in this open-ended, inter-generational and intercultural process of questioning and answering. The answers to these questions are called beliefs, which are simply the artifacts generated by the process of inquiry. New beliefs compete with old beliefs within our individual minds or brains and also in our collective minds or networked brains, or culture. As the process of inquiry proceeds across generations, some beliefs survive while others suffer extinction. Some of our more general beliefs carry more weight than others. We call our more general, stable, and widely-held beliefs theories. But human inquiry is highly contextualized, therefore, different individuals and communities tend to ask different questions and accept different answers. But despite this variation, there are many basic questions and answers that crop up in all contexts, at all times, and in all places. Hence, there are two universal lines of inquiry that all individual human beings and all communities pursue. We all seek the answers to two basic questions: "What is Truth?" and "What is Goodness?" Our answers are embedded in theories.
So morality involves both descriptive and prescriptive inquiry. Despite the fact that we make judgments about the morality of behavior and persons, we don't always agree with one another. We disagree over the composition of the moral universe. We disagree with one another over the rules of morality and as to whether we "ought" to hold certain individuals responsible for their behavior, and whether to praise them or blame them. We do not often agree as to what we ought to do or ought not to do; and we don't often agree as to whether individuals or communities are good or bad. Any theory of morality must take these facts into account. I shall argue that libertarianism does that better than any other theory, but it's not the main focus of the book. My primary concern will be to introduce you to the main lines of moral inquiry.
Here's my overall plan for the rest of this book. I will begin with a brief discussion of the three basic types of moral theory: teleological theories, deontological, and virtue based theories. Then I will examine five moral principles that underlie objective morality: utility, beneficence, non-maleficence, liberty, and justice.
TERMS TO KNOW: Human Inquiry, Descriptive Inquiry, Prescriptive Inquiry, Positive Ethics, Negative Ethics, Moral Character, Morality, Convention, and Prudence.
T
So all human beings believe that some human behavior is good and praiseworthy, and that other behavior is bad and blameworthy. It is true that human beings (as a matter of fact) murder each other, steal from each other, drive too fast, and fart in elevators. Under most circumstances, none of these behaviors are considered to be good or praiseworthy, although there may be particular circumstances when they might be. Farting is a perfectly natural phenomenon open to descriptive inquiry. It can be explained in terms of the laws of human physiology, (the production of nitrogenous waste) and the laws of physics: our knowledge of both sets of laws change over time. Killing and stealing can also be explained in biological terms. But many philosophers argue that there is a difference between inquiring into whether something is true and/or whether it is good.
If Truth involves a correspondence between our beliefs and reality, we might argue that Value involves a correspondence between our prescriptive beliefs and what is in fact, good. Unfortunately, moral philosophy is not that simple. It's not even clear that Truth involves correspondence, let alone value.
My view is that the line of demarcation between the descriptive "is" and prescriptive "ought" is extremely ambiguous. Descriptive theories aim to explain, predict, and control our behavior. These theories are either true or false. Prescriptive moral theories explain whether or not those beliefs correspond to what's good or bad. For example, if you want to know whether or not I believe that capital punishment is morally good, or not...you could begin by asking me. That's fine, assuming that I know what I believe and that I don't lie to you. Fortunately, beliefs are not only mental entities, but they also influence our behavior. So if you want to know what I believe to be true or good, observe my behavior over a period of time. You could listen to my lectures, or see if I've ever signed petitions for or against capital punishment, etc.
In my case, I'm not exactly sure what I think about capital punishment. Over the years I've changed my mind. I do know that if a member of my family or a close friend was murdered, my behavior would be profoundly influenced by emotion. I'd insist on retribution. In a moment of moral weakness, I might even attempt to exact retribution on my own. I think it is "true" that in all times and in all places, human beings seek retribution for harms inflicted by others. It is also "true" that human beings often kill one another. Now whether these behaviors are good or not is another question.
Scientists today have begun to cultivate a line of scientific inquiry that I call "descriptive psychology." Some of these inquirers explain our moral behavior by examining the structure of our brains. Then they suggest that that the brain module responsible for morality was shaped by millions of years of evolution. Based on this line of inquiry, many philosophers argue that, over time, as this line of descriptive inquiry unfolds, it will gradually replace prescriptive inquiry. That is to say, prescriptive inquiry will someday be absorbed by descriptive inquiry in the form of brain science. I don't believe it. Prescriptive moral inquiry is here to stay. Nevertheless, I think that descriptive inquiry certainly elucidates prescriptive inquiry.
To me, the only way to make sense of prescriptive inquiry is via descriptive inquiry: that is to say, we must establish how we, in fact, go about making value judgments. This is an empirically based activity in which we can all participate. All we have to do is observe how we employ moral language in our everyday lives, and how we arrive at moral judgments. Descriptive ethics, therefore, involves the collection of data that relates to moral behavior and the forging of our moral beliefs. It can involve biological inquiry, psychological inquiry, economics, sociological inquiry, and/or political inquiry. But in the final analysis, it turns out that there is something left over that resembles universal morality.
You may also notice that I am disinclined to spin a fine distinction between "ethics" and "morality." In fact, I shall use those terms as synonymous. The language that we employ within the moral domain is an essential ingredient for productive. Unfortunately, moral inquiry has always been complex, convoluted, and ambiguous. Thank God for philosophers! I'll at least try to identify some of those messy borders.
Another empirically-based observation evident to prescriptive inquiry is that it produces judgments containing an "ought." Positive moral behavior is judged to be "good" and therefore we "ought to do" those kinds of things. Negative behaviors that are "bad" and therefore we "ought to not do" those things. In a nutshell, morality consists in urging ourselves and others to do some things and not to do other things; and, therefore, we may have either positive duties, negative duties, or both. Moreover, we praise or blame each other, both, for doing good things and for not doing good things.
There is also widespread agreement that throughout human history, morality involves rules of conduct. In general, we praise persons that obey the rules and blame those that do not. But there is a lot of disagreement over specific moral rules and how we go discovering which rules to follow under various circumstances. Many philosophers argue that moral rules are simply statements of personal preference, while other philosophers say that moral beliefs are merely expressions of tradition and convention. Let's just say that traditionally, prescriptive moral inquiry usually addresses the question of rules.
Let's also agree that human beings make moral judgments, not only about specific acts of human behavior, we also make judgments about the character of the persons that perform these acts. This usually involves the analysis of internal mental things like intent, reasons, motivation, and conscience. Let's examine both good behavior and good persons.
When we say that a specific behavior is good, we are "prescribing" that behavior. Of course, we prescribe a lot of different kinds of behavior under a wide variety of circumstances. In fact, I think there are basically four kinds of behavior in which we use the adjective "good:" moral behavior (right or wrong), conventional behavior (good or bad manners), prudential behavior (practical/impractical), and legal behavior (lawful or unlawful)? Usually we invoke rules of conduct to frame these behaviors. But there are notoriously fuzzy boundaries here.
Moral behavior is usually classified as a subcategory of normative human behavior, which is to say that not all human normative behavior involves morality. In our society unconventional behavior, such as belching and/or farting at the dinner table is widely regarded as bad behavior. So is eating with your mouth open, picking your nose, and scratching private parts in public, especially on television. Conventional behavior is often dictated by a specific line of habitual behavior expressed as rules, which constitute a body of collective beliefs called tradition. Most traditional behavior varies between cultures and within cultures. They also vary relative to time and place. Bad manners can evoke feelings of distaste or revulsion in others within those cultural settings, but are not necessarily viewed as immoral. However, philosophers argue over whether there is something more to morality than rules enforced by tradition and convention.
The category of legality refers to behaviors that are prescribed or proscribed by power-laden institutions through the enforcement of laws. If a behavior is illegal, it carries with it a sanction that is imposed by that institution. Legal sanctions can be imposed by a variety of institutions, including: political institutions (government), religious institutions (churches), and economic institutions (corporations). Lawmakers often pass laws that are unenforceable, or laws that lack sanctions.
Prudence is an old, and probably arcane, concept. As I use the term, it signifies behavior that either advances individual or collective interests; or, at least it does not undermine interests. Imprudent behavior may or may not violate good manners, conventionality, or the law. Generally speaking, overeating is neither illegal nor immoral, but if you do it often enough it is certainly imprudent. And, unfortunately, in the United States overeating has become conventional behavior. In other contexts, overeating might be regarded as bad manners. Some argue that it is immoral to overeat if other human beings are hungry or starving. In most places it is not illegal to deliberately fart in a public elevator, but it will almost certainly be regarded as bad manners. It might also be imprudent, if your boss is in the elevator with you at the time.
Obviously, there is a lot of legal behavior that is immoral, nonconventional, and/or imprudent; and there is a lot of illegal behavior that is neither: immoral, non-conventional, nor imprudent. And of course, it is usually imprudent to violate standards of legality. But it is only imprudent if you get caught breaking the law. Sometimes the government is incapable of detecting your bad behavior, (weak monitoring) sometimes the sanction that it imposes does not threatening enough to deter your behavior (weak sanction), and sometimes government simply lacks the power to effectively enforce the sanction.
Within our own cultural setting, it seems fairly easy to differentiate between the domains of morality, conventionality, legality, and prudence, but it is much more difficult to do it between cultures. All human cultures use legality to enforce morality, conventionality, and prudence to varying degrees. Libertarians prefer to limit use of the legal code to enforce these alternative forms of the good. We'll get back to that shortly.
Although it is very difficult to distinguish between these normative contexts, there are several common denominators. All of these domains tend to involve persons, behaviors, rules, and the assessment of praiseworthiness, and blameworthiness. Once we get beyond these rather obvious generalities, things get more complicated. If it is philosophically possible to draw a clear line between these categories, morality is usually distinguished on the basis of its alleged universality. But prudential behavior can also approach universality. That is because prudence is often enforced by the laws of nature. (It's almost never a good idea to step in front of a vehicle traveling 75 miles an hour!). And murder is universally regarded as illegal, even though all cultures admit various exceptions. In some cultures, it is conventional to kill women that have been raped.
So the precise borders between morality, convention, legality, and prudence are far from clear. This ambiguity contributes to interminable debate over normative issues that transgress these vaguely defined borders.
In sum, so far I have suggested that human beings, by nature, ask questions and propose answers to those questions. Philosophy is simply the study of this questioning and answering process, which I call human inquiry. Whether we like it or not, we are all philosophers in so far as we engage in this open-ended, inter-generational and intercultural process of questioning and answering. The answers to these questions are called beliefs, which are simply the artifacts generated by the process of inquiry. New beliefs compete with old beliefs within our individual minds or brains and also in our collective minds or networked brains, or culture. As the process of inquiry proceeds across generations, some beliefs survive while others suffer extinction. Some of our more general beliefs carry more weight than others. We call our more general, stable, and widely-held beliefs theories. But human inquiry is highly contextualized, therefore, different individuals and communities tend to ask different questions and accept different answers. But despite this variation, there are many basic questions and answers that crop up in all contexts, at all times, and in all places. Hence, there are two universal lines of inquiry that all individual human beings and all communities pursue. We all seek the answers to two basic questions: "What is Truth?" and "What is Goodness?" Our answers are embedded in theories.
So morality involves both descriptive and prescriptive inquiry. Despite the fact that we make judgments about the morality of behavior and persons, we don't always agree with one another. We disagree over the composition of the moral universe. We disagree with one another over the rules of morality and as to whether we "ought" to hold certain individuals responsible for their behavior, and whether to praise them or blame them. We do not often agree as to what we ought to do or ought not to do; and we don't often agree as to whether individuals or communities are good or bad. Any theory of morality must take these facts into account. I shall argue that libertarianism does that better than any other theory, but it's not the main focus of the book. My primary concern will be to introduce you to the main lines of moral inquiry.
Here's my overall plan for the rest of this book. I will begin with a brief discussion of the three basic types of moral theory: teleological theories, deontological, and virtue based theories. Then I will examine five moral principles that underlie objective morality: utility, beneficence, non-maleficence, liberty, and justice.
TERMS TO KNOW: Human Inquiry, Descriptive Inquiry, Prescriptive Inquiry, Positive Ethics, Negative Ethics, Moral Character, Morality, Convention, and Prudence.
T
Saturday, February 25, 2017
Review of: Robin Dunbar's, Human Evolution: Our Brains and Behavior
Robin Dunbar, Human
Evolution: Our Brains and Behavior
(Oxford: 2016)
Reviewed for Choice Magazine by:
Ronald F. White,
Ph.D.
Professor of
Philosophy
Mount St. Joseph
University
Written by an
internationally recognized evolutionary psychologist and anthropologist, this
is a top-notch, state-of-the-art analysis of human evolution It traces the evolution
of the human species through five distinct “Transitions,” based on changes in either
brain size and/or ecological circumstance: (First) Australopithecines, (Second)
Early Homo, (Third) Archaic Humans (Fourth), Modern Humans, and (Fifth) Neolithic
Humans. It departs from other traditional anthropological accounts by focusing
less on “stones and bones” and more on the evolution of “social and cognitive traits;” especially,
the evolutionary puzzle of how to maintain social bonding in ever-growing
communities, while (at the same time) meeting the nutrient requirements of
larger bodies and brains. Dunbar’s approach builds upon the longstanding “social
brain hypothesis” by extending what we know about primate time-allocation; or, how
primates, hominids, and early humans might have allocated their time at various
latitudes for feeding, travel, rest, and social bonding. Many significant behavioral
markers are discussed including: bipedalism, reproduction, migration, foraging,
laughter, singing, dancing, weaponry, fire (warmth, light, cooking), meat-eating
(small/large game), language, feasting, agriculture, husbandry, raiding, and
warfare. Rife with technical terms, this rigorously referenced, science book covers
over 2 million years of human history. It is, however, extraordinarily well-written,
well-organized, and highly readable. This is certainly a high priority acquisition
for most academic and large public libraries.
Thursday, January 26, 2017
Fair Compensation: Minimum Wage
What is "fair" (or "just?) compensation? How
much is your labor worth? Is there some objective method that corporations
might utilize in order to compensate their workers fairly? Typically, the
morality of compensation falls under the category of distributive justice.
The formal principle of justice suggests that it is unfair to pay
workers either more than they deserve or less than they deserve. Of course, the
obvious question here is which material principle(s) of justice do we
employ in determining what those employees actually deserve?" Is it merit,
need, equality, or utility? Here are some of the options:
MERIT-BASED COMPENSATION: Based on the material principle of merit it would be unfair to pay the “best workers” the same or less than the “worst workers.” In other words, merit-based compensation is based on compensation. Sometimes “pay” involves salary, sometimes benefits, sometimes it involves other variables (or perks). But how would a corporate leader determine what the "best" means in any given workplace, and would he/she go about “objectively” grading work performance? Stock holder theorists would argue that merit is inseparable from the free market. If you underpay an employee relative to what’s being offered by other corporations for the same or similar work, that employee will most likely resign and take the more lucrative (or attractive) job. If you overpay workers, you’ll have to charge consumers more for your product or service and/or earn less profit and adversely affect stockholders and stock price. Defenders of merit-based compensation argue that compensation also influences employee performance (and employee loyalty). Workers will be more loyal to the company and work longer, harder, and better if they believe that they will be fairly compensated. Do they have merit pay at your place of employment? How is it distributed? Do you think it's fair? Are you overpaid? Are you underpaid?
EQUALITY-BASED COMPENSATION: Based in equality, it would be unfair to pay any worker more or less than any other worker, regardless of merit, need, or utility. After all, all workers may not, in fact, be of equal value in terms of merit, need, or utility. As a general rule, companies that compensate all workers at the same level, lose the best workers and attract the worst workers. This is called adverse selection. Unions often pursue variants of equality-based compensation, such as basing salary on non-competitive factors such as seniority. Would you want to work for a corporation that equally compensates all workers, regardless of their competence? How long would that corporation stay in business?
UTILITY-BASED COMPENSATION: Based on utility, it would be unfair to pay a less useful employee more than a more useful employee. But how does one determine what "greatest happiness" means in any particular workplace? Low employee wages might make the stockholders and consumers happy. High executive wages might make executives happy, but make everyone else unhappy. Many stockholder theorists argue that corporations compensate executives at a higher level because they have utility; that is, stockholders, employees, consumers, financiers, etc. benefit by retaining these workers. Hence, utility-based compensation is really merit-based compensation.
MARKET-BASED COMPENSATION: Based on market-based reasoning, it would be unfair to pay employees (including CEOs) more than what the market dictates. A corporation’s best overall strategy is always to hire best person for the least cost. The more costly it is to replace a worker, the more you have to pay that worker. If you underpay good workers, they will quit and work for someone that pays them more. Stockholder theorists argue that companies that adopt compensation schemes ignore the free-market tend to go bankrupt over the long run.
In the real corporate world, rationally self-interested corporations simply cannot hire the neediest workers unless doing so provides a favorable cost-benefit ratio (e.g. those individuals are willing to work longer hours for less compensation), unless the government forces them to (Americans with Disabilities Act), or unless government provides economic incentives (Enterprise Zones). Also in the real world, merit and utility usually mean the same thing. The best workers are usually the most useful, in the sense that they contribute more to the company. Therefore, in determining just compensation there are really only two principled alternatives: pay scales based on merit and pay scales based on equality: stockholder theory v. stakeholder theory.
Some small colleges try to pay their professors based, more or less, on equality; that is, they try to pay all professors on essentially the same scale, regardless of merit or utility. Sometimes these compensation policies involve setting up a pay-scale based on seniority, so that long time workers get paid more that recent hires. Of course one might argue that since workers with seniority have more job experience and tend to be the best workers, this is really a merit-based system. I would argue that these schemes are nevertheless equal as long as each worker has an equal opportunity to gain seniority. Many people think that compensation based on equality is fair. But, unfortunately, salaries based on equality often bump heads with economic reality. For example, there are, in fact, more high-paying employment opportunities than engineers. But there are more philosophers than jobs in philosophy. That's why colleges pay their engineering faculty much more than they do their philosophers. When defending these higher wages, college administrators might invoke several different moral principles. Some utilitarians might say that "since there are more engineering majors than philosophy majors, the whole college benefits more from engineering than philosophy, and therefore the higher wages for engineers is justified." Utilitarians might also justify paying football and basketball coaches more than any other employees.
Alternatively, one might argue based on the material principle of equality, that it is unfair to pay engineers more than philosophers if they hold Ph.D.s, write books, and teach excellently. However, if Aristotle were on the philosophy faculty, one might argue, based on the material principle of merit, Aristotle is the most academically accomplished faculty member, and therefore he ought to be paid the most. Then again, even though he may be the most meritorious faculty member, he may not necessarily generate the most utility for the college. Of course, libertarians would probably say that, if the college really wants to have either an engineering program or Aristotle on the faculty, they will, in fact have to pay market value for their labor. Otherwise those rationally self-interested individuals involved will simply exercise their liberty and change their place of employment. The labor market, they say, is not unlike any other market: it is inherently unequal. This fact of inequality means that at least some workers may not be worth very much to the corporation and therefore are compensated at a very low level, perhaps so low that those individuals may not be able to support themselves and/or their families. In the United States, government tries to compensate for the ruthless labor market by instituting minimum wage laws, unemployment insurance, Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid etc.
Minimum wage laws are prime examples of egalitarianism. They are often justified on the basis of Rawl's concept of a social minimum. (Utilitarians sometimes join forces with welfare liberals and argue that minimum wage laws make life better for all of us by reducing poverty, dependency, and crime.) Back in nineteenth-century America, before minimum wage laws were passed, workers were often paid extremely low wages for long hours working under extremely dangerous working conditions. Even children were subjected to working long hours in dangerous factories. Libertarian stockholder theorists argue that "those were the good old days!" when wages and working conditions were set by blind market forces and not by the whims of nosy, "do-good" government officials. In exercising their liberty, factory owners offered wages under certain working conditions and workers, who owned their labor, either accepted or rejected those offers. Once minimum wage laws took effect, stockholder theorists argue, corporations were forced to pay workers more than the market dictates, and as a result corporations couldn't afford to hire as many low wage workers. Hence, stakeholder theorists, by defending a legal minimum wage, inadvertently hastened the advancement of labor-saving technology which led directly to the rise of unemployment and poverty in the United States. Stockholder theorists argue that technology opens up more high-paying jobs for engineers and salesperson; and therefore, if you lose your job to technology, get retrained..
Stockholder theorists conclude that minimum wage laws are fundamentally ill-conceived. They say that the value of one's labor is best left to voluntary choices by buyers and sellers of labor. Hence, if these low wage workers had stayed in school longer and/or chosen more promising career paths, then their labor would be worth more. But when the government protects low wage workers from the consequences of their bad decisions, it encourages future bad decisions, and increases the number of people on welfare. So as a tax payer, I am penalized via the tax code for having made good decisions, while high school drop outs are rewarded by overly generous minimum wage laws, Medicaid, and welfare checks. Hence, government inadvertently discourages workers from staying in school and/or choosing more promising career paths. Why work at all if you can stay at home and collect that welfare check? That’s called “moral hazard.”
Other stockholder theorists argue that low wage jobs provide young workers with the opportunity to learn how to be a worker; and that the lower the wage paid, the more young people can be hired. And that minimum wage laws affect small businesses more than large corporations. Thus large corporations benefit from bankruptcy of local competitors.
MERIT-BASED COMPENSATION: Based on the material principle of merit it would be unfair to pay the “best workers” the same or less than the “worst workers.” In other words, merit-based compensation is based on compensation. Sometimes “pay” involves salary, sometimes benefits, sometimes it involves other variables (or perks). But how would a corporate leader determine what the "best" means in any given workplace, and would he/she go about “objectively” grading work performance? Stock holder theorists would argue that merit is inseparable from the free market. If you underpay an employee relative to what’s being offered by other corporations for the same or similar work, that employee will most likely resign and take the more lucrative (or attractive) job. If you overpay workers, you’ll have to charge consumers more for your product or service and/or earn less profit and adversely affect stockholders and stock price. Defenders of merit-based compensation argue that compensation also influences employee performance (and employee loyalty). Workers will be more loyal to the company and work longer, harder, and better if they believe that they will be fairly compensated. Do they have merit pay at your place of employment? How is it distributed? Do you think it's fair? Are you overpaid? Are you underpaid?
NEED-BASED COMPENSATION: Based on need, it would be unfair to pay
workers less than what they need. Need-based compensation usually incorporates
ideas such as a “minimum wage,” or a “living wage.” The problem here is how
does one objectively set these standards? How does an employer differentiate
between "wants"-(e.g. a new guitar) and "needs"
(e.g. a liver transplant)? And unfortunately, the neediest workers are
not necessarily the best workers. Sometimes workers are in need because they
are sick, incompetent, or just plain lazy. Stockholder theorists argue that
need-based compensation ( minimum wage and living wage) are unfair because they
involve paying the least valuable workers more than they deserve. Need-based
compensation also incentivizes employers to hire fewer low end workers, which
leads to unemployment of the least advantaged. Stakeholder theorists argue that
corporations have a tendency to exploit their less valuable workers and
that exploited workers become alienated from their work, family and themselves.
How much salary do you need? If you are ill, do you need more salary or
benefits to survive? Do workers have positive right to: home ownership, health
care, cell phones, or wide-screen televisions?
EQUALITY-BASED COMPENSATION: Based in equality, it would be unfair to pay any worker more or less than any other worker, regardless of merit, need, or utility. After all, all workers may not, in fact, be of equal value in terms of merit, need, or utility. As a general rule, companies that compensate all workers at the same level, lose the best workers and attract the worst workers. This is called adverse selection. Unions often pursue variants of equality-based compensation, such as basing salary on non-competitive factors such as seniority. Would you want to work for a corporation that equally compensates all workers, regardless of their competence? How long would that corporation stay in business?
UTILITY-BASED COMPENSATION: Based on utility, it would be unfair to pay a less useful employee more than a more useful employee. But how does one determine what "greatest happiness" means in any particular workplace? Low employee wages might make the stockholders and consumers happy. High executive wages might make executives happy, but make everyone else unhappy. Many stockholder theorists argue that corporations compensate executives at a higher level because they have utility; that is, stockholders, employees, consumers, financiers, etc. benefit by retaining these workers. Hence, utility-based compensation is really merit-based compensation.
MARKET-BASED COMPENSATION: Based on market-based reasoning, it would be unfair to pay employees (including CEOs) more than what the market dictates. A corporation’s best overall strategy is always to hire best person for the least cost. The more costly it is to replace a worker, the more you have to pay that worker. If you underpay good workers, they will quit and work for someone that pays them more. Stockholder theorists argue that companies that adopt compensation schemes ignore the free-market tend to go bankrupt over the long run.
In the real corporate world, rationally self-interested corporations simply cannot hire the neediest workers unless doing so provides a favorable cost-benefit ratio (e.g. those individuals are willing to work longer hours for less compensation), unless the government forces them to (Americans with Disabilities Act), or unless government provides economic incentives (Enterprise Zones). Also in the real world, merit and utility usually mean the same thing. The best workers are usually the most useful, in the sense that they contribute more to the company. Therefore, in determining just compensation there are really only two principled alternatives: pay scales based on merit and pay scales based on equality: stockholder theory v. stakeholder theory.
Some small colleges try to pay their professors based, more or less, on equality; that is, they try to pay all professors on essentially the same scale, regardless of merit or utility. Sometimes these compensation policies involve setting up a pay-scale based on seniority, so that long time workers get paid more that recent hires. Of course one might argue that since workers with seniority have more job experience and tend to be the best workers, this is really a merit-based system. I would argue that these schemes are nevertheless equal as long as each worker has an equal opportunity to gain seniority. Many people think that compensation based on equality is fair. But, unfortunately, salaries based on equality often bump heads with economic reality. For example, there are, in fact, more high-paying employment opportunities than engineers. But there are more philosophers than jobs in philosophy. That's why colleges pay their engineering faculty much more than they do their philosophers. When defending these higher wages, college administrators might invoke several different moral principles. Some utilitarians might say that "since there are more engineering majors than philosophy majors, the whole college benefits more from engineering than philosophy, and therefore the higher wages for engineers is justified." Utilitarians might also justify paying football and basketball coaches more than any other employees.
Alternatively, one might argue based on the material principle of equality, that it is unfair to pay engineers more than philosophers if they hold Ph.D.s, write books, and teach excellently. However, if Aristotle were on the philosophy faculty, one might argue, based on the material principle of merit, Aristotle is the most academically accomplished faculty member, and therefore he ought to be paid the most. Then again, even though he may be the most meritorious faculty member, he may not necessarily generate the most utility for the college. Of course, libertarians would probably say that, if the college really wants to have either an engineering program or Aristotle on the faculty, they will, in fact have to pay market value for their labor. Otherwise those rationally self-interested individuals involved will simply exercise their liberty and change their place of employment. The labor market, they say, is not unlike any other market: it is inherently unequal. This fact of inequality means that at least some workers may not be worth very much to the corporation and therefore are compensated at a very low level, perhaps so low that those individuals may not be able to support themselves and/or their families. In the United States, government tries to compensate for the ruthless labor market by instituting minimum wage laws, unemployment insurance, Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid etc.
Minimum wage laws are prime examples of egalitarianism. They are often justified on the basis of Rawl's concept of a social minimum. (Utilitarians sometimes join forces with welfare liberals and argue that minimum wage laws make life better for all of us by reducing poverty, dependency, and crime.) Back in nineteenth-century America, before minimum wage laws were passed, workers were often paid extremely low wages for long hours working under extremely dangerous working conditions. Even children were subjected to working long hours in dangerous factories. Libertarian stockholder theorists argue that "those were the good old days!" when wages and working conditions were set by blind market forces and not by the whims of nosy, "do-good" government officials. In exercising their liberty, factory owners offered wages under certain working conditions and workers, who owned their labor, either accepted or rejected those offers. Once minimum wage laws took effect, stockholder theorists argue, corporations were forced to pay workers more than the market dictates, and as a result corporations couldn't afford to hire as many low wage workers. Hence, stakeholder theorists, by defending a legal minimum wage, inadvertently hastened the advancement of labor-saving technology which led directly to the rise of unemployment and poverty in the United States. Stockholder theorists argue that technology opens up more high-paying jobs for engineers and salesperson; and therefore, if you lose your job to technology, get retrained..
Stockholder theorists conclude that minimum wage laws are fundamentally ill-conceived. They say that the value of one's labor is best left to voluntary choices by buyers and sellers of labor. Hence, if these low wage workers had stayed in school longer and/or chosen more promising career paths, then their labor would be worth more. But when the government protects low wage workers from the consequences of their bad decisions, it encourages future bad decisions, and increases the number of people on welfare. So as a tax payer, I am penalized via the tax code for having made good decisions, while high school drop outs are rewarded by overly generous minimum wage laws, Medicaid, and welfare checks. Hence, government inadvertently discourages workers from staying in school and/or choosing more promising career paths. Why work at all if you can stay at home and collect that welfare check? That’s called “moral hazard.”
Other stockholder theorists argue that low wage jobs provide young workers with the opportunity to learn how to be a worker; and that the lower the wage paid, the more young people can be hired. And that minimum wage laws affect small businesses more than large corporations. Thus large corporations benefit from bankruptcy of local competitors.
Stakeholder theorists respond by arguing that the fatal flaw of stockholder theory is that it assumes
that poverty is usually caused by irrational or misguided decisions, when in
fact, a lot of poverty is the result of natural inequality (the natural
lottery) and predatory behavior by more powerful stakeholder groups.
Through no fault of their own, many people simply cannot support themselves
because they are genetically and/or socially disadvantaged. As Rawls argued, in
the state of nature, the distribution of genetic and social advantage is
inherently unfair. The fact of inequality, egalitarians argue, does not make it
right. That's why our ancestors invented civilization to begin with! So should the government force corporations to pay low wage workers a minimum wage? If so where should that wage be set? What do
you think?
Tuesday, January 3, 2017
Business Ethics: Index
The following FP links are my writings on "Business Ethics." They are from the book I've been working on for twenty years. They save my students a lot of money... I never use textbooks for my ethics courses. All free stuff. The Cincinnati Enquirer has given me permission to use online material for case studies.
Chapter #1: What is a Corporation?
Chapter #2: Stockholder Theory of Corporate Management and Stakeholder Theory of Corporate Management
Chapter #3: Leadership Theory, Followership Theory, Self Organization, Leadership, Culture, and the Market, Information Flow and Leadership
Chapter #4: Media Ethics
Chapter #9: Ethics of Whistleblowing
Chapter #10: Privacy in the Workplace
Chapter #11: Discrimination
Chapter #12: Discrimination in the Workplace
Chapter #13: Affirmative Action
Chapter #14: Sexual Harassment
Chapter #15: Fairness in Compensation: Minimum-Wage and Executive Compensation
Chapter #16: Health and Safety in the Workplace
Chapter #17: Marketing Ethics
Chapter #18: Consumer Health and Safety
Chapter 19: Price Fairness
Chapter #20: Consumer Privacy
Chapter #21: Business Ethics in a Global Context: Objectivism v. Relativism
Chapter #22: Sweat Shops
Chapter #23: Bribery and Corruption
APPENDIX: What is Ethics?
Chapter #1: What is a Corporation?
Chapter #2: Stockholder Theory of Corporate Management and Stakeholder Theory of Corporate Management
Chapter #3: Leadership Theory, Followership Theory, Self Organization, Leadership, Culture, and the Market, Information Flow and Leadership
Chapter #4: Media Ethics
Chapter #9: Ethics of Whistleblowing
Chapter #10: Privacy in the Workplace
Chapter #11: Discrimination
Chapter #12: Discrimination in the Workplace
Chapter #13: Affirmative Action
Chapter #14: Sexual Harassment
Chapter #15: Fairness in Compensation: Minimum-Wage and Executive Compensation
Chapter #16: Health and Safety in the Workplace
Chapter #17: Marketing Ethics
Chapter #18: Consumer Health and Safety
Chapter 19: Price Fairness
Chapter #20: Consumer Privacy
Chapter #21: Business Ethics in a Global Context: Objectivism v. Relativism
Chapter #22: Sweat Shops
Chapter #23: Bribery and Corruption
APPENDIX: What is Ethics?
Monday, January 2, 2017
Discrimination in the Workpace
The concept of "discrimination" is rooted in the formal principle of justice: "treat equals equally and unequals unequally." Unfortunately, the principle of equality often bumps heads with other moral principles; especially: the Liberty Principle, Utility Principle, and the Principle of Merit.
Suppose that John Smith owns a store that sells guitars and hires only family members and close friends, all of whom happen to be young, guitar-playing, white heterosexual males. Stockholder Theorists argue that if John "owns" the store, then he has the liberty to hire whomever he chooses. However, one of the side-effects of exercising one’s liberty is that sometimes we make poor decisions and generate disutility. If John’s family and friends turned out to be incompetent, irresponsible thieves that know nothing about the guitar business, he would soon go bankrupt. That would be good news for all the other guitar stores that chose their workers based on impartial criteria such as job experience, knowledge of guitars, and honesty. Moreover, stockholder theorists argue that most of the time, discriminatory hiring and firing practices are punished by the free market, and therefore we do not need laws to enforce non-discriminatory business practices.
Stakeholder theorists argue that many corporations can survive and even thrive, for a long time despite discriminatory practices, therefore some government involvement is necessary to protect workers from discriminatory hiring and firing practices. Some job qualifications are regarded as bona fide occupational qualifications (BFOQs) in the sense that they represent legitimate lines of meritorious competition. In at least some contexts, the ability to play a guitar might be regarded as a bona fide requirement to sell guitars; while requiring that salesman to be a white, male guitar player might be discriminatory. In either case, the distinction between bona fide and discriminatory qualifications is contextual, and contingent upon moral argument.
However, over the years some occupations have been monopolized by females such as: nursing, primary education, and sales. Some occupations have been monopolized by males, such as: manufacturing, mining, engineering, and professional football. Some professions are monopolized down racial lines such as professional football (blacks), baseball (Latinos), basketball (blacks), and hockey (whites). It is difficult for males to compete in occupations dominated by females, and it is difficult for females to compete in occupations dominated by males. But why?
Critics also observe that most of the highest paying jobs have been long monopolized by old, white males. Since the 1960s, the pay scales have certainly changed, but females and blacks still encounter that "glass ceiling" that prevents them from advancing to the higher paying jobs in many industries.
For the ethics of discrimination, there are several descriptive (factual) questions. Do at least some skills and aptitudes cluster around categories such as race, gender, age, nationality, or sexual preference? If so, why does this happen? Is it a bad thing? Do men and women, blacks and whites, oldsters and youngsters, heterosexuals and homosexuals (at least occasionally) bring different skills and/or aptitudes to the workplace; or are our beliefs about those skills and aptitudes based on false cultural beliefs and/or subtle, discriminatory cultural traditions? What role, if any, should government play in breaking down these cultural barriers? Should corporations be forced to hire based on sex, race, age, or sexual preference, even if that practice violates the liberty principle, the utility principle, or the principle of merit?
1. Which of the following job descriptions seem to be obviously bona fide or discriminatory. Wanted: Good looking women with large breasts: strippers for a strip bar, secretary jobs, professional women's basketball team, brassiere salesman. Explain why.
2. Is job discrimination sometimes subtly brought about by unfair and or dis-utilitarian recruitment strategies? Would there be more males in nursing, if nursing schools recruited more male nursing professors, and recruited more male nursing students?
3. Is it discriminatory to refuse to hire workers that are unhealthy, morbidly obese, ugly, or smelly? Explain.
4. Should the WNBA hire at least some male players? Should the NBA hire at least some female players?
5. What is "reverse discrimination" in the workplace. Give an example.
Suppose that John Smith owns a store that sells guitars and hires only family members and close friends, all of whom happen to be young, guitar-playing, white heterosexual males. Stockholder Theorists argue that if John "owns" the store, then he has the liberty to hire whomever he chooses. However, one of the side-effects of exercising one’s liberty is that sometimes we make poor decisions and generate disutility. If John’s family and friends turned out to be incompetent, irresponsible thieves that know nothing about the guitar business, he would soon go bankrupt. That would be good news for all the other guitar stores that chose their workers based on impartial criteria such as job experience, knowledge of guitars, and honesty. Moreover, stockholder theorists argue that most of the time, discriminatory hiring and firing practices are punished by the free market, and therefore we do not need laws to enforce non-discriminatory business practices.
Stakeholder theorists argue that many corporations can survive and even thrive, for a long time despite discriminatory practices, therefore some government involvement is necessary to protect workers from discriminatory hiring and firing practices. Some job qualifications are regarded as bona fide occupational qualifications (BFOQs) in the sense that they represent legitimate lines of meritorious competition. In at least some contexts, the ability to play a guitar might be regarded as a bona fide requirement to sell guitars; while requiring that salesman to be a white, male guitar player might be discriminatory. In either case, the distinction between bona fide and discriminatory qualifications is contextual, and contingent upon moral argument.
However, over the years some occupations have been monopolized by females such as: nursing, primary education, and sales. Some occupations have been monopolized by males, such as: manufacturing, mining, engineering, and professional football. Some professions are monopolized down racial lines such as professional football (blacks), baseball (Latinos), basketball (blacks), and hockey (whites). It is difficult for males to compete in occupations dominated by females, and it is difficult for females to compete in occupations dominated by males. But why?
Critics also observe that most of the highest paying jobs have been long monopolized by old, white males. Since the 1960s, the pay scales have certainly changed, but females and blacks still encounter that "glass ceiling" that prevents them from advancing to the higher paying jobs in many industries.
For the ethics of discrimination, there are several descriptive (factual) questions. Do at least some skills and aptitudes cluster around categories such as race, gender, age, nationality, or sexual preference? If so, why does this happen? Is it a bad thing? Do men and women, blacks and whites, oldsters and youngsters, heterosexuals and homosexuals (at least occasionally) bring different skills and/or aptitudes to the workplace; or are our beliefs about those skills and aptitudes based on false cultural beliefs and/or subtle, discriminatory cultural traditions? What role, if any, should government play in breaking down these cultural barriers? Should corporations be forced to hire based on sex, race, age, or sexual preference, even if that practice violates the liberty principle, the utility principle, or the principle of merit?
Discussion Questions
2. Is job discrimination sometimes subtly brought about by unfair and or dis-utilitarian recruitment strategies? Would there be more males in nursing, if nursing schools recruited more male nursing professors, and recruited more male nursing students?
3. Is it discriminatory to refuse to hire workers that are unhealthy, morbidly obese, ugly, or smelly? Explain.
4. Should the WNBA hire at least some male players? Should the NBA hire at least some female players?
5. What is "reverse discrimination" in the workplace. Give an example.
Wednesday, December 28, 2016
Privacy in the Workplace
To what degree is it morally and/or legally justifiable for corporations to access private, personal information about their stakeholders and/or share that information with others?
First of all, the concept of "information" is epistemologically complex. The distinction between "public information" and "private information" is deeply rooted in Adam Smith's original distinction between "property" and "information." If there is a such thing as "private property," then why not "private information?" In what sense do individuals "own" information pertaining to their "private lives?" If there is a "right to privacy" is it a moral right or legal right? If there is a legal or moral right to privacy, then is that right a Positive Right or a Negative Right?
In business ethics, privacy is usually approached via two competing theories of management: Stockholder Theory and Stakeholder Theory.
First of all, the concept of "information" is epistemologically complex. The distinction between "public information" and "private information" is deeply rooted in Adam Smith's original distinction between "property" and "information." If there is a such thing as "private property," then why not "private information?" In what sense do individuals "own" information pertaining to their "private lives?" If there is a "right to privacy" is it a moral right or legal right? If there is a legal or moral right to privacy, then is that right a Positive Right or a Negative Right?
In business ethics, privacy is usually approached via two competing theories of management: Stockholder Theory and Stakeholder Theory.
Stockholder Theorists argue that all "rights" are negative moral rights. Corporations are cooperative enterprises comprised of various stakeholder groups who voluntarily cooperate in pursuit of their own individual and/or personal and collective interests. Those stakeholder groups include: stockholders, employees, consumers, suppliers, financiers, and local communities. Corporations thrive, survive, or go bankrupt based on the degree to which corporations satisfy the interests of those competing groups. For Stockholder Theorists, the Liberty Principle is fundamental; that is the various groups must have freedom to enter and/or exit from any given corporation. Thus, the CEO (or owner) of any corporation is bound by a moral agreement or contract that binds the various stakeholder groups. If any one stakeholder group is dissatisfied with that agreement they can refuse to sign that contract. If enough stakeholders from any one group refuse, the corporation may bankrupt. Therefore, on the issue of privacy, Stockholder Theorists argue that contracts must contain clear statements concerning what kind of information is required out of each stakeholder group, how that information will be gathered, and who will have access to that information. In short, corporations that unnecessarily pry into the private lives of their employees and/or consumers will pay the price in the free market.
Stakeholder Theorists argue that contractual moral agreements are insufficient guarantors of the right to privacy (or any other right!). They tend to support government regulations that limit what kinds of information can be collected by corporations, what corporations can do with that information, and who can have access to that information.
Corporations can secure information about stakeholder groups in many different ways. The most common source of information procurement is via surveillance: that is by observing the behavior of the various stakeholder groups. Throughout most corporate history, surveillance entailed direct observation by an owner or a designated overseer. In recent years, surveillance has been expanded via technologies such as video cameras, computers, and a variety of tests. Today most corporations use technology to observe the behavior of their employees and consumers. Once this information is gathered, then ethicists ask: "What is to be done with that information?" and "Who ought to have access to that information?"
For Stockholder Theorists the main ethical issues are utilitarian: "Do the costs for of surveillance outweigh the benefits?" Some surveillance technologies are very expensive to purchase from sellers. Some technologies are inaccurate and therefore yield false or misleading information. According to Stockholder Theory it's up to the stockholders to decide whether the benefits of any surveillance technology outweigh the costs.
Drug tests are both notoriously inaccurate and expensive. Many laboratories that process the tests employ underpaid incompetent workers. And of course, many employers, no doubt, alienate a lot of good workers by asking them to submit to drugs tests or honesty tests.
The overall utility of drug testing is questionable from many perspectives. Highly accurate drug tests, for example, may detect lingering quantities of illegal drugs, that do not (in fact) affect work performance. It’s one thing to smoke a joint just before flying a passenger plane and another thing to smoke a joint a week before takeoff. Doe employers really have a moral right to monitor employees behavior after work, that does not affect their productivity? Is it really my employers business if I choose to smoke a joint on my day off? There may also be a big difference between a rock star smoking joint before a performance and pilot smoking a joint before flying. But, unfortunately, due to the ongoing drug war, it is illegal for scientists to conduct clinical trials that might determine whether smoking pot really impairs one’s ability to fly a plane. What would happen if research shows that pot smoking is (in fact) performance enhancing, and enhances one’s ability to fly a plane? Could airlines justifiably require all airplane pilots to smoke pot?
Another privacy issue questions whether corporations have a duty to protect private information. When personal information on employees and/or consumers is stored on computers, the question arises "who owns that information" and "who ought to have access to that information?" How secure must that information be kept? How much should corporations invest in protecting the security of information on their employees and consumers?
The use of social media in the workplace is also problematic in the workplace. Many employees expend time at work checking their private, non-work-related e-mail, Facebook, and Twitter accounts. Hence, corporations end up paying for wasted time. From a moral or legal perspective, what can a company do to minimize this behavior? Should corporations hire employees or hire a corporation to monitor employee computer use? But who will monitor the monitors? How much should a company pay those monitors? Is it easier to justify testing one class of workers rather than another? For example, should we test airline pilots, physicians, and college professors to the same degree? If so, what kinds of tests?
QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
1. Do employers have a moral right to access private information of their employees or consumers? If so, under what conditions might that access be justified?
2. If your employer discovers via a required physical that you have a serious, contagious disease such as AIDS, does your employer have a moral duty to tell your wife, spouse, or children?
3. If your employer fires you for unauthorized use of your computer at work, does that employer have a duty to inform future employers of that transgression?
4. What do you think about employers requiring each of the following tests: honesty tests, IQ tests, or AIDS tests?
5. Discuss the use of performance enhancing drugs (steroids) and illegal recreational drugs (pot) in Major League Baseball and The National Football League. What are the privacy implications?
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