Friday, April 23, 2010

The Road to Serfdom: Part 1

My philosophy class has been finishing up the semester by reading F.A. Hayek's classic work, The Road to Serfdom. Admittedly, its not often assigned in introduction to philosophy courses. Philosophers will forgive me, given that we also read: Plato's Republic; Machiavelli's, The Prince; Marx's Communist Manefesto; and Skinner's, Beyond Freedom and Dignity. Throughout the course I emphasized three major relational themes: the nature of human knowledge and it's relationship to politics, the relationship between leaders and followers, and relationship between social groupings and individuals. I thought I'd devote the next two blog entries to Hayek as a social and political philosopher.


Before we get started, it is important to note that Hayek acknowledges that human beings are individuals that live in communities organized via leadership and followership. We usually organize communities via dominance hierarchies, ruled by Alpha Males. He also acknowledges that we are emotional beings driven by fear, and that much of our communal life is aimed at securing our individual lives from the forces that provoke those fears. The central question for social and political philosophy is to what degree we ought to empower government to provide that security? There are two closely related forms of security: physical security (fear of physical pain, suffering, and death: think terrorism) and economic security (fear from deprivation of material sustenance: think food, clothing, shelter). Hayek also distinguishes between two public policy options the pursuit of limited security and the pursuit of absolute security. The Road to Serfdom is a long argument against the socialist (Marxist) idea that the public policy goal must be the pursuit of absolute economic security, but his arguments apply equally to physical security. His arguments ultimately hinge on his views on the nature of cooperation.

We humans cooperate with one another either by choice or by coercion. Socialists argue that absolute economic security can be provided via large scale cooperation masterminded by a governmentally empowered "central planner." Central planning is by it's very nature coercive, in so far as it requires taking from some individuals and giving to other individual (usually via taxation). Therefore the basic question for social and political philosophy is what can we reasonably expect out of central planning in terms of providing economic and physical security? What kinds human activities, if any, ought to be centrally controlled by government, and what kinds of activities ought to be left to individual planning via non-coercive cooperation and competition?

Recall from my earlier blogs that some libertarians are anarchists. Hayek is not an anarchist, but a minarchist that recognizes that government must play role in human affairs. In fact, anarcho-libertarians often criticise Hayek for suggesting that government ought to provide a basic security "safety net" for citizens. Exactly what this net includes is left unclear. (Think hurricane relief, basic retirement, and basic health care.) What is clear, is that the goal of providing this safety net must be limited security and NOT absolute security. Why? Because when central governments pursue absolute security, the cost is an inevitable loss of individual planning. Why is this the case?

Well it has to do with the fact that human beings, by nature, plan for the future as both individuals and as communities. Now, what exactly is individual planning? In the economic realm its about buying and selling products and services; that is, engaging in cooperative, self-interested, voluntary exchanges with other humans in a free market. In the end, voluntary exchange is inexorably both competitive and cooperative: buyers compete with sellers, sellers compete with other sellers, buyers compete with other buyers etc. Thus individual planning in a capitalist society is moderated by supply and demand. But it's not necessarily "dog eat dog" competition. Buyers and sellers can also cooperate with each other via the formation of corporations, unions, and other non-governmental organizations. (Hint: Walmart, American Medical Association, and the Red Cross)

What is collective planning? Collective planning is when a central authority (a leader) plans for the well being of the whole community. "One size fits all!" In the political realm, this can only be accomplished by employing the coercive power of government to take money from one constituency and give it to another. (Remember Robin Hood?) Hence, the central planner(s) decide "who gets what and when." Collective planning entails replacing (or at least modifying) the act of "buying and selling." So what kinds of goods and services ought to be provided via by free market voluntary exchange and what ought to be provided by government? Military, Police and Fire Departments, Health Care, Retirement? If you believe that government ought to provide most of our economic security, you are a collectivist and a socialist. If you believe all of our needs and wants ought to be centrally distributed by government you are a totalitarian. If you believe most of our material sustence ought to be left to individual voluntary exchange within a free market, you are a individualist and a capitalist. If you believe that government ought to leave everything to the free market with no input from government, you are an anarchist.

In my next blog, I'll explore some of Hayek's specific arguments against collectivism, socialism, and central planning.

Thursday, April 8, 2010

Paternalism and the Rise of Risk-Averse Culture

So far I've suggested that paternalistic intervention is an other-regarding act performed on behalf of a beneficiary (or beneficiaries) by a benefactor. By definition it requires the violation of the liberty of that beneficiary in order to provide that benefit. Therefore, paternalism requires the application varying degrees of coercive force; usually in the form the imposition of a physical or economic threat. If the beneficiary voluntarily agrees to submit to the intervention without threat, it is NOT paternalistic, and interventions that merely entice beneficiaries (via rewards) without threatening a harms are NOT paternalistic. The case for paternalism is strongest when the benefactor seeks the removal of a harm. Harm is relative to individual and collective risk hierarchies. Irrationality, therefore, is relative to individual and collective risk hierarchies. And finally, paternalistic interventions either advance the interests of the beneficiary or they do not. Many interventions are either unsafe or ineffective, therefore, paternalism has an empirical component. An intervention that does not, in fact, provide a benefit (a positive cost-benefit ratio)is, strictly speaking, not paternalistic.


Authoritarian regimes are more prone to violate the liberty of citizens under the guise of paternalistic intervention. Indeed, citizens often become so acclimated to governmental authority that they willingly submit to governmental management of their personal risk-taking. Now, what happens when government uses its coercive power to define acceptable and unacceptable risk-taking? What are the social implications? Well, the first thing that happens is that minor risks are transformed into major risks and the range of acceptable risk-taking behavior narrows. Second, citizens begin to expect government to protect them from more and more low level risks, and over the long run, society become increasingly risk-averse. Admittedly, that is an empirical observation. Does it hold water? As a 58 year old libertarian, my observation is that the United States has become increasingly risk-averse. The most obvious examples are: increasingly strict drug laws, laws against smoking, laws against the use of transfats in restaurants, seat belts, child seats, helmet laws (I never wore a helmet when I rode my bike as a child). How about laws require that the organizers of large public gatherings take out liability insurance? Increasingly intrusive airport surveilance under the guise of protecting us from terrorists? Of course, in each of these cases we must ask the hard empirical question: "Do these interventions REALLY make us safer" Is government "better" at managing risk than I am? I don't know about you, but I'm willing to match my risk-taking acumen against government's any time. Then, pour me another beer, pass me the butter, and light me up a joint.

Saturday, March 27, 2010

PATERNALISTIC INTERVENTIONS

As I suggested earlier, paternalistic intervention involves a conflict between the risk hierarchies of a benefactor and an intended beneficiary. So paternalistic intervention is is based on the supposition that a benefactor's cost/benefit analysis (at least sometimes) trumps the assessment of a targeted beneficiary AND that the intervention will, in fact, leave the beneficiary "better off." Being made "better off" could mean either an unwanted benefit or an unwanted lessening or removal of a harm. The lessening or removal of a harm could mean either reducing the probability of its occurance or reducing its magnitude. Moreover, justified paternalistic intervention implies empirical evidence that the intended intervention, will in fact, leave the beneficiary "better off" in either the long-run or short run. So the question is whether a beneficiary will (in fact) be better off or not as the result of a given paternalistic intervention.

In assessing whether a beneficiary will be better off or not must take into account the full range of known costs and benefits. Paternalistic intervention invariably requires the use of coercive force, which is often an under-valued cost. The degree of coercive force is, obviously, contingent upon the degree of resistence offered by the intended beneficiary. Sometimes beneficiaries are relatively submissive and make a calculated decision to submit to the benefactor: "It's not worth fighting over!" When the beneficiary offers resistance intervention requires more coercive force. So some interventions require high degrees of physical coercion and inflict greater or lesser injuries on the beneficiary: black eyes, bruises, broken bones etc. Sometimes injuries result, not only from the interdiction process, but also from subduing the resistant beneficiary long enough to provide the benefit. Sometimes the interventions themselves inflict costs, which are euphemistically described as "side-effects. Most anti-psychotic drugs turn out to have serious long-term and short-term side effects, including suicidal thoughts, sexual dysfunction, and loss of energy etc. Thus the overall "redounding good" of any intervention must take into account the amount of coercive force required to get the job done and the side-effects of the intervention itself.

With the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, let's take a look at a few of classic large group paternalistic interventions. In the nineteenth century psychiatrists believed that the mentally ill were "better off" locked up in a mental hospital where they could be bled and force-fed emetics and purgatives. In hindsight, we know that those were unjustified interventions. In the mid-twentieth century, psychiatrists believed that electro-shock therapy and lobotomies left patients better off than bloodletting, emetics, and purgatives. Today we have a long list of modern drugs that have been proven to be either unsafe, ineffective, or both: DES, Fen Fen etc.

So despite the dismal record of well-meaning paternalistic interventions, and despite the fact that most interventions benefit the benefactors (and third parties), why do we accept paternalism as a social practice. I believe we all have a biological predisposition to submit to group-based authority, even when there is little evidence to suggest that authoritative interventions are any more reliable than anyone else. In other words, we blindly submit to group-based authority and rarely question it. This is probably a remnant of our Pleistocene hunter-gatherer brain. Therefore, it is very difficult for us to question socially-designated authorities. The social processes that we employ to manufacture experts is intriguing. Just think about how we ceremoniously bestow these "experts" with credentials: advanced degrees, licenses, etc.

Monday, March 22, 2010

PATERNALISM: HARM AND RATIONALITY

So under what conditions, if any, is paternalism morally justifiable? In the Western philosophical tradition justified paternalistic intervention, has focused on detailed philosophical analysis of the interwoven concepts of harm and rationality. First of all, since John Stuart Mill, the Western liberal tradition has distinguished between “harm to self” and “harm to others” and that paternalism, by definition, must target “harm to self.” Justified governmental intervention in regard to “harm to others” involves different principles and arguments. As stated in my previous essay, most human actions and paternalistic interventions affect others. So, with all this in mind, for now let’s focus on “harm to self.”

Paternalistic intervention is, by definition, an act of beneficence, where an individual (or group) coercively violates the liberty of another individual (or group) in order to prevent and/or remove “harm.” Well, what is harm? I don’t think I can improve much on Joel Feinberg’s definition, as the “invasion of an interest.” What is an interest? Well, it’s “anything you have a stake in.” If you have a “stake” in something, it means that, ultimately, your pleasure or pain is at stake. We all have an interest in a lot of different things, but obviously, we value some interests more than others. Let’s call these individual and collective rankings “interest hierarchies.”

Are these interest hierarchies “objective” or are they “relative” to individuals, small groups, or large groups? One might argue that interest invading harms are objective to the extent that harm can be measured in terms of magnitude and probability. Magnitude is the sheer degree of harm: "Death has greater magnitude than embarassment." Probability is the sheer likelihood of that harm. Thus, some harms are of great magnitude (death), but improbable (while flying); others are lesser in magnitude (embarrassment) but highly probable (farting in public). Moreover, the magnitude and probability of harm can be assessed over both the short-run and the long-run. Hence, most of us agree that Russian roulette is a high-magnitude, high-probability harm over the short run; smoking is a high-magnitude, high probability harm over the long run. (For the sake of argument, let’s assume that our beliefs about the causal relationship between smoking and cancer are true. My only point here is that smoking and Russian roulette are different.)

But in the real world, magnitude cannot be measured in a vacuum. It is always relative to other harms and benefits, and therefore subject to trade-offs. Therefore, rationality and irrationality are about those "interest hierarchies," risk-taking and trade-offs. We take risks when we either “do things” and when we “don’t do things,” therefore paternalistic interventions can either force us to “do things,” or prevent us from “doing things.” J.S. Mill suggested that irrational persons take irrational risks; that is they do things (or don’t do things) where the potential (or actual) costs of those actions exceed the potential (or actual) benefits. In short, irrational risks are not worth taking relative to an interest hierarchy. Unfortunately, he didn’t provide much insight into what this might mean in the real world. So what kinds of risks are rational?

Bernard Gert argues there harm is more or less objective. He observes that, unless a person has a good reason to do otherwise, rational individuals tend to avoid: death, pain, disability, and loss of opportunity. So what’s a “good reason” to choose death? Well, most Americans living in the twenty-first century agree that it is not, necessarily, irrational to choose death over suffering high levels of intractable pain or disability. But what happens if suicide is sometimes a rational act, relative to a large group, but irrational relative to a small group or an individual? If a teenager wants to jump off the bridge because of social embarrassment (farting in math class), then that it seems objectively irrational. After all, over the long run, embarrassment is, at most, a low magnitude short-term harm. But note that our large group, small group, and individual judgments are based the assumption that it is irrational to kill one's self out of embarrassment. Objectively speaking, embarassment is a mow magnitude harm, therefore suicide, a major harm, can never be justified. But in many parts of the world, embarrassed fathers routinely kill their daughters in the name of “honor” (embarrassment) and many daughters commit suicide after dishonoring (embarrassing) their fathers. Although most American believe that honor-based suicides are irrational (and immoral), how does one go about establishing an objective, universal standard?

So here lies the basic paternalistic dilemma. If our individual interest hierarchies are at least influenced by small groups and large groups, what does personal liberty mean in this context? (I'll address this in the next essay.) And, when there’s a conflict between individual and collective interest hierarchies, which interest hierarchy prevails over the others? Whose risk-assessment trumps whose? Large-group communitarians tend to empower large group hierarchies (American's), and small-group communitarians tend to empower small group hierarchies (Roman Catholic's), and libertarians empower individual hierarchies (Ron White's). But the question for libertarians is whether paternalistic intervention can ever be morally justified? As stated at the outset, traditionally that question has involved the analysis of rationality and harm. But another approach to this question is to take a closer look at how human knowledge underlies specific paternalistic interventions.

Sunday, March 14, 2010

Pure and Impure Paternalism

Let’s begin with a fundamental distinction between pure and impure forms of paternalism. Paternalistic intervention is an intentional act of beneficence where a benefactor violates the liberty of a beneficiary in order to provide an unwanted benefit. Beneficiaries and benefactors can be either individuals or groups. Within group-based paternalism, we can also differentiate between governmental paternalism (state paternalism) and non-governmental paternalism. Under state paternalism government acts as the benefactor by exercising the coercive power of government via regulations and taxation. For now let’s focus on group-based state paternalism.

Pure state paternalism is where the group whose liberty is being violated is identical to the group that may benefit (seat belt laws). Impure paternalism is when the group whose liberty is violated is larger than the group that is targeted for benefit. (laws that restrict access to sudafed)

Another feature of state paternalism is that it often benefits the benefactor and/or third parties, and therefore, masks conflict of interest and corporate welfare. Most paternalistic laws are initiated by providers. In modern societies, acts of pure paternalism are extremely rare. After all, in the “real world” of state paternalism, politically well-connected third parties almost always benefit such as: daycare centers, beauty salons, tatoo parlors, mental institutions, drug companies, psychologists, and psychiatrists. Seat belt laws benefit the engineers and manufacturers that produce seat belts. Drug laws benefit the alcohol industry and criminal organizations. (Admittedly, this is an empirical observation. If I'm wrong, please correct me!)

Now what can we say about those intended paternalistic benefits? Well, the fact of the matter is that many (if not most) paternalistic interventions enforced by the state, benefit the providers much more than the targeted beneficiaries. Do you really believe that laws that restrict access to marijuana protect anyone other than pharmaceutical companies, local police departments, and the employees of the Drug Enforcement Agency? (Another empirical observation!) As a modest proposal, let me suggest that justified paternalism requires that beneficiaries actually benefit from their loss of liberty. Libertarians tend to be highly critical of state paternalism because it rarely benefits intended beneficiaries and almost always masks corporate welfare. I’ll try to develop this theme in subsequent blog entries.

Saturday, February 27, 2010

Paternalistic Intervention: Part 1

My friend Bill inspired me to clarify my thoughts on the libertarian stance toward paternalism. The word “paternalism” is rooted in the Latin noun “pater,” or father. Today, the word paternalism signifies an act of intervention whereby one party, a well-meaning “benefactor,” violates the liberty of another person(s), a “beneficiary,” in order to provide an unwanted benefit. Benefits can be classified either something generally considered to be good, or the removal of something bad, a harm. The overwhelming majority of paternalistic interventions involve the removal of harms. Therefore, many (if not most) acts of paternalism seek to limit risk-taking by intended beneficiaries.

First of all, two parties are involved in paternalistic interventions: a beneficiary and a benefactor. So let’s break down this dyadic relationship a bit more. Beneficiaries and benefactors can be either individuals (individual paternalism) or groups of individuals (group paternalism). One important for of group paternalism is “state paternalism.” Examples of state paternalism include seat belt laws, drug laws, etc.

Paternalism involves the imposition of an unwanted benefit by a benefactor. On the face of it, this sounds absurd. After all, human beings tend to want benefits and not want harms. So the idea of an unwanted benefit seems irrational. That’s why RATIONALITY plays a key role in justifying paternalistic intervention. But in the real world, benefits and harms are subject to a certain degree of social construction. Thus rationality and social control tend to often overlap. We believe that there are some risks that are irrational. Why would any rational person choose to: kill one’ self, take mind altering recreational drugs, live homelessly out on the streets, refuse chemotherapy, not wear seat belts when driving etc. So the concepts of both rationality and HARM are central to paternalism.

But paternalism is only morally problematic in a social structure that places value on both PERSONAL LIBERTY and BENEFICENCE. Conversely, in cultures that place little or no value on personal liberty, or routinely value beneficence over liberty, paternalism is not regarded as problematic. Indeed, many cultures defer decision-making to husbands, parents, religious leaders, and/or government. However, in most of the Western world, especially, the United States and Europe, personal liberty has at least some value, and therefore, the violation of one’s liberty requires moral justification.

Insofar as paternalistic intervention violates the will of an intended beneficiary, it requires the benefactor to employ a certain degree of COERCIVE FORCE. Here the presumption is that if you do not want the benefit that is being offered, but you do not pose any resistant force to its imposition, it is not paternalistic because no coercive force was required.

And finally, we can explore the nature of interventions. Since all interventions involve costs and benefits, the underlying feature of paternalism is that the benefits offered by intervening outweigh the costs for not intervening. Call it REDOUNDING GOOD. Thus, there seems to be an empirical component involved in paternalistic intervention: either the intended beneficiary will, in fact, benefit from the intervention or they will not.

So we’ve established that there are five dimensions to paternalistic intervention:

1.) The presence or risk of an identifiable HARM.

2.) The value of PERSONAL LIBERTY and BENEFICENCE and the underlying assumption that individuals ought to be able to take at least some risks without being subjected to well-meaning benefactors.

3.) The RATIONALITY of the intended beneficiary and benefactor and/or the risks involved.

4.) The use of COERCIVE FORCE by benefactors

5.) The assessment of costs and benefits, or REDOUNDING GOOD of the intervention.

I’ll explore each of these dimensions in detail in subsequent blog entries.

Sunday, February 7, 2010

Haiti: A Libertarian View of World Hunger

With some justification, rights-based libertarians have been accused on being chronically insensitive to world hunger. Actually, the issue is much more complex. Take, for example, the ongoing food distribution debacle in Haiti. It seems that much (if not most) of the food aid being funneled into earthquake ravaged Haiti has been plagued by bribery, corruption, and theft perpetrated by gangs of predatory males. (This was true even before the eathquake!) To combat male-dominated food piracy, and maldistributed food aid, relief agencies have been issuing food coupons to women, who in are expected to exchange them for food and distribute it equitably among men, women, and children. Unfortunately, to the surprise of profoundly naive distributers, women are now being robbed by men of their coupons and food rations before they even get home with the goods. As reported by USA Today, these same women are being raped and victimized by these predatory males in the re-settlement camps.

Back in the 1970s, Neo-Malthusians like Garrett Hardin pointed to the intergenerational "ratchet effect" that invariably plagues food distribution. You feed one generation, they have more babies, population increases, and your moral obligation to feed them increases geometrically. But there is also an intrageneration "ratchet effect." In order to feed the hungry, distributers must first clear the rubble out of the streets, then police the roads for gangs that demand bribes for safe passage, set up distribution centers, make certain that the food gets to vulnerable women and children,and then police the camps where the Haitians are living to make sure that women and children are not victimized by men on the way home or at the lawless camps. In other words, at least in Haiti you cannot realistically expect to "feed" anyone without monitoring and enforcing a semblance of "rule of law" and, ultimately, without rebuilding their nation from the bottom up.

If you are a utility-minded libertarian and you want to spend your hard earned money to feed starving fellow humans, is Haiti a good place to send your money, or are there other countries where you'd get more "bang for a buck?" Of course, once the intragenerational ratchet effect subsides (if it ever does), then what? When is the job finished? How long will it take to teach Haitian males not to advance their individual and collective well-being through violence, threats, thievery, and corruption? If you expect the Haitian government to soon rise to the occasion, forget it. It is too busy prosecuting misguided missionaries caught trying to smuggle a few children out of a Malthusian quagmire.