Evolutionary Leadership, Evolutionary Ethics, and Redistribution (Part I)

Preliminary Draft

 Evolutionary Leadership, Evolutionary Ethics, and Redistribution

Ronald F. White, Ph.D.

Professor of Philosophy

Mount St. Joseph University

 

(To be presented at the International Political Science Association Congress, July 26, 2016 to be held at Poznan, Poland)
 

Abstract 

 

 

The cornerstone of “welfare liberalism” is the core belief that social justice requires that government limit (Rawls) or even eliminate (Marx) “social distance” between the “most-advantaged” and “least-disadvantaged” individuals and/or nations. Distance is usually measured in terms of the intra-group (and/or inter-group) distribution of “social goods.” While social redistribution relies on voluntary moral exchange whereby the most-advantaged willingly share their social goods (directly or indirectly) with the least-advantaged; political redistribution is executed, coercively, by political regimes via tax code. For Rawls, the justification for social and political redistribution of social goods is the Difference Principle. With a few exceptions, classical liberals who support redistribution, favor voluntary social redistribution, while most welfare liberals also accept political redistribution. Until recent years, there has been very little research on the “nature” of social distance and the social and/or political origins of redistribution. Contemporary Evolutionary Leadership Theory (ELT) and Evolutionary Ethics (EET) provide important insight into the biological origins of both social distance and redistribution. In this presentation I will argue, based on ELT  that “social distance” in its various manifestations is the product of a growing mismatch between our modular brains and human culture; most notably, the cultural evolution of leader-follower relationships within stationary, large-scale, political regimes.
 

 

Introduction 
 

There is a longstanding philosophical debate going back to the ancient Greeks that questions the descriptive facts and prescriptive values associated with human “inequality.” What is inequality? Do some political regimes create more and/or less inequality than others? Is a certain degree of inequality necessarily bad? If so, what (if anything) can be done to correct it? If a certain degree of inequality in “good” how much? In this essay, I would like to focus on one dimension of the twentieth-century debate over inequality as viewed through the lens of social contract theory. I’ll focus on John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice, Political Liberalism (1971), and The Law of Peoples (1999); not because I think Rawls got it right, but because much of the subsequent debate over redistribution revolves around his Neo-Kantian social contract theory. First, I’ll identify a cluster of Rawlsian terms, and then, I’ll discuss how ELT and EET might elucidate the Rawlsian framework and perhaps, provide a foundation for more effective and efficient redistributive policies.
 

As a preliminary observation, it is important to emphasize that Rawls is a political philosopher and that Welfare Liberalism and/or Political Liberalism are political theories. Over the years, he dutifully responded to criticism from both Libertarians and Communitarians, and attempted to clarify and/or meet a host of objections. Therefore, despite his pronouncements, Rawls’ political philosophy, itself, evolved. (Wenar, 1995) Although he insisted that the kernel of his neo-Kantian approach remained intact, many of his basic concepts underwent subtle, but often profound refinements. The most important Rawlsian refinement was his shift from intra-group dynamics (Rawls, 1971) to global inter-group dynamics (Rawls, 1991). I won’t do much with the Rawls’ intellectual development over time. In the following essay I’ll try to focus on the redistribution of social goods via Rawls’ Difference Principle as represented in his three major works. (Rawls, 1971; 1993, and 1999). 
 

 

 

The Rawlsian Framework   
    

Since the late twentieth century, the philosophical debate over access to social goods (by individuals and groups of individuals) has been shaped by the territory staked out by John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice (Rawls, 1971). Basically, Rawls revived a Kantian form of Social Contract Theory, which sought to forge a rational foundation for both personal liberty and the redistribution of social goods. Rawls argued, hypothetically, that if rationally-self-interested individuals, including the “most advantaged” and the “least advantaged,” sat together at a bargaining table, without knowledge of their own socioeconomic status (under a “veil of ignorance”), they would ultimately agree upon two timelessly universal principles of justice: the Equal Liberty Principle (the “most advantaged” and the “least advantaged” ought to be afforded the same set of basic liberties) and the Difference Principle (the “most advantaged” would willingly agree to contribute to the well-being of the “least advantaged”). The logical relationship between the Equal Liberty Principle and the Difference Principle has long been a bone of contention. (Narveson, 2003 and 2008) In Rawls’ later works, he attempted to apply both principles to international relations; most-advantaged v. least-advantaged “Peoples.” (Rawls 1999)  
   

Much of the subsequent debate over Rawls’ justification for his two principles of justice can be traced to his approach to social contract theory; especially, his distinction between two hypothetical (and ambiguously  defined) stages of social agreement: the original position (how autonomous, rationally self-interested humans would have lived their lives in the absence of a social contract); and, the hypothetical contents of that subsequent social contract (what autonomous, rationally self-interested humans (and/or peoples) would contractually agree upon, via an “over-lapping consensus,” if they got together and forged a collective agreement via that original position).
 

Since the eighteenth century, the Western Liberal conceptual framework for distinguishing between equality and inequality has been measured in terms of distributive justice in terms of access and/or possession of “social goods.” There are many competing definitions of “social goods.” Most scholars agree that (in general) social goods refer to the “good things” in life that become available to us (as individuals and groups) as the result of cooperation within and between social and/or political groups. Scholars rarely explore “social bads” or the bad things in life that also emerge out cooperation. (Kellerman, 2004)  Rawls often focused on the equality of access to primary goods; or “things which it is supposed a rational man wants whatever else he wants…rights and liberties, opportunities and powers, income and wealth.” (p.92) But he also viewed primary goods in more abstract terms; as the necessary conditions or prerequisites to other goods desired by the human species. They are usually identified as human needs (food, clothing, and shelter) which are pre-requisite (necessary) for the attainment of other goods, or wants, that comprise the “good life.” Over time, the list of proposed human needs has tendency to proliferate. Peter Corning identified fourteen “primary needs domains.” (Corning, 2011) Ambiguity surrounding the concepts of “primary goods” and “social goods” ultimately obscures exactly what kinds of “goods” are (or ought to be) subject to redistribution. (Goetze, 2007)
 

Rawls hypothesized that in that “original position” (state of nature) social goods would have been (or might have been) distributed unequally on the basis of Darwinian evolution, or what he called the “natural lottery;” whereby competitive advantage and disadvantage would have been distributed based on Darwinian chance variation and natural selection, without regard for justice as fairness (merit, need, quality, or utility). In that “state of nature” Rawls acknowledged the “natural” inevitability of a certain degree of social distance between the “haves,” who often produce social goods (and services); and the “have-nots,” who often seek to consume those social goods (and services). But how much “advantage” (in terms of access to primary social goods) ought to be afforded the producers? Rawls argued that given that our natural advantages are acquired via genetic inheritance (from parents that we did not select) we cannot claim unfettered ownership of social goods based on “merit.” Hence, a degree of redistribution of primary goods is morally and rationally justified, based on the amoral “natural lottery.” After all, neither the “haves” nor the “have nots” would have deserved their current endowment of “advantages” and/or “disadvantages.” As a consequence of that hypothetical bargaining session, Rawls argued that those rational bargainers would eventually arrive at an “overlapping consensus” on the Difference Principle; and that both the most and least- advantaged would benefit from a limited degree of social distance between the producers and the consumers of social goods (and services). But how much social distance is necessary and/or morally acceptable?  
 

Ultimately, the Rawlsian puzzle was how to incentivize the production of social goods over the long-run, by allowing the most advantaged to benefit from producing those goods, without creating a sociopolitical environment where social distance between the “haves” and the “have nots” is socially accepted, but limited. So the long-term goal of Rawlsian redistribution is not to achieve social equality but to prevent “the rich from getting richer and the poor from getting poorer.” Rawls’ Difference Principle, therefore, was intended to provide rational self-interested arguments that might convince the rationally self-interested “haves” (producers) and the rational “have-nots” (consumers) to voluntarily cooperate in redistribution.
 

But in the real world, this raises two justice-related challenges:  First, how do political leaders rationally convince the “haves” to be satisfied with less than they already possess? Second, how does a regime (or “Peoples”) rationally convince the “have-nots” to be satisfied with more than they possess in the “state of nature,” but less than what the “haves” possess? Most political philosophers focus on the First puzzle and ignore the Second. But even if the Difference Principle is rationally acceptable to both the “haves” and “have-nots,” then the key practical question would remain: “How might political regimes develop effective and efficient redistributive public policies?”
 

Rawls wrote before there was much known about the evolutionary history of the human species, social psychology, or brain science. And, like most political philosophers of that era, he expended little (if any) time and effort studying the social sciences or biology. His early critics immediately attacked the ahistorical” and utopian basis for that original position and Rawls’ insistence that the original contractors (haves and have-nots) would willingly “bargain” under a hypothetical “veil of ignorance.” (Wolf, 1977) Other critics questioned how those would-be “bargainers” could negotiate without knowledge of their own advantages and disadvantages?  Even if all rational bargainers ultimately agreed on social redistribution, what could the rational bargainers do about irrational bargainers who resist cooperative redistribution and/or rationally self-interested “free-riders” who seek to reap the benefits of cooperative redistribution, without paying the price?
 

In this essay, I shall argue that in order to develop any redistributive public policy that is acceptable to both the “haves” and the “have nots,” policymakers would have to know a lot more about human nature than Rawls did; especially Evolutionary Social Psychology.    SEE Part II.

Libertarianism: My revised entry for the 2nd edition of the Encyclopedia of Business and Business Ethics (2016)

Libertarianism

 

Libertarianism is a social and political philosophy in the Western Liberal tradition founded on personal liberty. Although the term “libertarianism” did not appear in political discourse until the 1950s, its conceptual framework was firmly established in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by philosophers in the “classical liberal tradition;” most notably, John Locke and John Stuart Mill. It is distinguished from egalitarianism and communitarianism by its views on property rights and the use of force.

Libertarians in the tradition of John Locke justify the liberty principle on a natural rights argument, while Libertarians in the tradition of John Stuart Mill justify liberty based it on utilitarian arguments. Despite marginal theoretical disagreement, libertarians agree that the principles of self-ownership and non-aggression are foundational. 

 

Self-Ownership

According to John Locke, legal and moral rights and duties are based on the a priori principle of self-ownership; that is, the self-evident idea that we own ourselves in the same sense that we own property (natural resources and/or artifacts). Self-ownership sets legal and moral limits what others can do to us and/or our property without our consent.

Entitlement to property is based on historical principles; or how that property was originally acquired. Initial ownership is based on individuals (and groups) mixing their own labor with previously unowned resources. Once natural resources come under initial ownership, entitlement to those natural resources and/or the artifacts created out of those resources may be transferred to others, if and only if the contract is informed and consensual.  Governmental redistribution of property is limited to returning property to rightful owners, in cases of fraud or theft. Most libertarians reject all governmental policies that coercively redistribute property based on any patterned, or preferred, end state such as: merit, need, equality, or utility.

The institution of slavery, for example, is universally morally wrong because it violates the principle of self-ownership and involuntarily deprives individuals (and groups) of their natural right to own and transfer property.     

Non-Aggression

Libertarians argue that the non-aggression principle is the basic principle of both legality and morality. Unprovoked physical aggression is a violation of property rights via self-ownership. Libertarians follow John Stuart Mill and distinguish between other-regarding acts, which violate the rights of others without their consent; and, self-regarding acts which do not. The inviolable bounds of personal liberty lie within the sphere of self-regarding actions. Self-defense is the only justification for violation of the non-aggression axiom. 

Deontological libertarians distinguish between legal and moral duties (and rights) and between positive and negative duties (and rights). Negative rights impose negative duties upon others; duties to not harm persons or deprive them of their rightfully acquired property. Hence, the non-aggression axiom imposes a negative right to life, which imposes a negative duty not to kill others, deprive them of their liberty, or their property. However, there can be no positive legal rights that obligate individuals to assist others; and therefore there is no “positive legal right to life.” If individuals acknowledge a “positive moral right to life,” that right would be more efficiently fulfilled by individual charity and non-governmental organizations than by governmental, tax-supported redistributive welfare.  

Libertarians disagree over the implications of the non-aggression axiom for the nature and scope of statism and the justifiability of raising revenue via taxation, or raising a defensive army via involuntary conscription. Most libertarians today are “minarchists” and therefore, support limited government, where the state may be empowered to protect its citizens from external threats posed by aggressive states (via an all-volunteer army); and from internal threats posed by criminals (murderers, frauds, and thieves) via a criminal justice system.

Some deontological libertarians are “anarchists,” or “anarcho-capitalists” who argue that statism, by definition, violates the nonaggression axiom; and that small governments have a natural propensity to become larger, more aggressive and/or dominated by powerful cronies. Utilitarian anarchists argue that even military and criminal justice can be more efficiently provided by competing private individuals, and voluntary non-governmental associations. .       

Libertarianism, Social Issues, and Global Affairs

Libertarians are social liberals and economic conservatives. They argue that most social problems are caused by coercive government; and therefore, seek to empower individuals and groups to make their own decisions and solve their own problems via voluntary cooperation.

Libertarians resist any attempt by political regimes to coercively impose any self-regarding moral or religious view as a legal obligation. They oppose governmental policies that regulate self-regarding acts such as: marriage, birth control, pornography, and recreational drugs. Libertarian views on abortion, stem cell research, and cloning are contingent upon individual beliefs: whether zygotes, fetuses, and/or clones are “persons” or “property.”   

Economically, most libertarians embrace free market capitalism and are opposed to governmental regulations intended to serve the public good, such as: urban planning, social welfare, socialized medicine, affirmative action, minimum wage laws, or public schools. Statist market intervention, they argue, invariably advances the interests of the family and friends of governmental officials, or “cronies.”

In global affairs, libertarians embrace free market economic policies and laissez faire government, which seeks to limit or eliminate the role of governmental regimes (national and international) to protecting consumers against theft, and fraud. Most libertarians are opposed to governmentally-enforced monetary policy, national banks, protective tariffs, and/or anti-sweat shop legislation. Most argue that foreign aid, when appropriate, is more effective when provided by individuals and non-governmental organizations directly to individuals who need it and to governments.

In terms of human warfare, libertarians hold firm to the non-aggression axiom and therefore declare war only in self-defense; or perhaps in defense of allied regimes. Preemptive warfare is, therefore, problematic.

On the contemporary political landscape, the primary critics of libertarians are statists, communitarians, and egalitarians.   

 

Ronald F. White

 

See also liberalism; egalitarianism; self-ownership; shareholder model of corporate governance; anarchism; statism; Hayek, Friedrich A.; Nozick, Robert; Friedman, Milton

 

Further Readings and References

Boaz, David. (1997). Libertarianism: A Primer. New York: Free Press.

Friedman, Milton, (1962). Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Hayek, F.A., (1944). The Road to Serfdom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Narveson, Jan. (1988). The Libertarian Idea. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Narveson, Jan, (2008). You and the State: A Short Introduction to Political Philosophy. Rowman  & Littlefield Publishers.

Nozick, Robert. (1974). Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books. 

Rothbard, Murray. (1982). The Ethics of Liberty. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press.

 

Smith, George H. (2013). The System of Liberty: Themes in the History of Classical Liberalism. Cambridge University Press.

Something’s Fishy: Proximate and Ultimate Explanations in Evolutionary Leadership Theory (Rough Draft)

By its very nature, Evolutionary Leadership Theory (ELT) must draw input from many different disciplines; most notably the biological sciences (evolutionary biology, primatology, neurology, genetics etc.) and the social sciences (psychology, sociology, history, political science, etc.). However, biosocial interdisciplinary raises a thorny theoretical question: Under ELT, how do the traditional social sciences relate to the biological sciences? In order to advance biosocial interdisciplinarity, many ELT scholars have retooled Ernst Mayr’s original “ultimate-proximate distinction” and, thereby, differentiate between Proximate Leadership Theories and Ultimate Leadership Theories. This essay will explore whether that re-adaptation sheds much light on the evolution of human leadership and followership.  

Let me begin by pointing out that since the 1960s, there has been longstanding philosophical debate over the nature and function of scientific theories, causal mechanisms, and scientific explanations. So most of what I’ll say today, is about resuscitating unresolved issues in light of ELT.

Some psychologists argue that the proximate-ultimate distinction is central to all evolutionary theories of human behavior. (Scott-Phillips et. al., 2011).  It was first introduced in 1961 by Ernst Mayr, in his essay “Cause and Effect in Biology,” which attempted to sort out the role that various biologically-based disciplines play in explaining biological traits. His strategy was to differentiate between proximate explanations based on proximate theories generated by functional biologists (esp. physiological explanations) and ultimate explanations based on ultimate theories produced by evolutionary biologists (esp. natural selection). From the very beginning his distinction involved four overlapping questions: What are biological explanations and how do they compare to explanations in other scientific disciplines? What is the nature of causality (causal mechanisms) as it is employed in the biological sciences as compared to other natural sciences? What are biological theories and how do they compare to other scientific theories? And finally, how do causal theories shape biological explanations and/or other scientific explanations? Hence, we have complex issues involving the nature of scientific explanations, scientific theories, and causal theories in particular.      

According to Mayr, all scientific theories attempt to answer certain kinds of discipline-specific questions. In biology, proximate theories address “how” questions by identifying onto genic causal mechanisms which act upon individual organisms to produce behavior. These mechanisms explain “how” specific traits generate certain behaviors. Thus proximate mechanisms most often include the physiology that underlies genetic causation, hormonal causation, neuronal causation, or even the physiological basis of specific brain modules. At the proximate level, Mayr explained the “how” in terms of linear, unidirectional causal chains, where causes always precede effects over time within relatively closed systems.

Mayr also acknowledged that although biologists (as a matter of fact) explore not only “how” traits are caused by physiological mechanisms, but also “why.” Why questions, according to Mayr, imply historical analysis. Therefore, evolutionary biologists look back at the emergence of any given trait, and explain why it emerged. In biology, “why questions” are answered via Darwinian Evolutionary Theory. Mayr identified Natural Selection as the ultimate phyllo genic mechanism for addressing why questions. Therefore ultimate explanations entail gathering of historical information about the environmental conditions that originally selected that specific trait over other possible traits, and whether that original environment has remained stable or whether it has evolved.  

Mayr’s original essay focused on explaining the “how” and “why” of the migration of a specific species of birds, warblers. Thus, he observed that one group of ornithologists might seek to explain “how” (and “when”) that specific species of birds migrates, while another group might explain “why” those causal mechanisms originally emerged at a specific time and place (in the past); and/or, whether those mechanisms still contribute to the survival of that species (in the present or future).        

Critics of Mayr’s original distinction now question whether the complete explanation of the migration of one species of birds (both proximate and ultimate explanations), sheds much (if any) light on the evolution of the migratory behavior of other organisms; including human migration via leadership and followership.

The early proximate theories of leadership focused exclusively on identifying and describing the specific traits, behaviors, skills, and/or knowledge possessed by individual leaders. However, Political Science and Leadership Studies have been long-dominated by the social sciences, and therefore, still focus on the proximate social mechanisms that produce leaders, often without reference to followers or biology. Thus, until recently Leadership Studies has treated leadership behavior as learned behaviors, transmitted within and between generations via imitation, teaching, and learning. In contrast, ELT now seeks to identify, not only the social causation of leadership behavior, but also the proximate biological mechanisms that underlie those traits, behaviors, skills, and/or knowledge of both leaders and followers.

Once identified, many proximate theorists seek to “reduce” macrocosmic mechanisms to microcosmic mechanisms.  For example, ELT scientists attempt to proximately explain male political behavior by reducing that behavior it to microcosmic material mechanisms as evident within distinctive male brains, the presence of Y chromosomes and/or testosterone. Ultimate leadership theorists, however, must ask “why” males today tend to lead, based on the environmental and social conditions present during the Pleistocene Era and whether those conditions are still shape leadership and followership in the present.  

According to ELT scholars, such as van Vugt, political leaders and followers within all social species “emerge” out of various natural environmental contexts. (van Vugt 2006, 2008, and 2012) ELT scientists agree that the political leadership preferences of followers are largely automatic and non-conscious; often forged on the basis of facial cues of leaders that “signal” health and intelligence. (Spisak et.al., 2014) Thus, based on the presence (or absence) of those “body signals,” ELT scientists can now explain, predict, and (to a certain degree) control who wins most democratic elections, regardless of the so-called campaign issues.  However, what’s missing here is the answer to the ultimate “why question;” that is: Why do political followers today tend to base their leadership preferences on non-cognitive “body signals,” given the fact that there is no evidence to suggest that, today, ‘tall, dark, and handsome’ male leaders’ are “better leaders” than “short, light-skinned, ugly” males; or even females?

Any Ultimate Theory of Leadership must answer those elusive “why questions.” Evolutionary biologists answer all “why questions” in terms of ultimate function (or purpose) via Darwinian natural selection. Thus, leader-follower relationships are viewed as biological adaptations that have advanced the long-term (and/or short-term) survival of genes, individual organisms, and/or groups of organisms living under various environmental conditions at various times and places. 

But the distinction between proximate and ultimate theories (and explanations) remains controversial. Much recent debate focuses on the nature of teleology and/or teleological explanations in biology. (Depew 20015; Auletta, Colage, and Ambrosio 2015 ).  Other critics object to the use of the ambiguous term “ultimate.” Scientists who oppose “natural law theory” (natural=good) argue that Darwinian “survival of the fittest” surreptitiously replaced “divine purpose” with “natural purpose.” Other critics ask more basic questions such as: “How proximate is proximate?” and “How ultimate is ultimate?” If proximate theories are subject to multiple levels of analysis, then why must ultimate theories identify one, single (ultimate) function? Why value the ultimate survival of one population over another? This line of reasoning also raises some pesky “prescriptive” questions. Suppose the survival of life on earth is (in fact) contingent upon the extinction of the human species? Would the long-term survival of other mammals, other primates, or even all “life on earth” morally justify global human genocide?

While the ultimate-proximate distinction remains open to scholarly debate, ELT scholars argue that it offers a promising long-term strategy for the reconciliation of biological and social sciences, and perhaps even serves as the foundation for the emergence of a truly interdisciplinary science of political leadership. So although the ultimate-proximate distinction raises many issues, most biologists agree that a complete understanding of human behavior requires both. (Scott-Phillips, 2011) However, those of us engaged in ELT might also ask whether Mayr’s original analysis, based on the migration of one species of birds, really sheds much light on the evolution of more complex forms of human behavior, most notably behavior generated by co-evolutionary traits (including bio-cultural co-evolutionary) and traits that evolve on the basis of non-linear feedback causation (A causes behavioral changes in B, and B causes behavioral changes in A); as evident in leader-follower relationships.  And finally, we might also explore whether cultural evolution is cause or effect human behavior? And whether, cultural evolution is the product of proximate causation, ultimate causation, or both? In the case of contemporary human migration, it is hard to generate any explanation apart from technological evolution; especially communication technology (cell phones, mass media etc.) and travel technology (planes, automobiles, trains etc.) Perhaps, cultural evolution answers at least some “how” and “why” questions. In conclusion, for ELT, there is a lot work yet to be done on whether the original proximate-ultimate distinction sheds much light on human leader-follower relationships.     
 

References

 Laland, Kevin N., Kim Sterelny, John Odling-Smee, William Hoppitt, and Tobias Uller. (2011) Cause and Effect in Biology Revisited: Is Mayr’s Proximate-Ultimate Dichotomy Still Useful?” Science, 334. 1512-1516

 

Losco, Joseph (1981) Ultimate vs. Proximate Explanation: Explanatory Modes in Sociobiology and the Social Sciences. Journal of Social Biological Structure 4, 329-346

 Marchionni, Caterina, and Jack Vromen (2009) The Ultimate/Proximate Distinction in Recent Accounts of Human Cooperation. Tijdschrift voor Filosofie. 71. 87-117

 Mayr, Ernst. (1961) Cause and Effect in Biology. Science 134, 1501-1506

 Scott-Phillips, T. C.; Dickins T.E. & West, S.A. 2011. Evolutionary theory and the ultimate-proximate distinction. Perspectives on Psychological Science 6, 38-47.  

 

Spisak, B. R.; Blaker, N.M.; Lefevre, C.E.; Moore, F.R.; & Krebbers, K.F.B. 2014.  A face for all seasons: searching for context-specific leadership traits and discovering a general preference for perceived health,  Human Neuroscience 8, 1-9.

 Spisak, B.R, O’Brien, M., Nicholson, N., & Van Vugt, M. (2015). Leadership in organizations: A niche-construction perspective. Academy of Management Review 40, 291-306.

 Van Vugt, M., Hogan, R., Kaiser, R. (April, 2008). Leadership, followership, and evolution: some lessons from the past.  American Psychologist 63 182-96.

 van Vugt, M. 2006. Evolutionary origins of leadership and followership. Personality and Social Psychology Review 10, 354-371.    

 van Vugt, M. 2012. The nature in leadership: evolutionary, biological, and social neuroscience perspectives’ (in)  Day, D.D & Antonakis J. (eds), The Nature of Leadership, ( 2^nd ed.) Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore, Washington DC: Sage Publications, 141-178.   

 

A Libertarian View of Global Ethics

I think libertarianism offers the only tenable approach to global ethics... While it's not without problems, it's certainly less problematic than other left-leaning approaches. Home-base consists in "self-ownership," the "non-aggression axiom," and universal voluntariness. In terms of global issues, libertarianism, embraces a non-interventionist foreign policy and global free market capitalism. 

For libertarians all universal human rights are negative rights. That means that global ethics is more about what you "ought-to-not-do" than what you "ought-to-do." Ultimately, there's only one universal moral rule... the "non-aggression axiom," which states that individuals (and groups) are absolutely forbidden to harm others, except in self-defense. The argument for free markets goes like this: if it is true that I own myself, then (logically) I own the fruits of my labor. So if you unjustifiably use coercive force either against my body or my property you've violated it and I have a right to protect myself and my property. If I willingly give you my property or sell it to you...there's no violation... even if it's a bad deal. In short, if you get "suckered" into a bad deal, its your own fault. Call it the "buyer beware principle." Thus, even, if you willingly sell yourself into slavery for a mutually agreed upon amount of time, in exchange for some other good or service (or out of beneficence) ...that's fine too. However, slavery is (almost by definition) perpetuated by force (or threat of force) and rarely (if ever) voluntary. Although, you have a right to voluntarily sell yourself into slavery, I have a "right" (if not a "duty") to point that it's a bad deal. But I can't use force to prevent you from becoming a slave. If you have an extremely low IQ, if you're an underage child,  or if you are suffering from a mental disease, some libertarians (J.S. Mill) might paternalistically intervene, at least temporarily. I might intervene just long enough to determine your rational status, or just long enough to point out that it is irrational. 

The non-aggression axiom also applies toward cultures. If your culture has a rule that says that it's OK for men to sell adult women (or children) into slavery without their consent...then that culture violates the non-aggression axiom. The problem here is that in many cultures, women willingly allow men to sell them, because they believe that their God created them to serve males. So what duties does libertarianism impose upon us as observers of culturally-induced harm to women? I might present those women (and men) with compelling rights-based and/or utilitarian arguments in favor of female equality. But I wouldn't be very optimistic. We all know that culture (especially religious culture) can be a powerful liberty-limiting force in the world. However, I would argue that we libertarians (individually and collectively) are morally bound to NOT advance the interests of any aggressive individuals or cultures; that is we have a negative duty to not cooperate with aggressive persons or cultures. We also have a "negative right" (based on freedom of speech) to point out  that individual P and/or culture X violates the non-aggression axiom and is therefore immoral.

Now what if I convince a particular woman (or a group of women) that servitude is morally wrong and they REQUEST my assistance in either escaping from an aggressive culture or transforming it into a non-aggressive culture? As a libertarian I can choose to either assist or not assist, based on how much I'm willing to risk in providing that assistance. If I could (in fact) free those women by donating $1000. to a certain private military group that defends women...I might do it. But remember....it's my money, my time, and my effort. In short, I do not have a positive duty to intervene in terms of either speech or actions. Now if I promise to intervene, I must keep my promise. Now the hallmark of left-leaning morality is the idea of positive legal and/or moral rights. However, thoughtful libertarians observe that there are many ways to intervene short of violating the non-aggression axiom. And that if we employ aggression in order to stifle aggression we perpetuate more aggression, toward not only the persons or groups that we intend to help, but also pose risks for the intervener. And, of course, there are so many aggressive cultures in the world, we can't intervene in all of them without going bankrupt. Therefore, a rational libertarian will intervene only in those cases where there is a probability that intervention will succeed...and not make things worse.

OVER-THE-LONG-RUN the best libertarian strategy is to teach all individuals and groups in the world to accept the non-aggression axiom. But we, obviously, can't force everyone to do it. The problem with liberal statism is that governments often intervene in cases where aggressive intervention is futile, and likely to make things worse. Minarchists like myself argue that aggressive political intervention (especially within civil wars) almost never yields a positive utility ratio. Therefore, we advocate non-interventionist foreign policy. But that doesn't prevent us from engaging non-aggressive intervention.

As non-aggressive culture spreads throughout the world (via teaching and learning) aggression will (eventually) become less common, and ultimately extinct. But remember...we libertarians can't engage in non-defensive aggression, but we must actively refrain from supporting aggressive individuals and cultures. That means that the non-aggression axiom prevents us from advancing the interests of aggressive individuals and cultures. Now I might forge a defensive agreement with certain individuals or groups and promise to defend them from aggression, but libertarians must be leery of pre-emptive defensive strikes.

In sum, libertarians cannot support the mantra: "When in Rome do as the Romans do." The libertarian manta would be:  "When in Rome, do as the Romans do...but don't harm anyone; even if its legal and/or moral in Rome." Better yet..."Don't go to an aggressive Rome, unless you're going to crusade against aggression." So if you own a multi-national corporation, and have employees in Rome who are victimized by an aggressive culture, you cannot support that culture. If you choose to teach them non-aggression, the host culture (or government) probably wouldn't like it. Nevertheless, we libertarians have a negative duty to not assist in the advancement of aggressive individuals or groups. So, if you want to assist the world's poor...do it with your own money...or with money voluntarily contributed by other like-minded individuals and groups. Governmental interventions that use tax money is immoral because involuntary taxation is a form of theft, and because state intervention rarely works. One final note on legality... Libertarians are (at best) minarchists, and therefore oppose the expansion of national and international legality. Our policy is to advance morality, which is limited to advancing non-aggression. In short...you can't force people to be good. And finally, being good is about what you "don't do." Don't kill, don't steal, and don't break voluntary contracts. Ant thoughts?

Global Ethics: Objectivism, Relativism, and Skepticism.

As communication technologies advance, so does our exposure to what is going on in other cultures around the world. Most business today is conducted internationally, between different nations with different cultural beliefs. So, given a world of conflicting beliefs, how should we think about legality and morality this diverse, global context? First of all, let's acknowledge that many differences between cultures are "matters of taste," that really have no moral relevance; such as rules governing food, clothing, hair style, music, or art. However, sometimes enforcing rules that govern "matters of taste" cross over in the domain of ethics. For example, cannibalism is NOT just a matter of taste. But how do we draw those lines between ethics and taste? Let's also recall that there is a difference between legality and morality . Just because X is legal in a certain culture, doesn't mean that its moral and visa verse. So in this blog let's focus on morality...not legality. I suggest that there are three (longstanding) philosophical positions that dominate debates over moral rules in a global context: Objectivism, Relativism, and Skepticism. Let's look at them one at a time. 

MORAL OBJECTIVISM: There are at least some universally, objective moral rules that comprise global morality Many philosophers call these moral universals "hyper-norms." However, exactly what counts as a hyper-norm is a matter of philosophical debate. So if you are traveling around the world, or if you are conducting business in another culture what moral rules, if any, do you obey? If you are an objectivist, your rule of thumb would be: “When in Rome, do what’s right.” But how do you "know" what's right? Historically there are two theories that are often invoked to justify objectivism: Kantian Ethics (act on universal rules)and Utilitarianism (act based on positive utility ratios). 

Kantian Ethics is based on one rule, The Categorical Imperative (or the "Golden Rule"), which argues that there are some timelessly universal rules that are true (and have always been true or justified) and that those rules trump any individual or cultural beliefs that violate those rules. The basic Kantian position is that all human beings (or persons) are beings endowed with rationality and free will. Thus (at a bare minimum) all rational, competent adults deserve to be treated with dignity. One formulation of Kant's categorical imperative states that we should "always treat persons as ends and never as means." Ultimately...that's what dignified treatment entails. Thus, slavery is universally wrong because it "treats persons as means and not ends," and therefore ALWAYS is a violation of universal human rights. 

So if there is a violation of universal rights, what is our duty? Kant would argue that if you KNOW that X is morally wrong (violates universal human rights), then you have positive duty to intervene, regardless of the costs of that intervention. However, some interventions are more likely to be successful than others. Kant really doesn't help us decide which intervention to pursue. Another problem with Kantian Ethics is that universal moral rules often conflict with other universal moral rules based on rationality. There are many classic conflicts that arise in the context of Kantian Ethics: beneficence v. utility, utility v. justice, liberty v. utility etc.

Utilitarian Ethics argues that cost-benefit analysis provides a timelessly, universal moral standard. Rule utilitarians  argue that some moral rules (actually) express timelessly universal utility functions; that is, some rules (ultimately) lead to positive utility functions (love thy neighbor) and some rules always lead to negative utility functions (steal from your neighbor). Slavery poses a challenge to any ethical theory. A rule utilitarian would argue that slavery is timelessly and universally wrong because the costs (always have and always will) outweigh the benefits. Costs to slave-owners include: feeding and clothing slaves, training them, maintaining their health, and preventing them from escaping. In contrast to Kant's call for duty-based moral intervention, utilitarians would argue that you do not (necessarily) have a positive duty to forcefully intervene if the costs of that intervention outweigh the benefits, or if intervention is futile. For example, U.S. intervention in China over most human rights violations has proven to be (mostly) futile. One might argue that the protection of human rights in China would require aggressive intervention or warfare. But war with China may not be winnable. Therefore the best (and only) strategy for improving human rights in China (over the long run) might be to argue to Chinese leaders that specific rights violations cost more to China than the benefits are worth. For example, we might point out to China that it's one-child policy per family is too expensive to monitor and enforce, and that it has resulted in the abortion of most females. Consequently, China is now experiencing the "unanticipated consequence" of having greatly imbalanced in sex ratios. Hence, most males (especially in rural areas) will never be able to date a woman, get married, or have kids. Ultimately, China figured that out and is no longer enforcing that one-child policy as much. 

The problem with utility is that cost-benefit analysis can be enormously complex, and experts often disagree over whether certain future ratios will turn out to be positive or negative. Thus, cost-benefit analysis is often invaded by both positive and negative unanticipated consequences. Are the utility ratios of capital punishment, euthanasia, abortion, or the drug war positive or negative. Wars are notoriously complex and wrought with unanticipated consequences.

2.) MORAL RELATIVISM: There are no universal, rationally objective rules that govern global ethics. There are   culturally-bound moral standards, but no universal hyper-norms. So if you travel worldwide, and the culture that you are visiting has different moral rules, then what do you do. The rule of thumb for cultural relativism is: “When in Rome, do what the Romans do.” There are three forms of relativism: historical relativism, cultural relativism, and individual relativism.  

Historical relativism observes that ethics is relative to time and place, and therefore, one cannot compare the moral views of past with that of the present. For example, historical relativists argue that during the early 19th century, slavery was morally acceptable (or even good) but today it is wrong. Therefore, we can't justifiably blame plantation owners. In short, historical relativists deny the timelessness of ethics. "The Good" changes over time. 

Cultural relativism states that, ultimately, ethics is a matter of cultural agreement. If any culture (at any given time or place) believes that x is good and y is bad, then that's the standard. In short, ethics is a matter of social agreement. So if I disagree with what my culture says is wrong, then I'm wrong. If one culture believes that slavery is morally acceptable...then it is (as a matter of fact) acceptable within that culture. Thus, the views of one culture cannot trump the views of any other culture. Relativists call moral intervention in other cultures "cultural imperialism." Therefore, the virtue associated with cultural relativism is toleration. So if a given culture believes that the enslavement of women and/or children for sexual purposes is morally acceptable, then relativists argue that we have a negative duty to not interfere. All culturally based moral beliefs are incommensurable. Just because Western cultures have moral rules against sex slavery, doesn't mean that all cultures must accept those rules. Ethics, therefore, is contextual. Our views on sex slavery are incommensurable with their views. So, the cultural relativist's rule of thumb is: "When in Rome, do as the Romans Do."
So if you want to own a sex slave (or two) go to another country. The problem here is that if you take a vacation in Thailand to have sex with children, make sure that the rest of us don't find out... bad things might happen to you.    

Individual relativism holds that morality is whatever an individual believes it is. Therefore, there are no hyper-norms or cultural norms. If an individual believes that murder, theft, lying, cheating, and slavery are morally acceptable, and I believe they are not...there is no contradiction. In other words, ethics is entirely a matter of "individual taste".... like food. The problem here is that ethics is about living in groups and individual relativism doesn't address that issue. And, as a matter of fact, if you murder, steal...etc. other individuals and cultures will hold you morally and/or legally blameworthy. So let's forget about individual relativism for now.      

3.) MORAL SKEPTCISM: There are no rationally objective moral rules either within cultures or between cultures. Morality is "in the interest of the stronger;" that is, the exercise of the strong over the weak. “Might makes right.” or “When in Rome, do whatever you can get away with.” Most philosophers that I know acknowledge that this is a real problem and that it's very difficult to disprove. For now, let's focus on either objectivism and relativism.

Obviously, both objectivism and relativism pose serious philosophical problems. Does the U.S. have a positive duty to defend universal human rights all over the world, even if it entails costly military intervention? Do impoverished nations governed by corrupt, totalitarian military regimes that harm their citizens, have a right to exist free from external moral condemnation and/or intervention?

The libertarian view on global ethics involves all of the above. First of all, the only moral rule that all libertarians are obliged to accept is the non-aggression axiom or the "harm principle." More on this in a subsequent blog.

Libertarianism: Encyclopedia Entry

 Libertarianism is a social and political philosophy in the Western liberal tradition committed to the advancement of  personal liberty. It is distinguished from egalitarianism by its views on property rights and the use of force. Although the term libertarianism first appeared in political discourse in the 1950s, its conceptual framework was firmly established in the 18th and 19th centuries by political economists and philosophers in the “classical liberal” tradition, most notably John  Locke and John Stuart Mill. Despite marginal theoretical disagreement, most libertarians agree that the principles of self- ownership and nonaggression are foundational.

The most influential 20th-century libertarian theorists are in the Lockean deontological (rights-based) moral tradition. Robert Nozick and Murray Rothbard defend liberty via rights, independent of utilitarian considerations. Other recent scholars are in the teleological (consequentialist) moral tradition of John Stuart Mill. Milton Friedman and F. A. Hayek argue that increased personal liberty and small, decentralized government also produces greater individual happiness and social utility than highly centralized government. In the 20th century, libertarian theory was also shaped by outside influences such as Ayn Rand’s objectivist philosophy.

Self-Ownership

For Lockean libertarians, all rights are property rights rooted in John Locke’s principle of self-ownership, or the idea that we own ourselves in the same sense that we may own property (natural resources and/or artifacts). Self-ownership limits sets objective limits on what others can do to bodies and our property without our consent. Entitlement to property is based on historical principles or how that property was originally acquired and voluntarily passed on to subsequent owners.  Initial historical ownership of undeveloped natural resources resulted from a human person mixing his or her self-owned labor with that previously unowned resource. So, if we own ourselves, then we have a right to the fruits of our labor. The institution of involuntary slavery, for example, is universally morally wrong because it violates the principle of self-ownership and involuntarily deprives individuals of their natural right to what they produce.

Once natural resources come under initial ownership, entitlement to those natural resources and the subsequently human-created artifacts may be transferred to others, if and only if the contract is informed and consensual. Once legitimate ownership is established, neither other individuals nor the government may coercively seize that property. Most libertarians reject all governmental policies that coercively redistribute property based on some patterned, or preferred, end state such as merit, need, equality, or utility.

Recent debate concerning the original status of natural resources has spawned a form of libertarianism known as “left libertarianism,” which, in contrast to “right libertarianism,” argues that natural resources are not initially unowned, but owned collectively by society in some egalitarian manner as public property. Therefore, those who want to acquire unowned natural resources must secure consent or reimburse society for their use. If “social-ownership” is interpreted as “public-ownership,” then and libertarianism’s commitment to “private-ownership” is may be eroded over the long-run, especially if political leaders dole out those natural resources to reward to political cronies and punish political enemies.

Nonaggression

Libertarians argue that the non-aggression axiom serves as the universal foundation for both morality and legality. Unprovoked physical aggression is as a violation of property rights via self-ownership. Libertarians follow John Stuart Mill and distinguish between other-regarding acts (harms), which violate the rights of others without their consent, and self-regarding acts, which do not. The inviolable bounds of personal liberty lie within the sphere of self-regarding actions. Self-defense is the only justification for violation of the nonaggression axiom. However voluntary, mutual defense contracts between individuals and groups are possible, but problematic.

Rights impose duties not to kill others or to deprive them of their liberty or property. According to libertarianism, the nonaggression axiom imposes a negative right to life, which posits a duty not to kill others or deprive them of their liberty or their property. There are no positive rights that obligate us to assist others and therefore, there is no “positive right to life.” However, most libertarians are willing to forge mutually-beneficial, voluntary contracts with individuals and voluntary groups that support a positive right to life. All libertarians agree that positive rights might emerge on the basis of contractual mutual benefit, and that a right to life would be more efficiently secured by individual charity and cooperative, nongovernmental organizations than by tax-supported redistributive welfare.

The nonaggression axiom applies to both individuals and governments. Libertarians disagree over the implications of the nonaggression axiom for the nature and scope of the state as it limits government’s ability to raise revenue via coercive taxation or raise an army via involuntary conscription. Most libertarians today are “minarchists,” who support limited government that protects citizens (via an all-volunteer army) from external threats posed by aggressive nations and from internal threats (via a criminal justice system) posed by murderers and thieves. Some radical libertarians are “anarchists” or “anarcho- capitalists,” who argue that all governments (by their very nature)  violate the nonaggression axiom or that all governmental functions can be more efficiently served by private individuals, voluntary, nongovernmental associations, and the free market.

Libertarianism, Social Issues, and Global Affairs

Libertarians hold that most social problems are worsened, if not caused by government and therefore seek to empower individuals to make their own decisions and solve their own problems. Most libertarians are free market capitalists who opposed to any government redistribution programs intended to serve the greater good, such as: social welfare, socialized medicine, affirmative action, minimum wage laws, public schools, or urban planning.

Libertarians resist any attempt by powerful individuals or governmental central planners to coercively impose any one moral or religious view as a legal obligation. Therefore, they stand opposed to governmental regulation of marriage, birth control, pornography, and recreational drugs. Libertarian views on abortion, stem cell research, and cloning are contingent on internal arguments over whether self-ownership applies to zygotes, fetuses, and/or clones.

In terms of foreign policy, libertarians hold firm to the nonaggression axiom and therefore declare war only in self-defense or perhaps the defense of non-state allies. In global economic affairs, libertarians embrace free market economic policies and laissez-faire government. Minarchists limit the role of government (national and international) to protecting consumers against theft and fraud, while both minarchists and anarchists oppose governmentally enforced monetary policy, protective tariffs, and anti-sweatshop legislation. Both argue that foreign aid, when appropriate, is best provided by private individuals and nongovernmental organizations (but not governments) to benefit private individuals and groups (but not governments).

On the contemporary political landscape, libertarians are classified as “social liberals” and “economic conservatives.” They are united in their opposition to any individual or group that is willing to violate the non-aggression axiom for the “greater good” (communitarians, egalitarians, and utilitarians). Libertarians, however, disagree among themselves as to whether it is possible for minarchists to maintain small government over the long-run, without expanding into totalitarian statism; and, whether it is possible for anarchists to rely on private, police, judiciaries, and armies for self-defense.

—Ronald F. White

See also Anarchism; Egalitarianism; Friedman, Milton; Hayek, Friedrich A.; Liberalism; Nozick, Robert; Self-Ownership; Shareholder Model of Corporate Governance; Statism

Further Readings

Boaz, D. (1997). Libertarianism: A primer. New York: Free Press.
Friedman, M. (1962). Capitalism and freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hayek, F. A. (1944). The road to serfdom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Narveson, J. (1988). The libertarian idea. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Narveson J. (2008) You and the state: A short introduction to political philosophy. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield
Nozick, R. (1974). Anarchy, state, and utopia. New York: Basic Books.
Rothbard, M. (1982). The ethics of liberty. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.
Smith, George H. (2013) The system of liberty: Themes in the history of classical liberalism. New York: Cambridge University Press

Minds and Animals

 

One of the traditional lines of metaphysical inquiry entail drawing lines of demarcation between various classes of entities and/or systems. From an evolutionary standpoint, one of the most venerable lines on inquiry involves the line of demarcation between the various species of living things, especially between humans and animals.

Historically, one of the most common methods for drawing these lines has been to construct hierarchies.  In human affairs, these hierarchies have always been used to justify our behavior toward different classes of entities. The most familiar hierarchies draw lines of demarcation between: living and non-living things, human and non-humans, males and females, and a wide variety of lines between human groups, such as: tribes, religions, races, social classes, and overly-zealous fans of competing high school football teams. As a moral mechanism, one’s place within a hierarchy determines how you are treated by those situated both above and below you. (It’s great when you’re on the top of a hierarchy and not-so-great when you’re on bottom!)

One major bone of philosophical contention here is whether these hierarchies are “real” in the sense that they actually correspond to an external natural order, whether hierarchies are “real” in the sense that they correspond to internal brain programming, or whether they are “real” in the sense that they are “social constructions” that mask and enforce natural or unnatural relationships of power. 

In the history of human inquiry, the most replicated hierarchical organizational schemes are variations of the “Great Chain of Being,” a longstanding line of inquiry that hierarchically arranges the various kinds of living organisms. There are many different ways to organize these hierarchies. We can set them up as food chains (who-eats-who). We can set them up based on degree of complexity from small, relatively simple microscopic organisms (bacteria) to large, more complex, macroscopic animals (whales and humans) etc. Religions often set up hierarchies based on proximity to God. Germs occupy the lower rungs of the hierarchy and are situated a long way from their creator! Therefore, don’t feel guilty when you take your antibiotics.

As stated earlier, many religions trace the origin of the living and non-living aspects of the universe to a deliberate act of creation by a God, which in turn affects their hierarchical taxonomies. In the Western theistic tradition, God the creator is endowed with superlative attributes such as: omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, and goodness. God, therefore, stands at the top of the Great Chain of Being, which sets us up for theological inquiry into the precise relationships between God and various living and non-living components of the universe. Non-living systems, or things, are usually situated at the bottom of the Great Chain.  Within the class of non-living things God is sometimes associated with systemic order of those things, such as the motion of the planets. All of this raises questions concerning the line of demarcation between non-living and living things. There are, however, many pantheistic and deistic non-Western religions that are less anthropocentric and less committed to these rigid hierarchies. Some religions even situate animals and plants on an even plane, or above us! India protects a lot of high-ranking cows.

 Animal psychology, according to seventeenth-century philosopher, Rene Descartes’ is straightforward and obviously amenable to the prevailing Newtonian methodology.  He argued that animals are simply machinelike material entities, or automatons, that lack mind or consciousness. Their behavior, therefore, can be explained entirely in terms of the Newtonian laws that govern their material bodies. So their biological existence is programmed by innate reflexive neurological activity. Logically, it followed that if animals are strictly finite, machinelike, temporal creatures, it’s because they lack an eternal soul.

Obviously, the bodies of human beings resemble the bodies of animals, and therefore, are also subject to Newtonian analysis, and can be reduced to the interaction of material entities and processes at the microcosmic level. However, consciousness itself, according to the Cartesian tradition, cannot be entirely reduced to those material entities and processes. Bodies are one thing and minds are something else. Hence, Descartes invoked a pluralistic, mind-body ontology, which had been a longstanding staple of Western philosophy and theology. It is predicated on the ontological reality of both material systems and mental systems. Material systems change via material causes and spiritual or mental systems change via spiritual or mental causes.

Descartes argued that all living things are complex machines and that although human beings have machinelike attributes, we are qualitatively different from the rest of God’s creation.  The presence of an eternal soul (or mind or consciousness) was invoked to draw that line. The soul, being Godlike, therefore, elevates human beings to the upper rungs of the Great Chain, just below angels. Human males are usually situated above women and children, but below angels. Just below human beings we have various classes of animals and then plants, which are just above non-living things. (Americans and Europeans seem to rank their cats and dogs well above third-world humans on the Great Chain. Most of our pets eat a lot better than most non-Western humans.) But contemporary biological evolution casts serious doubt on the veracity of these traditional hierarchies and the hard lines of demarcation that they seem to imply.   

Today, evolutionary biologists argue that in order to explain the emergence of the human species body (including our large brains and distinctive feelings, thoughts, percepts, and behavior) we must conduct genealogical research on our closest evolutionary forbears. According to long-standing orthodoxy, the human species Homo sapiens are genealogically descended from the primate order. More recent discoveries have divided the various species of primates into two main branches the Old World Primates, which evolved into Old World Monkeys (Baboons and Macaques) and the Great Apes (Chimpanzees, Bonobos, Gorillas, and Orangutans). About 35 million years ago, New World Monkeys (Capuchins, Muriquis, and Squirrel Monkeys) branched off of the Old World Primates.

For many years, scientists struggled to scientifically establish the precise genealogy of the "Great Apes," especially the hominids, which eventually evolved into modern humans. The sociopolitical problem has been that evolutionary biology postulates the interrelatedness of species. This belief conflicts with longstanding non-scientific religious beliefs. For monists, this can pose a problem. If you believe that genetic theory is approximately true, then, (logically at least) you’ll have a hard time rejecting the idea that all living things are genealogically related and that humans are closely related to chimpanzees. In short, the scientific evidence in support of biological evolution is about as overwhelming as it can get: but still far short of mathematical certainty!       

In 1984, Sibley and Ahlquist developed a procedure called DNA hybridization. It involved extracting single strands of DNA from the blood of two different species, then allowing the nucleotide sequences to bind or "zip" together, thus creating a hybrid. When heated, the strands of DNA in the zipper separated. The greater the melting temperature required to achieve separation, the closer the relationship between the species within the hybrid.

When they tested the Great Apes they concluded that orangutans first diverged from the hominid line about 10-16 million years ago and that gorillas, bonobos, and humans all evolved from a common ancestor about 5 million years ago. Chimpanzees branched off of the bonobo lineage about two million years ago and are more closely related, genetically, than to any other primate species. When the testing was over, it turned out that we humans are indeed more closely related to chimpanzees than we are to gorillas or orangutans, and that chimpanzees are more closely related to humans than they are gorillas. As Jared Diamond put it, we are the "Third Chimpanzee."  Imagine how disconcerting that discovery must have been. For centuries, theologians, philosophers, and scientists have defended that inviolable line of demarcation between man and animal. Predictably, many scientific and non-scientific inquirers reject either their methodology or conclusions.  Let the ad hoc explanations begin!

According to modern evolutionary theory, human beings actually evolved rather quickly in comparison to what we know about the evolution of other species. During this relatively short 5 million year interval, we evolved from a "Rainforest Ape" to "Woodland Ape," and through several pre-human species including (Australopithecus (4 million years ago), and Homo erectus (1.7 million years ago). According to Wrangham and Peterson, we are only about 150,000-230,000 years old.

The main difference between modern humans and other primates seem to be the relative size of our brains and our cerebral cortex. The average human brain today weighs about 3 pounds and contains about 100 billion nerve cells, called neurons.  In humans, that cerebral cortex contains about 30 billion neurons and one million billion connections, or synapses. Brain scientists like to argue that the human brain is the most complex system on earth. Actually the higher level systems that “emerge” out of our brain activity, such as popular culture and market economies, are much more complex. Remember, we’re dealing with open-systems!

Although the human brain has evolved slowly over millions of years, the idea of brain localization theory has evolved much more rapidly. Historians can explore how contemporary brain theory evolved out of earlier intellectual systems by observing cultural artifacts such as old scientific books and articles on neurology.  When future intellectual historians look back on the history of biological inquiry, they will be hard pressed to explain the persistent intellectual, sociopolitical, and economic conflicts that arise out of our current beliefs about the relationships between animals and humans.
 

 At this point I must reiterate that our evolving descriptive beliefs concerning the status of animals in relationship to humans influence our evolving prescriptive moral beliefs concerning the borders of the moral universe. Today, many animal rights advocates argue that it is immoral to treat sentient and/or non-sentient animals as things, property, or resources. This animal rights movement, therefore, seeks to break down and reorder these longstanding anthropocentric hierarchies. But how does the possession of something that resembles a cerebral cortex signify membership in the moral universe? Why is extending the boundaries of that universe to include mammals (mammalpocentrism?) morally superior to anthropocentrism?