The human brain is the most complex machine on earth. It not only manufactures our perceptions, feelings, thoughts, and behavior; it is also enables us to communicate those feelings, thoughts and perceptions to other brains in the form of information. As you read the words on this page your brain is seamlessly transforming these black marks into information, or ideas. Hence, my ideas are in your brain right now! Of course, I stole most of my ideas from dead philosophers, so you’re welcome to store them in your brain too.
At the microcosmic level, the basic unit of exchange is the “neuron,” which processes both “matter” and “information.” Brains that study brains use the idea of neurons to explain predict, and control the feelings, thoughts, and behavior generated by the human brain. The brain itself contains about 100 billion of neurons, with about thirty billion of them located in the outer layer known as the cerebral cortex. We still do not know how brains transform matter into information, or whether information exists independent of brains.
At the macrocosmic level, the human brain evolved as an adaptive response to survival challenges experienced by our distant ancestors during the Pleistocene period, about 3.5 million years ago. The brains of brain scientists now say that, functionally speaking, the brain resembles a “Swiss army knife,” a multiple organ comprised of identifiable subsystems or “modules.” The matter of our brains really hasn’t changed much since then, but the cultural information contained within it has evolved much faster. Consequently, there is a “mismatch” between our hunter-gatherer brains and modern culture. Unfortunately, our mismatched Pleistocene brains still tend to identify with similar brains, which accounts for the persistence of sexism, racism, tribalism, nationalism, and speciesism.
Evolutionary scientists say that the brain resembles an archeological site that contains the history of other brain-carrying organisms from our evolutionary past. The oldest parts of our brains structures, which are located near the center of our brains, regulate our body functions. Scientists often refer to this as the Reptilian Brain. The more recently evolved structures responsible for thought, language, and reasoning are located closer to the surface. If the outermost structures that manufacture thought mind are damaged, your body can still survive for a long time, as long as your brain stem continues to function. Unfortunately, if your brain gets locked into this persistent vegetative state, it won’t have any perceptions, feelings, thoughts, or behavior.
The only machine more complex than the human brain is a network of brains, which also processes matter and information, only on a larger scale. The most basic brain network involves two brains. XX (female) and XY (male) networks, periodically get together to manufacture more brains. The process requires two distinct processes: a material process via the replication of DNA; and an informational process called education.
Brains also process matter. If you own one, it will consume about 33 % of your daily caloric intake. That means you will have to spend at least 8 hours a day networking in the production and exchange of matter and or information, which we call work. Networks of brain scientists manufacture information about brains and transform it black marks on white surfaces. These black marks are then replicated by brain networks called publishing companies and later distributed by other networks called bookstores, libraries, and Internet sites. The process of exchange is facilitated by an artificial form of matter called money, which can be exchanged for calories that feed brains. Networks of economists study this exchange.
The most important brain module is the one that facilitates the making and use of tools. In recent years, brain scientists have benefited immensely from new tools: especially, very expensive, state-of-the-art new imaging machines that allow researchers to observe the flow of matter within the brain. Networks called research laboratories, buy these expensive machines from a network of brains called General Electric Corporation. Brain scanners generate a lot of calories that feed a lot of brains: manufacturers, distributers, salesmen, technicians and researchers. These technologies are often located in larger networks called colleges and universities that use these scanners to generate pictures of brains, and then sell the information gleaned from these images to younger brains or students. Because colleges and universities need money to pay for these scanners and feed the brains of their professors, they charge students a sum of money, called tuition. Students usually borrow their tuition from brain networks called banks, which also generate a lot of calories, especially for the brains of their stockholders and CEOs. Many of the colleges and universities that buy these scanners are public institutions; governmental networks that extract money from the brains of citizens via taxation. My college does not own any brain scanners, but it does have many photocopy machines and computers, that replicate information; and a cafeteria and vending machines that sell calories to feed our brains.
Sunday, March 4, 2012
Monday, February 13, 2012
Religious Freedom v. Reproductive Freedom: A Pointless and Unnecessary Debate
OK..Some of you all have been trying to coax me into addressing the ongoing controversy between President Obama and the Roman Catholic Church over a new federal mandate requiring all employers to include health insurance coverage for contraception, sterilization and abortion. If your views have been shaped by corporate media, you probably believe that this is a straightforward, deontological dilemma between "religious rights" and "reproductive rights." Sorry...but I won't address that issue! Why not? Well...it's NOT because I teach at a Roman Catholic college and it's NOT because most of my friends and colleagues are liberal women. The reason that I refuse to address that debate is that it's not the ultimate source of the conflict and therefore, to do so would be tantamount to a physician treating the symptoms of the disease rather than the underlying disease.
So what's the disease? Well, it's President Obama's decision to "reform" the U.S. health care system by expanding and revising employment-based health insurance. Kronke and I have already dealt with the various problems associated with employment-based health insurance in our essay: The Modern Health Care Maze. So in this use blog I'll try to explain how and why this mindless system inevitably alienates not only religious employers like the Roman Catholic Church, but also their employees. Ultimately, I might even question why an otherwise saavy politician like Obama failed to "anticipate" the consequences of this policy.
First of all, let's ask the most basic question. Why would I want my employer, the federal government, and/or the state of Ohio to choose my health insurance coverage for me? Do these governmental entities or my employer know something that I don't know about what I need in terms of coverage? President Obama sent me an e-mail message the other day. It said: "Sorry Ron, but even though you and your wife are well beyond your reproductive years, I decided that you really NEED health insurance coverage for contraception, sterlization, and abortion?" Then the bishop sent me an e-mail that said: "Sorry Ron, but the Roman Catholic Church won't pay for that mandated coverage because we believe that contraception, sterilization, and abortion are immoral." Note that both the President and the Bishop believe that they are acting in good conscience on my on my behalf. But the fact of the matter is that I really don't need contraception, sterilization, or abortion coverage. I also don't need in vitro fertilization coverage. If I did, I guess it's good to know that if my wife and I end up with octuplets, my health insurance will cover up to $1,000,000. per child toward treatment in a neonatal intensive care unit. The government and my employer might also decide that we also need insurance coverage for mamograms, a hair transplant, cosmetic surgery, and/or a sex change operation. I know that pharmaceutical companies believe that I need insurance coverage for a test Low T (low testosterone), and for the expensive, patent-protected drug that cures it. That's why their lobbyists are are swarming state governments hoping to force insurance companies to cover those tests and drugs.
Now if the health insurance offered to me by my employers was offered as a gift, I wouldn't be so critical. But the fact is that I pay for that insurance via diminished salary and co-pays. Moreover, although the President and the Bishop are willing to force me to pay for insurance coverage that I mostly don't need, neither of them are anxious to provide me with reasonable coverage that I really might need someday: dental care, eye care, or long-term nursing care. So one of the unanticipated consequences of employment based health insurance is that I'm stuck paying for health insurance that I wouldn't otherwise purchase. And of course, over time, the quality of that insurance coverage has decreased, while the costs have increased. So as a result, every year I pay more for my health insurance and more out-of-pocket for my uncovered health care. Now I can't blame the Bishop for my lousy health insurance. There are only a few health insurance companies licensed in the state of Ohio, and they all are well-represented by powerful lobbies. But I do blame President Obama for attempting to recussitate such an irrational, convoluted health care system.
Now let's look at another related issue. Why do we continue to support a tradition whereby access to some birth control methods requires a prescription from a physician; a stranger that probably doesn't know much about you, or the drug being prescribed? Moreover, that same physician is financially motivated to prescribe expensive, recently patented new drugs and devices (whose safety and effectiveness are not well known), rather than prescribe generic old drugs and devices (whose safety and effectiveness are well known)? As a result of this wacky system, every few years these new drugs and devices, whose safety and effectiveness were initially declared by the Food and Drug Administration, turn out to be unsafe and/or ineffective. Then, we have those highly paid lawyers, specializing in "class-action lawsuits," taking pharmaceutical companies to court. When the pharmaceutical companies lose those class-action lawsuits and are ordered to pay out huge settlements to the victims, those payoffs are either covered by their own liability insurance and/or passed onto consumers in the form of higher prices. Do you got all that?
In conclusion, the debate over contraceptive covereage is really a sideshow; a byproduct of a woefully convoluted health care system. As much as I'd like to write a convincing deontological argument reconciling religious freedom with reproductive freedom, it's really not the real issue. I thought Kroncke and I articulated the problem pretty well! "In hindsight, did it ever really make sense to set up a health care system whereby fourth-party corporate employers purchase health care insurance for their first-party employees from third-party corporations, which in turn pay second-party providers for health care products and services? Does any other industry insulate buyers from sellers in this way?" So, the conflict between religious rights and reproductive rights disappears if we just dump employment-based health insurance, and replace it with a system where we buy our own health insurance (and health care). Unfortunately, insurance companies, physicians, pharmaceutical companies, and hospitals won't like that new system. They all want us to buy more health care than we really need.
Finally, we must ask the question: Why would President Obama risk politically alienating Catholics, Evangelical Protestants, Jews, and Muslims in an election year in order preserve such an irrational, ill-conceived, and convoluted health care system? God only knows!
So what's the disease? Well, it's President Obama's decision to "reform" the U.S. health care system by expanding and revising employment-based health insurance. Kronke and I have already dealt with the various problems associated with employment-based health insurance in our essay: The Modern Health Care Maze. So in this use blog I'll try to explain how and why this mindless system inevitably alienates not only religious employers like the Roman Catholic Church, but also their employees. Ultimately, I might even question why an otherwise saavy politician like Obama failed to "anticipate" the consequences of this policy.
First of all, let's ask the most basic question. Why would I want my employer, the federal government, and/or the state of Ohio to choose my health insurance coverage for me? Do these governmental entities or my employer know something that I don't know about what I need in terms of coverage? President Obama sent me an e-mail message the other day. It said: "Sorry Ron, but even though you and your wife are well beyond your reproductive years, I decided that you really NEED health insurance coverage for contraception, sterlization, and abortion?" Then the bishop sent me an e-mail that said: "Sorry Ron, but the Roman Catholic Church won't pay for that mandated coverage because we believe that contraception, sterilization, and abortion are immoral." Note that both the President and the Bishop believe that they are acting in good conscience on my on my behalf. But the fact of the matter is that I really don't need contraception, sterilization, or abortion coverage. I also don't need in vitro fertilization coverage. If I did, I guess it's good to know that if my wife and I end up with octuplets, my health insurance will cover up to $1,000,000. per child toward treatment in a neonatal intensive care unit. The government and my employer might also decide that we also need insurance coverage for mamograms, a hair transplant, cosmetic surgery, and/or a sex change operation. I know that pharmaceutical companies believe that I need insurance coverage for a test Low T (low testosterone), and for the expensive, patent-protected drug that cures it. That's why their lobbyists are are swarming state governments hoping to force insurance companies to cover those tests and drugs.
Now if the health insurance offered to me by my employers was offered as a gift, I wouldn't be so critical. But the fact is that I pay for that insurance via diminished salary and co-pays. Moreover, although the President and the Bishop are willing to force me to pay for insurance coverage that I mostly don't need, neither of them are anxious to provide me with reasonable coverage that I really might need someday: dental care, eye care, or long-term nursing care. So one of the unanticipated consequences of employment based health insurance is that I'm stuck paying for health insurance that I wouldn't otherwise purchase. And of course, over time, the quality of that insurance coverage has decreased, while the costs have increased. So as a result, every year I pay more for my health insurance and more out-of-pocket for my uncovered health care. Now I can't blame the Bishop for my lousy health insurance. There are only a few health insurance companies licensed in the state of Ohio, and they all are well-represented by powerful lobbies. But I do blame President Obama for attempting to recussitate such an irrational, convoluted health care system.
Now let's look at another related issue. Why do we continue to support a tradition whereby access to some birth control methods requires a prescription from a physician; a stranger that probably doesn't know much about you, or the drug being prescribed? Moreover, that same physician is financially motivated to prescribe expensive, recently patented new drugs and devices (whose safety and effectiveness are not well known), rather than prescribe generic old drugs and devices (whose safety and effectiveness are well known)? As a result of this wacky system, every few years these new drugs and devices, whose safety and effectiveness were initially declared by the Food and Drug Administration, turn out to be unsafe and/or ineffective. Then, we have those highly paid lawyers, specializing in "class-action lawsuits," taking pharmaceutical companies to court. When the pharmaceutical companies lose those class-action lawsuits and are ordered to pay out huge settlements to the victims, those payoffs are either covered by their own liability insurance and/or passed onto consumers in the form of higher prices. Do you got all that?
In conclusion, the debate over contraceptive covereage is really a sideshow; a byproduct of a woefully convoluted health care system. As much as I'd like to write a convincing deontological argument reconciling religious freedom with reproductive freedom, it's really not the real issue. I thought Kroncke and I articulated the problem pretty well! "In hindsight, did it ever really make sense to set up a health care system whereby fourth-party corporate employers purchase health care insurance for their first-party employees from third-party corporations, which in turn pay second-party providers for health care products and services? Does any other industry insulate buyers from sellers in this way?" So, the conflict between religious rights and reproductive rights disappears if we just dump employment-based health insurance, and replace it with a system where we buy our own health insurance (and health care). Unfortunately, insurance companies, physicians, pharmaceutical companies, and hospitals won't like that new system. They all want us to buy more health care than we really need.
Finally, we must ask the question: Why would President Obama risk politically alienating Catholics, Evangelical Protestants, Jews, and Muslims in an election year in order preserve such an irrational, ill-conceived, and convoluted health care system? God only knows!
Thursday, January 5, 2012
Stakeholder Theory of Corporate Management
Stockholder and Stakeholder Theory are theoretical perspectives within the Nexus of Contracts framework. The Stockholder Theory of Corporate Management says that CEOs (leaders) “ought” to manage the nexus in the interest of stockholders. Stakeholder Theory argues that CEOS are agents for all of the stakeholders, and therefore, “ought to” manage the nexus in order to advance the interests of all stakeholders: stockholders, employees, consumers, suppliers, financiers, and the local community.
Stakeholder Theory provides a pretty big tent for a variety of different views. Many argue that corporations are not the private property of stockholders, but “public property” and that the goal role of the CEO is to increase cooperation and not competition. One implication of this emphasis on cooperation is the notion that the various stakeholders ought to be treated equally, and/or that it is wrong to deliberately allow the most advantaged stakeholders (especially stockholders) to exploit the least advantaged stakeholders. So the basic argument is that the various stakeholder groups come to the bargaining table with competitive disadvantages, and that Stockholder Theory often leads to the exploitation of employees, consumers, financiers, suppliers, and/or local communities. In other words Stakeholder Management implies a special moral obligation to advance the interests of the “least advantaged” (or the most vulnerable) stakeholders.
But the most important difference between the two theories is their respective views on the role that government ought to play in economic matters. If Stockholder Theory targets policy at increasing competition and personal liberty, Stakeholder Theory seeks to empower government to protect the least advantaged stakeholders; usually employees and consumers. Hence Stakeholder theorists tend to support policies such as a social safety net and/or a living wage. However, Stockholder Theorists prefer to address the needs of the "least advantaged" via individual philanthropy and/or voluntary associations rather than government programs.
Stockholder theorists tend to emphasize private property rights and personal liberty (Locke). On global issues, they embrace the mantra:”When in Rome do as the Romans do.” Stakeholder theorists focus more on public property, economic security of all stakeholders, and follow their manta: “When in Rome do what’s right.” As a general rule, European countries tend to embrace Stakeholder Theory, while the United States defends Stockholder Theory. But don’t jump to the conclusion that business ethics can be reduced to Stockholder Theory v. Stakeholder Theory. Both theories are more subtle than that; and of course, not all business ethicists buy into that whole "social contract" approach to doing ethics. I would argue that Nexus of Contracts Theory, Stockholder Theory and Stakeholder Theory all represent ideals. And that Realists observe that in the “Real World,” there are (in fact) neither “perfectly free markets” (perfect information, perfect freedom, and perfect competition) nor “perfectly functional governments." Ultimately, business ethics cannot avoid the basic issues in ethics: knowing v. doing, facts v. values, individual v. collective responsibility, legality v. morality, public v. private, and contextualism v. universalism. Don't let anyone tell you that ethics is easy. It's not!
Stakeholder Theory provides a pretty big tent for a variety of different views. Many argue that corporations are not the private property of stockholders, but “public property” and that the goal role of the CEO is to increase cooperation and not competition. One implication of this emphasis on cooperation is the notion that the various stakeholders ought to be treated equally, and/or that it is wrong to deliberately allow the most advantaged stakeholders (especially stockholders) to exploit the least advantaged stakeholders. So the basic argument is that the various stakeholder groups come to the bargaining table with competitive disadvantages, and that Stockholder Theory often leads to the exploitation of employees, consumers, financiers, suppliers, and/or local communities. In other words Stakeholder Management implies a special moral obligation to advance the interests of the “least advantaged” (or the most vulnerable) stakeholders.
But the most important difference between the two theories is their respective views on the role that government ought to play in economic matters. If Stockholder Theory targets policy at increasing competition and personal liberty, Stakeholder Theory seeks to empower government to protect the least advantaged stakeholders; usually employees and consumers. Hence Stakeholder theorists tend to support policies such as a social safety net and/or a living wage. However, Stockholder Theorists prefer to address the needs of the "least advantaged" via individual philanthropy and/or voluntary associations rather than government programs.
Stockholder theorists tend to emphasize private property rights and personal liberty (Locke). On global issues, they embrace the mantra:”When in Rome do as the Romans do.” Stakeholder theorists focus more on public property, economic security of all stakeholders, and follow their manta: “When in Rome do what’s right.” As a general rule, European countries tend to embrace Stakeholder Theory, while the United States defends Stockholder Theory. But don’t jump to the conclusion that business ethics can be reduced to Stockholder Theory v. Stakeholder Theory. Both theories are more subtle than that; and of course, not all business ethicists buy into that whole "social contract" approach to doing ethics. I would argue that Nexus of Contracts Theory, Stockholder Theory and Stakeholder Theory all represent ideals. And that Realists observe that in the “Real World,” there are (in fact) neither “perfectly free markets” (perfect information, perfect freedom, and perfect competition) nor “perfectly functional governments." Ultimately, business ethics cannot avoid the basic issues in ethics: knowing v. doing, facts v. values, individual v. collective responsibility, legality v. morality, public v. private, and contextualism v. universalism. Don't let anyone tell you that ethics is easy. It's not!
Monday, January 2, 2012
Stockholder Theory of Corporate Management
Recall from my previous blog that “Nexus of Contracts Theory” (NOC) says that a corporation is a nexus of contracts between various stakeholder groups: stockholders, employees, consumers, financiers, sub-contractors, and the local community. Business leadership ethics, therefore, is about how to manage that nexus. Within the contractual constraints of the NOC framework there are two competing theories that offer different strategies for dealing with the inevitable stakeholder conflicts that arise: stockholder theory and stakeholder theory.
Now an agent is a person possessing technical knowledge that is paid by someone else to serve their interests. Stockholder Theory states that the CEO is an agent hired by stockholders (or owners), and therefore he/she is legally and morally obligated to serve their interests. Corporations are money machines owned by the stockholders (not persons) and the CEO is hired to manage that nexus. In order for the CEO to make money for the stockholders, he/she must make decisions that affect all stakeholder groups. Stockholder theorists, therefore, argue that the “free market” is simply a system of distribution based the non-coercive, voluntary choices made by the various stakeholders. One of the criticisms of Stockholder Theory is that it seems to justify the unlimited exploitation of other stakeholders for the benefit of the stockholders. However, CEOs cannot simply ignore the interests of the other stakeholders. Otherwise, they’ll withdraw from the nexus: employees will quit, consumers will buy from a competitor, financiers will not lend them money etc. For example, if the CEO offers most workers $8.00 in hourly wages, and if prospective employees can freely accept or reject that offer, then it’s a moral transaction. However, a “good CEO” (that makes money for the stockholders) will, out of necessity, serve the interests of the other stakeholders, within the constraints of the free market. Hence, if a "good CEO" cannot hire enough workers at $8.00 an hour, then he/she will try $8.25. If there are many willing workers available, the CEO will offer $7.75. The same market-based bargaining will be applied in dealing with the other stakeholder groups.
What about business ethics? Or better yet…whose moral values is a "good CEO" morally obligated to uphold? Most stockholder theorists are moral relativists, and therefore, argue that the CEO must decide whose moral values ought to guide his/her decisions. Since the stockholders own the company they can collectively agree to operate based on a set of shared moral values. If the CEO disagrees with those values he/she can refuse to take the job or resign. And of course, any corporate morality must be clearly disclosed to the other stakeholders. If some stockholders disagree with those expressed values they can sell their stocks, employees can quit, financiers can refuse to loan money etc. But then again, very large corporations have thousands of stockholders whom may not share the same moral values. That’s why the stockholders appoint or elect their own agent(s), the Board of Trustees. However, if the CEO chooses to “manage” based on his/her personal morality, which is in conflict with the stockholders values, the Board can fire the CEO. Unfortunately, sometimes the CEO and/or the Board do not act as reliable agents. In those cases, if the stockholders find out, they can either hire new agents, or sell their stock. Although Stockholder Theorists tend toward moral relativism, they are legal objectivists, in the sense that they require corporate leaders to abide by the laws where they are doing business. So when competing in global markets where the laws vary between nations, Stockholder Theorists uphold the mantra: “When in Rome, do as the Romans do.”
Finally, any theory of the modern corporation must also address the political question: “What role should government play in managing the nexus?” Within the Stockholder Model, there’s a considerable disagreement over what role the government ought to play in managing the nexus. Anarcho-capitalists argue that all government violates the non-aggression axiom, and therefore all government intervention in the market is morally unjustified. Minarchists, however, argue that the primary purpose of government is to protect the personal and property rights of individuals. Thus, at a bare minimum government must monitor and enforce laws against theft, fraud, and breech of contract. However, all stakeholders possess “negative rights” and therefore, as bargainers they are guaranteed the equal right to bargain, but there can be no governmentally enforced guarantee that any one stakeholder group will emerge victorious as a result of the competitive process. According to ST, government ought to be “impartial” or “neutral” in the competitive bargaining process, but should not pick winners and losers. Again, the primary purpose of government is to enforce contracts between rationally self-interested bargainers and promote free market competition. Stockholder Theorists argue that over the long run, the free market approach to corporate management unintentionally leads to a moral nexus.
Libertarians generally defend various versions of the Stockholder Theory of corporate management. My next blog will cover Stakeholder Theory, the other approach to corporate management.
Sunday, January 1, 2012
What is a Corporation?
What is the most influential social institution in the Western world? Now by “influential” I don’t mean just “positive influence” but also “negative influence.” Well, let’s look at some of the candidates. Given the cultural forces that are currently at work here in the United States, most of you would say either religion or government. Both are pretty good candidates. But let’s look a bit closer. Who produced the food that you ate this morning? Who sold it to you? Who loaned you the money to go to college? Who built your computer? Who sold it to you? Who printed your books? Who sold them to you? Who brewed the beer that you drank last Saturday night, and who sold it to you? Who produced your cigarettes and who sold them to you? Who owns the Reds and the Bengals? Who built your home? Who financed it? Get the point? For better or worse, I would argue that corporations are the most influential social institutions in the Western world, especially in the United States. But what is a corporation? The answer to any question requires a theory. Therefore, we need a “theory of the modern corporation.”
Orthodoxy in business management and ethics often cites “Nexus-of-Contracts Theory.” Rooted in in social contract theory, it argues that the firm, or the modern corporation, is a complex adaptive system comprised of definable subsystems, called stakeholders. A stakeholder is any individual or group of individuals that either benefits of suffers as a result of the actions of that corporation. Therefore, the modern corporation is essentially a set of contracts or agreements between various stakeholder groups. The corporate stakeholder groups, engaged in this bargaining process typically include: stockholders, employees, consumers, suppliers, financiers, and local communities. The interests of these various groups are often represented by “agents.”
Now in order for the Nexus-of Contracts Theory to be useful it must be both descriptive and prescriptive; that is, it must describe how the classes of stakeholders (stockholders, consumers, managers, employees, consumers etc.) bargain in the real world, AND prescribe how those stakeholders ought to bargain. It must also describe and prescribe the role that leaders ought to play in this process. Hence, any theory of the modern corporation must answer three questions:
1. Whose ends (rights or interests) are in fact served by corporate leaders? (E.g.: stockholders, consumers, employees, financiers, suppliers, local communities, nations, humanity etc.) AND, whose ends (rights or interests) ought to be served by corporate leaders?
2. By what means can leaders in fact employ in order to efficiently realize these stated ends (rights or interests) AND, what means can managers morally realize these stated ends.
3. What role does government in fact play in the realization of these various ends? AND, what role ought government (local, state, federal, international) play in this process?
Despite the idealistic ruminations of various “win-win” strategists, in the real world, what’s “good” for one group of stakeholders (stockholders, employees, consumers, etc) is not necessarily “good” for the other stakeholders. If you raise the pay of employees, generally, either the consumers pay higher prices, and/or the stockholders earn less. And, what’s “good” for any given society may or may not be “good” for individual industries or corporations. And, what’s “good” for United States may or may not be “good” for the rest of the world. And what’s “good” for present stakeholders, may not be good for future stakeholders. Hence, corporations are both cooperative and competitive.
Within the NOC framework, a “good leader,” is a leader that can reconcile the often conflicting interests of the various stakeholder groups. NOC scholars have identified two alternative sub-theories of corporate leadership.
Stockholder Theory: Leaders are morally and legally obligated to serve as agents of the stockholders, and advance their interests regardless of how those decisions might affect the other stakeholders.
Stakeholder Theory: Leaders are morally and legally obligated to serve as agents of all stakeholder groups, and try to advance all of these interests collectively and impartially.
The next two blogs will discuss these two theories.
Orthodoxy in business management and ethics often cites “Nexus-of-Contracts Theory.” Rooted in in social contract theory, it argues that the firm, or the modern corporation, is a complex adaptive system comprised of definable subsystems, called stakeholders. A stakeholder is any individual or group of individuals that either benefits of suffers as a result of the actions of that corporation. Therefore, the modern corporation is essentially a set of contracts or agreements between various stakeholder groups. The corporate stakeholder groups, engaged in this bargaining process typically include: stockholders, employees, consumers, suppliers, financiers, and local communities. The interests of these various groups are often represented by “agents.”
Now in order for the Nexus-of Contracts Theory to be useful it must be both descriptive and prescriptive; that is, it must describe how the classes of stakeholders (stockholders, consumers, managers, employees, consumers etc.) bargain in the real world, AND prescribe how those stakeholders ought to bargain. It must also describe and prescribe the role that leaders ought to play in this process. Hence, any theory of the modern corporation must answer three questions:
1. Whose ends (rights or interests) are in fact served by corporate leaders? (E.g.: stockholders, consumers, employees, financiers, suppliers, local communities, nations, humanity etc.) AND, whose ends (rights or interests) ought to be served by corporate leaders?
2. By what means can leaders in fact employ in order to efficiently realize these stated ends (rights or interests) AND, what means can managers morally realize these stated ends.
3. What role does government in fact play in the realization of these various ends? AND, what role ought government (local, state, federal, international) play in this process?
Despite the idealistic ruminations of various “win-win” strategists, in the real world, what’s “good” for one group of stakeholders (stockholders, employees, consumers, etc) is not necessarily “good” for the other stakeholders. If you raise the pay of employees, generally, either the consumers pay higher prices, and/or the stockholders earn less. And, what’s “good” for any given society may or may not be “good” for individual industries or corporations. And, what’s “good” for United States may or may not be “good” for the rest of the world. And what’s “good” for present stakeholders, may not be good for future stakeholders. Hence, corporations are both cooperative and competitive.
Within the NOC framework, a “good leader,” is a leader that can reconcile the often conflicting interests of the various stakeholder groups. NOC scholars have identified two alternative sub-theories of corporate leadership.
Stockholder Theory: Leaders are morally and legally obligated to serve as agents of the stockholders, and advance their interests regardless of how those decisions might affect the other stakeholders.
Stakeholder Theory: Leaders are morally and legally obligated to serve as agents of all stakeholder groups, and try to advance all of these interests collectively and impartially.
The next two blogs will discuss these two theories.
Monday, December 26, 2011
Responsibility
The question of "responsibility" plays a central role in retribution and is central to our feelings and thought about justice. There are two different forms: legal responsibility and moral responsibility.
Legal responsibility is not necessarily identical to moral responsibility. Not everything that is “legal” is “moral,” and not everything that is moral is legal. The basic difference between legality and morality lies in the distinction between “laws” and “rules” and how each are monitored and enforced. Laws are monitored and enforced via the coercive power of the state. If you break a law and get caught, you can get punished by a government. In the Western world, governments “sanction” law breakers via fines, incarceration, and sometimes via death (United States). Some non-Western countries whip or beat law breakers. If you break a moral rule, members of the community will praise you or blame you. Most governments limit what groups can do to enforce morality. In some countries, like Saudi Arabia, almost everything that is immoral is also illegal.
Moral responsibility involves the basic question of what kinds of persons are “fair” targets for moral praise and moral blame. Simply put, we praise or reward persons that do good things, and we blame persons that do bad things. But what is it about the nature of persons that justifies holding them responsible for their behavior? And, why do we, in fact, hold each other morally responsible for our actions? Well, at least in the Western moral tradition we assess responsibility based on two main criteria: rationality and free will.
We praise and blame persons that are capable of understanding and applying moral rules and reasoning about consequences before they act. The assessment of degrees of rationality usually involves assessing mental processes such as logical reasoning, forethought, learning from experience, processing information etc. Thus, mind or mentality is a necessary condition for the assessment of moral responsibility, but not a sufficient condition. Not all persons that possess mentality are morally responsible. We do not hold young children responsible for their behavior. But as they get older we tend to hold them more responsible. Nor do we hold persons that have a "cognitive or defect" responsible for their actions. And, obviously we do not always hold other persons responsible for acts born out of ignorance of the rules or the consequences. We generally do not hold animals morally responsible for their good or bad behavior, although we may praise or blame them in order to encourage or discourage future behaviors.
We also praise and blame responsible persons for acts of free will; that is, acts that they are capable of controlling. Basically, this means that we do not praise or blame persons for acts that are coerced by other persons or forced by internal or external circumstances. Personal coercion generally involves the use of personal threats and enticements enforced by others. Both threats and enticements come in various degrees. Major threat: "Rob that bank or I'll kill your family!" Minor threat: "Rob that bank or I'll take your shoes!" Major enticement: "Rob that bank and I'll give you 10 million dollars!" Minor enticement: "Rob that bank and I'll give you one dollar." Generally speaking, we hold moral agents responsible for bad acts that were performed in exchange for enticements and we do not usually praise people that do good things in exchange for major enticements. In other words, responsible persons ought to be able to resist at least some low-level threats and/or enticements. Philosophers argue over whether and/or to what degree threats and enticements undermine free will, and whether the concept of free will even makes sense.
As a general rule, we do not praise or blame others for good or bad consequences that are brought on by chance, or moral luck. If I accidentally run into a fleeing bank robber, I probably will not be praised as a hero. Unless, I could convince the media that I knew he was a fleeing bank robber and that I deliberately tackled him. If I accidentally killed that robber, I might even be held legally responsible and blamed for his death. More on that later.
Not only do we hold persons morally responsible for their actions, we also hold groups of individuals legally and morally responsible for their actions. But collective responsibility is much more difficult to assess. Here’s why. First of all, our individual association with groups is not always framed by rationality or free will. Sometimes we are coerced into associating with others, and sometimes we associate ourselves with groups without really knowing everything that they do. Sometimes we associate ourselves with groups based on tradition alone. Most of us remain associated with the same religious group that we grew up with.
Voluntary associations are those groups that we rationally and freely choose to associate. These associations are often organized hierarchies that involve leaders and followers. Generally speaking, we hold both leaders and followers morally responsible for their actions. But the responsibility of followers is contingent upon what they knew beforehand and the presence of coercive influences. When we really know exactly what an organization does and when we freely choose to follow its leaders, we are held individually responsible for what that organization does. Hence, responsibility is diminished commensurate to both information and freedom. Unfortunately, in the real world followers do not always possess perfect knowledge or perfect freedom.
Moreover, hierarchies often delegate responsibility, which means that leaders at the top of an organization may not always know what lower level leaders are doing and sometimes upper level leaders employ coercive force on lower level leaders. For example, many of the Nazi doctors claimed that they tortured their patients because they would have been killed if they disobeyed orders.
Corporate responsibility is especially convoluted. Who is ultimately responsible for good and bad corporate behavior? Should we hold the CEO or the Board of Trustees of a multi-national corporation responsible for everything that takes place within that corporation? Should the leaders get paid for what followers produce? Should leaders be held responsible for immoral and/or illegal behavior of followers? In short, this notion of collective (or shared) responsibility turns out to be very complex.
Another source of complexity has to do with the dynamics of how human beings behave in groups. Historically, philosophers have identified two sources of determinism that limit moral responsibility” biology and social structure. Biological determinists argue that at least some human behavior is “natural,” or caused by our brains and genes. Therefore, biological determinists argue that at least some human behavior lies outside of the realm of rationality and free will and that praise and/or blame cannot alter those behaviors.
So, how does social structure affect human rationality and free will, and to what degree does "social causation" diminish individual and/or collective responsibility? This question raises a host of other questions concerning the nature and extent of circumstantial coercion, the malleability of human nature, and the "nature v. nurture controversy." To what degree are human beings conditioned by their social environment and their genetic makeup? There are two wrong answers:
If the truth lies somewhere between these extremes, then how do we (in fact) go about assessing personal and collective moral responsibility in our everyday lives? How should we?
Now the relationship between legality and morality is itself subject to a long line of philosophical inquiry. Historically, many philosophers have argued that morality is timelessly universal and “objective” and that legality is relative to time and place. Other philosophers have argued that universal morality always trumps legality. Some say that both morality and legality are temporally and culturally relative. Therefore, “When in Rome do as the Romans do.”
Legal responsibility is not necessarily identical to moral responsibility. Not everything that is “legal” is “moral,” and not everything that is moral is legal. The basic difference between legality and morality lies in the distinction between “laws” and “rules” and how each are monitored and enforced. Laws are monitored and enforced via the coercive power of the state. If you break a law and get caught, you can get punished by a government. In the Western world, governments “sanction” law breakers via fines, incarceration, and sometimes via death (United States). Some non-Western countries whip or beat law breakers. If you break a moral rule, members of the community will praise you or blame you. Most governments limit what groups can do to enforce morality. In some countries, like Saudi Arabia, almost everything that is immoral is also illegal.
Moral responsibility involves the basic question of what kinds of persons are “fair” targets for moral praise and moral blame. Simply put, we praise or reward persons that do good things, and we blame persons that do bad things. But what is it about the nature of persons that justifies holding them responsible for their behavior? And, why do we, in fact, hold each other morally responsible for our actions? Well, at least in the Western moral tradition we assess responsibility based on two main criteria: rationality and free will.
We praise and blame persons that are capable of understanding and applying moral rules and reasoning about consequences before they act. The assessment of degrees of rationality usually involves assessing mental processes such as logical reasoning, forethought, learning from experience, processing information etc. Thus, mind or mentality is a necessary condition for the assessment of moral responsibility, but not a sufficient condition. Not all persons that possess mentality are morally responsible. We do not hold young children responsible for their behavior. But as they get older we tend to hold them more responsible. Nor do we hold persons that have a "cognitive or defect" responsible for their actions. And, obviously we do not always hold other persons responsible for acts born out of ignorance of the rules or the consequences. We generally do not hold animals morally responsible for their good or bad behavior, although we may praise or blame them in order to encourage or discourage future behaviors.
We also praise and blame responsible persons for acts of free will; that is, acts that they are capable of controlling. Basically, this means that we do not praise or blame persons for acts that are coerced by other persons or forced by internal or external circumstances. Personal coercion generally involves the use of personal threats and enticements enforced by others. Both threats and enticements come in various degrees. Major threat: "Rob that bank or I'll kill your family!" Minor threat: "Rob that bank or I'll take your shoes!" Major enticement: "Rob that bank and I'll give you 10 million dollars!" Minor enticement: "Rob that bank and I'll give you one dollar." Generally speaking, we hold moral agents responsible for bad acts that were performed in exchange for enticements and we do not usually praise people that do good things in exchange for major enticements. In other words, responsible persons ought to be able to resist at least some low-level threats and/or enticements. Philosophers argue over whether and/or to what degree threats and enticements undermine free will, and whether the concept of free will even makes sense.
As a general rule, we do not praise or blame others for good or bad consequences that are brought on by chance, or moral luck. If I accidentally run into a fleeing bank robber, I probably will not be praised as a hero. Unless, I could convince the media that I knew he was a fleeing bank robber and that I deliberately tackled him. If I accidentally killed that robber, I might even be held legally responsible and blamed for his death. More on that later.
Not only do we hold persons morally responsible for their actions, we also hold groups of individuals legally and morally responsible for their actions. But collective responsibility is much more difficult to assess. Here’s why. First of all, our individual association with groups is not always framed by rationality or free will. Sometimes we are coerced into associating with others, and sometimes we associate ourselves with groups without really knowing everything that they do. Sometimes we associate ourselves with groups based on tradition alone. Most of us remain associated with the same religious group that we grew up with.
Voluntary associations are those groups that we rationally and freely choose to associate. These associations are often organized hierarchies that involve leaders and followers. Generally speaking, we hold both leaders and followers morally responsible for their actions. But the responsibility of followers is contingent upon what they knew beforehand and the presence of coercive influences. When we really know exactly what an organization does and when we freely choose to follow its leaders, we are held individually responsible for what that organization does. Hence, responsibility is diminished commensurate to both information and freedom. Unfortunately, in the real world followers do not always possess perfect knowledge or perfect freedom.
Moreover, hierarchies often delegate responsibility, which means that leaders at the top of an organization may not always know what lower level leaders are doing and sometimes upper level leaders employ coercive force on lower level leaders. For example, many of the Nazi doctors claimed that they tortured their patients because they would have been killed if they disobeyed orders.
Corporate responsibility is especially convoluted. Who is ultimately responsible for good and bad corporate behavior? Should we hold the CEO or the Board of Trustees of a multi-national corporation responsible for everything that takes place within that corporation? Should the leaders get paid for what followers produce? Should leaders be held responsible for immoral and/or illegal behavior of followers? In short, this notion of collective (or shared) responsibility turns out to be very complex.
Another source of complexity has to do with the dynamics of how human beings behave in groups. Historically, philosophers have identified two sources of determinism that limit moral responsibility” biology and social structure. Biological determinists argue that at least some human behavior is “natural,” or caused by our brains and genes. Therefore, biological determinists argue that at least some human behavior lies outside of the realm of rationality and free will and that praise and/or blame cannot alter those behaviors.
So, how does social structure affect human rationality and free will, and to what degree does "social causation" diminish individual and/or collective responsibility? This question raises a host of other questions concerning the nature and extent of circumstantial coercion, the malleability of human nature, and the "nature v. nurture controversy." To what degree are human beings conditioned by their social environment and their genetic makeup? There are two wrong answers:
1. Human behavior is infinitely malleable via manipulation of the social environment (social determinism). Therefore individual responsibility is impossible.
2. Human behavior is not malleable at all, but determined by our social environment and biology (genetic determinism). Therefore, the assessment of individual responsibility is impossible.
If the truth lies somewhere between these extremes, then how do we (in fact) go about assessing personal and collective moral responsibility in our everyday lives? How should we?
Now the relationship between legality and morality is itself subject to a long line of philosophical inquiry. Historically, many philosophers have argued that morality is timelessly universal and “objective” and that legality is relative to time and place. Other philosophers have argued that universal morality always trumps legality. Some say that both morality and legality are temporally and culturally relative. Therefore, “When in Rome do as the Romans do.”
Sunday, December 18, 2011
Metaphysical Academic Freedom
Okay...so I copped out on my last blog entry on academic freedom. If you all insist, I'll take a crack at the ever-elusive concept of "metaphysical academic freedom." To me, metaphysical academic freedom generally refers to either the descriptive (factual) capacity for human to "freely" produce a theory and the prescriptive (normative) conditions that might be involved. Descriptive academic freedom would entail addressing the larger problems of biological and cultural determinism. Prescriptive academic freedom might involve the rights and duties that would undergird that "freedom of inquiry." Answers to academic questions are called theories (or conjectures) that either explain, predict, or control phenomena. So it's fair to ask two questions: "To what extent do I have a right to propose theories?" And, "To what extent do I have a right to propose theories to an academic community?"
First of all, what do we mean by a right to propose a theory? There are two kinds of rights: positive rights and negative rights. If I claim a positive right to propose a theory, then someone else has a duty to assist me. If I have a negative right, that means that my right is implies the duty of non-interference by others and does not necessarily mean that others have a duty to assist me or enable me to publish my theory. That is: "Ron you have a right to publish that book, I won't interfere with that! But I don't have a duty to read it, and I don't have a duty to publish it in my journal. How about a case study?
Ron W. is going up for promotion next year and believes that he needs one more publication. So he surfs the Internet and finds a journal titled the Journal of Arcane and Useless Philosophy, which has an acceptance rate of 98.2% and a circulation of 73 subscribers. It is published by the Society for Arcane and Useless Philosophy, which has a membership of 73. Ron thinks to himself: "Ah...the perfect home for my most recent scholarly essay: "Does Academic Freedom Imply Positive or Negative Rights?" He sends the essay to the editor, who then sends it to two "referees," who read it six months later and submit their respective reviews. Reader A loves it, and offers three minor revisions. Reader B hates it and recommends that it be rejected. The editor, however, notes that only three essays were submitted to the journal in the last three months (all were accepted) and that Volume 11 Number 16 needs one more article. So he decides to publish Ron's essay. As a result, Ron was promoted to full professor. Since then, three scholars read that article (one of them finished it!), the Society for Arcane Philosophy has disbanded, and their journal discontinued. However, that article still appears prominently on Ron's curriculum vitae. Question: Does "academic freedom" include a scholar's right to publish research in journals that no one reads? Do academic institutions have a right or a duty to read what their faculty publish? And, if so who and how much should that reader get paid? So much for metaphysical academic freedom.
First of all, what do we mean by a right to propose a theory? There are two kinds of rights: positive rights and negative rights. If I claim a positive right to propose a theory, then someone else has a duty to assist me. If I have a negative right, that means that my right is implies the duty of non-interference by others and does not necessarily mean that others have a duty to assist me or enable me to publish my theory. That is: "Ron you have a right to publish that book, I won't interfere with that! But I don't have a duty to read it, and I don't have a duty to publish it in my journal. How about a case study?
Ron W. is going up for promotion next year and believes that he needs one more publication. So he surfs the Internet and finds a journal titled the Journal of Arcane and Useless Philosophy, which has an acceptance rate of 98.2% and a circulation of 73 subscribers. It is published by the Society for Arcane and Useless Philosophy, which has a membership of 73. Ron thinks to himself: "Ah...the perfect home for my most recent scholarly essay: "Does Academic Freedom Imply Positive or Negative Rights?" He sends the essay to the editor, who then sends it to two "referees," who read it six months later and submit their respective reviews. Reader A loves it, and offers three minor revisions. Reader B hates it and recommends that it be rejected. The editor, however, notes that only three essays were submitted to the journal in the last three months (all were accepted) and that Volume 11 Number 16 needs one more article. So he decides to publish Ron's essay. As a result, Ron was promoted to full professor. Since then, three scholars read that article (one of them finished it!), the Society for Arcane Philosophy has disbanded, and their journal discontinued. However, that article still appears prominently on Ron's curriculum vitae. Question: Does "academic freedom" include a scholar's right to publish research in journals that no one reads? Do academic institutions have a right or a duty to read what their faculty publish? And, if so who and how much should that reader get paid? So much for metaphysical academic freedom.
Labels:
academic freedom,
negative rights,
positive rights
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
