BOOK REVIEW: Alexandra Lange, The Design of Childhood: How the Material World Shapes Independent Kids (Bloomsbury Publishing, NY: 2018)

Alexandra Lange, The Design of Childhood: How the Material World Shapes Independent Kids (Bloomsbury Publishing, NY: 2018)

 

 This is a welcome addition to a genre of scholarly research that explores the nature and history of childhood play. The author is a well-published critic of human-constructed architectural environments. This most recent book explores the “Design of Childhood.” Much of it is historical, identifying the principles that underlie the ebb and flow how adults (for better or worse) have designed material environments and toys (large and small) for children since the early twentieth century. Chapter titles reveal much about its foci: Blocks, House, School, Playground, and City. One of the over-riding themes is the observation that, since the late 20^th century, adults have been over-protecting children and thereby undermining their independence, creativity, and social development. By the authors own admission, the book is intended to be more descriptive (facts) than prescriptive (values), which is mostly true. But at least some critics will argue that this emphasis resulted in wishy-washy prescriptive conclusions, as evident in its final sentences, which urge us to learn from the past in order to “make childhood a better place.” Nevertheless, this is an important addition to a rapidly expanding genre that has largely ignored design issues.    

Reviewed for Choice Magazine by: Ronald F. White, Ph.D.

 

 

The Philosophy of Play

                            By: Ronald F. White, Ph.D.
                               Professor of Philosophy
                           Mount St. Joseph University

                                         ABSTRACT
 
            Scholars agree that, at all times, in all places, and at all stages of post-natal development, human beings exhibit, what we all (rather loosely) refer to as “play behavior.” Among the many scholarly disciplines that study “play,” philosophy is foundational. That’s because play is inherently multidisciplinary, while philosophy has become increasingly interdisciplinary. Therefore it is well-postured to contribute toward a more unified theory of play. A well-developed, unified theory will address the most important foundational questions, including: What exactly is “play behavior” and how is it distinguished from “non-play behavior?” Based on that theory, do non-human species play, if so how does non-human play behavior compare to human play?  What are toys and how do they relate to play? Over time and place, how and why does play and toys vary within and between cultures? What are the determinants that influence the amount of time, effort, and resources that humans and non-humans devote to play? And finally, how might future philosophers contribute to the advancement of playtime research in other disciplines?

 

            WHAT IS THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLAY?

            Before we can make much progress on the “philosophy of play,” we must address the two age-old questions: “What do philosophers do?” and, “Are philosophers useful?” Most philosophers agree that they “ask questions and pose answers,” and that the vast majority of professional philosophers teach in colleges and universities. But once they get beyond those two acknowledgments, there is not much agreement. Most notably, there is widespread disagreement as to which questions are worth asking, how to go about answering those questions, and what questions require philosophical, non-scientific, and/or scientific answers. There is also widespread agreement that epistemological questions are foundational, especially: What is a Theory? What is Truth? What is Value? And, how do Truth and Value relate to one another? Hence, we have the revival of the old positivist agenda that seeks to transform values (good and bad) into facts (true and false). Let’s add that non-philosophers often ask/answer philosophical issues and that non-philosophers reinterpret those philosophical questions, and sometimes they do not acknowledge that some questions/answers are inexorably philosophical or non-philosophical. Most disciplinary approaches to the study of play contain unstated epistemological assumptions; especially the nature of theories, truth and value. Therefore, in order to address these epistemological issues and work toward towards a “unified theory of play,” this essay will argue that this unification requires both biological and cultural evolution.
 

WHAT IS THE SCIENCE OF PLAY?

 

In recent times, many philosophers have become interdisciplinary scholars, and therefore employ philosophical theories as a way to bridge the gaps between various disciplines. Scientific explanations of human behavior invoke scientific theories. So based on contemporary science, what distinguishes “play” from “non-play?”

As a matter of sheer logic, playtime philosophers agree that play must be fun. So if we engage in a behavior that is not fun, it’s not play. Of course, this raises the question: What is fun? Well, fun (by definition) must be pleasurable. Evolutionary psychologists, observe that, at least some, human feelings of pleasure and pain are evolutionarily shaped, over vast expanses of time, by natural and/or sexual selection. Feelings of pleasure, naturally, incite us to engage in that behavior again, and feelings of pain discourage us from doing it again. Those feelings can be materially reduced to various chemical changes that take place within the human body, especially the presence and/or absence of the hormone serotonin. Similarly, neuroscientists can now differentiate between the experience of pain and pleasure by looking at the flow of neurons within human brain via various imaging technologies.

At least some feelings of pain and pleasure can also be shaped by social and/or cultural norms present at any given time or place. Thus, social scientists distinguish between human behaviors that are timelessly universal from those that are relative to specific times and places. Although “play-behavior,” in general, is timelessly universal, it manifests itself in forms that are historically and/or culturally relative. Developmental psychologists might seek to explain how “play” changes over the course of a human person’s lifetime: At what age do these changes take place? Why do these changes take place? Is child’s play different from adult play; and if so, how? Anthropologists and sociologists might seek to identify changes over time within and between cultures. The most complex forms of historically and culturally relative play are often comprised of timelessly universal components; shaped by biological evolution.

In sum, there are three empirical observations that underlie playtime science. First, “play” is, obviously, a form of human behavior and therefore its presence or absence can be empirically verified and/or falsified by external observation. Second, human play behavior can be internally observed in terms of a “player’s own psychological states via the feelings and thoughts that accompany that behavior. In short, we all know, directly, when we’re experiencing pleasure and pain. Third, it is also empirically evident that other primates and hominids exhibit similar patterns of “play-like” behavior.

Theories are complex beliefs that have both theoretical social implications. Some playtime scholars focus their time, energy, and resources on theoretical concerns such as empirical evidence, logical consistency, and soundness; while others note that all theories serve a variety of social functions, at various times and places. So what are the social functions of contemporary playtime theories serve, and how do we evaluate those functions; that is, how do we differentiate between a “good theory of play” and a “bad theory of play?”