The "Is" and the "Ought"

As I wind up my research on Leadership Ethics I have become more convinced of the centrality of the distinction between facts (is) and values (ought), and how they are related. As social psychologists continue to uncover the mental mechanisms that comprise our "moral psychology," it becomes increasingly evident that we still do not really know what to make of these scientific truths. Here are the basic questions: How does empirical knowledge about mental mechanisms elucidate everyday moral problems? If we knew all of the "facts" that underlie our moral feelings, thoughts, and behaviors, would we also know all of the "values" that ought to guide us? Before we get started, let's clear the air of two fallacies. The naturalistic fallacy says that "facts" determine "values" and that empirical knowledge alone elucidates knowledge of moral goodness. The moralistic fallacy says that knowledge of "values" (moral facts) trumps knowledge of "facts" and/or that "facts" are merely values in "disguise. Most moral psychologists deny that either the naturalist fallacy or the moralistic fallacy is a fallacy. So how does libertarianism approach the is/ought distinction?

First of all, thoughtful libertarians like Karl Popper, F.A. Hayek and myself (;D) deny that there are (in fact) either scientific facts or moral facts. The word "fact" carries with it an aura of finality: "We know the Truth, therefore, we must act on it. If it's True, it's True forever." Libertarians argue that knowledge of facts and values is highly fallible and therefore must be subjected to constant revision. Why? Well, because scientists, like everyone else, are prone to make mistakes and/or succumb to the influence of power structures. Science and ethics, therefore, are about establishing a self-correcting system that uncovers both factual errors and value-errors wrought by ideological corruption. The early libertarians were the first to attack the scientific positivists and the moral positivists by insisting on continued inquiry, even when scientists and moralists insist that they've got it right. That means that thoughtful libertarians are reluctant to bestow unquestioned authority on either scientists or moralists. We are not skeptics or cynics. Our allegiance is not to particular scientific or moral truths but to self-correcting epistemic processes that weed out error and ideological contamination of what's presented as unassailable scientific and moral facts. How does all of this work? I'll have to cover that later. I have a class in 10 minutes and a stack of essays to grade before I can do much else.

Nationalism v. Globalism

Check out my friend Peter Corning's most recent blog entry on "Fair Trade" on his FAIR SOCIETY blog and my comment. http://www.thefairsociety.net/

Who says: "Money can't buy Happiness?"

I saw this in Science News. http://www.world-science.net/othernews/100908_happiness

What is Happiness?

Aristotle's philosophy is based on two naturalistic principles: centrality and hierarchy. Both play a key role in his theory of happiness. Both are empirically dubious and tend to undermine personal liberty.

For Aristotle, everything in nature has a goal or purpose. Excellence of anything, therefore, refers to the fulfillment of function or purpose. What end or purpose do all humans pursue? Aristotle argues that happiness is the supreme "end" of all human action. Humans have three kinds of souls: vegetative (appetitive), animal (spirited), and human (rational). We are qualitatively superior to other species because of the presence of that "higher" rational soul. Thus we have the basis for over two thousand years of anthropocentrism. And unfortunately, Aristotle never empirically verified the existence of these three souls. They are really explanatory constructs. Today we know that these functions (along with many other functions) are performed by our brains and spinal cords. But anyway... Aristotle attributed our human nature to this "higher" rational soul. Like Plato, Aristotle argued that in the sphere of human action, the function of that "higher soul" is to control the other two "lower souls."

Aristotle was also intellectually infatuated with the "middle" or "centrality." Everything good, naturally, resides in the middle. Hence, the earth must be the center of the universe. Moral virtue, therefore lies midway between the vices of excess and deficiency. Thus the "Good Life" is one of moderation in all spheres of deliberate human action. When faced with fear, the virtue of courage is bordered by both foolhardiness and cowardice. Then, Aristotle goes on to identify many other spheres where virtue might be exercised. Virtue is also contextual. Again, doing the right thing requires you to "do it" at the right time (not too early, not too late), at the right place, and right degree (not too much, not too little.

So everything that we deliberately pursue aims at the goal of happiness. Unfortunately, not everything we pursue actually leads to happiness. We all make mistakes by going after the wrong things, at the wrong place, and/or wrong degree. (But that doesn't necessarily disprove his general hypothesis.) He argues that there are three main ways that humans pursue happiness, or the "Good Life:" a life in pursuit of pleasure (experience), a life in pursuit of honor (military), a life in pursuit of wisdom (contemplation). For now, let's focus on the pursuit of pleasure. Aristotle, distinguishes between the experience of higher and lower pleasures. Unfortunately, he wrongly believed that only humans are capable of experiencing the higher intellectual pleasures. Higher intellectual pleasures are qualitatively and quantitatively superior to lower pleasures, which are the products of our "lower" nature. Thus, if we never experience higher pleasures we are not fulfilling our higher purpose, and therefore are not really happy. Even if we believe we're happy! I suspect that Aristotle would say that the vast majority of humans do not live happy lives, even though they believe they are happy. After all, most humas are not capable of living happy lives because they lack either the natural intelligence or the moral training to be virtuous. Three final caveats: First, it is natural (and good) for "virtuous people" to rule. Second, you cannot be the judge of your own happiness. It requires third-party verification. And Third, happiness can only be predicated over a lifetime, therefore, a happy life can only be identified by third parties after you're dead. Thus young people have only the potential to be happy. But if you are 21 years old and still lack moral virtue, that potential is rather low. And, of course, it's natural (and good) for old people to rule over young people. (Right now I won't go into his idea than men ought to rule over women and animals.)

Aristotle is challenging for any libertarian. Why? There's a lot of good, old-fashioned common sense! He's obviously right in affirming that we're rational animals that live in cities. It's also probably true that a life of moderation is more likely to contribute to at least a long life. But then, most of us acknowledge that many "good lives" are posthumously valued because they have been cut short. However, libertarians are obviously concerned with his propensity to defend natural social hierarchies, which tend to concentrate power in the "upper classes." Overall, there is no necessary reason for a libertarian to reject virtue-based ethics. After all, it's your life. However, we are concerned with your political views, especially if seek to set yourself up (and/or your cronies) in that "higher" social status, and rule over the rest of us.

My next blog entry will delve deeper into the question of whether happiness requires third-party attribution by outside experts, and whether that determination must be post-mortem.

Happiness: Introductory Remarks

I use the Freedom's Philosopher blog to develop libertarian theories that address important issues in social and political philosophy. I recently tried my hand at leadership. I thought it would be worthwhile to explore the question of "happiness." I'm in the process of re-reading Aristotle's NICOMACHEAN ETHICS for my course on Human Nature, and I'm reading Sissela Bok's new book, EXPLORING HAPPINESS. In a few days I should be ready to embark on that endeavor. I'll probably address three main issues raised by Aristotle, which are also covered by Bok. What are the basic theories of happiness that have been offered by philosophers? Can we know whether we are happy or not without input from others? And, what is the relationship between morality and happiness? The next three blog entries will tackle these basic questions.

Legality and Morality

Prescriptive human inquiry explores the basis for normative human behavior guided by "norms." Philosophers often distinguish between two spheres of normative activity: "legalty" and "morality." Political philosophy focuses on how organized societies employ these two alternative means of social control. Liberal societies tend to rely more on on morality, communitarian societies tend to rely more on legality. Let's sort out these two basic concepts a little bit.

Individual human beings are planners by nature; that is, we are goal-directed animals that have the ability to deliberately alter our present behavior in order to bring about a preferable future state of affairs. Social psychologists argue that although we are capable of altering our own goal-directed behavior for the sake of the future, we're not very good at it, and therefore we tend to live more in the present or near future. (There are evolutionary reasons for this that we explore later.) Living in social groups requires placing limits on at least some forms of individual behavior. All groups employ the use of painful disincentives (or sticks) and pleasurable incentives (or carrots). Legality and morality represent two different ways that societies and social groups to use those sticks.

Legality enforces rules, primarily, by punishing rule violations with painful dinincentives. Historically, societies have used physical pain (whipping), killing (hanging), deprivation of resources (fines), and incarceration (jail time). The degree of punishment has always been set in proportion to seriousness of the rule violation (or crime): "An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth." The rules that are monitored and enforced by any given group, reflect the values of the central planners. The Taliban's recent execution (by stoning) of a young couple for elopement, reflects the "value" that it places on the rules that govern marriage. The United States government still imposes longer sentences for drug offenders that use "crack cocaine" than for "powdered cocaine." (Don't ask me why!) Legality is obviously enormously complicated. Justice requires that rule violations must be deliberate, and therefore enforcers must decide the degree of voluntariness involved in the rule violation. Individuals that are declared "incompetent" are given lighter sentences, or placed under the control of psychiatrists rather than prison guards or executioners. The laws themselves are written by "lawmakers," in an obscure language that only lawyers can understand (sometimes they can't even understant it!), which means that questions of guilt or innocence are shaped by credentialized lawyers and judges, who control the processes of criminal justice. Some laws are so vaguely written that it's difficult if not impossible to decipher the lawmakers' original intent. Old laws are especially problematic. The courts generally rely on tradition to resolve these vague cases by referring to previous "legal precedents." In the end, judges and juries decide matters of guilt or innocence and the degree of punishment. Of course, the more laws that are being enforced, the more difficult it is for individuals to know what's illegal. And finally, most societies have processes by which convicted rule-breakers can appeal to another judge or jury. We can go on-and-on...but the point here is that legality is one way that human beings enforce rules that shape social behavior.

Morality is different. First of all, morality (by definition) is not enforced by any one single centralized entity: otherwise it becomes legality. Morality naturally arises from personal and group relationships. In it's purest form the rules of morality spontaneously emerge out of specific social contexts. We praise good behavior and blame bad moral behavior. Blameworthy behavior is discouraged by public sentiment, and not by physical threats to person or property. Public sentiment can be applied in various ways such as "labeling" the person that violate the rules, labels with negative connotations such as: whore, cad, tight-wad, drunk, or addict. Sentiment also includes punishing violations by individually and collectively treating that person as less valuable than others, including the practice of "shunning." The specific rules of morality tend to be rather stable because they get locked into bodies of tradition via teaching and learning. In fact, many individuals justify moral rules based on tradition alone: "We've always done it that way." But over the long run, moral rules evolve based on variation and selection. In the United States we do not regard having children out of wedlock as immoral or ilegal, although we do not think its very prudent. We certainly don't stone them. The advantage of relying on morality to insure social cohesion is that it does not require the formentioned expensive legal institutions: policemen, lawyers, judges, prison guards, and executioners. A moral society is "self-organized."

The nature of any society is based how much morality is monitored and enforced via legality. Minarchist libertarians, like myself, seek to limit the sphere of legality to harm to persons or property. Hence, limit legality to controlling murder, theft, and fraud. Communitarian societies tend to monitor and enforce much of their moral codes via the coercive power of legality, including . In countries like this, the legal codes become enormous, and the costs of monitoring and enforcement rise proportionately. One sign of a society that relies primarily on legality is the size of their police force,judiciary, and the number of lawyers. We can also look at the number or prisons and/or executions (for non-violent crimes). Now when groups are organized based on legality, members obey the law based on "fear of getting caught." Therefore, in groups that have many laws, but don't have enough policemen, those laws are routinely violated. My personal view is that a "Good Society" or "Good Social Group" is one that limits legality to monitoring and enforcing laws against harm to others. Why? Because legality interferes with the natural evolution of morality. I'm glad we don't stone young couples that want elope any more, but I am concerned that the Drug War marches on, even though most of us are concerned with the exponential growth of police forces and the inordinate amount of time spent on drug crimes. One consequence of using the police to enforce legal moralism is that the police rarely catch murderers, rapists, thieves, and frauds; and jails and prisons are all full of junkies. No room left for real criminals. Go figure.

Experts and Imperfect Information

In my previous blog, I suggested that the Gulf Oil Spill is has been polluted by a surge of experts. Since I already discussed a libertarian stance on leadership, I thought it might be worthwhile to take a closer look at those "experts."

First of all, leaders and experts have a lot in common. Both enjoy the social privileges associated with authority and both gain those privileges via a maze of socio-political construction. So what is an "expert?" Well, today the process of gaining expertise is a lot different than it was in the past. On the other hand, let me suggest that all societies in all times and all places produce experts and that the processes employed are very similar. At the cultural level, the first experts were probably religious experts that claimed to possess knowledge of the will of God. More recent experts claim to know the will of Nature. While we'd all like to say that there's a major difference between experts on religion and experts on nature, I'd argue that there's more commonality than difference. The most obvious commonality is that expertise has always been conferred by a public institution of some kind. Religious experts are coronated by religious institutions and scientific experts are coronated by scientific institutions. Today, scientific expertise is contingent upon the completion of a series of tasks and the acquistion of a technical language that signify membership in the community of scientific experts. FThis entails attending a college or university that confers documents that confer expertise. Once you complete this series of tasks (usually four years) you must undergo a ceremony of initiation. These ceremonies exhibit highly ritualized speech and behavior that involve costumes, music, documents and a gallery of witnesses comprised of family and friends of the conferees. These pompous ceremonies are conducted by old experts that have already completed these rituals. Near the end of the ceremonies, conferees are awarded their official documents, which signal the acquistion of expertise. These documents are usually prominently displayed on a wall where the expert sells his/her expertise. Once this document is secured, the new expert joins an association, which has its own rituals and mode of communication.

It is important to note that throughout human history the vast majority of conferers and conferees of expertise have been men. Although, in recent years, many females have entered the brotherhood of experts, they tend to be experts in areas involving the "care" of other humans; especially in primary education, health care, and social science. But there are still very few female experts in physics, mathematics, engineering, or religion. In recent years there has been an overall surge in the number of female experts, as the number of males that complete the ritual declines. How that plays out over the long run remains to be seen.

Now there are two different kinds of experts. First, there are experts that acquire "perfect information" over the course of their ritual. The hallmark of the acquisition of perfect information is that it leads to the ability to effectively predict or control something of value. An expert in mathematics can accurately add, subtract, and multipy numbers; and expert in engineering can build a bridge. This kind of expertise is easily demonstrated so if your mathematical calculations are wrong or if your bridge falls into the river, your expertise may be questioned, despite the possession of the document displayed on a wall. Occasionally, the conferers of expertise withdraw their expert designation and remove the document from the wall of the conferee. But not very often. In fact, the higher the level of expertise attained, the less likely it is that you'll lose that document.

The second kind of expert, claims possession of "imperfect information." These experts are usually held to a much lower standard, given that the phenomena that they predict and control are more complex and therefore there is less consensus among the conferers of expertise as to what the expert will be able to predict or control after the document is conferred. The most noteworthy experts on imperfect information are in religion, philosophy, social science, medicine, theoretical physics, macro-economics, and ecological science. The hallmark of experts on imperfect information is that it is more difficult for them to publically demonstrate their expertise and even more difficult to disprove their expertise. Therefore, experts in imperfect information primarily demonstrate their expertise by producing documents that other experts in their association occasionally read and criticise. Fortunately, publication of these documents is sufficient to maintain expert designation, even if no one understands or even reads those documents.

Finally, it is important to note that experts on imperfect information, rarely if ever, admit that their information is imperfect. But instead, they claim to possess perfect information. Since their bridges never fall in the river, and their oil wells rarely pollute the waterways, these kinds of experts tend to enjoy a high degree of job security. Therefore, in the near future we can expect an increase in the number of experts on imperfect information. We can also expect more falling bridges and oil spills.