In my last blog I suggested that minarchy lies midway between the ideals of anarchy and unbridled progressivism. This raises two obvious questions: "How small is small?" and "How do we prevent small from becoming large?" How any government (national, state, or local) answers to these questions determines the degree of personal liberty within that jurisdiction. I'll try to focus on the United States, but I think these issues apply equally to all governments.
Almost all minarchists argue that there are three main functions that require a publically-funded governmental monopoly: a defensive military, a domestic police force, and a criminal justice system. (Some of us are also willing to provide a basic safety net.) All three represent a realistic collective response to the darker side of human nature. Some individuals and groups of humans are willing to violate the non-aggression axiom and/or the anti-theft axiom, in order to advance their interests. Anarchists argue that even these functions ought to be be privatized, which would subject those functions to competition, increase quality, and reduce cost. The question here is whether minarchies can maintain competition without caving into cronyism.
Obviously, all nations need a military force. The the size of that military is contingent upon how governments use those militaries. Minarchists argue that the the military must be defensive in nature. Thus, we must be able to thwart an invasion. If, governments expand that mandate to include "potential invasions," then the size of the military is likely to expand. According to Ron Paul and Dennis Kucinich, the United States' military has expanded way out of control, and as a result we have troops stationed all over the world and several wars underway. Cronyism is a primary source of spiraling military budgets. The corporations that supply the "War Machine" with supplies are especially powerful, mostly because military contracts are notoriously opaque and non-competitive. Hence, the proverbial $400 toilet seats! One might argue that we've already "privatized" the U.S. military, however, what we've really done is disabled competition via cronyism. In short, privatization does not necessarily imply free markets.
Minarchists also support a publically-funded police force. Now, first of all, the size of a police force is contingent upon the number of laws that it is required to montor and enforce. The more more laws there are "on the books" the larger the police force you'll need. Minarchists argue that lawmaking powers of congress must be limited the laws that address the harm principle; that is "harm to other persons" (assault, murder etc.) and "harm to the property of others" (theft, fraud, breach of contract etc.). The problem with the harm principle is that it tends to become irrationally pre-occupied with preventing low-magnitude harms and low-probability harms. Paternalistic laws that protect us from "self-inflicted harms" have led to an extraordinary expansion of police forces, especially drug laws, laws against gambling, alcohol abuse. The United States leads the world in incarceration, most of those prisoners committed are non-violent drug crimes. The actual cost of providing a police force is also contingent upon how those policemen are paid. Libertarians argue that policement ought to be paid based on free market forces, where the best policement get paid the most (within the bounds of the free market) and the worst policemen get fired. Of course, crony relationships between politicians and law enforcement are way too common and lead to bloated, over-paid and under-paid policemen.
Minarchists also accept a publically-funded criminal justice system. Like the police force, the size of the judiciary is contingent upon the number of laws it is expected to enforce. The more laws and the more policemen, the more lawyers and judges that are needed. The exponential growth of the judiciary (at all levels) is also related to the fact that our law schools crank out a lot of lawyers, those lawyers often become politicians, and they have a powerful lobby. Thus, cronyism also contributes to bloated judiciaries. The cost of maintaining a judiciary is also contingent upon how much lawyers and judges are paid, and whether they are appointed or elected. Another important cause of "judiciary creep" is the longstanding legal tradition of writing laws in a private language known only to lawyers, and judges who are empowered to "interpret" those laws. This also artificially enforces their monopoly.
In sum, I have argued that minarchists seek to limit the size and scope of government to military, police, and judicial functions. However, even if our government limited itself to those three functions, there is no guarantee that small government would not morph into large government. Therefore, the most efficient way to limit the size of government is to limit the ability of politicians to endlessly expand the criminal code beyond crimes against persons and properties. I think both libertarians and progressives agree that the U.S. government has expanded way beyond minarchy.
Saturday, July 16, 2011
Wednesday, July 13, 2011
Two Ideological Perspectives on the Use of Coercive Political Power
The current political malaise in the United States can be best understood in terms of two conflicting ideological perspectives on the the nature and use of political power. On the far left we have the progressives, on the far right we have the libertarians. There is a lot of variation within both ideologies. However, in the United States progressives usually lean toward the far left of the Democratic Party, the libertarians usually lean toward the far right of the Republican Party. However, neither progressives nor libertarians dominate their respective parties. The progressive-libertarian debate is a very old and important debate, therefore it's still worth reviewing those two ideologies.
Progressives are idealists that believe that political entities (cities, states, and nations) must deploy the coercive of power of government in order to serve the public good. Progressive government requires that altruistic, impartial, objective leaders that will exercise political power in pursuit of the "public good." Good government, therefore, requires that political entities seek out these "good leaders." When government fails to serve the public good it is because the political system has become infested with self-serving leaders that use their political power to enrich themselves, their families, and friends at the expense of the public good: call it cronyism. Therefore, the key to progressive government is to devise a political system that selects these "good leaders." Plato believed that in order to maintain a sufficient supply of "good leaders," the state must develop selective breeding programs and specialtized education programs. Contemporary American progressives reject selective breeding, but place invest heavily in law degrees earned at elite private schools, most notably Yale and Harvard. Coercive force is exercised in the form of a "progressive" tax code, which provides the funds to serve the public good. In the United States, progressives tend to equate serving the public good to implimenting government programs that serve the unmet needs of the "least advantaged," the poor, workers, consumers, elderly, sick, racial minorities, and women. This agenda requires large numbers of workers employed by tax-funded government agencies. For most progressives, knowledge of the "public good" and knowledge of how to achieve it usually relegated to empowered social scientists. On foreign policy, many progressives support the use of U.S. military power to advance the "public good."
Libertarians are idealists that believe that coercive power is always wrong, either because it violates the property rights of others or because it leads to bad comsequences. Taxation is regarded as problematic because it resembles theft; that is the involutary appropriation of another person's property. Libertarians also argue that knowledge of the public good and how to achieve it is elusive, if not impossible. Social scientists routinely identify the "public good" with the good of the social scientists themselves, or their cronies in government that empowered them. Libertarians are especially wary of the rise of cronyism, where government serves the good of specific interest groups, especially: corportations, labor unions, churches, and the military. All libertarians are against the use of military power unless we're actually invaded by a foreign nation. Therefore, according to libertarians, the secret to good government is to either eliminate the coercive power of government (anarchism) or limit the coercive power of government (minarchy).
Anarchists reject government outright, and idealistically believe that if individuals (and groups of cooperating individuals) are left to make their own decisions and live with the consequences of those decisions, human society would thrive. Anarchists argue that because progressive governments "spend other people's money," they tend to be overly-generous to the least advantaged and public employees, and less concerned with "bang for the buck" efficiency. Moreover, anarchists observe that over time, collectivized power tends to corrupt even the most altruistic, and impartial leaders. Social science is similarly corrupted. Therefore, progressive governments tend to collapse under the weight of military adventurism coupled with the high levels of taxation needed to serve the bureaucracies that serve the "military-industrial complex" and the ever-growing ranks of "least advantaged." Anarchists argue that eventually everyone becomes either a soldier or "least advantaged." Thus, under anarchy all collective functions are met by non-governmental entities, including the: military, police force, criminal justice system, and social welfare.
Minarchists embrace limited government; that is government that is limited to using tax money to provide a defensive military, police force, and judiciary. Some minarchists, like myself, are also willing to include a "basic safety net" to protect the "least advantaged." Anarchists, however, insist that minarchy is unsustainable and that, over time, minarchism becomes progressivism. Altruistic politicians and social scientists are eventually corrupted by power. Progressives argue that the limited power of minarchism, inevitably leads to under-funded military, police, judiciary, and safety nets.
Today, the idealists on the far left (progressives) and the far right (anarchists) are unwilling to compromise and therefore the U.S. government now mired in gridlock. Since minarchists draw criticism from both the far left and the far right, they now occupy the centrist position in U.S. Politics. I would argue that the future of the United States lies in the formation of a coalition of progressives and libertarians that are willing to limit the exercise of concentrated political power, but not necessarily eliminate it. Politically, this might result in the formation of a political alliance between Ron Paul and Dennis Kucinich.
Progressives are idealists that believe that political entities (cities, states, and nations) must deploy the coercive of power of government in order to serve the public good. Progressive government requires that altruistic, impartial, objective leaders that will exercise political power in pursuit of the "public good." Good government, therefore, requires that political entities seek out these "good leaders." When government fails to serve the public good it is because the political system has become infested with self-serving leaders that use their political power to enrich themselves, their families, and friends at the expense of the public good: call it cronyism. Therefore, the key to progressive government is to devise a political system that selects these "good leaders." Plato believed that in order to maintain a sufficient supply of "good leaders," the state must develop selective breeding programs and specialtized education programs. Contemporary American progressives reject selective breeding, but place invest heavily in law degrees earned at elite private schools, most notably Yale and Harvard. Coercive force is exercised in the form of a "progressive" tax code, which provides the funds to serve the public good. In the United States, progressives tend to equate serving the public good to implimenting government programs that serve the unmet needs of the "least advantaged," the poor, workers, consumers, elderly, sick, racial minorities, and women. This agenda requires large numbers of workers employed by tax-funded government agencies. For most progressives, knowledge of the "public good" and knowledge of how to achieve it usually relegated to empowered social scientists. On foreign policy, many progressives support the use of U.S. military power to advance the "public good."
Libertarians are idealists that believe that coercive power is always wrong, either because it violates the property rights of others or because it leads to bad comsequences. Taxation is regarded as problematic because it resembles theft; that is the involutary appropriation of another person's property. Libertarians also argue that knowledge of the public good and how to achieve it is elusive, if not impossible. Social scientists routinely identify the "public good" with the good of the social scientists themselves, or their cronies in government that empowered them. Libertarians are especially wary of the rise of cronyism, where government serves the good of specific interest groups, especially: corportations, labor unions, churches, and the military. All libertarians are against the use of military power unless we're actually invaded by a foreign nation. Therefore, according to libertarians, the secret to good government is to either eliminate the coercive power of government (anarchism) or limit the coercive power of government (minarchy).
Anarchists reject government outright, and idealistically believe that if individuals (and groups of cooperating individuals) are left to make their own decisions and live with the consequences of those decisions, human society would thrive. Anarchists argue that because progressive governments "spend other people's money," they tend to be overly-generous to the least advantaged and public employees, and less concerned with "bang for the buck" efficiency. Moreover, anarchists observe that over time, collectivized power tends to corrupt even the most altruistic, and impartial leaders. Social science is similarly corrupted. Therefore, progressive governments tend to collapse under the weight of military adventurism coupled with the high levels of taxation needed to serve the bureaucracies that serve the "military-industrial complex" and the ever-growing ranks of "least advantaged." Anarchists argue that eventually everyone becomes either a soldier or "least advantaged." Thus, under anarchy all collective functions are met by non-governmental entities, including the: military, police force, criminal justice system, and social welfare.
Minarchists embrace limited government; that is government that is limited to using tax money to provide a defensive military, police force, and judiciary. Some minarchists, like myself, are also willing to include a "basic safety net" to protect the "least advantaged." Anarchists, however, insist that minarchy is unsustainable and that, over time, minarchism becomes progressivism. Altruistic politicians and social scientists are eventually corrupted by power. Progressives argue that the limited power of minarchism, inevitably leads to under-funded military, police, judiciary, and safety nets.
Today, the idealists on the far left (progressives) and the far right (anarchists) are unwilling to compromise and therefore the U.S. government now mired in gridlock. Since minarchists draw criticism from both the far left and the far right, they now occupy the centrist position in U.S. Politics. I would argue that the future of the United States lies in the formation of a coalition of progressives and libertarians that are willing to limit the exercise of concentrated political power, but not necessarily eliminate it. Politically, this might result in the formation of a political alliance between Ron Paul and Dennis Kucinich.
Wednesday, May 25, 2011
Nuanced Cooperation
In my previous blog entry I suggested that social scientists often overlook some of the finer points in human cooperation. Let's continue that diatribe! Obviously, the word "cooperation" is notoriously vague. It is a relational term that can mean just about anything. So let's call my new approach: "nuanced cooperation." Obviously, cooperation requires at least two persons, unless you suffer from multiple-personality disorder. Under normal, healthy psychological circumstances, you cannot cooperate with yourself or with a thing. Individuals can cooperate with other individuals and/or groups, and groups can cooperate with other groups and/or individuals. One of the nuances that is almost entirely overlooked in discussions of cooperation is the obvious fact that there are varying degrees of cooperation. So why do we cooperate in varying degrees? Well...because we live in a finite world and therefore individuals and groups cannot afford to contribute time, energy, and resources to all cooperative enterprise. Hence, finite humans ration their cooperative time, energy, and resources. Many if not most individual enterprises involve both cooperation and competition from other enterprises. Even Bill Gates rations his finite resources! Given the vast number of cooperative opportunities in our social environment, we are all probably more non-cooperative than cooperative. Therefore, it's probably more accurate to portray modern humans as a non-cooperative.
All cooperative enterprises involve planning in pursuit of ends or goals. Collective enterprises orchestrated by groups (or organizations) require collective planning, which in turn requires leader-follower relationships. A good leader attracts followers, a bad leader repels followers. Individual enterprises require individual planning. And, of course, there are better and worse forms of individual and collective planning. Ineffective planning usually leads to failure to achieve one's goals. We are non-cooperative when we prefer not to contribute our time, energy or resources to any given enterprise. Even when we choose to cooperate, we limit the amount of time, energy, and resources that we commit to various cooperative enterprises. Consequently, most enterprises eventually suffer from extinction due to competition from other enterprises. The number of cooperators associated with the horse and buggy industry and the Flat Earth Society has been greatly diminished.
Of course, there's a lot moral discourse associated with how individuals and groups ration time, energy, and resources, especially when it comes to beneficent enterprises. There are many enterprises conducted by charitable organizations that are worthy of our cooperation. But it's impossible to contribute time, effort, and resources to all of them! Our personal friends and relatives often request our beneficent cooperation in pursuit of their personal ends (or goals). If you have a lot of "needy" friends, these requests can really drain your time, energy, and resources. Parents with young children and adult children with old parents experience the finitude of time, energy, and resources. Everyone believes that their own particular enterprise is worthy of the time, effort, and resources of others, and therefore, we are often offended when others choose to be non-cooperative, or contribute less to our enterprise than we'd like.
Some cooperative enterprises are immoral and therefore, not only do we refuse to cooperate, we actively seek to undermine those enterprises. Some immoral enterprises pursue immoral goals, some employ immoral means, and some pursue both immoral ends via immoral means. Unfortunately, we ration our cooperation based on imperfect information, and unwittingly contribute time, effort, or resources to illegal and/or immoral enterprises. One way to dress up a repulsive enterprise is to lie about it's means and/or ends. How many bogus charitable organizations have you contributed to?
Moreover, human cooperation has always been conditioned by both enticements (rewards) and coercive threats (punishments). Many cooperative enterprises involve reciprocity; that is cooperation is based on "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours." However, we all willingly contribute variable quantities of our time, energy, and resources to various enterprises in the absence of either enticements or threats. And, depending on your supply of time, energy, and resources, if you commit yourself to to many cooperative enterprises, your contribution to any one enterprise might be negligible, or even border on non-cooperative.
Finally, given the inevitable competition between cooperative enterprises, all enterprises eventually suffer extinction. Where's that Roman Empire now? One way to avoid extinction is to force individuals and groups to contribute time, effort, and resources to your particular enterprise. However, forced cooperation is no panacea. Those who control enterprises that provide the coercive force that sustains involuntary cooperation, also ration their own time, energy, and resources, and therefore, usually demand more and more of your time, effort, and resources to monitor and control those who prefer non-cooperation. How many DEA agents, fences, courts, and prisons will it take to monitor and enforce the ongoing Drug War enterprise? There is a general understanding that Libertarians are committed to voluntary cooperation and therefore they reject forceful seizure of the time, energy, and resources of others; and the expansion of coercive force necessary to insure all forms of involuntary cooperation.
All cooperative enterprises involve planning in pursuit of ends or goals. Collective enterprises orchestrated by groups (or organizations) require collective planning, which in turn requires leader-follower relationships. A good leader attracts followers, a bad leader repels followers. Individual enterprises require individual planning. And, of course, there are better and worse forms of individual and collective planning. Ineffective planning usually leads to failure to achieve one's goals. We are non-cooperative when we prefer not to contribute our time, energy or resources to any given enterprise. Even when we choose to cooperate, we limit the amount of time, energy, and resources that we commit to various cooperative enterprises. Consequently, most enterprises eventually suffer from extinction due to competition from other enterprises. The number of cooperators associated with the horse and buggy industry and the Flat Earth Society has been greatly diminished.
Of course, there's a lot moral discourse associated with how individuals and groups ration time, energy, and resources, especially when it comes to beneficent enterprises. There are many enterprises conducted by charitable organizations that are worthy of our cooperation. But it's impossible to contribute time, effort, and resources to all of them! Our personal friends and relatives often request our beneficent cooperation in pursuit of their personal ends (or goals). If you have a lot of "needy" friends, these requests can really drain your time, energy, and resources. Parents with young children and adult children with old parents experience the finitude of time, energy, and resources. Everyone believes that their own particular enterprise is worthy of the time, effort, and resources of others, and therefore, we are often offended when others choose to be non-cooperative, or contribute less to our enterprise than we'd like.
Some cooperative enterprises are immoral and therefore, not only do we refuse to cooperate, we actively seek to undermine those enterprises. Some immoral enterprises pursue immoral goals, some employ immoral means, and some pursue both immoral ends via immoral means. Unfortunately, we ration our cooperation based on imperfect information, and unwittingly contribute time, effort, or resources to illegal and/or immoral enterprises. One way to dress up a repulsive enterprise is to lie about it's means and/or ends. How many bogus charitable organizations have you contributed to?
Moreover, human cooperation has always been conditioned by both enticements (rewards) and coercive threats (punishments). Many cooperative enterprises involve reciprocity; that is cooperation is based on "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours." However, we all willingly contribute variable quantities of our time, energy, and resources to various enterprises in the absence of either enticements or threats. And, depending on your supply of time, energy, and resources, if you commit yourself to to many cooperative enterprises, your contribution to any one enterprise might be negligible, or even border on non-cooperative.
Finally, given the inevitable competition between cooperative enterprises, all enterprises eventually suffer extinction. Where's that Roman Empire now? One way to avoid extinction is to force individuals and groups to contribute time, effort, and resources to your particular enterprise. However, forced cooperation is no panacea. Those who control enterprises that provide the coercive force that sustains involuntary cooperation, also ration their own time, energy, and resources, and therefore, usually demand more and more of your time, effort, and resources to monitor and control those who prefer non-cooperation. How many DEA agents, fences, courts, and prisons will it take to monitor and enforce the ongoing Drug War enterprise? There is a general understanding that Libertarians are committed to voluntary cooperation and therefore they reject forceful seizure of the time, energy, and resources of others; and the expansion of coercive force necessary to insure all forms of involuntary cooperation.
Wednesday, May 18, 2011
Cooperation
Over the years there's been a lot scientific research and discussion of cooperation, especially in the area of "leadership studies." Personally, I think a lot of it is based on conceptual ambiguity. Let's see what we can do to clean up some of the mess.
Since Plato, philosophers have found it useful to distinguish between two species of the Good. Some human actions are regarded as "intrinsically good," or "good for their own sake." Happiness, pleasure, and friendship are usually offered as examples. Other human actions are "extrinsically good," or "good for their favorable consequences." Getting a flu shot in the fall is a good example. And of course, since Plato, philosophers have argued endlessly over whether ANY human actions are really "good for their own sake," AND whether it is possible to know (with certainty) whether human actions have positive or negative utility ratios over the long-term or the short-term. And of course, there's the old standby: "Good for whom?" So let's ask the simple question: "Is cooperation Good? If so, is it an intrinsic good or an extrinsic good?"
Before we answer that, we have to decide what we mean when we use the term cooperation. First of all, we cooperate (or do not cooperate) in the context of the pursuit of goals, therefore cooperation is a teleological term subject to analysis via "means" and "ends." In ethics, we can judge the morality of both means and ends. Some ends are morally praiseworthy (ending world hunger) others are morally blameworthy (genocide). Some means of ending world hunger are morally praiseworthy (teaching starving nations how to grow food), other means are immoral (killing off children to feed adults). So what does this say about cooperation? Human cooperation in inexorably amoral; that is to say, we human beings can cooperate in pursuit of either praiseworthy or blameworthy goals, and can cooperate via both both moral and immoral means. So what does this say about the morality of the human species? Well, we certainly cannot deduce morality from the mere fact that we cooperate with one another. Moreover, there are also more and less effective means of cooperating. Some "means" are more likely to produce "ends" than others. I don't think anyone thinks that, over the long run, shipping vast quantities of food to starving countries is a very efficient way to solve the problem of world hunger. In other words, we have a moral obligation to not only cooperate in the pursuit of worthwhile goals, we also have an obligation to do it as efficiently as possible. Call it non-productive cooperation. There's a ton of it out there! Conversely, we humans often cooperate very efficiently in pursuit of immoral goals, genocide, holocaust, organized crime etc. So I would argue that morality cannot be deduced from the fact we are a cooperative species. The ethics of cooperation is enormously complex and vastly under-developed by contemporary moral psychology. My next blog entry will explore the ethics of individual cooperation in collective projects.
Since Plato, philosophers have found it useful to distinguish between two species of the Good. Some human actions are regarded as "intrinsically good," or "good for their own sake." Happiness, pleasure, and friendship are usually offered as examples. Other human actions are "extrinsically good," or "good for their favorable consequences." Getting a flu shot in the fall is a good example. And of course, since Plato, philosophers have argued endlessly over whether ANY human actions are really "good for their own sake," AND whether it is possible to know (with certainty) whether human actions have positive or negative utility ratios over the long-term or the short-term. And of course, there's the old standby: "Good for whom?" So let's ask the simple question: "Is cooperation Good? If so, is it an intrinsic good or an extrinsic good?"
Before we answer that, we have to decide what we mean when we use the term cooperation. First of all, we cooperate (or do not cooperate) in the context of the pursuit of goals, therefore cooperation is a teleological term subject to analysis via "means" and "ends." In ethics, we can judge the morality of both means and ends. Some ends are morally praiseworthy (ending world hunger) others are morally blameworthy (genocide). Some means of ending world hunger are morally praiseworthy (teaching starving nations how to grow food), other means are immoral (killing off children to feed adults). So what does this say about cooperation? Human cooperation in inexorably amoral; that is to say, we human beings can cooperate in pursuit of either praiseworthy or blameworthy goals, and can cooperate via both both moral and immoral means. So what does this say about the morality of the human species? Well, we certainly cannot deduce morality from the mere fact that we cooperate with one another. Moreover, there are also more and less effective means of cooperating. Some "means" are more likely to produce "ends" than others. I don't think anyone thinks that, over the long run, shipping vast quantities of food to starving countries is a very efficient way to solve the problem of world hunger. In other words, we have a moral obligation to not only cooperate in the pursuit of worthwhile goals, we also have an obligation to do it as efficiently as possible. Call it non-productive cooperation. There's a ton of it out there! Conversely, we humans often cooperate very efficiently in pursuit of immoral goals, genocide, holocaust, organized crime etc. So I would argue that morality cannot be deduced from the fact we are a cooperative species. The ethics of cooperation is enormously complex and vastly under-developed by contemporary moral psychology. My next blog entry will explore the ethics of individual cooperation in collective projects.
Tuesday, March 15, 2011
Science and Morality
In my previous blog I argued that morality requires more than praiseworthy moral intent. You must also must exert a reasonable effort to figure out how to effectively and efficiently fulfill that goal: call it a plan. One of the hallmarks of recent human history is that fact that we now know more and can do more, and therefore our individual and collective plans are more likely to be fulfilled more effectively and efficiently. But not all of our plans are morally good.
So why can we do so much more than our Pleistocene forbears? In a word: Science. Although there are many different ways to define “Science,” I prefer to boil it down to its essence. To me (and F.A. Hayek) Science is nothing more than extended, systematized “trial and error.” By this definition, hunter and gatherer societies certainly had Science. These small groups no doubt employed trial and error, but it was much less effective and efficient because the number of “trials” employed in solving any given problem was severely limited; and so was their ability to ability to detect variable degrees of "error." So the hallmark of Modern Science is the sheer number scientists, the ability of those scientists to keep track of what works and what doesn’t work, and the ability to communicate these results to large numbers of other scientists. So Science is about creating large networks of cooperative and competitive inquirers. NOTE: cooperation and competition are not polar opposites, but complementary, necessary conditions for Science. The vast networks of scientists today, are, in fact, markets comprised of "buyers" and "sellers" of information (or what works and what doesn't work). These markets exchange not only time, energy, and resources between buyers and sellers, but they also exchange theories, which are the basic units of information. Competing Scientific theories reside in the networked minds (brains) of communities of scientists. The more scientists the merrier! Thus, the sociopolitical rise of modern scientific inquiry corresponds to the expansion of idea markets beyond small groups of hunters and gatherers. Today we can cooperate and compete in the production of ideas based on trust, not only with our close relatives (kin altruism) and friends (reciprocal altruism), but also with strangers. The initial challenge for the rise of Modern Science was extend the benefits of reciprocal altruism to include strangers. So is it that can we trust strangers? For the rise of Modern Science this entailed creation scientific institutions such laboratories, libraries, and colleges and universities. But it also required the discovery of large-group morality via trial and error. "Hey, wouldn't we all be better off by cooperating and competing with strangers, based on mutually agreed upon rules, than simply going to war with them again?" This moral revolution entailed the cultural acceptance of three abstract rules that constitute large-group morality: don't kill, don't steal, and don't lie. Adherence to those three rules led to the rise of markets, including idea markets.
The rise of these institutions and rules that comprise Modern Science was made possible by the Agricultural Revolution, which marked the decline of small group morality (based on genetic relatedness and friendship) and the rise of large group (modern) morality. Pleistocene scientists expended so much time, effort, and resources hunting and gathering that they were unable to do much science, which explains why human societies remained relatively unchanged for millions of years. In fact, it's hard to deny that conditions of human life has changed more in the last 300 years than the previous 3 million.
Now what about ethics? Ethics is about how benefits and harms are distributed within and between human communities. Obviously, there are more known benefits to be distributed today and more known harms to be avoided. (When I was a kid we used to break thermometers and play with the little balls of mercury!) Unfortunately, Science is amoral in the sense that it is equally proficient in generating harms as it is benefits. Thanks to the rise of Modern Science we can now cure many diseases, build safer buildings, grow more food, travel faster and farther, and communicate more efficiently. But we can also more effectively and efficiently: kill each other (advanced weaponry), steal from one another (identity theft), and disseminate misinformation and disinformation (lie). Scientific lies are especially pernicious. Scientific Fraud is based on lying; that is where scientists falsely report the results of trial and error in order to reap the social and economic benefits that we bestow upon scientists. So Modern Science, or systematized trial and error, has provided modern humans with the opportunity to execute both morally praiseworthy and morally blameworthy plans. The challenge for us today is how to increase the use of Science in the pursuit of praiseworthy goals and minimize its use in pursuit of blameworthy goals.Thus, Modern Science is not exempt from the dictates of large-group morality: don't kill, don't steal, and don't lie. This raises an extremely thorny political problem. What kind of political strategy should political regimes employ in order to maximize the positive impact of science? A Progressive Strategy: increase the power and influence of "good" leaders and followers and the pursuit of good ends by moral, effective, and efficient means. Or, a Libertarian Strategy; decrease the power and influence of bad leaders and followers and the pursuit of bad ends, by immoral, effective, efficient means? I'll try to tackle this problem in my next blog.
So why can we do so much more than our Pleistocene forbears? In a word: Science. Although there are many different ways to define “Science,” I prefer to boil it down to its essence. To me (and F.A. Hayek) Science is nothing more than extended, systematized “trial and error.” By this definition, hunter and gatherer societies certainly had Science. These small groups no doubt employed trial and error, but it was much less effective and efficient because the number of “trials” employed in solving any given problem was severely limited; and so was their ability to ability to detect variable degrees of "error." So the hallmark of Modern Science is the sheer number scientists, the ability of those scientists to keep track of what works and what doesn’t work, and the ability to communicate these results to large numbers of other scientists. So Science is about creating large networks of cooperative and competitive inquirers. NOTE: cooperation and competition are not polar opposites, but complementary, necessary conditions for Science. The vast networks of scientists today, are, in fact, markets comprised of "buyers" and "sellers" of information (or what works and what doesn't work). These markets exchange not only time, energy, and resources between buyers and sellers, but they also exchange theories, which are the basic units of information. Competing Scientific theories reside in the networked minds (brains) of communities of scientists. The more scientists the merrier! Thus, the sociopolitical rise of modern scientific inquiry corresponds to the expansion of idea markets beyond small groups of hunters and gatherers. Today we can cooperate and compete in the production of ideas based on trust, not only with our close relatives (kin altruism) and friends (reciprocal altruism), but also with strangers. The initial challenge for the rise of Modern Science was extend the benefits of reciprocal altruism to include strangers. So is it that can we trust strangers? For the rise of Modern Science this entailed creation scientific institutions such laboratories, libraries, and colleges and universities. But it also required the discovery of large-group morality via trial and error. "Hey, wouldn't we all be better off by cooperating and competing with strangers, based on mutually agreed upon rules, than simply going to war with them again?" This moral revolution entailed the cultural acceptance of three abstract rules that constitute large-group morality: don't kill, don't steal, and don't lie. Adherence to those three rules led to the rise of markets, including idea markets.
The rise of these institutions and rules that comprise Modern Science was made possible by the Agricultural Revolution, which marked the decline of small group morality (based on genetic relatedness and friendship) and the rise of large group (modern) morality. Pleistocene scientists expended so much time, effort, and resources hunting and gathering that they were unable to do much science, which explains why human societies remained relatively unchanged for millions of years. In fact, it's hard to deny that conditions of human life has changed more in the last 300 years than the previous 3 million.
Now what about ethics? Ethics is about how benefits and harms are distributed within and between human communities. Obviously, there are more known benefits to be distributed today and more known harms to be avoided. (When I was a kid we used to break thermometers and play with the little balls of mercury!) Unfortunately, Science is amoral in the sense that it is equally proficient in generating harms as it is benefits. Thanks to the rise of Modern Science we can now cure many diseases, build safer buildings, grow more food, travel faster and farther, and communicate more efficiently. But we can also more effectively and efficiently: kill each other (advanced weaponry), steal from one another (identity theft), and disseminate misinformation and disinformation (lie). Scientific lies are especially pernicious. Scientific Fraud is based on lying; that is where scientists falsely report the results of trial and error in order to reap the social and economic benefits that we bestow upon scientists. So Modern Science, or systematized trial and error, has provided modern humans with the opportunity to execute both morally praiseworthy and morally blameworthy plans. The challenge for us today is how to increase the use of Science in the pursuit of praiseworthy goals and minimize its use in pursuit of blameworthy goals.Thus, Modern Science is not exempt from the dictates of large-group morality: don't kill, don't steal, and don't lie. This raises an extremely thorny political problem. What kind of political strategy should political regimes employ in order to maximize the positive impact of science? A Progressive Strategy: increase the power and influence of "good" leaders and followers and the pursuit of good ends by moral, effective, and efficient means. Or, a Libertarian Strategy; decrease the power and influence of bad leaders and followers and the pursuit of bad ends, by immoral, effective, efficient means? I'll try to tackle this problem in my next blog.
Friday, February 11, 2011
Fairness: The Puzzle of "Knowing" and "Doing."
Why is "Fairness" (and ethics in general) such a complex line of human inquiry? There are many different possible answers to that question. In this blog I will argue that one important, but often neglected, source of moral complexity is the Aristotelian distinction between "knowing what's good" and "doing what's good." Let me start off with a few basics.
First of all ethics is inexorably teleological; that is to say it is about "goal-directed" behavior. It's about how we go about pursuing ends by various means in a social context. Hence, we argue over whether our individual and/or collective goals are "good or bad;" and we argue over whether the means that we employ in pursuit of those goals is "good or bad." Thus fairness, and ethics in general is about knowing what's good and then doing it. For Aristotle, both are necessary conditions for moral action. Sometimes we "know" what's good, can easily do it, but just choose not to do it (which is usually immoral); and sometimes we "do" what's good without "knowing" it (which is amoral). I would argue that at the level of theory, this is all pretty much self-evident and consistent with how we humans go about making moral judgments and assessing moral responsibility, especially fairness.
Second, fairness is ultimately about what we "know and don't know"; and what we "do and don't do." Are you still with me? Let me see if I can clarify this. How often do you find yourself in a situation where you know what's a good goal, such as feeding homeless people, but don't know exactly how to do it. Should I give the old guy panhandling in the Kroger parking lot $5, or should I donate that money a local charitable organization? If I give him $5 I don't "know" if he'll buy food, booze, or drugs. If I give it to a charity, I don't "know" if that charity is legitimate. If the old guy buys a six pack or if the charity pocket's my donation I really didn't do any good. Right? On the other hand, if I want to "know" these things I'll have to expend my own time, energy, and research finding out. My only point here is that moral action requires knowledge and acquistion of knowledge requires time, effort, and resources.
For now, let's assume that we all agree on a universal set of moral ends. For example, my friend Peter Corning identifies 14 basic human needs that any "Fair Society" must address in order to insure human survival: theromregulation, waste elimination, nutrition, water, mobility, sleep, respiration, physical safety, physical health, mental health, communications, social relationships, reproduction, and nurturance of offspring. I happen to agree with this basic list, although I would probably add a few other human "needs" such as: creative and artistic expression and recreation. Now if we all agree that fairness demands that we identify (know) and bring about (bring to fruition) these 14 or so goals, the logical question is how do we go about acquiring the knowledge necessary to achieve them? After all, we could all agree that we "ought" to pursue these goals, and nevertheless fail miserably to achieve them for lack of knowledge. A Fair Society, therefore, must not only "know" what's "Good" but it must also expend time, energy, and resources developing the knowledge necessary to bring about what's good.
Take for example, one of my scholarly interests, "physical health." If we expect to maintain a reasonably healthy population, we obviously must "know" something about how the human body works and how it interacts with our social and physical environment. What kinds of food should we eat and how much? How much and what kinds of exercise do we need to maintain health? How do we avoid and/or cure diseases? This is all "knowledge." Right? But the acquisition of knowledge requires more than a Philosopher King contemplating "Truth." It's much more complex than Plato or Aristotle ever envisioned. It takes many scientists working in expensive laboratories communicating, cooperating, and competing with one another.
So if I'm right (which I am) the production of scientific knowledge is a necessary condition for human need fulfillment. This raises a whole new level of moral analysis. Here are few questions that must be addressed by any Fair Society. Where do we find the time, energy, and resources necessary to conduct scientific research? Where do we find the time, energy and resources necessary to teach scientific research? How do we go about providing incentives that might influence young people to study the natural and social sciences? How do we develop and maintain a sufficient number educational institutions that can effectively teach science to this next generation of scientists? And, finally how do we go about distributing the products and services developed by Science? Should all Americans have equal access to state-of-the-art cancer treatments? Motorized wheel-chairs? Heart transplants? If so, exactly how should that distribution be managed? My conclusion is that we are not going to meet our basic survival needs without investing in scientific knowledge. For health care, we need not only biological knowledge, but also social, political, and economic knowledge. And none of these knowledge bases can be acquired for free. "There is no free lunch!"
Now during the Pleistocene era, out hunter-gatherer ancestors "survived" for centuries without the benefits of modern science. I'm glad they did! In fact, I'm glad that over the past fifty years scientists expended time, energy, and resources studying primitive societies and other primates. Although, primitive societies were probably egalitarian (and therefore met the basic the basic needs of all members of the group, more or less "equally") they really didn't "know" very much. In fact, thanks to modern science, we know they didn't live very long. They certainly didn't know anything about how their bodies worked, or how to identify and cure diseases. They didn't know how to distinguish pure from impure water sources. The fact that they didn't "know" very much suggests that they really couldn't "do" very much, and therefore, they didn't "have very much." Hence, there really wasn't much for them to distribute fairly to begin with, maybe: food, clothing, shelter, a few tools, sex partners. In short, it's easy to be "Fair" in a society that doesn't have much to distribute. If everyone lives to be about 40 years old, and if 25% of women died during childbirth, that's certainly a "Fair Society," but not necessarily "Good." One of the fruits of the Scientific Revolution has been that we "know" a lot more, we can "do" a lot more, and as a result we "have" a lot more to distribute (especially in the area of health). The hidden puzzle for us today is how to keep the "Ball of Science" rolling in a world of "free riders;" that is a world where the cost of the acquistion of scientific knowledge is unequally distributed. We need to "know" much more today; and unfortunately, there is no guaratee that we'll continue to acquire the knowledge we need to survive as modern society. We have to know how to nurture Science.
In my next blog I'll try to make the argument that scientific knowledge requires global cooperation, global scientific institutions and free markets.
First of all ethics is inexorably teleological; that is to say it is about "goal-directed" behavior. It's about how we go about pursuing ends by various means in a social context. Hence, we argue over whether our individual and/or collective goals are "good or bad;" and we argue over whether the means that we employ in pursuit of those goals is "good or bad." Thus fairness, and ethics in general is about knowing what's good and then doing it. For Aristotle, both are necessary conditions for moral action. Sometimes we "know" what's good, can easily do it, but just choose not to do it (which is usually immoral); and sometimes we "do" what's good without "knowing" it (which is amoral). I would argue that at the level of theory, this is all pretty much self-evident and consistent with how we humans go about making moral judgments and assessing moral responsibility, especially fairness.
Second, fairness is ultimately about what we "know and don't know"; and what we "do and don't do." Are you still with me? Let me see if I can clarify this. How often do you find yourself in a situation where you know what's a good goal, such as feeding homeless people, but don't know exactly how to do it. Should I give the old guy panhandling in the Kroger parking lot $5, or should I donate that money a local charitable organization? If I give him $5 I don't "know" if he'll buy food, booze, or drugs. If I give it to a charity, I don't "know" if that charity is legitimate. If the old guy buys a six pack or if the charity pocket's my donation I really didn't do any good. Right? On the other hand, if I want to "know" these things I'll have to expend my own time, energy, and research finding out. My only point here is that moral action requires knowledge and acquistion of knowledge requires time, effort, and resources.
For now, let's assume that we all agree on a universal set of moral ends. For example, my friend Peter Corning identifies 14 basic human needs that any "Fair Society" must address in order to insure human survival: theromregulation, waste elimination, nutrition, water, mobility, sleep, respiration, physical safety, physical health, mental health, communications, social relationships, reproduction, and nurturance of offspring. I happen to agree with this basic list, although I would probably add a few other human "needs" such as: creative and artistic expression and recreation. Now if we all agree that fairness demands that we identify (know) and bring about (bring to fruition) these 14 or so goals, the logical question is how do we go about acquiring the knowledge necessary to achieve them? After all, we could all agree that we "ought" to pursue these goals, and nevertheless fail miserably to achieve them for lack of knowledge. A Fair Society, therefore, must not only "know" what's "Good" but it must also expend time, energy, and resources developing the knowledge necessary to bring about what's good.
Take for example, one of my scholarly interests, "physical health." If we expect to maintain a reasonably healthy population, we obviously must "know" something about how the human body works and how it interacts with our social and physical environment. What kinds of food should we eat and how much? How much and what kinds of exercise do we need to maintain health? How do we avoid and/or cure diseases? This is all "knowledge." Right? But the acquisition of knowledge requires more than a Philosopher King contemplating "Truth." It's much more complex than Plato or Aristotle ever envisioned. It takes many scientists working in expensive laboratories communicating, cooperating, and competing with one another.
So if I'm right (which I am) the production of scientific knowledge is a necessary condition for human need fulfillment. This raises a whole new level of moral analysis. Here are few questions that must be addressed by any Fair Society. Where do we find the time, energy, and resources necessary to conduct scientific research? Where do we find the time, energy and resources necessary to teach scientific research? How do we go about providing incentives that might influence young people to study the natural and social sciences? How do we develop and maintain a sufficient number educational institutions that can effectively teach science to this next generation of scientists? And, finally how do we go about distributing the products and services developed by Science? Should all Americans have equal access to state-of-the-art cancer treatments? Motorized wheel-chairs? Heart transplants? If so, exactly how should that distribution be managed? My conclusion is that we are not going to meet our basic survival needs without investing in scientific knowledge. For health care, we need not only biological knowledge, but also social, political, and economic knowledge. And none of these knowledge bases can be acquired for free. "There is no free lunch!"
Now during the Pleistocene era, out hunter-gatherer ancestors "survived" for centuries without the benefits of modern science. I'm glad they did! In fact, I'm glad that over the past fifty years scientists expended time, energy, and resources studying primitive societies and other primates. Although, primitive societies were probably egalitarian (and therefore met the basic the basic needs of all members of the group, more or less "equally") they really didn't "know" very much. In fact, thanks to modern science, we know they didn't live very long. They certainly didn't know anything about how their bodies worked, or how to identify and cure diseases. They didn't know how to distinguish pure from impure water sources. The fact that they didn't "know" very much suggests that they really couldn't "do" very much, and therefore, they didn't "have very much." Hence, there really wasn't much for them to distribute fairly to begin with, maybe: food, clothing, shelter, a few tools, sex partners. In short, it's easy to be "Fair" in a society that doesn't have much to distribute. If everyone lives to be about 40 years old, and if 25% of women died during childbirth, that's certainly a "Fair Society," but not necessarily "Good." One of the fruits of the Scientific Revolution has been that we "know" a lot more, we can "do" a lot more, and as a result we "have" a lot more to distribute (especially in the area of health). The hidden puzzle for us today is how to keep the "Ball of Science" rolling in a world of "free riders;" that is a world where the cost of the acquistion of scientific knowledge is unequally distributed. We need to "know" much more today; and unfortunately, there is no guaratee that we'll continue to acquire the knowledge we need to survive as modern society. We have to know how to nurture Science.
In my next blog I'll try to make the argument that scientific knowledge requires global cooperation, global scientific institutions and free markets.
Sunday, January 23, 2011
The Problem of Future Generations: Part 2
You probably recall that my previous blog entry ended with the seemingly bizzare suggestion that future generations are the "ultimate strangers." The common thread is that altruism between strangers is difficult to establish and that large-group cooperation based on a social contract must figure out how to convince strangers to cooperate. That claim is based on the two basic forms of altruism: kin altruism and reciprocal altruism. In order to make my "ultimate stranger" argument, I'll employ a simple case study. Suppose you are a morally competent person living in 2011 and you learn that scientists have proven beyond a shadow of a doubt the earth will be uninhabitable in the year 3000 if our generation and all subsequent generations do not cut back on carbon pollution by 50%. Does that fact (is) imply an individual and collective moral obligation (ought) on our part to cut back our carbon-based energy pollution by 50%? Can future generations be included within a social contract framework? Does that future generation have a right to an inhabitable environment? Do we have a duty to sacrifice our individual interest and our generation's interest on their behalf? Do those intermediary future generations between us and 3000 also have that same duty?
Well, back to my initial claim. In what sense is that distant future generation populated by strangers? From the standpoint of kin-altruism, I may have absolutely no genetic stake in that 3000 generation. Why? Well, first of all my two sons are not even married yet, may never get married, and may never have children. None of my nieces have children yet either. So if my specific genetic lineage will end after their generation, why should I turn down my thermostat, buy a high mileage vehicle, and take other actions that benefit that 3000 generation? There goes my personal self-interested incentive. So much for kin-altruism. The only alternative would be to postulate a "general will" that includes future generations. But that would not be kin altruism.
What about reciprocal altruism? That 3000 generation can clearly benefit from John Rawls called our "just savings," but how can they reciprocate? We can scratch the back of future generations but they can't scratch ours. Barring the invention of a time machine (which would facilitate retribution between generations), about the only thing that the 3000 generation can do in retribution is praise or blame us. "Boy, that generation that lived in 2011 neglected to save us 50% of their pollution. What a self-centered, discriminatory generation! They preferred to serve the interest of their own generation at the expense of our generation. That's UNFAIR!" They violated the intergenerational social contract." If we had that time machine, we might leap forward and respond to that indictment as follows: "Heck, we didn't even know that your generation would ever exist? The human species might have been wiped out by a lethal epidemic of swine flu in the year 2999. Moreover, if we had chosen to "save" some clean air for your generation, how could we know if my sons' generation or their kids generation (and all subsequent generations) wouldn't default on that obligation and undo any good that our "savings" might have accomplished? In other words, what happens if those intermediary generations act as free riders and merely spend the "just savings" that my generation withheld on behalf of your 3000 generation?"
First of all, lets admit that there's no easy solution to the problem of future generations. Throughout human history present generations have routinely over-consumed and over-polluted at the expense of future generations. Rawls argued that distant future generations are indeed vulnerable and that we ought to save something for them. However, he also recognized that, in the real world, our incentive to feel a sense of moral obligation toward distant future generations is weak. Therefore, he suggested that we think of intergeneration justice within the bounds of kin altruism. If every generation "saves" enough back for their children and grandchildren, the interests of the 3000 generation would be taken care of over the long run. Unfortunately, that wouldn't work for the case study I proposed, unless near generations also require that 50% just savings.
Now admittedly distant future generations are not the only candidates for the title of "ultimate strangers." Historically, many groups of humans have also been excluded (racial and ethnic minorities, women, children, fetuses, serial killers, lepers, and AIDS patients). So any large-group social contract theory will have to contend with the question of whose interests (small groups or individuals) shall be included or excluded from the contract. We might argue that ugly and/or scary animals (snakes, spiders, bees, and snails) and plants are "strangers" in so far as we are not likely to include them within our anthropocentric social contract framework. Based on evolutionary theory, it is clear that the contract cannot grant priviliged status to humans over plants and animals. Thus, if evolution enlightens social contract theory at all, it is clear that the interests of distant future generations of humans are no more salient than the interests of future generations of plants and animals. In sum, the challenge for any social contract theory is how to overcome not only the "problem of future generations" but also its anthropocentric moorings, which have been empirically discredited by evolution.
Well, back to my initial claim. In what sense is that distant future generation populated by strangers? From the standpoint of kin-altruism, I may have absolutely no genetic stake in that 3000 generation. Why? Well, first of all my two sons are not even married yet, may never get married, and may never have children. None of my nieces have children yet either. So if my specific genetic lineage will end after their generation, why should I turn down my thermostat, buy a high mileage vehicle, and take other actions that benefit that 3000 generation? There goes my personal self-interested incentive. So much for kin-altruism. The only alternative would be to postulate a "general will" that includes future generations. But that would not be kin altruism.
What about reciprocal altruism? That 3000 generation can clearly benefit from John Rawls called our "just savings," but how can they reciprocate? We can scratch the back of future generations but they can't scratch ours. Barring the invention of a time machine (which would facilitate retribution between generations), about the only thing that the 3000 generation can do in retribution is praise or blame us. "Boy, that generation that lived in 2011 neglected to save us 50% of their pollution. What a self-centered, discriminatory generation! They preferred to serve the interest of their own generation at the expense of our generation. That's UNFAIR!" They violated the intergenerational social contract." If we had that time machine, we might leap forward and respond to that indictment as follows: "Heck, we didn't even know that your generation would ever exist? The human species might have been wiped out by a lethal epidemic of swine flu in the year 2999. Moreover, if we had chosen to "save" some clean air for your generation, how could we know if my sons' generation or their kids generation (and all subsequent generations) wouldn't default on that obligation and undo any good that our "savings" might have accomplished? In other words, what happens if those intermediary generations act as free riders and merely spend the "just savings" that my generation withheld on behalf of your 3000 generation?"
First of all, lets admit that there's no easy solution to the problem of future generations. Throughout human history present generations have routinely over-consumed and over-polluted at the expense of future generations. Rawls argued that distant future generations are indeed vulnerable and that we ought to save something for them. However, he also recognized that, in the real world, our incentive to feel a sense of moral obligation toward distant future generations is weak. Therefore, he suggested that we think of intergeneration justice within the bounds of kin altruism. If every generation "saves" enough back for their children and grandchildren, the interests of the 3000 generation would be taken care of over the long run. Unfortunately, that wouldn't work for the case study I proposed, unless near generations also require that 50% just savings.
Now admittedly distant future generations are not the only candidates for the title of "ultimate strangers." Historically, many groups of humans have also been excluded (racial and ethnic minorities, women, children, fetuses, serial killers, lepers, and AIDS patients). So any large-group social contract theory will have to contend with the question of whose interests (small groups or individuals) shall be included or excluded from the contract. We might argue that ugly and/or scary animals (snakes, spiders, bees, and snails) and plants are "strangers" in so far as we are not likely to include them within our anthropocentric social contract framework. Based on evolutionary theory, it is clear that the contract cannot grant priviliged status to humans over plants and animals. Thus, if evolution enlightens social contract theory at all, it is clear that the interests of distant future generations of humans are no more salient than the interests of future generations of plants and animals. In sum, the challenge for any social contract theory is how to overcome not only the "problem of future generations" but also its anthropocentric moorings, which have been empirically discredited by evolution.
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