Professor of Philosophy
Mount St. Joseph University
ABSTRACT
Scholars agree that, at all times, in all places, and at all stages of post-natal development, human beings exhibit, what we all (rather loosely) refer to as “play behavior.” Among the many scholarly disciplines that study “play,” philosophy is foundational. That’s because play is inherently multidisciplinary, while philosophy has become increasingly interdisciplinary. Therefore it is well-postured to contribute toward a more unified theory of play. A well-developed, unified theory will address the most important foundational questions, including: What exactly is “play behavior” and how is it distinguished from “non-play behavior?” Based on that theory, do non-human species play, if so how does non-human play behavior compare to human play? What are toys and how do they relate to play? Over time and place, how and why does play and toys vary within and between cultures? What are the determinants that influence the amount of time, effort, and resources that humans and non-humans devote to play? And finally, how might future philosophers contribute to the advancement of playtime research in other disciplines?
Before we can make much progress on the “philosophy of play,” we must address the two age-old questions: “What do philosophers do?” and, “Are philosophers useful?” Most philosophers agree that they “ask questions and pose answers,” and that the vast majority of professional philosophers teach in colleges and universities. But once they get beyond those two acknowledgments, there is not much agreement. Most notably, there is widespread disagreement as to which questions are worth asking, how to go about answering those questions, and what questions require philosophical, non-scientific, and/or scientific answers. There is also widespread agreement that epistemological questions are foundational, especially: What is a Theory? What is Truth? What is Value? And, how do Truth and Value relate to one another? Hence, we have the revival of the old positivist agenda that seeks to transform values (good and bad) into facts (true and false). Let’s add that non-philosophers often ask/answer philosophical issues and that non-philosophers reinterpret those philosophical questions, and sometimes they do not acknowledge that some questions/answers are inexorably philosophical or non-philosophical. Most disciplinary approaches to the study of play contain unstated epistemological assumptions; especially the nature of theories, truth and value. Therefore, in order to address these epistemological issues and work toward towards a “unified theory of play,” this essay will argue that this unification requires both biological and cultural evolution.
WHAT IS THE SCIENCE OF PLAY?
In recent times, many philosophers have
become interdisciplinary scholars, and therefore employ philosophical theories as
a way to bridge the gaps between various disciplines. Scientific explanations
of human behavior invoke scientific theories. So based on contemporary science,
what distinguishes “play” from “non-play?”
As a matter of sheer logic, playtime philosophers
agree that play must be fun. So if we engage in a behavior that is not fun,
it’s not play. Of course, this raises the question: What is fun? Well, fun (by
definition) must be pleasurable. Evolutionary psychologists, observe that, at
least some, human feelings of pleasure and pain are evolutionarily shaped, over
vast expanses of time, by natural and/or sexual selection. Feelings of
pleasure, naturally, incite us to engage in that behavior again, and feelings
of pain discourage us from doing it again. Those feelings can be materially reduced
to various chemical changes that take place within the human body, especially
the presence and/or absence of the hormone serotonin. Similarly,
neuroscientists can now differentiate between the experience of pain and
pleasure by looking at the flow of neurons within human brain via various
imaging technologies.
At least some feelings of pain and
pleasure can also be shaped by social and/or cultural norms present at any
given time or place. Thus, social scientists distinguish between human
behaviors that are timelessly universal from those that are relative to
specific times and places. Although “play-behavior,” in general, is timelessly
universal, it manifests itself in forms that are historically and/or culturally
relative. Developmental psychologists might seek to explain how “play” changes
over the course of a human person’s lifetime: At what age do these changes take
place? Why do these changes take place? Is child’s play different from adult
play; and if so, how? Anthropologists and sociologists might seek to identify
changes over time within and between cultures. The most complex forms of
historically and culturally relative play are often comprised of timelessly
universal components; shaped by biological evolution.
In sum, there are three empirical
observations that underlie playtime science. First, “play” is, obviously, a form of human behavior and therefore
its presence or absence can be empirically verified and/or falsified by
external observation. Second, human
play behavior can be internally observed in terms of a “player’s own
psychological states via the feelings and thoughts that accompany that
behavior. In short, we all know, directly, when we’re experiencing pleasure and
pain. Third, it is also empirically
evident that other primates and hominids exhibit similar patterns of
“play-like” behavior.
Theories are complex beliefs that have
both theoretical social implications. Some playtime scholars focus their time,
energy, and resources on theoretical concerns such as empirical evidence,
logical consistency, and soundness; while others note that all theories serve a
variety of social functions, at various times and places. So what are the
social functions of contemporary playtime theories serve, and how do we
evaluate those functions; that is, how do we differentiate between a “good
theory of play” and a “bad theory of play?”
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