Public and Private Unions

My friend David inspired me to write about public unions. My views are rooted in my longstanding adherence to voluntary association moderated by competition.

Human beings are social animals that have the natural capacity to organize themselves into groups of other like-minded, self-interested humans. We certainly associate ourselves with a wide variety of groups. Like all groups labor unions are the manefestation of this natural capacity to form cooperative groups to advance individual self interest. The libertarian stance on labor unions requires adherence to the principles of voluntariness, non-aggression, and competition. Therefore, unions, like any other voluntary associations must be subject to "creative destruction," which is nature's way of weeding out group dysfunctionality and inefficiency. When a union ceases to advance the self-interest of it's members, or if another union does a better job of advancing those interests at a lower cost, that dysfunctional and/or inefficient union loses members to its competitors and becomes extinct. If a union does an extraordinary job of serving the interests of its members, it may temporarily achieve monopolistic status; at least until its competitors figure out how to compete for members more effectively by offering superior functionality more efficiently. However, unions, like other voluntary associations, often develop survival strategies that have nothing to do with serving members more efficiently. The most common strategy is to employ coercion or the threat of coercion to force new members to join the union and/or prevent old members from abandoning the union; thus undermining voluntariness, non-aggression, and competition. And of course, the most sure-fire way to maintain dysfunctional unions is to employ the coercive power of government to control entry and exit.

Originally, unionization arose as a natural counter-balance to the growth of private corporations, which at least in theory, are also subject to creative destruction. However, since the 1960s, there has been a growing movement toward public unions; that is unions that are formed in order to meet the wants and needs of those who are employed by government. As agencies of government gradually displaced private corporations, unionization was gradually introduced into the public sector; most notably, in the areas of public education and postal service. So what's the libertarian stance on public sector unionization? Well, most of us libertarians oppose governmental encroachment into the private sector, therefore public sector unions border on absurdity. Other than relying on that reductio ad absurdum argument, what else can be said about public unions?

First of all, public sector monopolies are by their very nature immune from competition, which explains why public education and postal service have remained low quality and inefficient for so long. Public unions contribute to low quality and inefficiency by protecting workers from competitors via controlling union entry and exit, and by preventing the formation of competing public unions. Note that the salaries of public workers are paid for via coercive taxation, and that public officials are less than frugal when they spend tax other people's money. Therefore, we end up with a growing public sector workforce, protected by non-competitive unions that reward incompetency with non-competitive salaries and benefits. And of course, this devolutionary process ultimately leads to public spending deficits, increased taxation, and inferior public services.

Some misguided libertarians argue that public unions ought to be illegal. But I would argue that what we really need to do is to get back to limited government, or at least regulate both the public and private realms by enhancing competition rather than stifling it. My prediction would be that if left to the impersonal working of creative destruction, both public and private unions would eventually become extinct. And, where unionization is justified, competing private unions would drive public unions out of business. In short, libertarians must eschew all artificial monopolies, including both corporations (corporate welfare) and unions (union welfare). But we can't simply deploy the coercive power of government to prevent the formation of unions or any other voluntary associations. That's just another indirect expedition on that road to serfdom.

A Libertarian Perspective on "Too Big to Fail"

As the government continues to “bailout” failing corporations such as General Motors, Chrysler, American Investment Group (AIG), and a host of other financial institutions, the “too big to fail principle” has been cited as the primary justification for these rescue packages. This is a utilitarian principle that implies that the costs of “allowing” these corporations to fail outweigh the benefits; that is, if they fail others will fail and unemployment will rise. Although most economists seem to accept this utilitarian justification, no one has offered any explanation of how these corporations got “too big to fail.” Let’s explore two alternative explanations. The free market explanation is that corporations get “big” because they offer higher quality products and/or services at a lower cost than their rivals. These natural monopolies get “big” because they defeat their competition. In the absence of competition these monopolies raise prices and earn windfall profits. But natural monopolies are usually short-lived because other corporations can see their success, copy their strategies and/or improve upon those strategies. This process of weeding out the “unfit” (inefficient) competitors and inspiring competitors that are more “fit” (efficient) is called “creative destruction.” Unfortunately, there are other ways for corporations to “destroy” their competition. The second way to “get big” is to raise the cost of competing in a market by artificially raising the cost of others entering the competition. The easiest way for “big” corporations to stifle competition from smaller, more innovative companies is by lobbying government officials to raise the cost of competing by imposing costly regulations. These artificial monopolies can maintain their stature, regardless of their actual “fitness.” In fact, most artificial monopolies are downright inept: U.S. Postal Service, Public Schools, Public Utilities, etc. Now, how did AIG (American International Group) get “too big to fail?” Did it “take-over” its competitors because it was more “fit” or because it was more adept at lobbying government? The basic problem with the “too big to fail principle," is that if a corporation is “too big to fail” in the eyes of the government, it can take risks that other smaller, risk-sensitive corporations cannot. This leads to the proliferation of large, inefficient corporations that are protected from failure. Then, these maladapted corporations proceed to takeover over smaller, more efficient corporations. In short, the “too big to fail principle” tends to undermine “creative destruction.” Libertarians argue that when governments artificially prop up obviously inefficient corporations that take irrational risks, and reward incompetent executives with bonus pay, they also drive good corporations out of business. Would you rather invest in, work for, or buy from an inefficient corporation that is “too big to fail;” or invest in, work for, or buy from an efficient corporation that will probably be driven out of business by an inefficient corporation that is “too big to fail?” If you owned a smaller, more innovative, and more efficient competitor would you rather continue to compete with a corporation that is “too big to fail,” or agree to a lucrative takeover offer? The libertarian view on the “too big to fail principle” is that it undermines “creative destruction,” and leads to endless cycles of future government bailouts. But more than that it gives rise to an enormously destructive corollary the “too small to succeed principle.”