So the concept stewardship is usually invoked in a context where something valuable is being shared over time. In ethical terms that suggests that sharing over time is good; that is to say, it's a virtue, a duty, or a preferable consequence.
If stewardship is a virtue it signifies excellence in character. For Aristotle, it would relate to distributive justice. Hence, a "good person" takes no more nor less than he/she deserves. Now Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics really doesn't get into intergenerational justice, but we know from his other writings that potential beings would have moral standing. We also know that if stewardship is a virtue, it would involve teaching, learning, and the establishment of a habit. But beyond that I'm not sure Aristotle takes us very far. The Judeo-Christian concept of the virtue of stewardship is based on the idea that God gave the universe to humans to share. There is a built in sense of value associated with any "gift" that comes from an omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, and "Good" being. God, by definition, does not give lousy gifts! No ugly ties or exploding cigars! Moreover, since God created Homo sapiens as an intergenerational community, he certainly would not favor early generations over subsequent ones. Nature is not a Ponzi scheme! Hence, previous generations took their fair share, we take, our fair share, and future generations take their fair share. The problem here is how do we know how much each generation can consume without shortchanging the next generation? The history of humans on earth suggests that virtue-based concepts of stewardship have led to intergenerational exploitation rather than intergenerational justice.
If stewardship is a duty, then we must think about it in a different way. First of all, we'd have to establish that all generations have an equal right to that good thing that is being shared between generations. So if we establish that each generation has an equal right to the fish in ocean then, each generation has a duty to determine it's fair share of fish and preserve the rest for the next generation. But there's a lot more here than meets the eye. Suppose subsequent generations will have more living persons than our generation? Do we have a duty to take into account the fact that the next generation will "need" more than we do? And, of course how far into the future does this obligation extend? Moreover, the human ability to exploit the earth's bounty changes relative to technology. We can catch more fish, cut down more trees, extract more oil and coal than previous generations. Hence, the potential for intergenerational injustice is magnified over time. All I want to say here is that even if we all agree that we have a duty to hold back a few fish for future generations we really don't know what this duty entails. In short, it's a lot easier to assign rights and duties across generations than it is to fulfill them.
Finally, if stewardship is conceived as the means to a preferable set of consequences or outcomes across generations, we must be able to assess cost/benefit ratios across generations. Thus stewardship might imply aiming at the "greatest happiness for the greatest numbers" across generations. If this is our goal, then it's not at all clear how much we ought to hold back, given that we really don't know how many generations will follow us. I would argue that if stewardship requires utilitarian calculus exercised across generations, each generation's rate of consumption would be minicule if not zero. Of course, that would solve the obesity problem, but that's another topic worth exploring.
So what does all of this say about stewardship as a moral concept? First of all, there's a lot of muddled thinking about "sustainability." If we have a moral obligation to consume at a "sustainable" rate we have to decide how far into the future that obligation extends. If we limit our obligation to the next generation we might be able to calculate a sustainable rate of consumption. On the other hand, if todays politicians seek to be responsible stewards of the earth's bounty and neglect the needs (and wants) of our present generation in order to save a few fish for future generations, those politicians won't be in office very long. Future generations aren't old enough to vote!
Showing posts with label environmental stewardship. Show all posts
Showing posts with label environmental stewardship. Show all posts
Saturday, August 20, 2011
Sunday, August 14, 2011
Stewardship Part I.
The moral concept of "stewardship" is deeply rooted in the Judeo-Christian tradition. Today, it is used primarily as a set of moral obligations that are associated with the responsible use of something that belongs to someone else. Or as Merriam Webster puts it: "...the careful and responsible management of something entrusted to one's care." In light of my recent rants on intergenerational justice, I thought I'd deconstruct that slippery concept a bit.
First of all, today "stewardship" is most often encountered in the context of the sustainable management of resources. A "steward" is someone that takes care of someone else's property, hence the notion of ownership plays a key role. A "responsible steward," therefore, preserves or "sustains" the value of that property while an "irresponsible steward" does not. Stewards are not entrusted to sustain something of no value. And there's also a temporal component to stewardship; that is to say, the steward's "sustenance" of something valuable extends over a period of time.Therefore, stewardship has two moral components: the goal (or motive) of sustaining valuable something and knowledge of the means of sustaining that value. Thus, a responsible steward must be motivated to sustain something and know how to do it. An irresponsible steward (or a non-steward) either lacks the motivation to sustain something, or doesn't know how to do it. Thus, stewardship involves both knowing the Good and being able to do the Good.
Suppose, I agree to loan you one of my guitars for a week. Naturally, I expect you to be a responsible steward of it. At a bare minimum, I would expect it to be as returned without loss of value. A responsible steward might return it to me in better condition: maybe polish the finish and change the strings. You might replace the pickups or refinish it, which might or might not meet my approval. WARNING: Do not repaint my orange guitar with black spray paint. So responsible stewardship implies knowledge of the interests of the owner.
Stewardship also shares common ground with the concept of "agency," where one person serves as an "agent" for another person (or "principal"). A responsible agent, who possesses specific knowledge or skills is expected to serve the interests of the principal. Thus, the common ground is the expectation that another person will serve the interests of someone else. But there is also an underlying expectation that the steward or agent will benefit from serving as a steward or an agent. Today, we generally pay agents (insurance agents, financial advisors, and physicians) to serve our interests while stewards benefit by using what they are entrusted to sustain.
So far, the idea of stewardship between individuals seems fairly clear cut, and hardly worthy of a philosophical diatribe. But when stewardship is applied in the context of collective ownership, and/or collective stewardship the waters get muddy fast! I'll dive into that morass next.
First of all, today "stewardship" is most often encountered in the context of the sustainable management of resources. A "steward" is someone that takes care of someone else's property, hence the notion of ownership plays a key role. A "responsible steward," therefore, preserves or "sustains" the value of that property while an "irresponsible steward" does not. Stewards are not entrusted to sustain something of no value. And there's also a temporal component to stewardship; that is to say, the steward's "sustenance" of something valuable extends over a period of time.Therefore, stewardship has two moral components: the goal (or motive) of sustaining valuable something and knowledge of the means of sustaining that value. Thus, a responsible steward must be motivated to sustain something and know how to do it. An irresponsible steward (or a non-steward) either lacks the motivation to sustain something, or doesn't know how to do it. Thus, stewardship involves both knowing the Good and being able to do the Good.
Suppose, I agree to loan you one of my guitars for a week. Naturally, I expect you to be a responsible steward of it. At a bare minimum, I would expect it to be as returned without loss of value. A responsible steward might return it to me in better condition: maybe polish the finish and change the strings. You might replace the pickups or refinish it, which might or might not meet my approval. WARNING: Do not repaint my orange guitar with black spray paint. So responsible stewardship implies knowledge of the interests of the owner.
Stewardship also shares common ground with the concept of "agency," where one person serves as an "agent" for another person (or "principal"). A responsible agent, who possesses specific knowledge or skills is expected to serve the interests of the principal. Thus, the common ground is the expectation that another person will serve the interests of someone else. But there is also an underlying expectation that the steward or agent will benefit from serving as a steward or an agent. Today, we generally pay agents (insurance agents, financial advisors, and physicians) to serve our interests while stewards benefit by using what they are entrusted to sustain.
So far, the idea of stewardship between individuals seems fairly clear cut, and hardly worthy of a philosophical diatribe. But when stewardship is applied in the context of collective ownership, and/or collective stewardship the waters get muddy fast! I'll dive into that morass next.
Monday, July 13, 2009
Tragedy of the Commons, Part 3: Over-Pollution
The second manifestation of the “tragedy of the commons” is the problem of over-pollution. When human beings either extract resources from the environment or transform resources into artifacts a certain amount residual material is left behind. That residual material deposited in the earth, air, or water can be useless, useful, harmful, or harmless. We usually call the useless, harmful, residual “pollution.” Knowledge of whether that residual material is (in fact) useful or useless, and/or harmless or harmful is contingent upon conducting costly scientific research and acting based on that research. Moreover, in many cases the natural environment is capable of reducing or eliminating the harmfulness of pollution. Knowledge of Mother Nature’s timeline for the transformation of waste can often be discovered via research, but sometimes not. The holy grail of human extraction and production is to develop techniques that minimize; or, at least expel waste at a degree and rate within Mother Nature’s ability to transform it into more useful and/or less-harmful byproducts. Call it "sustainability."
The basic problem for the social and political management of pollution is how to provide incentives and disincentives that lead extractors and producers to conduct the research necessary to limit and or reduce pollution, and act based on this research. The “tragedy of the commons” predicts that political stewardship over the “commons,” is invariably inefficient and/or ineffective. Hence, when extractors and producers expel useless and/or harmful waste into “commons” there is little, if any incentive to conduct the research necessary to transform it, eliminate it, or act on that research. Here’s why. If it costs less to pollute than not pollute, extractors and producers will usually choose to pollute. They will invest in research to minimize pollution and/or convert it, if and only if, the cost of conducting that research, and the prospects of that research “paying off” is less than the cost of continuing to pollute with impunity. For example, it is difficult to extract minerals from the earth without polluting the adjacent air and water. If there is little cost associated with polluting the commons, mining companies will continue to pollute, and/or transfer the cost of cleaning up the mess to others (usually government). Therefore, pollution control policy is all about providing extractors and producers with incentives and disincentives that lead to acceptable levels of pollution.
There are two ways for societies to provide these incentives: one entails “more government” the other “less government.” Unfortunately, neither strategy is likely to succeed at a global level. There are two “more government” strategies that are often employed to raise the cost of polluting the commons. One way is to simply tax or fine polluters. This strategy entails that government "cap" pollution levels, monitor and enforce compliance with these caps, and either tax or fine extractors or producers that exceed those limits. This raises serious practical problems. At what level will government set those pollution limits? (Set caps too high and there will be no extraction or production.) How much will it cost for government to effectively monitor and enforce compliance with pollution limits? (It could cost more to monitor and enforce pollution laws than it would cost to clean up the mess.) At what level will the government tax or fine violators? (Set taxes or fines too low and there is no incentive to not-pollute, set it too high and black market polluters will appear.) Who pays the cost of monitoring and enforcement of pollution standards? (Taxpayers, polluters, stockholders, retailers etc.)
The second “more government” strategy is the policy now being pursued by the Obama administration, called “cap-and-trade.” The general idea is to “cap” pollution at a certain level, but then allow extractors and producers that generate pollution levels lower than the cap to “trade” or sell “pollution credits” to those extractors and producers that are unwilling or unable to meet those standards. This creates an artificial market, that in theory, provides an incentive to become a seller of pollution credits, and a disincentive to become a buyer of credits. Although, this resembles a free-market approach, it is really a contingent upon where government sets the pollution limits, how government manages the pollution credit market, and how much government spends doing all of this. Since the sellers of the credits are the primary beneficiaries of cap-and-trade, the question remains of how to pay for the army government watchdogs responsible for implementing this convoluted cap-and-trade system.
Critics of taxation, fines, and “cap and trade” argue that most serious problem with any strategy that involves setting, monitoring, and enforcing “caps” is that these standards are usually set by industry lobbyists rather than scientists, and therefore reflect political expediency and not science. Other critics argue that the cost of monitoring and enforcing the caps would require hiring an army of monitors and enforcers, which would require a massive tax increase, user fees of some kind, and/or increased borrowing from China! And, of course, all libertarians will point out that in recent years the United States government has proven to be less than reliable steward of the "public good" and an ineffective and inefficient monitor and enforcer of laws governing other undesirable forms of corporate behavior.
Libertarians therefore argue that the best “less government” strategy for the reduction of pollution would be to simply transform public property in private property, and thus eliminate "the commons." But private ownership of earth, air and water will not necessarily reduce pollution in the United States. If the short-term (or long-term) benefits of extraction outweigh the perceived costs of continuing to pollute, extractors and producers will continue to pollute. Moreover, if extractors and producers were required to pay the owners of the earth, air, and water, to clean up the mess, or purchase earth, air, or water from the owners, it would almost certainly reduce pollution levels, but where? If United States adopted this strategy, the most likely consequence would be that extractors and producers would simply move extraction and production to other countries that maintain “public property,” where government officials earn a handsome profit from graft and corruption. So when pollution is exported to nations that allow their governments to exercise stewardship over publically-owned earth, air, and water, “tragedy of the commons” predicts that pollution levels will rise in those countries. So although private ownership in the United States may reduce pollution levels in the United States, global pollution would continue to increase. In other words, global pollution will require global cooperation between nations and/or universal abandonment of "the commons,"which are both highly unlikely. Am I a libertarian or a cynic? What do you think?
The basic problem for the social and political management of pollution is how to provide incentives and disincentives that lead extractors and producers to conduct the research necessary to limit and or reduce pollution, and act based on this research. The “tragedy of the commons” predicts that political stewardship over the “commons,” is invariably inefficient and/or ineffective. Hence, when extractors and producers expel useless and/or harmful waste into “commons” there is little, if any incentive to conduct the research necessary to transform it, eliminate it, or act on that research. Here’s why. If it costs less to pollute than not pollute, extractors and producers will usually choose to pollute. They will invest in research to minimize pollution and/or convert it, if and only if, the cost of conducting that research, and the prospects of that research “paying off” is less than the cost of continuing to pollute with impunity. For example, it is difficult to extract minerals from the earth without polluting the adjacent air and water. If there is little cost associated with polluting the commons, mining companies will continue to pollute, and/or transfer the cost of cleaning up the mess to others (usually government). Therefore, pollution control policy is all about providing extractors and producers with incentives and disincentives that lead to acceptable levels of pollution.
There are two ways for societies to provide these incentives: one entails “more government” the other “less government.” Unfortunately, neither strategy is likely to succeed at a global level. There are two “more government” strategies that are often employed to raise the cost of polluting the commons. One way is to simply tax or fine polluters. This strategy entails that government "cap" pollution levels, monitor and enforce compliance with these caps, and either tax or fine extractors or producers that exceed those limits. This raises serious practical problems. At what level will government set those pollution limits? (Set caps too high and there will be no extraction or production.) How much will it cost for government to effectively monitor and enforce compliance with pollution limits? (It could cost more to monitor and enforce pollution laws than it would cost to clean up the mess.) At what level will the government tax or fine violators? (Set taxes or fines too low and there is no incentive to not-pollute, set it too high and black market polluters will appear.) Who pays the cost of monitoring and enforcement of pollution standards? (Taxpayers, polluters, stockholders, retailers etc.)
The second “more government” strategy is the policy now being pursued by the Obama administration, called “cap-and-trade.” The general idea is to “cap” pollution at a certain level, but then allow extractors and producers that generate pollution levels lower than the cap to “trade” or sell “pollution credits” to those extractors and producers that are unwilling or unable to meet those standards. This creates an artificial market, that in theory, provides an incentive to become a seller of pollution credits, and a disincentive to become a buyer of credits. Although, this resembles a free-market approach, it is really a contingent upon where government sets the pollution limits, how government manages the pollution credit market, and how much government spends doing all of this. Since the sellers of the credits are the primary beneficiaries of cap-and-trade, the question remains of how to pay for the army government watchdogs responsible for implementing this convoluted cap-and-trade system.
Critics of taxation, fines, and “cap and trade” argue that most serious problem with any strategy that involves setting, monitoring, and enforcing “caps” is that these standards are usually set by industry lobbyists rather than scientists, and therefore reflect political expediency and not science. Other critics argue that the cost of monitoring and enforcing the caps would require hiring an army of monitors and enforcers, which would require a massive tax increase, user fees of some kind, and/or increased borrowing from China! And, of course, all libertarians will point out that in recent years the United States government has proven to be less than reliable steward of the "public good" and an ineffective and inefficient monitor and enforcer of laws governing other undesirable forms of corporate behavior.
Libertarians therefore argue that the best “less government” strategy for the reduction of pollution would be to simply transform public property in private property, and thus eliminate "the commons." But private ownership of earth, air and water will not necessarily reduce pollution in the United States. If the short-term (or long-term) benefits of extraction outweigh the perceived costs of continuing to pollute, extractors and producers will continue to pollute. Moreover, if extractors and producers were required to pay the owners of the earth, air, and water, to clean up the mess, or purchase earth, air, or water from the owners, it would almost certainly reduce pollution levels, but where? If United States adopted this strategy, the most likely consequence would be that extractors and producers would simply move extraction and production to other countries that maintain “public property,” where government officials earn a handsome profit from graft and corruption. So when pollution is exported to nations that allow their governments to exercise stewardship over publically-owned earth, air, and water, “tragedy of the commons” predicts that pollution levels will rise in those countries. So although private ownership in the United States may reduce pollution levels in the United States, global pollution would continue to increase. In other words, global pollution will require global cooperation between nations and/or universal abandonment of "the commons,"which are both highly unlikely. Am I a libertarian or a cynic? What do you think?
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