The fundamental theoretical consideration among libertarian
social and political theorists is whether libertarianism requires a “thin
theory” or a “thick theory.” This, obviously, includes the corollary questions
of: “How thin is thin?” and “How thick is thick?” In this paper, I shall extend
that same distinction to the Theory of Autonomy. Hence, the basic question
becomes: “At a bare-minimum, what kind of a Theory of Autonomy does Libertarian
political theory require?” I will argue that, although a rigorous and
relatively complete “thick theory of autonomy” is both desirable and possible
over the long run, libertarianism requires only a “thin theory” grounded in the
Non-Aggression Axiom. Any thicker theory, I shall argue, must be able to
generate both descriptions of human
nature consistent with evolutionary psychology; and justifiable normative prescriptions. However, any Theory of
Autonomy must also be consistent with libertarianism’s central tenet; the
so-called “Non-Aggression Axiom.” Indeed, the first order of business for any
evolutionarily-centered political theory must be to generate both facts and values about the use of human aggression. But regardless of those facts, libertarians must embrace autonomy
as a value and flush out exactly
which (if any) legal and/or moral duties are entailed by the Axiom.
INTRODUCTION
Before I get too far along, let’s agree on some basic concepts.
Human inquiry is about asking
questions and posing answers. Theories are answers to questions. Broadly
speaking, there are two kinds of theories. Descriptive
theories answer questions involving “matters of fact” (what is True), while
prescriptive theories (or normative theories) answer questions
about “matters of value” (what is Good). Any theory of individual autonomy will
involve BOTH descriptive and prescriptive inquiry. All political regimes employ
two ways of monitoring and enforcing prescriptive values: morality and legality. Both
involve the imposition of duties. While positive
duties prescribe that we ought to
“do something,” negative duties prescribe that we ought to “not do something.”
Since
the eighteenth-century, there has been widespread acknowledgment within the
Western liberal philosophical tradition that autonomous individuals (rational, competent adults) are (in fact)
capable of exercising “self-rule,” while non-autonomous
individuals (young children, mentally ill etc.) are (in fact) incapable of
self-rule and therefore are (in fact) heterologous, and therefore, ought
to be to “ruled by others.” In that tradition, the foundational question of
political philosophy is” “Which normative values are to be enforced by morality and which by legality (legal coercion), and whether
those duties are “positive” or “negative.”
The Classical
Liberal (libertarian) theory of individual autonomy is rooted in its own
distinctive theory of human nature, which includes the following elements: individualism (humans are individuals and ought to be treated legally and/or morally as such), self-ownership (human individuals “own”
their bodies and/or ought to be treated legally and/or morally as such); rationality (humans are rational and ought to
be treated legally and/or morally as such), self-interested
(humans employ rationality to advance their own interests and/or ought to be
treated legally and/or morally as such), freedom
of the will (humans are free to
choose to act or not act and/or ought
to be treated legally and/or morally as such), and responsibility (humans are
morally and/or legally responsible for their freely-chosen actions and ought to be treated legally and/or
morally as such). If any human lacks one or more of these elements, he or she
is deemed non-autonomous, incapable of exercising self-rule. In these cases,
those individuals are labeled as heterologous, and therefore subject to “rule
by others.” But who draws that autonomous/heterologous line and on what basis is it drawn and/or ought to be drawn?
Historically
there have been two lines of empirical research that scientists have offered in
opposition to any theory of individual autonomy: cultural evolution (nurture) and biological evolution (nature). Many social scientists argue that individual
autonomy (the capacity for self-rule) is undermined by the fact that humans are
“social animals” programmed (determined) by culture via teaching and learning.
Many biologists argue that autonomy is undermined by, what Rawls called the
“Natural Lottery;” that is, the fact that the natural attributes that
constitute natural “advantages” and “disadvantage” are distributed unfairly. Between
these two lines of causal determinism, scientists argue that at least some (if
not all) humans are non-autonomous, and therefore, subject to rule by others.
In
recent years, with advancements in evolutionary psychology and neuroscience, we
now know a lot more about how that “natural lottery” works. Communitarian critics
of individual autonomy conclude that (taken as a whole) the newfound “facts” undermine
both the “facts” and “values” associated with the Classical Liberal theory of
autonomy. But as Scott James persuasively demonstrated; the reduction of ethics
to biology “can mean different things to different people.” (James 2). In
short, the relationship between “facts” and “values,” raises daunting
philosophical complexities, so daunting that I’ll let Scott sort out those
issues. Nevertheless, I’ll simply point out that any theory of autonomy raises mind-boggling
fact-value complexities and that knowledge of “facts” does not necessarily tell
us everything we need to know about “values.”
Today, it
is a fact that throughout the Western world individual autonomy assessed in
terms of greater and lesser degrees. Psychiatrists (and psychiatrists) are legally
empowered to assess variable degrees of autonomy: individualism, rationality, self-interestedness,
freedom, and responsibility. Their authority is often justified based on the
findings of social science and/or biological science. But to what degree is the
legal empowerment of experts, morally (and/or legally) consistent with libertarianism’s
central value, the Non-Aggression Axiom?
THE LANDSCRAPE OF
“SELF-RULE”
As
Andrew Sneddon has clearly shown, any theory of autonomy builds upon a well-trodden
body of Western liberal thought. However, many theories fail to distinguish
between various contexts of “autonomy,” including: autonomy
of choice, autonomy of persons
and/or autonomy of actions. There is
also a menagerie of other notoriously ambiguous, overlapping terms that haunt these
theories, such as: non-autonomous, (not
autonomous) heteronomous (ruled by
others presumably for the good of those who are non-autonomous), coercion (the use of aggression to force
individuals to do or not do certain things), and perhaps incompetence (the inability of an
individual to rationally decide what to do
or not do.) And, of course all of
these distinctions are subject to both legal
and moral monitoring and enforcement.
Again, the
basic question of all post-eighteenth century social and political philosophy
revolves around the concept of “sovereignty;” or “who rules?” And, under what
conditions might “rule by self,” “rule by others,” and/or “rule of law” be
justified? Prototypically, young
children and mentally ill adults are classified as non-autonomous, and
therefore, are labeled heteronomous (subject to paternalistic intervention by
others). In the case of “rule of law,” utility-based libertarians argue that we
must weigh the costs and benefits of paternalistic intervention exercised by
various classes of benefactors. Whose interests ought to be advanced by any given legal intervention and whose
interests are (in fact) advanced by that
intervention? In the case of “rule by others,” rights-based libertarians question
which specific class of “others” (if any) ought
to rule on behalf of non-autonomous persons: family, friends, medical experts, corporations,
or government (executive, legislative, or judicial branch).
Here it
is important to note that individual autonomy is only part of the
post-eighteenth century philosophical landscape. Political philosophers have
also raised questions concerning group
autonomy; that is, autonomous and/or non-autonomous interrelationships
between macro-groups (large groups) and micro-groups (small groups). Thus,
political philosophers argue endlessly over which groups are (in fact)
autonomous, and which groups ought to be autonomous; and which groups are (in
fact) heterologous, and which groups ought to be heterologous. While this issue
will not be addressed in this paper, it does reveal the complexities associated
with “self-rule.”
Within
libertarian theory, the relationship between individual autonomy, non-aggression,
and heteronomy is, obviously, complex. All libertarians (by definition) reject
the use of aggression (physical force) in pursuit of individual and collective
goals. Rights-based libertarians postulate non-aggression as a self-evident, unproven
axiom, while utility-based libertarians justify non-aggression based on the negative
utility ratios that result from the unbridled use of aggression. Some utility-based
libertarians argue that there are some exceptions to the Axiom, and that we occasionally
have a positive duty to employ coercive force in order to provide unwanted
benefits or remove harms from non-autonomous individuals (known as individual
paternalism). However, most utility-based libertarians reject state paternalism (legal intervention by
any branch of government); and are at least suspicious of individual paternalism (legal intervention by other parties such as
family, friends, etc.). This essay will argue that we libertarians need to flush
out what we mean by non-autonomy and heteronomy, and identify the duties (positive
or negative, moral or legal) that are entailed by Non-Aggression Axiom.
AUTONOMY AND
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY
So how might
recent research in evolutionary psychology and neuroscience elucidate and/or
resolve some (or all) of the classic questions of sovereignty: most notably “who
rules, and why?” And, “Who ought to rule, and why?” There is an overlapping
consensus among evolutionary psychologists and neuroscientists that, if there
are (in fact) any autonomous individuals (decisions, and/or acts) they must be
consistent with what we know about the structure of the human brain. Evolutionary
psychologists now agree that the human brain is comprised of “modules,” which have
evolved over the last 3.5 million years to solve specific problems associated
with reproducing and surviving in groups. Neuroscientists agree that individual
brains are not only computer-like organs of “reason,” but complex adaptive
systems, or “neuronal networks” that address these problems. The primary goal
of neuroscience research, therefore, is to identify those specific modules, “locate”
the brain structures that underlie these modules, and ultimately generate
explanations, predictions, and perhaps facilitate internal and/or external control
over brains. Most scientists agree with Bickle that the ultimate explanation,
and most likely the ultimate target for generating useful predictions and
facilitating useful control of these networks lies at the microcosmic level. In
short: brain science ultimately aims at the reduction from living entities (neurons and genes) to non-living entities (molecules atoms).
Scientists
have long observed that individual modular brains also have the natural propensity
to collectively “network” with other modular brains, but argue over how networked
brains contribute to human reproductive success (transmission of genes between
generations), and/or the survival of individual humans, groups of humans, and/or
the human species etc. So how might this emerging body of scientific knowledge about
“networked,” brains enlighten “autonomy theory?”
Today, a
growing number communitarian scholars, like Michael Sandel, Peter Corning, and Franz
de Waal have long argued that (what I call) this emerging “network ontology” provides
empirical disproof of one or more of the traditional components of classical liberalism
(individualism, rationality, self-ownership, self-interestedness, freedom, and/or
responsibility). They argue that human beings are (by nature) sympathetic, cooperative,
heteronomous, social animals, and therefore, “are” and/or “ought to be” be
ruled by external others or forces. But is there really a compelling argument in
support of the claim that networked modular brains ought to be subject to “rule by others” (or “rule of law”) based on
the evolutionary biology and/or neuroscience?
My
argument is that although this emerging “neuronal network ontology” appears to undermine
the various components of the classical liberal theory of human nature, that
ontology does not, (and cannot), undermine the Non-Aggression Axiom. Therefore,
libertarians may choose to develop a “thick theory of autonomy” that might
someday “prove” that individual brains are (in fact) autonomous. But that line
of research assumes that non-autonomy is purely at matter of fact. My argument is
that, regardless of the future pronouncements of evolutionary biology, we must continue
to embrace the Non-Aggression Axiom as a normative value. However, we must also
more rigorously flush-out exactly which duties (positive or negative) that are
imposed by the Axiom.
THROUGH THICK AND
THIN
For
better or worse, many recent Western Liberal social and political theorists embrace
John Rawls’ original distinction between a “thin theory of the good” and a “thick
theory.” (Rawls) In that original context, Rawls argued that Western liberalism
(welfare liberalism and libertarianism) must defend “individual rights” (or
justice) over “communal conceptions of the good.” (Forst p. 30). Thus, liberalism
(both left and right) implies both a “thin theory of the good;” “and “ethical
neutrality of the law.” The relative “thickness” or “thinness,” refers to the
degree to which any liberal theory (liberal left or libertarian right) can
justify laws that advance specific social commitments and/or values beyond what’s
required by the non-aggression axiom. Rawls went on to develop a theory of
“primary goods,” which he argued justified a short list of “positive rights” that
all civilized societies would voluntarily provide the “least advantaged;” most
notably “equal liberty” and “the difference principle.” Thus, under Rawlsian
theory “beneficence” (the provision of benefits and removal of harms) is
regarded as a positive duty.
The Non-Aggression
axiom states that “No one has the right to initiate aggression against the
person or the property of anyone else.” (Boaz p.74) Again, thoughtful libertarians
observe that the Axiom applies to, not only relationships between individuals but
also: relationships between individuals and groups, relationships within and between
micro-groups, and relationships between macro-groups and micro-groups. For
libertarians the Axiom implies at least a negative
duty that forbids us (individually or collectively) to use (or threaten to
use) physical aggression against anyone who has not initiated it. This negative duty serves as the basis for
the corresponding negative right of
individuals and groups not to be subjected to aggression or threats of
aggression.
The
Non-Aggression Axiom is also subject to “thinner” and “thicker” analysis. In
fact, libertarians disagree over which “acts” are specifically forbidden by the
Axiom and therefore might justify aggressive legal or moral intervention. Some
actions violate negative duties, and are obviously morally (and legally) wrong:
murder, rape, assault, robbery, kidnapping, and fraud. (Boaz 75). In these
cases, it is easier to justify the use of defensive aggression. Other “acts,” that
might also justify aggressive intervention are open to debate, such as: defense
of the non-autonomous (legal paternalism), defense of friends or allies, or the
defense of weak persons (poor, sick). Another core dispute (which I won’t
discuss) is whether taxation violates the Axiom.
Defenders
of a “thin theory” argue that libertarianism is a moral and/or political theory
based on non-aggression, and nothing more. Thus, (what I call) Thin-Theory Libertarianism
tends to resist the expansion of legality (government) to include specific,
socially embedded concepts of the good. Thus, thin theory libertarians oppose
Rawls’ attempt to justify any “positive rights.” In contrast, proponents of a
“thick(er)-theory” might argue that it is also possible (and/or necessary) for libertarianism
to employ aggression in support of other legal and/or moral values; especially beneficence (the duty to provide
benefits and remove harms on behalf of others). Left-leaning, minarchist, libertarians (like
F.A. Hayek), therefore, support laws that provide for a (very basic) social
safety net, a minimum wage, or even engagement in a “just war.”
We can
also employ the thick-thin distinction in the context of a Theory of Autonomy. A “Thin Theory of Autonomy” will defend any
individual’s “negative right” to pursue his/her concept of the good, as long as
that pursuit does not violate the Non-Aggression Axiom. In contrast, a “thicker
theory” of autonomy might seek to identify the necessary and sufficient
conditions for autonomous human persons (or groups), decisions, and/or actions.
Thus, a “thicker” theory of individual autonomy might distinguish between
autonomous, non-autonomous, and heteronomous individuals and groups. However, thicker
theories might (but not necessarily) also legally empower experts (mostly
psychologists, psychiatrists) to objectively distinguish between varying
degrees of autonomy and thereby dole out variable degrees of moral and/or legal
responsibility. The problem here is that the legal empowerment of experts to
discern varying degrees of autonomy can violate of the Non-Aggression Axiom.
Again, what
I want to emphasize here is that libertarianism does not theoretically require
a “thick theory of libertarianism, a “thick theory of non-aggression,” or a “thick
theory of autonomy.” We do not need to “know” the necessary and sufficient
conditions for autonomous personhood or autonomous decisions, or autonomous
actions. Why? Because “non-aggression” is a prescriptive concept (a value), and
therefore, cannot be “falsified” by the descriptive “facts” of evolutionary
psychology or neuroscience. Moreover, as Hayek (Hayek) and Feyerabend (Feyerabend)
have argued, we libertarians must be much more of legally empowering experts, to
violate the Non-Aggression Axiom, even if violating it “benefits” certain
individuals and/or groups (ourselves, our friends, our allies, or the weak).
At a
bare minimum, the Non-Aggression Axiom holds that humans are a priori morally obligated to treat humans
“as if” they are autonomous, morally responsible agents; even if Science discovers
that some (or even all) persons lack some (or all) of the neuronal capacities associated
with effective, self-rule. So, even if Science “proves” that all humans are in
fact non-autonomous, that would not necessarily imply that all persons and/or
decisions are heterologous, and therefore “ought” to be ruled by “others” or
ruled by “laws.” That’s because we’d still have the prescriptive moral questions
remaining: “who ought to rule and why?” In short, if there are (in fact) non-autonomous
persons or groups (decisions and/or actors), those persons or groups (decisions
and/or actions) would not necessarily be heterologous. Treating some
individuals (and/or groups) as heteronomous and subjecting them to beneficent coercive
intervention by others violates the Non-Aggression Axiom.
On the
other hand, let’s also admit that the Non-Aggression Axiom is inconveniently
vague and that libertarians really need to spell out what it morally and
legally entails. A “thin theory” might justify a moral right to employ
aggression ONLY in defense of ourselves (individually or collectively). That
would suggest a non-interventionist morality. A thicker theory might justify
interventionism on behalf of (at least some) others (most notably: in defense
of the non-autonomous (children and the mentally ill) and/or defense of friends
and/or the weak) that are suffering from aggressive acts inflicted by
third-parties. The more we libertarians thicken the Non-Aggression Axiom, and
the Theory of Autonomy, the closer we move toward an interventionist, welfare-liberal
social and political philosophy.
CONCLUSION
In
conclusion, I have argued that the Non-Aggression Axiom serves as the necessary
condition for a Thin Theory of Libertarianism. The development of a “Thicker
Theory,” that questions the human capacity to “know” and “do” what is in our
individual and collective interests (based on the findings of biological
evolution, genetics, and/or neuroscience) is perfectly acceptable if not
desirable. However, it is imperative that we acknowledge that the Non-Aggression
Axiom is a normative (moral and legal) concept and therefore, it is not (by
definition) subject to empirical verification or falsification. Therefore, libertarians
like John Bickle can continue to scientifically study the neurological basis of
individual (and collective) autonomy. But those findings can neither confirm
nor disconfirm the Non-Aggression Axiom, nor can they confirm or disconfirm any
one social and political theory. Although scientists can certainly offer us useful
information, products, and/or services the Axiom prevents those experts from
forcing us to act on that information, and/or buying the products and/or
services that they offer, for “our own good.” The prescription “x is for our own good”
implies that ultimately experts know more about what is good for us than we do.
Moreover, these prescriptions, invariably, force us to conform to what others
believe is good for us. Even if scientists could (in fact) differentiate
between autonomous and non-autonomous brains, it would not necessarily imply
that non-autonomous persons are heterologous or than any one person or group is
more qualified to decide we want. In sum, if some (or all) human brains are (in
fact) wired to be “ruled by others,” questions of value would remain unanswered,
most notably: “Who” ought to rule those
brains from the outside and “why.” These are ultimately moral and philosophical
issues, therefore, evolutionary psychology and neuroscience will not (and
cannot) shed much light on them.
REFERENCES
Bickle, John, Philosophy and Neuroscience: a Ruthlessly Reductive
Account (Kluwer Publishing Company: 2003)
Boas, David, Libertarianism: A Primer (Free Press:
1997)
Christman, John ed. The Inner Citadel: Essays on Individual
Autonomy (Oxford University Press: 1989)
Fairfield, Paul. Moral Selfhood in the Liberal Tradition
(University of Toronto Press: 2000)
Forst, Rainer. Contexts
of Justice: Political Philosophy Beyond
Liberalism and Communitarianism (University of California Press: 2002)
James, Scott M. An Introduction to Evolutionary Ethics (Wiley-Blackwell: 2011)
Mulhall, Stephen and Adam
Swift. Liberals and Communitarians.
second edition. (Blackwell Publishers: 1996)
Oshana, Marina. Personal
Autonomy in Society (Ashgate: 2006)
Rawls, John. Political Liberalism (Columbia
University Press: 1993).
Sneddon, Andrew. Autonomy (Bloomsbury: 2013)
Waller, Bruce N. The
Natural Selection of Autonomy (Suny Press: 1998)