Ronald
F. White, Ph.D.
Mount
St. Joseph University
Department
of Philosophy
Mount St. Joseph University
Let’s begin by addressing the
most obvious question. Given the vast number of books published on political
science every year, why would the Association for Politics and the Life Science
(APLS) and it’s journal Politics and the
Life Sciences (PLS) expend time, energy, and resources publishing a
multiple-author analysis of a book that contains little (if anything) about the
life sciences, Darwin, or evolution? The answer is that The Ethics of Influence provides an excellent opportunity for APLS
to further expand its commitment to interdisciplinarity; especially, behavioral
economics.
Cass R. Sunstein, a prolific
author, has written several books and scholarly articles defending “libertarian
paternalism.” (Sunstein 2008, 2014, 2016, 2017) Libertarian critics have long-argued
that the conjunction of “libertarian” and “paternalism,” is oxymoronic; and
that the “liberty principle” or the “principle of autonomy” excludes
paternalistic intervention on behalf of rational, competent adults. Over the
years, with varying degrees of success, Sunstein has addressed many, if not
most lines of criticism emanating from both the political left and right. And,
like many scholars, his views have evolved, over time, based on that criticism.
This roundtable review will focus on the arguments presented in most recent
book and how those arguments may (or may not) apply to recent public policy issues.
By way of introduction, I will introduce some of the more enduring elements of
the conceptual framework that underlies Nudge Science; most notably, the
concepts of: choice architecture; political bans, mandates, and influence,
political ethics, and paternalistic intervention.
Choice Architecture
In recent years, the philosophical debate over
“free-will v. determinism” in the context of human decision-making has been
usurped by the social and biological sciences. Sunstein, a pioneer in the field
of behavioral economics, has consistently argued that human decision-making is
“framed” by “choice architecture;” a set of causal variables that influence (if
not determine) our ultimate decisions. We are not always aware of this framework and
therefore we often confuse “freedom to choose” with “freedom to choose within
architectural constraints.”
Given the vast number of architectural
variables that shape our ultimate decisions, one might still question how much
room is left for freedom of choice? But, for now, let’s leave these
metaphysical arguments for those lingering pre-scientific philosophers.
Today, philosophical
analysis initially focuses on clarifying the meanings of key concepts. In
ordinary language we use the term “influence” in many different contexts. In
physics, scientists use it to indicate natural causal relationships between
non-living things; that is, the sun “influences” the orbit of the earth. Biologists
employ the same term to describe a wide variety of relationships between living
things and their environment. And finally, in the human sciences we use the
term influence to designate a wide array of relationships between humans; but
not without risking confusion between causality with influence.
At least some of the choice
architecture that underlies our decision-making is contextual, and therefore
shaped by our own individual or collective life history and/or unique genetic
makeup. Interpersonal influence can be exercised between individuals (family,
friends, and/or strangers) or between collective organizations (businesses
and/or governments). However, “Nudge Science,” seeks to identify the (more or
less) universal psychological forces that constitute human choice architecture.
Sunstein and others argue that, scientific knowledge of these universal
mechanisms will improve our own individual decision-making by exposing our own natural
biases. But it will also advance our individual and collective ability to
influence the behavior of others (hopefully for the better); and perhaps even
increase our own ability to resist unwanted interpersonal influence.
One way to explore the
relationship between choice architecture and our ultimate choices is to analyze
a few relatively simple, clear-cut case studies. For example, we all agree that
our decision whether or not to go on a picnic on any given day is influenced (or
nudged) by the external physical environment, especially the weather. In short:
“nature nudges.” (Sunstein, 2016: 35) However, there may be conflicting opinions
of what constitutes good and bad picnic weather. My personal rule of thumb
would be: “the hotter the better.” In the case of conflicting weather
predictions, our would-be picnickers might “trust” one local forecaster more than
another. If it turns out to be unexpectedly cold and/or raining on the day of
the picnic, the availability of a picnic shelter may be turn out to be highly
influential, if not decisive.
Although nature and the external
physical environment, obviously, influence many of our decisions, it does not,
necessarily, determine those decisions. That’s because our decisions may also be
influenced by external social and/or political variables. Our decision to
picnic at any given park might also be externally influenced by legal bans and legal mandates. Many public parks legally ban the consumption of
alcohol, or legally mandate dogs to be on leashes. Hence, consumers of alcohol
and/or dog owners might choose one park over another based on legality. But all
legal bans and mandates require monitoring and enforcement, which require a
costly, ever-vigilant police force, and judiciary. Depending on whether a local
government is willing and/or able to monitor and enforce these legal bans and
mandates, those laws might be undermined by a “black market effect,” whereby would-be
picnickers might deliberately choose to violate those bans and mandates. In
fact, many utilitarians follow Sunstein and argue that it’s often more cost
effective for political leaders to exercise influence over citizens, rather to monitor
and enforce legal bans and mandates.
While our choices are obviously
“framed” by external physical and sociopolitical architecture, those choices
are also influenced by internal, psychological forces. Psychologists now agree
that human decisions are ultimately shaped by cognitive operations that have
evolved over millions of years, which are located in specific regions of the
human brain. System 1 cognitive
operations are “fast, automatic, and intuitive;” which include perceptual
and emotive operations. They tend to be associated with the parts of the brain
responsible for perception (back) and part responsible for emotive responses
(inner). System 2 cognitive operations
are “slow, calculative, and deliberative.” (Sunstein, 2016: 28) “Rational” operations
emanate from the frontal lobes or cerebral cortex. As scientific knowledge of System
1 and System 2 operations advance, so will our individual and collective ability
to influence and/or manipulate the behavior of others. However, that same
knowledge might also advance our ability to resist unwanted political influences.
The long-term challenge for Nudge Science is to distinguish between universal
choice architecture that underlies all human decision-making, from architectural determinants that are
contextual, and/or relative to specific individuals and cultures.
Historically, the most obvious
applications for Nudge Science have been in the domain of business marketing;
as the most successful business leaders have long employed knowledge of various
cognitive operators in order to more effectively market their products and
services to consumers. Sunstein and others seek to expand the exercise of
influence into politics.
Political Bans, Mandates, and Influence
Worldwide, political regimes
tend toward either authoritarianism or democracy. For better or worse, all
regimes exercise both coercive force and influence over citizens. Authoritarian
regimes rely almost entirely on coercive force, by monitoring and enforcing
legal bans and mandates; which often dictate, not only what is good, but also
how to pursue it. So what are the moral limits to the exercise of political influence
within liberal democracies?
Although Democratic Republics respect individual autonomy, they
also employ combinations of political coercion (bans, mandates) and political
influence (System 1 and System 2 Nudges). However, unlike Authoritarian
regimes, Republican regimes must morally justify bans, mandates, and nudges. For
example, most Western democracies employ System 2 nudges that mandate that private
corporations conduct scientific research on the costs and benefits of the
products and services they offer; and clearly and accurately “label” those
products so consumers can make informed decisions whether to purchase those
products or services. In the U.S. recent labeling proposals include mandating labels
that identify Genetically Modified Foods (GMOs) and labels that disclose the
caloric and sodium content of foods. As a general rule, most of us do not
object to labeling nudges. There are also Public Education nudges, whereby
governments mandate that corporations provide information concerning the risks
associated with dangerous or unhealthy activities such as smoking, drinking, distracted
driving, and childhood obesity. Again, most of us do not object to Public
Education Nudges based on System 2.
However, sometimes
governments supplement System 2 nudges with System 1 nudges, by requiring graphic
labels that instill fear of dangerous products. Fear is a powerful motivator.
Other System 1 nudges are based on universal perceptual defaults, including our
natural preferences for products presented at eye-level, and our inclination to
choose the first alternative. Therefore, many democracies mandate that cafeterias
present unhealthy, high caloric deserts at the end of the line, below eyelevel,
in less conspicuous places. Although most of us oppose health-related bans and
mandates, we often appreciate, or at least tolerate, health-related nudges.
Most of us are also naturally wired by choice architecture (individually
and collectively), to maintain the status quo, as evidenced by the formation of
personal habits and cultural traditions. Both habits and traditions are
notoriously difficult to change. That’s why we also have a propensity to avoid
making life-changing decisions. Many liberal democracies, therefore, mandate
that we make choices, such as deciding whether to be an organ donor before
getting a license. Other democracies employ Automatic Enrollment via default
decisions, which offer passive “opt-out” benefits rather than active “opt-in”
benefits, such as enrollment in Pension Plans or the use of Green Energy
options. We are also naturally programmed more to avoid harm, than to pursue
benefits. This explains why governments, worldwide, invoke fear rather than
merely promise a better life.Finally, we are also naturally predisposed to act in pursuit of short-term benefits, and avoidance short-term harms; less inclined to pursue long-term benefits or avoid-long term harms. In part, that’s why System 2 scientific arguments that warn of long-term harms associated with obesity, poverty in old age, breast cancer, and global warming, tend to fall on deaf ears. All of this suggests that System 2 nudges must occasionally be supplemented by System 1 nudges, and even bans and mandates.
Political Ethics
Much human behavior is
teleological (or goal-directed) and therefore, requires the analysis of both
means and ends. Empirical psychologists describe what human beings, in fact,
pursue (ends) and how they pursue those ends (means). Ethicists, however, prescribe
not only the ends that we all ought to pursue, but also how we ought to pursue
those ends. As a libertarian, Sunstein embraces the idea that liberty consists
in the freedom to choose which ends are worth pursuing, as long as that pursuit
does not harm others. Therefore, the Ethics
of Influence limits the application of Nudge Science to helping us achieve
the universal ends that all humans value. Sunstein argues that unlike “ends
nudges” (which dictate what we ought to pursue) “means nudges” are (by definition)
“freedom preserving.” (Sunstein,
2016:
Ethics, like psychology, political
science, and economics, is a scholarly discipline. For centuries, theologians
and philosophers dominated that discipline. The Western Legal and Moral
Tradition focuses on both “knowing” (what to do or not to do) and being willing
or able (to do or not do it). Thus the determination of moral responsibility
for one’s actions involves both rationality (the ability to know what’s right
and what’s wrong) and free will (the ability to do what’s right and not do
what’s wrong. The ability to “know” is widely regarded as a System 2 brain
function and the ability to “do” is usually considered to be a product of
System 1. For centuries moral
philosophers argued that ethical behavior is determined by either System 1 “feelings”
or System 2 “knowledge.” Historically ethicists argued over whether ethics is
anchored in System 1 emotions or feelings or System 2 rationality? Today we know it’s both.
Philosophers have also long-debated
the role that moral rules and/or principles play in moral decision-making.
Political philosophers have also questioned the degree to which liberal democracies
ought to rely on legality (laws) and morality (moral rules). Sunstein identifies four values, or “foundational commitments”
that constitute the ethics of political influence in a liberal democracy:
welfare, autonomy, dignity, and self-government. (Sunstein. 2016: 25) However,
the simultaneous advancement of all four values is often problematic. In a
liberal democracy (Republic), self-government often trumps welfare, autonomy,
and dignity. Therefore, unpopular bans, mandates, and nudges carry with them a
political cost.
Sunstein’s four commitments
are non-controversial and deeply embedded in the Western liberal tradition.
However, many philosophers would amend that list to include utility, justice,
or non-maleficence. Others might question whether his four commitments
logically independent. For this review
we’ll, assume that these four principles capture the essence of morality in a
modern liberal democracy. Given these four moral commitments, how might the
U.S. government go about justifying the deployment of specific bans, mandates,
and nudges?
Recall that political
scientists have long observed that authoritarian political regimes rely almost
exclusively on coercive force; in the form of “bans” (Don’t do X or you’ll be
punished by the state!) and “mandates” (Do Y or you’ll be punished by the state!)
Democratic regimes, in contrast, set
moral and/or legal limits on the use of coercive force. Left-leaning democratic
regimes tend to emphasize human welfare, often at the expense of autonomy, and
self-government. Sometimes welfare-liberals are even willing to employ coercive
bans and mandates in pursuit of welfare. Right-leaning political philosophers,
in the libertarian tradition, value autonomy and dignity over both welfare and
liberal democracy. For Sunstein, the battleground lies in the ethics of state
paternalism.
The Ethics of State Paternalism
In his classic work book, On Liberty, John Stuart Mill, laid the
conceptual foundation for anti-paternalism in liberal democracies. He argued
that the only justification for the use of political force (legal bans and
mandates) is to prevent or remove “harm to others.” However, “harm to self” by
rational competent adults is protected by the liberty principle. According to
Mill, paternalistic intervention by government officials must be limited by the
above “very simple principle.” The first step is to determine whether that potential
beneficiary is a rational, competent adult. If so, then that official may also
inquire whether that person, knows that this action will (in fact) result in
harm to self. If so, that official may present rational argument in order to
change his mind. But ultimately, physical coercion must be avoided. Thus,
according to Mill, paternalistic intervention on behalf of rational competent
adults must be limited to the determination of System 2 competence. If that
person is a rational competent adult, then paternalistic intervention must be
limited to providing information and issuing a warning. Sunstein seeks to soften
Mill’s anti-paternalistic stance based on state-of-the-art behavioral science.
There are three longstanding
philosophical problems are associated with anti-paternalism: an epistemic
problem, a moral agency problem, and the impure paternalism problem. The first
two problems are deeply embedded in the Western liberal tradition, which says
that rational, competent adults must be treated as “moral agents,” who can be
held legally and morally responsible for their actions toward themselves or
others. The third problem is the direct result of the corporatization of
welfare.
The epistemic problem arises
from the fact that “human agents” (rational, competent adults) may not “know”
(for lack of information) what’s good to do in order to promote their own well-being
(do exercise), or what not to do (don’t smoke). Libertarians, in the John
Stuart Mill tradition, argue that once a rationally competent adult is informed
(warned) of the self-regarding risks associated with any activity, government
cannot forcefully interfere with that informed choice. But how much information
does a rational, competent, adult need in order to make a truly informed
self-regarding decision? What should that paternalistic governmental official
do, if there is conflicting public information concerning the degree and/or
probability of a specific activity? How much information does a rational, agent
need, before he/she engages in a self-harming activity, such as smoking? If a
genetic test were available that might “inform” that would-be smoker of his/her
own cancer risk, and that would-be smoker refuses to take the test, is that
person really informed? Should government sometimes mandate those tests?
Moral agency is usually ascribed to rationally competent
adult humans. Thus, human agency hinges on the standards of knowing and doing. Even
if a rational person knows” what’s good for him/her (do exercise, don’t smoke),
that person may not be willing or able to do or not do it. Informed moral
agents might freely choose to smoke because “by their own lights” the immediate
pleasure of smoking outweighs the long-term health risks. In short, a person
may know what to do or not do, but will not or cannot do it or not do it. Some
humans obviously lack moral agency, including young children and/or adults;
who, by their very nature, lack rationality or free will. Today, given a
widespread explosion of conflicting scientific information that is readily
available; rational competent adults may be regarded as de facto incompetent. Many
substances and activities are now regarded as addictive, including: tobacco, alcohol,
heroin and even gambling. Addiction is widely regarded a mental and/or physical
disease, that justifies paternalistic medical intervention. Thus the
battleground lies in the question of whether person P knows what to do, and if so,
can person P do it? As psychologists continue to plumb the depths of choice
architecture, the more difficult it will become to defend absolute standards of
moral agency. The third problem is impure paternalism, whereby paternalistic
intervention by the state (in the form of bans, mandates, and nudges) benefits
not only the intended beneficiary, but other third parties, who benefit by providing
that benefit or removing that harm. Sometimes these third-parties are
governmental officials, or their friends or relatives; and sometimes they are
for-profit private businesses, non-profit charitable organizations. Americans often
object to impure paternalistic interventions that provide minimal benefit to
the intended beneficiary, while providing enormous benefits to third parties. In
recent years, the Affordable Care Act included both an employer and employee
mandate to purchase costly health insurance. That mandate has proven to be
increasingly unpopular among small businesses and young healthy workers.
Summary and Conclusion
In sum, many (if not most) humans
lack the intellectual capacity to acquire and/or process the vast amount of information
that is now available. And many lack the will to act upon that information. Many
instances of state paternalism benefit third-parties. This sets us up for the
basic issue that underlies the Ethics of
Influence: Is Mill’s anti-paternalistic stance still justified? Is
paternalistic intervention exercised by the leaders of left-leaning liberal
democracies ever morally justified? If paternalistic intervention is sometimes
justified, under what circumstances might liberal democracies violate autonomy
and/or, dignity in pursuit of welfare? The answer lies in self-government. Liberal
democracies must refrain from the deployment of political bans, mandates, and
influence that are enormously unpopular. In Appendix A (204-208) Sunstein lists
34 nudges and their corresponding approval ratings, which range from 86%
approval for Mandatory Labels for GMOs to 21% approval rating for “Default
assumption of Christianity for census data.” Liberal Democracies must also be
wary of paternalistic interventions that line the pockets of third parties;
most notably corporations that generously contribute to political campaigns.
In the final analysis, The Ethics of Influence is NOT about freedom
and determinism. The fact is that our all of our decisions are influenced by choice
architecture. Sunstein’s goal is to determine whether liberal democracies ought
to employ freedom-diminishing bans and mandates or freedom-preserving nudges.
Those decisions, he argues, ought to be made in conjunction with moral values: welfare, autonomy, dignity, and self-government. When
the deployment of influence is morally/legally justified, then leaders must,
then, decide which kinds of “nudges” (System 1 or System 2) are morally
justified and/or efficient? As nudge science advances, the exercise of political
influence by liberal democraciesmay become increasingly more efficient. The Ethics of Influence is all about when to
mandate, ban, or influence. If nudges are morally required or morally
permitted, what kinds of nudges are best employed in various contexts, and for
how long?
So how might recent advances
in Nudge Science be applied in addressing some of todays’ most vexing public
policy issues in the United States, including: obesity and dietary nudges, post-employment
poverty and retirement savings nudges, breast cancer and mammogram screening
nudges, and environmental degradation and environmental nudges?
References
Sunstein,
Cass R.; Thaler, Richard (2008). Nudge:
Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness. New Haven,
Connecticut: Yale University Press.
Sunstein,
Cass R. (2013). Simpler: The Future of
Government. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Sunstein, Cass R. (2014). Why
Nudge?: The Politics of Libertarian Paternalism (The Storrs Lectures
Series). Yale University Press.
Sunstein,
Cass R. (2016) The Ethics of Influence:
Government in the Age of Behavioral Science. New York, Cambridge University
Press,
Sunstein,
Cass R. (2017) Human Agency and
Behavioral Economics: Nudging Fast and Slow (Palgrave Advances in
Behavioral Economics) Switzerland: Palgrave McMillan.
David
V. Johnson (2017) “Twilight of the Nudges: The Quest to Keep Behavioral
Economic in Policy After Obama’s Presidency.” New Republic https://newrepublic.com/article/138175/twilight-nudges
Sunstein, Cass R. and Richard Thaler
“Libertarian Paternalism” The American
Economic Review. Vol 7 Number 2 ( May 2003) pp. 175-179
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